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Abstract 
 
The collapse of Nazi Germany was accompanied by a humanitarian 
disaster of staggering proportions. The newly-founded United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and its successor the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO) identified repairing the damage that the war had 
inflicted on Allied displaced populations as one of its foremost humanitarian 
obligations. These UN agencies cast themselves as pre-eminent agents of 
‘rehabilitation’, facilitating a fast transition from war to peace through scientific 
methods of refugee management conducted along Rooseveltian lines. 
Departing from earlier relief efforts, their ambition was to provide more than a 
mere ‘soup kitchen’ charity, their aim being to ‘rehabilitate’ Displaced Persons 
(DPs). Their methods were, however, vigorously contested in the field by 
military and occupation authorities, by members of established voluntary 
societies, and by UNRRA/IRO’s own continental recruits. 
This thesis explores these confrontations through the lens of French DP 
administration. Although these UN agencies proclaimed a new era of 
internationalism, solutions to DP problems were often defined in nationalist 
terms. DPs were organised by ethnicity and strong ties attached relief workers 
to their own national groups. For French planners and humanitarian workers, 
the DP question was much more than a humanitarian problem, and was bound 
up with issues of domestic reconstruction, culture and identity as much as the 
provision of medical aid and relief. This thesis demonstrates that distinctive 
diplomatic constraints, economic requirements and cultural differences 
influenced the thought and practices of refugee humanitarianism, shaping 
alternate ways of arranging interim provision and ‘rehabilitating’ DPs in the 
French zone of occupation.  
  Despite the fact that Allied responses to the DP problem mirrored 
divergent wartime experiences and differing national visions for the post-war 
future, this thesis argues that the history of UNRRA and the IRO in the French 
zone cannot be solely understood as a story of inter-Allied confrontation and 
clashes of political culture. Numerous transfers of expertise and the circulation 
of ideas and people between the zones belie such a view. New-Deal influenced 
methods penetrated the French zone and local UNRRA/IRO staff progressively 
embraced the organizations’ declared mission of ‘self-help’, albeit on terms that 
reflected their particular interpretation of DPs’ best interests. The real impact of 
UNRRA and the IRO lies in this grey area of subtle processes of imitation and 
re-interpretation. 
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Fig. 1. Germany and Austria under Allied occupation in 19451 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1"Cyril" Daydé," Zone" française" d’occupation" en" Allemagne" et" en" Autriche" (ZFO)," Archives" des" administrations" françaises" et" des"
organismes"tripartites,"1945E1955,"Notice"générale"d’orientation"et"d’aide"à"la"recherche"(May"2013),"pp."1E64,"p."50."
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Introduction 
 
Several human silhouettes emerge on the corner of each street. They 
begin to shout with joy. Then, men and women, as if responding to a 
signal, spring forth from all over the place. Poles, Russians, Czechs, and 
French as well, all welcome us in their own language, greeting us after the 
fashion of their homeland. We thought we were entering an enemy town, 
but it is Babel that receives us as liberators. This war is rich in paradoxes.2 
 
 Describing the constant stream of Displaced Persons (DPs) roaming the 
devastated cities of Germany and acclaiming the French liberating troops in 
April 1945, French war correspondent James de Coquet evoked the Tower of 
Babel. This biblical image is a recurring trope in diaries, memoirs and novels of 
the post-war years.3 The defeated Reich that the victors encountered in spring 
1945 was a bewildering patchwork of people belonging to countless 
nationalities and moving in every conceivable direction. Millions of those 
uprooted by war - former soldiers and prisoners of war, forced labourers, 
survivors of death and work camps, alongside Eastern European refugees - 
were on the move. ‘Through a singular paradox, racism has made of Germany 
the crossroads of all human races,’ observed Coquet. ‘The war has exploded all 
the millennial divisions and we are witnessing the most extraordinary human 
flux that history has ever experienced.’ 4  Poles, Balts, Frenchmen, Italians, 
Belgians, Dutch, Ukrainians, Russians, Yugoslavs, and others competed with 
German locals for sparse food and accommodation. Victims lived amidst their 
former oppressors; deportees cohabited with those who had voluntarily gone to 
Germany. Former elites shared houses with ‘ordinary’ peasants, while millions 
of children wandered around in search of lost family members.  
 For French observers, the sight of these columns of refugees evoked 
memories of the French Exodus in 1940.5 ‘One felt an intense joy retracing the 
routes of 1940, but [this time] in the opposite direction,’ noted Coquet. 6 
Relishing les voluptés de la revanche, Coquet nevertheless admitted that the 
desolation and destruction of Germany, and the human distress accompanying 
it, were more shockingly tragic than the equivalent scenes in France during 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2"James"de"Coquet"Nous%sommes%les%occupants"(Paris:"Librairie"Arthème"Fayard,"1945),"p."115."
3"François"Cochet" ‘Des" retours"“décalés”."Les"prisonniers"de"guerre"et" les" requis"du" travail’"Christiane"Franck" (ed)" "La%France%de%
1945.%Résistances,%retours,%renaissances%(Caen:"Presses"universitaires"de"Caen,"1996)"pp."141E152,"p."147";"Henri"Neveu"Historique%
des%TMAPC,%transports%automobiles%pour%les%populations%civiles"(Stuttgart:"June"1946),"p."152."
4"Coquet"Nous%sommes%les%occupants,""p."141."
5"On" representations" of" the" Exodus" in" wartime" France" see" Valerie" Holman" ‘Representing" refugees:"migration" in" France," 1940E
1944’,"Journal%of%Romance%Studies,"Vol."2,"No."2"(2002),"pp."53E69."
6"Coquet"Nous%sommes%les%occupants,"p."56."Also"see"Jacques"Notin"Les%vaincus%seront%les%vainqueurs"(Paris:"Perrin,"2004),"p."128."
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summer 1940.7 He was right: the number of uprooted people struggling to 
survive in 1945 Germany far outweighed those caught up in the French 
‘Exodus’ five years earlier.8 More importantly, the Allied invasion of Germany 
was accompanied by a monstrous explosion of violence and by the horrific 
discovery of the Nazi concentration camps. On entering Germany in the spring 
of 1945, French liberating soldiers, relief workers and repatriation officers had to 
adjust to a new and strange realm of experiences, which shattered all previous 
norms. 
 Sonia Vagliano was only twenty-three when she entered Buchenwald in 
April 1945. Having followed the invading army ever since the Normandy 
landings in June 1944, she had witnessed considerable human distress. But, in 
her memoirs, she described the harrowing experience of confronting 
Buchenwald. In seeking a way to express her feelings, she turned to metaphor, 
drawing a comparison between the sight of the camp and Hieronymus Bosch’s 
tormented artwork: 
 
I am not certain about how I feel, but I would never have thought that I 
could one day wish to find myself again in Verviers in the cold, under the 
bombs and everything… At least, there, it was normal, human… Here, it is 
a nightmare, all these people are grotesques, it is Bosch’s hell… Perhaps, 
I’ll be woken…and they will all have disappeared up in smoke through the 
chimney…9 
 
The sight of German desolation was not only reminiscent of the Tower of Babel, 
it also recalled the apocalypse - or, as Vagliano suggested, the dystopian world 
of a Bosch painting.  
 Allied planners responded to this humanitarian crisis with the creation in 
November 1943 of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA), an organization devised to bring aid and relief to peoples and 
countries devastated by the war.  But neither the Allied governments, nor their 
military officials, or UNRRA personnel were prepared for the scope and gravity 
of the problems they eventually encountered.10 The presence of nearly eight 
million DPs in Germany presented the liberators with a colossal logistical 
challenge. They included nearly six million civilian foreign workers, two million !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7"Coquet"Nous%sommes%les%occupants,%p."130."
8"Pieter"Lagrou"The%legacy%of%Nazi%occupation:%patriotic%memory%and%national%recovery%in%Western%Europe,%1945N1965"(Cambridge:"
Cambridge"University"Press,"2000),"p."81;"Sharif"Gemie"et"Fiona"Reid"'Chaos,"Panic"and"the"Historiography"of"the"Exode',"War%and%
Society,"Vol."26,"No."2,"(2007),"pp."73E98,"p."74."
9"Sonia"VaglianoEEloy"Les%demoiselles%De%Gaulle,%1943N1945"(Paris:"Plon,"1982),"p."227;"Also"see"MarieEAnne"Matard"Bonucci"and"
Edouard"Lynch"(eds)"La%Libération%des%camps%et%le%Retour%des%déportés%(Bruxelles:"Complexe,"1995)."
10"Ben"Shepard""‘Becoming"Planning"Minded’:"The"Theory"and"Practice"of"Relief"1940E1945’"Journal%of%Contemporary%History,%Vol."
43,"No."3"(2008),"pp."405E419;"The%Long%Road%Home.%The%Aftermath%of%the%Second%World%War%(London:"Bodley"Head,"2010),"pp."41E
59."
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prisoners of war and 700,000 surviving concentration camp prisoners.11 All DPs 
needed to be registered, dusted with DDT, fed, clothed, housed and, above all, 
repatriated to their countries of origin. Yet, means of transportation, food and 
clothing were insufficient. Basic services, such as running water, electricity and 
heating utilities had ceased to function. The only thing that still seemed to flow 
was alcohol. ‘Madness reigns amongst the soldiers’ observed French relief 
worker Eliane Brault, describing soldiers ‘swimming in wine.’12 The accumulated 
psychological brutalisation of slave labour, the long years of living in close 
proximity to extraordinary levels of personal violence, and the sudden and 
complete collapse of authority structures all came together to produce a brief 
moment of mad, self-destructive escapism and vengeance. Crimes, including 
theft, assault, rape and murder proliferated.13  
 While all three Western occupiers faced enormous obstacles to 
establishing law and order and reassembling DPs to facilitate their repatriation, 
the French faced especially difficult challenges. France itself was coming out 
from four years of German occupation. It was invited to join the occupation in 
February 1945, primarily upon British insistence. It had exerted no influence on 
the fundamental decisions concerning the international status of Germany and 
had lacked time to prepare the administrative organization of its zone.14 Created 
out of areas formerly allocated to the British and American zones, the French 
zone was considerably smaller than the other zones and made little political, 
geographical and economic sense.15 It bordered France and included the Saar, 
the Rhineland-Palatinate, the south-western parts of Baden and Württemberg, 
and the northwest section of Berlin. With the exception of Saarland and the 
Palatinate region, German administrative districts were separated from their 
respective historical capitals: Württemberg was assigned to French control but 
Stuttgart was not; the Baden area excluded Karlsruhe, and the Rhineland state 
was administratively separated from Köln. 
 Charged by the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces 
(SHAEF) with establishing camps, categorising DPs and arranging interim 
provision for them in what would become their occupation zone, French military !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11"[Figures" of" August" 1944]" Ulrich" Herbert"Hitler’s% Foreign%workers.% Enforced% Foreign% Labor% in% Germany% under% the% Third% Reich."
Translated"by"William"Templer"(Cambridge":"Cambridge"University"Press,"1997),"p."1."
12"Eliane"Brault"L’épopée%des%AFAT"(Paris:"Editions"Pierre"Horay,"1954),"p."209."
13"Jean"Bradley" Jours%Francs" (Paris:"R." Julliard,"1948);"Richard"Bessel" ‘Establishing"Order" in"PostEwar"Eastern"Germany’,"Past%and%
Present"Vol."210,"No."6"(2011),"pp."139E157."
14"Geneviève"Maelstaf"Que%faire%de%l’Allemagne?%Les%responsables%français,%le%statut%international%de%l’Allemagne%et%le%problème%de%
l’unité%allemande%(1945N1955)"(Paris:"Direction"des"Archives,"MAE,"1999),"XVII."Corine"Defrance"and"Ulrich"Pfeil"(eds)"Entre%guerre%
froide% et% integration% européenne.% Reconstruction% et% rapprochement,% 1945N1963% (Villeneuve" d’Ascq:" Presses" Universitaires" du"
Septentrion,"2012),"pp."55E56."
15"Martial" Libera" ‘Les" “lendemains" de" guerre”" en" zone" française" d’occupation" (1945E1949)." Un" temps" de" ruptures?’," François"
Pernot" and" Valérie" Toureille" (eds)" Lendemains% de% guerre.% Réflexions% sur% «%l’après%»% de% l’Antiquité% au%monde% contemporain.% Les%
hommes,%l’espace%et%le%récit"(Bruxelles:"Peter"Lang,"2010),"pp."341E350,"p."344."
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authorities also needed to provide assistance for around a million and a half 
Frenchmen, prisoners of war (POWs), labour conscripts and political and racial 
deportees, still held in Germany prior to organising their repatriation.16 In 1944, 
an UNRRA leaflet made the following prediction: ‘There are 1,800,000 
Frenchmen in Germany: according to one estimate, to move this number will 
take twenty-four trains a day, everyday, for nearly three months.’17 The exact 
number of these French DPs is difficult to assess, official figures tending to 
exaggerate figures and iron out differences between volunteers, political and 
racial deportees, transformed PoWs, workers from the relève or the Service du 
Travail Obligatoire (STO).18  Historians nevertheless concur that there were 
around 1 million PoWs, 650,000 labour conscripts, 76,000 Jewish deportees 
and 60,000 political deportees, convicted criminals and hostages held in 
Germany. 19  Their return put tremendous strain on the French Provisional 
Government. As Henri Cartier Bresson’s film Le retour strikingly illustrated, the 
fast and orderly repatriation of France’s Absents, as they were commonly 
called, was a critical domestic challenge for the new republican elite seeking to 
establish its power in a nation left profoundly divided by the war.20 
 Comparatively, the French zone accommodated fewer DPs than the other 
zones.21 French military estimates suggest that in the territories, which, in July 
1945, became part of the French occupation zone, there were approximately 
514,000 DPs before the German capitulation.22 French and Soviet nationals 
who formed the two largest DP groups were repatriated first. Despite logistical 
and transport difficulties, repatriation rates were surprisingly high. In July 1945, 
the number of DPs decreased to 300,000, reassembled in 73 camps. In 
October of the same year, the number dropped to approximately 80,000 DPs, of 
which roughly 35% were located in the northern part of the zone (Saar, 
Rhineland-Palatinate) with the remaining 65% in the Southern part (Baden, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16"According"to"Herbert,"there"was"1.3"million"Frenchmen"in"Germany"in"August"1944."Herbert"Hitler’s%Foreign%Workers,"p."1."
17"Helping% the% People% to% Help% Themselves.% The% Story% of% the% United% Nations% Relief% and% Rehabilitation% Administration% (London:"
Stationary"Office,"1944),"p.11."
18"For"high"estimates"see"Ministère"des"prisonniers,"déportés"et"réfugiés"Bilan%d’un%effort"(Paris:"Imprimerie"Busson,"1945);"Lagrou"
The%Legacy%of%the%Nazi%occupation,%pp."88E89."
19"Pieter"Lagrou"‘Beyond"memory"and"Commemoration:"Coming"to"Terms"with"war"and"Occupation"in"France"after"1945’,"Dominik"
Geppert" (ed)" The% postwar% challenge,% 1945N1958" (Oxford:" Oxford" University" Press," 2007)," pp." 65E80," p." 71;" Laurent" Joly"
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Württemberg).23 Of those DPs who remained in both regions, the largest single 
group was constituted by those claiming Polish citizenship, although a 
significant minority of DPs hailed from the Baltic States.  
 
Fig. 2. Proportion of DPs by nationality in the French zone24 
 DPs’ motives for refusing repatriation varied. Some were determined to 
avoid repatriation at all costs. Others found themselves in a ‘wait and see’ 
position. Some feared that they would be tried for collaboration with the Nazis 
or persecuted by newly-installed Communist regimes. Still others had formed 
family attachments in Germany or simply sought better economic opportunities 
abroad.  Finally, a few hundred returned to Poland only to decide to return to 
Germany once more.25  On 31 December 1946, with mass repatriation over, the 
number of remaining DPs was estimated at 49,804.26  This figure included 
28,736 Polish/Ukrainian DPs, 2,666 Lithuanians, 2,561 Latvians, 2,236 
stateless persons, 1,647 Yugoslavs, 1,592 Hungarians, 1,427 Austrians, 1,330 
Romanians, 914 Jews, 858 Estonians and various other nationalities.27 The 
presence of this hard core of ‘unrepatriable’ DPs provoked diplomatic tension 
between the French occupying forces and Eastern European countries, in 
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addition to constituting a source of social problems and welfare dilemmas within 
defeated Germany.  
Comparatively, the French zone had suffered less war damage, 
particularly when compared with the Soviet and British zones. France’s zone 
was predominantly rural with only a handful of large towns, which, by German 
standards, had suffered relatively little physical destruction. 28  The sanitary 
situation was also significantly better with the rates of major infectious diseases 
consistently either the lowest or the second lowest (rates were consistently 
highest in the Soviet zone).29 For all that, civilian life in the French zone was still 
impaired by chaos and disruption. In the autumn of 1946 American Quaker 
relief worker Carl Welty noted that local conditions remained grim. Describing 
the situation in Koblenz, he observed ‘[t]he streets are cleared of rubble, or at 
least the main ones are. People simply pile enough rocks in the windows and 
doors to make a wall, and then shovel the rest of the rubble inside the burned-
out building. Nothing seems to have been spared by the fires and bombs.’30 
Despite being the most rural, the French occupation zone was also far from 
self-sufficient. Resources were scarce, transportation facilities limited, and 
French occupation officials, as well as French public, unwilling to meet the 
additional costs of reconstruction.  
In addition to DPs, the zone accommodated between 300,000 and 
400,000 German refugees in October 1945. The majority of them lived in the 
Rhineland (140,000) and Württemberg (131,000), the rest in Baden (84,500), 
the Palatinate (45,000) and the Saar (2,500).31 In November 1945, at a meeting 
of the Directoire des Prisonniers de Guerre et Personnes Déplacées, the 
French delegation voiced concerns about the transfers of German refugees 
from other zones, observing that American and British authorities did not 
understand what it meant to ‘to have its country completely invaded by the 
enemy.’32 
 
I would like to remind the Delegates that France currently imports food to 
supply the French zone, that France was occupied for more than four 
years, that the Germans took everything, and that even today, six months 
after the Victory, France does not eat sufficiently, that the children of 
France continue to be undernourished…33 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Despite marked divergences of view between French occupation officials, one 
area of consensus appeared to endure: it was imperative to avoid refugees and 
DPs’ from settling permanently in Germany. In pursuit of this goal, the two 
principal alternatives for DPs were repatriation (to the DPs’ home country) or 
emigration (preferably to France). This was not only driven by anxieties over the 
economic burden that DPs represented. It was also shaped by fears about 
France’s depopulation and the conviction that German over-population still 
posed a threat to European security. 
 From the beginning, the DP question was much more than a humanitarian 
problem, encompassing issues of politics, culture and identity as much as the 
provision of medical aid and relief. After the Liberation, Allied policy-makers and 
humanitarian workers linked their work on behalf of DPs to the reconstruction of 
European democracy and the repudiation of fascist values.34 But the Allies 
disagreed about what democratization entailed and whether DPs should be 
compelled to return to their home countries or not. As UNRRA official historian 
Georges Woodbridge observed, no issues took up more time in successive 
Council meetings or caused so much controversy among delegates as ‘what, 
specifically, was [UNRRA’s] role to be’ in Germany, and which ‘displaced 
persons were to be eligible for help?’35Throughout the late 1940s the DP 
question was closely linked to broader questions regarding the legality of forced 
repatriation, the categorization of wartime collaborators, helpers and allies, the 
ideology and methods of modern humanitarianism, and the reconstruction of 
European families and countries.  
In this turbulent period of political upheaval in the aftermath of the Nazi 
regime, the work of French authorities and relief workers was, in turn, shaped 
by diplomatic considerations, concerns about economic recovery, and domestic 
political tensions. The study of French policies, priorities, experiences and 
encounters with DPs thus raises unaddressed historical questions. How did 
distinctive diplomatic constraints, economic requirements and cultural 
differences influence the thought and practices of refugee humanitarianism, 
thereby contributing to the shaping of different approaches to relief in the 
French zone? To what extent did the DP question defy consensus amongst 
leading French politicians and relief workers, reviving wartime divisions and 
exacerbating early Cold War tensions?  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 In the context of the emerging Cold War, as Hannah Arendt pointed out, 
the DP problem was intrinsically political. For her, DPs were ‘the most 
symptomatic group in contemporary politics.’36 Debates over the repatriation of 
DPs exacerbated tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, 
hastening the demise of the wartime alliance.37 As explained in this thesis, the 
history of UNRRA exemplified the difficulties – if not the impossibility – of 
achieving humanitarian neutrality in peacetime. One of the many paradoxes of 
the war was the emergence of a new type of refugee. In the 1920s, refugees 
were often persons, typically from ethnic or religious minority groups, who could 
not return home because their own governments were unwilling to receive 
them. In 1945, by contrast, many hundreds of thousands of people were 
unwilling to return to their native countries, although their governments were 
anxious to see them return.38   
 For the Soviet Union and Eastern European governments, DPs constituted 
elements of anti-communist propaganda. Furthermore, these countries had 
generally suffered some of the war’s highest casualty rates, adding urgency to 
the need for replacement manpower to undertake the reconstruction of war-torn 
territories. The Soviet Union, after all, had lost nearly a tenth of its population 
during the war, Poland a fifth, and Yugoslavia an eighth.39 The expulsion of 
ethnic Germans further exacerbated anxieties over depopulation. Factories, 
farms and mines also required labour. 40  For newly-established Communist 
regimes the refusal of displaced persons to return home was deemed to 
represent an act of treason. In the West, on the contrary, as Cohen argues, ‘the 
loss of citizenship was treated after World War II as a direct consequence of 
political or racial persecution.’41  Whereas the pre-war ‘stateless’ person was 
negatively perceived as an individual deprived of citizenship, the post-war 
‘political refugee’ was positively branded as a victim of human rights violations 
entitled to international protection.42  
 As Peter Gatrell observes, ‘[i]f the scale and scope of displacement were 
bewildering, so, too was the plethora of international, governmental and 
voluntary agencies […] that became involved in the care of refugees and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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displaced persons. The end of the war witnessed a corresponding efflorescence 
of governmental, inter-governmental and voluntary organizations to cope with 
displacement on this scale.’43  In departure from the inter-war period, when the 
League functioned mainly as the co-ordinator of relief operations otherwise 
carried out by private philanthropic organizations, UNRRA supervised the work 
of these voluntary societies.44 One important consequence of this subordinated 
status of the voluntary agencies was the increased secularization and 
professionalization of relief work. UNRRA became a forum where new forms of 
expert knowledge about displacement, reconstruction and ‘rehabilitation’ 
emerged. 
Created at the mid-point between the United Nations (UN) Declaration of 
January 1942 and the UN Charter adopted in San Francisco in June 1945, 
UNRRA has been viewed as ‘the initial laboratory for the experiment of post-war 
cooperation among the United Nations.’45 Many of the experts who helped 
create UNRRA were veterans of the relief efforts undertaken following the First 
World War, specialists who believed that better coordination and planning 
would have saved more lives and that humanitarian action should encompass 
each individuals’ personal rehabilitation.46 They hoped that UNRRA would be 
more successful in promoting international cooperation than its predecessor, 
the League of Nations. UNRRA’s first Director General Herbert Lehman 
maintained, for instance, that ‘if UNRRA succeeds, the world will know that 
international cooperation is possible… If UNRRA should fail, there is grave 
doubt that any collaboration within the United Nations can survive the test of 
practical application.’47  
 UNRRA was, to a striking extent, the expression of a distinctively North 
American ideology of internationalism. It was both directed and predominantly 
financed by the United States. Americans provided a third of its personnel, the 
US Treasury, on average, financed seventy-two per cent of UNRRA’s operating 
costs, and an even larger proportion of its supplies. 48  UNRRA’s official 
language was English and US staff held the leading positions in its internal 
administration. Both of UNRRA’s senior directors (Lehman and his successor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Fiorello H. La Guardia) were Americans. As recent studies have demonstrated, 
UNRRA’s project reflected Roosevelt’s goal of exporting a ‘New Deal for the 
World’, with UNRRA workers disseminating the ideals and values of the New 
Deal liberalism in Occupied Germany. 49  
 The creation of UNRRA also ushered in new forms of refugee 
humanitarianism, based on an American-style understanding of self-help and a 
trust in science. In a shift from earlier relief efforts, UNRRA planners aimed to 
provide more than a mere ‘soup kitchen’ charity.50 Along with filling refugees’ 
stomachs, dispensing clothing, shelter and health care, UNRRA planners 
intended to provide ‘psychological rehabilitation.’ UNRRA’s proclaimed motto 
was ‘helping the people to help themselves.’51 This shift bore the imprint of the 
New Deal. In aiming to ‘help DPs to help themselves’, UNRRA planners linked 
the psychological rehabilitation of individual displaced persons to a broader 
campaign to cultivate democratic values in post-war Europe.52 UNRRA’s new 
methods of refugee management, promoted by New-Deal influenced relief 
workers, were, however, vigorously contested by members of older charitable 
and religious organizations and by UNRRA’s own continental recruits.53 This 
study analyses these confrontations in the French zone. 
To be more specific, the thesis examines UNRRA’s aspirations to 
transform international relief, to provide more than ‘bread and butter’ material 
support, before reviewing the obstacles that stood in the way of these 
aspirations in the French zone. In other words, it seeks to assess whether this 
shift from ‘soup-kitchen’ charity to ‘psychological rehabilitation’ occurred in the 
French zone and to understand why alternative ways to arrange interim 
provision and rehabilitate DPs emerged. While the majority of DPs in the British 
and American zones were reassembled in large camps run by UNRRA, DPs 
under French control were housed and catered for differently.54 In the northern 
part of the zone, DPs tended to gather in relatively large camps run by UNRRA 
teams; in its Southern part, French authorities maintained DPs in confiscated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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private houses or very small DP centres.55 Furthermore, greater emphasis was 
placed on DPs’ employment in the French zone than in the British and 
American zones.  
Why was it that the same, apparently logistical and practical questions 
concerning the solution to the DP problem were initially answered so differently 
by French occupation officials when compared with their British and American 
counterparts? Why despite the presence of UNRRA (and later the International 
Refugee Organization) did alternative ways of arranging interim provision and 
‘rehabilitating’ DPs emerge in the French zone? Finally, did French relief 
workers in the field embrace or reject the Americanisation of refugee 
management? How far, in other words, was the French zone affected by the 
‘humanitarian revolution’ occurring in the other western zones? 
Assessing the multiple influences that shaped refugee humanitarianism 
in the zone requires an understanding of the many contexts in which UNRRA 
(and later the IRO) operated. Methodologically, this thesis draws on a variety of 
archival documents from the UN archives in New York, reports from the French 
Occupation zone, and Foreign Ministry materials from the Quai d’Orsay 
archives at La Courneuve, in addition to records from the French national and 
military archives (held in Paris, at Fontainbleau and Vincennes). Finally, notes 
from the International Tracing Service (ITS) have also been consulted. The ITS 
findings are primarily social and cultural in focus – and so, too, is this thesis. 
Indeed, the chapters that follow aim to demonstrate that the answer to French 
specificities do not just lie in the field of diplomatic relations and inter-state 
political conduct, but also in the cultural and ideological settings of the 
occupation project. In doing so, the thesis shows that a specific focus on DP 
administration throws a rather different light on the post-war period more 
generally.  
 The thesis has two interrelated, yet distinct goals. One is to offer a new 
narrative of the history of western humanitarianism as seen through the lens of 
French DP camp administration. Although the French zone only hosted around 
five per cent of the overall DP population in occupied Germany, the French 
case offers fascinating insights into the ideology and methods of modern 
refugee humanitarianism. Assessing UNRRA and the IRO activities in the 
French zone enables us to contribute to recent debates about whether the war’s 
aftermath was the founding moment of a new era and whether UNRRA’s 
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machinery contributed to the reaffirmation of national identifications or the 
promotion of the ‘international idea.’  
 The second objective is to explore French internal divisions in order to 
enhance our comprehension of the continuities and ruptures between the 
discourses and practices of the government of Vichy and of the Republics that 
preceded and followed it.56 This thesis shows that conflicting attitudes towards 
DPs were not only intertwined with nascent Cold War tensions, but were deeply 
shaped by competing interpretations of the past. Debates over the recruitment 
of DPs revived divisions related to the problematic legacies of the STO and the 
forced enrolment of Alsatian and Mosellans in the Wehrmacht. This, in turn, 
should improve our understanding of the discrepancies between official policies 
and local practices in French-occupied Germany. 
 
The historical context 
 
  The Allies invented the concept of the ‘DP’ during the war years.57 In 
Allied terminology, ‘Displaced Persons’ were originally defined as all civilians 
belonging to the United Nations who found themselves ‘outside the national 
boundaries of their country by reason of the war’ and needing repatriation.58 
British and American planners, who thought first and foremost about providing 
for their own citizens, lumped together all civilians who needed to be repatriated 
under the broad category of DP while, in effect, insisting that POWs held priority 
over DPs. As Annette Wieviorka observes,‘[f]or British and Americans, the 
distinction between Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons would never 
disappear. Their soil was not invaded, their civilian population was not 
displaced, the war remained a classical war in which armies fight and take 
prisoners.’59 For French planners, however, this distinction was incongruous.60  
As a result of it, a French volunteer who arrived in 1942 to replace a Prisoner of 
War under the “Releve” had priority over a 1944 deportee interned in a 
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concentration camp.’ 61  French PDR authorities opposed the principle of 
prioritizing the repatriation of PoWs over DPs.62 It was only after the liberation of 
Buchenwald in April 1945 that the French secured a relaxation in the American 
policy of absolute priority for the PoWs.63 
For British and American planners, isolated as they were from direct 
experience of civilian population transfers, the tracing and categorization of DPs 
was, in many respects, an arid bureaucratic exercise. For French planners, by 
contrast, repatriating and tracing civilians was not an abstract, dispassionate 
exercise. This fundamental disjuncture in the perception of the DP problem, on 
the one hand immediate and personal for the French, on the other hand 
organisational and theoretical for the British and Americans, was a source of 
significant conflict between them. As recent studies have demonstrated, the 
invention of the administrative category ‘DP’ revealed – often in significant 
ways- the inability of the Allies to think internationally. In April 1945, SHAEF 
introduced a criterion of nationality (understood as state citizenship). United 
Nations DPs (nationals of Allied countries) were separated from enemy DPs 
(nationals of Germany, Austria and Japan) and ex-enemy DPs (nationals of 
Italy, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary). By establishing this distinction, 
allied authorities sought to separate winners from losers. As Anna Holian 
explains, ‘[r]egardless of why individuals had been displaced, their place in the 
Allied DP program was determined by their nationality. This was the primary 
organizing principle.’64 Significantly, the Allies refused to assist the millions of 
German expellees. In practice, as will be explained in chapter three, the 
definition was more opaque, many UNRRA Directors providing assistance to 
ex-enemy nationals in the French zone. 
  Despite these lagging problems, repatriation rates were staggeringly high 
in the first weeks following the capitulation of Germany. By the middle of 
October 1945, more than 1.5 million Frenchmen had returned home: 895,000 
from the American zone, 270,000 from the British zone, 215,000 from the 
Soviet zone and 170,000 from the French zone. 65  Somewhere between 
200,000 and 250,000 ‘foreign’ DPs were also repatriated from the French 
Occupation Zone in the same period.66 According to French repatriation figures, 
18,000 Belgian, 16,000 Dutch and 12,500 Italians had been sent westwards by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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15 October 1945; meanwhile, 150,000 Russians, 6,000 Poles, 15,000 
Yugoslavs and 1,500 Czechs eastwards.67 As mentioned earlier, in September 
1945, only around 80,000 DPs remained in the French zone.  
 The concept of the ‘DP’ did not make sense for the DPs either, who 
rejected a term that had little to do with their lived experiences. As Ulrich 
Herbert points out, ‘DPs had little in common except the mere fact that they 
were foreigners on German soil.’68 Describing the situation of Ukrainian women 
in DP camps, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak observes:  
 
Women of different social classes, indeed of different levels of home 
culture, were thrown into communal living, communal cooking, and 
communal washing. Women who had never done housework had to fend 
for themselves and their families, and vie for provisions and facilities with 
women who were used to communal living, shortages, and hard physical 
labour. Strangers shared living quarters – privacy was a blanket 
suspended around a bed – and camp life was conducive to military-style 
regimentation that was strange to women.69 
 
DPs’ nationalities, social backgrounds and wartime experiences profoundly 
differed.  In Nazi Germany, working and living conditions were highly contingent 
‘on whether the labourer was a Jew; male or female; a civilian, prisoner of war, 
or a ghetto or camp inmate; could or not speak German; […] had to toil […] in 
agriculture, or industry, directly for the SS or the Wehrmacht, in a state-owned 
or private enterprise, a large or a small one, and in construction or mining or on 
an assembly line.’70 In the French zone, some DPs were certainly survivors of 
the sub-camps of the Natzweiler concentration camp, located in Alsace. Others 
were refugees from Eastern Europe who had fled the Red Army during the war. 
Former collaborators certainly rubbed shoulders with anti-Nazi activists. As an 
official French leaflet reported, ‘with the rare exceptions of famous personalities, 
it was impossible to find proof of treason or heroism […] As a matter of fact, no 
distinction was made between refugees, evacuees and political, racial or work 
deportees.’ 71 
 In her comparative study of four of the largest DP groups (Poles, 
Ukrainians, Russians and Jews) in American-occupied Bavaria, Anna Holian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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has demonstrated that DPs did not unite around their shared experiences of 
persecution or around their refusal of repatriation. Instead, historically grounded 
mutual distrust split them apart. According to her, central to understanding how 
Bavaria’s DPs viewed themselves, their recent experiences and their future 
lives, were their competing interpretations of the Second World War and their 
differing interpretations of National Socialism and Soviet Communism. ‘The 
meanings that displaced persons assigned to their wartime experiences and the 
hopes they harbo[u]red for the future often followed the outlines of pre-existing 
political ideologies.’72 Following Pieter Lagrou’s work, she argues that that a 
‘sharp confrontation between two general interpretations of the last global 
conflict – between antifascism and anticommunism’ – defined the legacy of the 
Second World War in DP camps.73  
The emergence of DP anticommunism posed specific problems in the 
French zone, notably due to the presence of French citizens in the Soviet 
Union. At the Liberation, another striking difference between France and its 
Western Allies was the presence in Soviet-annexed territories of a significant 
number of French POWs from Alsace-Lorraine who had been forcibly enrolled 
in the Wehrmacht and subsequently were captured by the Red Army. The 
majority of the 130,000 Malgré-nous, as they were commonly known, fought on 
the Eastern front. In consequence, they were classified as ex-enemy 
combatants by the Soviets. They therefore shared the fate of German Prisoners 
of War and suffered from chronic overcrowding, malnourishment, inadequate 
housing and forced labour in the Soviet Union.74 Aware of the high death rate 
amongst them, French authorities were anxious to see the Malgré-nous return 
to France as quickly as possible.75 Soviet figures indicate that 21,300 French 
POWs in total were repatriated, the majority coming from Alsace and Moselle 
and a minority from the openly collaborationist Légion des Volontaires Français 
(division Charlemagne-Waffen SS).  In addition, French authorities awaited the 
return of approximately 300,000 French internees, concentration camp 
survivors and POWs liberated by the Red Army at the Liberation.76 These 
internees benefited from significantly better treatment.77  
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As French historian Catherine Gousseff has explained, to a large extent 
France was compelled to comply with a politique du donnant-donnant – always 
making concessions in its dealings with the Soviet Union – in order to 
guarantee the return of French Malgré-nous.78 Bowing to Soviet pressure, on 29 
June 1945 the Provisional Government concluded an agreement on repatriation 
that was, in some respects, more radical than the bilateral agreements 
concluded by the British and American authorities at Yalta.79 France committed 
itself to repatriate all Soviet citizens, including those likely to be prosecuted for 
their collaboration with the Nazis. As repatriation rates dropped and as 
arguments over the issue of forced repatriation of citizens of annexed Soviet 
territories intensified in early 1946, French POWs found themselves held 
hostage as a result of the non-repatriation of Soviet DPs.80 This problem had 
important domestic repercussions. 
 The Malgré-nous question generated heated argument within the French 
Parliament, the Constituent Assembly. This was most evident in the summer of 
1946 when the Ministry for Ex-Servicemen announced the completion of the 
repatriation of French citizens from the Soviet Union thereby precipitating 
virulent criticism from French deputies on the grounds that 30,000 Malgré-nous 
were still missing. As Catherine Klein-Gousseff observed, ‘[a]lthough the 
number of French detainees in the Soviet Union probably amounted to less 
than a hundred, and not thousands as it was claimed at the time, their detention 
became [in France] one of the living symbol of the emerging Cold War.’81  
The work of French authorities and relief workers with DPs was shaped 
by these diplomatic considerations. French official DP policy had indeed to 
accommodate contradictory requirements. On the one hand, French authorities 
were anxious not to antagonize the Soviet Union due to the problem of the 
Malgré-nous and the general orientation of French foreign diplomacy at the 
time. Satisfying Moscow’s demands was consistent with the main orientation of 
French foreign policy between 1945 and 1947.82 During this three-year period of 
‘tripartism’ – in other words, of centre-left tripartite coalition government - the 
French Communist Party sustained a central role in government alongside the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Socialist Party and the Christian Democrat MRP. Successive tripartite coalition 
administrations tried to exploit France’s December 1944 alliance with the Soviet 
Union to secure a pivotal role between the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ powers and the 
Eastern bloc. On the other hand, some policy-makers saw in DPs a valuable 
reservoir of manpower in the context of heightened anxieties over depopulation. 
While publicly affirming their commitment to DPs’ prompt repatriation to the 
various Eastern European repatriation missions, behind-the-scenes French 
diplomats and military authorities strove to recruit the healthiest DPs for the 
reconstruction of France. 
 French policy-makers’ efforts to recruit DPs were not solely motivated by 
French manpower needs however. As explained earlier, there were also driven 
by the conviction that German over-population posed an inherent security threat 
to Europe.83 For many French officials, it remained axiomatic that German 
overpopulation was a root cause of Nazi expansionism. Therefore, neither the 
Quai d’Orsay nor the French military government in Germany wanted to see 
DPs permanently settled in Germany.84 French authorities carefully monitored 
the entry of DPs and German refugees in the zone.85 Yet, from the beginning, 
French diplomats and occupation officials’ efforts to recruit the healthiest DPs 
were fraught with problems. French Communist leaders opposed the 
recruitment of ‘anti-communist’ elements, while population ‘experts’ expressed 
doubts about the assimilability of these Slavic DPs. From 1945 to 1950, French 
approaches to the DP problem would continue to evolve in light of this 
admixture of domestic, international, ideological and ethical concerns. 
 
The historiographical context 
 
 As a spate of recent publications in Journal of Contemporary History, Past 
and Present, Central European History and Journal of Refugee studies attest, 
UNRRA work in relation to Displaced Persons has begun to seize 
unprecedented scholarly attention.86 To an extent, these developments have 
been cumulative. The last two decades have seen the emergence of a growing 
body of work both on DP policies and western humanitarianism after 1945 and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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on the internal politics of DP camps. The richness and variety of the resulting 
analytical research is remarkable. Notwithstanding their absence from public 
memory and historical literature over the preceding forty years, DPs are, in 
Cohen’s words, ‘manifestly back in force in commemorative practices’ and in 
scholarly inquiry.87 While websites dedicated to DP camps’ history flourished on 
the internet, recent publications reveal the breadth of contemporary research on 
the topic. As Pamela Ballinger recently noted, historical scholarship on the work 
of international agencies with DPs has ‘acquired critical mass.’88 The literature 
on DPs includes both studies that focus on the social and cultural history of DP 
camps and those that situate their history within broader scholarly frameworks 
of the diplomatic and political history of European reconstruction, post-war 
German-Jewish relations and early Cold War narratives. And, to judge from the 
recent flood of books, documentaries and exhibitions on the subject, this is a 
trend that is set to continue.89 As yet, however, very little attention has been 
paid to UNRRA and later IRO administration of DP camps in the French 
occupation zone.90  
 This striking imbalance is hardly surprising. France was a second-rank 
occupying force, one whose zone was significantly smaller and its wider political 
influence more limited than those of its Western Allies. It is also true that the 
largest communities of refugees and DPs were to be found in the British and 
American zones. At its height, the UNRRA personnel deployed in the French 
zone numbered less than 500, while the agency deployed over 5,000 staff 
throughout Germany as a whole. In histories of post-war France, UNRRA is 
often relegated to a footnote, written off as a failed experiment of 
internationalist-minded American liberalists. Even in the literature on French 
humanitarianism, specialists often argue that France ‘had limited involvement in 
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the early construction of the UN’ and in the early phases of NGO growth 
following the Second World War.91  
 While the importance of French involvement in the League of Nations was 
an uncontested fact, France’s involvement in the UN system was much more 
limited.92 The relatively meagre literature on post-war France’s involvement in 
the UN reflects this loss of influence.93 Admittedly, Eric Pateyron has described 
René Cassin’s participation in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Rights 
in 1948.94 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost have also documented the life of René 
Cassin, demonstrating how he inspired the Universal Declaration. 95 More 
recently, Chloé Maurel and Todd Shepard have examined some aspects of 
France’s contribution to UNESCO.96 This latter organization was based in Paris 
and this, as Shepard has recently pointed out,  ‘facilitated aggressive attempts 
to use this forum to reinsert French models and experts into the mainstream of 
post-1945 intellectual exchange.’97 Finally, Jessica Pearson-Patel has recently 
completed a PhD dissertation on French colonial administration and various UN 
Agencies in France’s territories in Sub-Saharian Africa.98 Yet, more research 
needs to be done on France’s overall involvement in the early years of the UN. 
This might lead us to reassess the (relative) importance of France in the UN. 
For instance, if France had only very few representatives in the executive level 
of UNRRA’s administration, French personnel were relatively numerous on the 
ground. Indeed, in December 1945, UNRRA employed 5,169 people in 
Germany, 16 % hailing from the United States, 31% from Britain and the British 
colonies, 18% from France, and 30% from other European countries.99  
 This thesis integrates thus the ‘French case’ into the burgeoning literature 
on post-1945 Western humanitarianism, drawing on insights from diplomatic, 
social, cultural and gender history. Several factors account for the booming 
growth in the history of post-war relief and its increasing integration into the 
mainstream of war studies. Some are to be found in the end of the Cold War !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and the opening up of East and Central European archives; others in the 
commitment of Gerhard Schröder’s government to compensation for former 
Nazi victims and the consequent rise in demands for restitution after 1989.100 In 
addition, the 1990s resurgence of ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia and in 
Rwanda placed refugees at the centre of international politics, prompting 
scholars to inquire more deeply into forced migrations as aspects of previous 
episodes of genocide in Europe. These events stimulated a wealth of research 
on diaspora and connection between war and dispossession in diaspora 
politics.101 Finally, some analysts point to the American invasion and occupation 
of Iraq beginning in 2003, which generated a renewed interest in ‘post-conflict 
planning’ – and its shortcomings.102 Although hard to measure, all of these 
factors probably contributed in some way to the growth of historical interest in 
the fate of Post-war Germany’s DP populations.  
  The dynamics within other sub-fields of history were also decisive in 
pushing the question of DPs to the foreground of scholarly inquiry. The upsurge 
of DP studies is intimately bound up with an important paradigm shift in German 
historiography evident from the late 1980s. 103 After reunification, the 
development of German local and regional history, as well as the growth in 
studies of Nazi persecution and forced migrations, was decisive in shifting DPs 
to the centre of the post-war German experience. As Atina Grossmann 
observed, it became increasingly evident to German historians in the late 1980s 
that ‘the history of post-war Germany was neither ‘only a story of men’ nor ‘only 
a German story.’104 The 1990s thus saw sustained efforts both to rethink the role 
of ‘outsiders’ in post-war Germany and to challenge the reductive meaning of 
“refugees” in German historical writing hitherto. By integrating DP histories into 
broader overviews of German post-war history, historians convincingly 
demonstrated that refugees ‘were not only ethnic German expellees but also 
Slavic and Jewish DPs who transited, lived, worked and, at times, settled in 
Germany.’105 
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 In recent years, the DP literature has also benefited from parallel 
developments in various sub-fields of military history, which became 
increasingly receptive to social history approaches, evident, for example, in 
studies of the daily lives of soldiers, issues of sexuality and desire among 
military personnel, and in the analysis of patterns of fraternization between 
armed forces and local communities106  More recently still, historians have 
become increasingly attentive to the study of transitions from ‘war to peace’ and 
the phenomenon of life after death, scrutinizing how ‘ordinary’ people survived 
the war and came to terms with it.107 Distinctive treatments of this issue of the 
‘sortie de guerre’ as something discrete and worthy of study in its own right 
have emerged strongly in French historiography over the past few years. 
Following in the footsteps of John Horne’s pioneering work on cultural 
mobilization and demobilization in wartime and the immediate post-war period, 
Bruno Cabanes and Guillaume Piketty launched a project on ‘les sorties de 
guerre’, examining how societies ‘got out of the war’ socially and culturally 
speaking.108 
  These studies, essentially social and cultural in focus, have prompted 
fresh reflection on narratives of return and issues of victimisation and healing. 
The history of post-war Germany – with its multiplicity of historical actors from 
various nationalities - provides an especially interesting site for inquiring into the 
problématiques of the return (or impossible return) to ‘normality’ in the aftermath 
of war. As Richard Bessel points out, ‘Germany’s transition in 1945—from war 
to peace, from extreme violence to the beginning of a long march towards 
settled conditions—is one of the most remarkable in modern history.’109 This 
period of multiple ‘encounters’ - between occupiers and occupied, former 
perpetrators and victims - is a vast field of research for those interested in social 
history and transnational perspectives.110 DP camps constitute an especially 
interesting site through which to trace issues of contested victimization and 
national and ethnic rivalries.  
  The expansion of gender studies has also fuelled the expansion of what 
could now be justifiably called ‘DP studies.’ In the tradition of Alltagsgeschichte, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Atina Grossmann, Margarete Myers and Judith Tydor Baumel have produced 
in-depth analyses of the remarkable baby-boom that occurred in Jewish DP 
camps. They have illustrated how these camps became sites for a Leben aufs 
neu (affirmation of life) in obvious counterpoise to the Holocaust.111 Drawing on 
a vast range of sources – including official documents, DPs’ letters, films, oral 
history interviews, newspapers, and photography, these studies have examined 
Jewish DPs’ efforts to reclaim a sense of agency and identity. In contrast to 
German women, who saw themselves as victims of war and occupation, and 
who were, on the whole, less willing to bear a child, Jewish women gave birth 
both to feel ‘normal’ and to foster a kind of ‘productive forgetting’ after the 
horrors of the recent past. As Margarete Myers Feinstein observed, ‘despite 
their nightmares, fears, and uncertain future, Jewish DPs sought to re-imagine 
themselves not as victims of Nazism but as survivors of the great 
catastrophe.’112  
 These studies have revealed the vast potential of the DP camps as an 
investigative field for those interested in gender history, providing insight into 
the complex interplay of continuity and change that marked DPs’ lives. 
Scrutinizing the social and cultural activities flourishing in DP camps and 
analysing the everyday encounters between defeated Germans and their 
former victims also enable us to revisit key questions such as the German 
Frauenüberschuss (surplus of women) and the contemporary fears and imagery 
of the Trümmerfrauen (‘women of the rubble’). Such approaches open the way 
to a deeper understanding of what in this period was often referred to as the 
‘hour of the woman.’113   
 The literature on Jewish DPs is by far the most extensive and the most 
varied.114 Studies attentive to gender issues have focused on Jewish-German 
encounters, documenting what Frank Stern has aptly called the ‘historic 
triangle’ of Germans, Jews and Americans.115 This growing interest in Jewish 
life in post-war Germany has, of course, been spurred by the growth of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Holocaust studies.116 This was, in turn, stimulated by the wealth of new sources 
made available by the opening of former Soviet and Eastern bloc archives in 
the post-communist period. The emergence of a new generation of Israeli 
scholars such as Tom Segev, Idith Zertal and Yosef Grodzinsky since the 
1990s, all of them eager to pose new questions about familiar topics - from the 
Brikha and the Alyah Beth (Jewish illegal immigration) to the role of Holocaust 
survivors in the founding of the State of Israel - has been central to this 
process.117 The importance of France and the French zones of occupation of 
Germany and Austria in the illegal transit of Jewish refugees to France is now a 
familiar tale. Zionists enjoyed political support in the press and among the new 
republican elite in their efforts to get to Palestine.118 
 It bears emphasis, though, that Jewish DPs were considerably less 
numerous in the French zone, with the notable exception of the French Sector 
in Berlin. Several factors account for this. The majority of Nazi concentration 
camps were located in the US and Soviet zones. Perhaps, most importantly, the 
American zone, where the Brikha was better-organized and material resources 
more abundant, was more attractive to them. In May 1945, the two biggest 
Jewish DP camps were located in Gaillingen and Biberach.119 In early 1946, 
1,000 Jewish DPs were officially registered in the French zone of occupation, 
representing approximately 2% of the overall Jewish DP in Germany and 1.6% 
of the overall DP population of the French zone.120 But as Andreas Rinke and 
Julia Maspero have pointed out, many Jewish DPs illegally transited through 
the French zone.121 The American Joint and the Jewish Agency for Palestine 
helped organize illegal immigration in the French zone.122  
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 Contrary to their British equivalents, the French authorities recognized 
Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe as a ‘separate group’ very early on. 
Moreover, as Maspero points out, while British and American authorities 
refused to grant DP status to refugees who had arrived in their zone before 10 
August 1946 (for the British) and 21 April 1947 (for the American authorities), 
France imposed no such restriction.123  Evidence suggests that there were 
several Kibbutzes in the French zone, notably in Gailingen, Konstanz, 
Jordenbad. In Jordenbad, DPs even organized a hunger strike in the summer of 
1946 to protest against British policies.124  
 Finally, any assessment of recent historical interest in the DP problem 
would not be complete were one to omit the upsurge in global and transnational 
history over the last two decades as well as the recent evolution of the literature 
on ‘reconstruction’, post-war planning and the United Nations.125 ‘The fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989’, observed Mark Mazower, ‘had a massive impact on our 
understanding of the reconstruction effort that reshaped Europe in the years 
1945-48.’126 It became evident that, for too long, scholars had focused on the 
construction of two hostile blocs during the period 1945-1948 and had written a 
‘kind of prehistory of the Iron Curtain.’ Moving away from these Cold War 
binaries, new studies of reconstruction have illuminated the reconfiguration of 
internationalism as a consequence of the war. ‘[T]he hopes evident in the 1990s 
of a new more central role for the United Nations and other international bodies 
redirected attention to the post-1945 years in the emergence of a new world 
order, and a redefinition of internationalism.’127 This was accompanied by a 
surge of interest in the history of human rights. Since the 1990s, historians have 
explored how the universal language of human rights has been negotiated and 
applied in various local social and political settings. 128 The proliferation of 
conferences and publications commemorating the UN’s sixtieth anniversary in 
2005 further enriched the organization’s historiography. 129    
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 By contrast, little is known about French UNRRA (and later IRO) recruits. 
Did they implement UNRRA’s scientific methods in the field? How did they re-
interpret UNRRA guidance about DP rehabilitation and psychological health? 
Did they emulate many of their British counterparts in spurning New Deal-
inflected ideas about welfare? And finally, did the language of human rights 
weigh upon France’s DP policies, even if only marginally? These are some of 
the questions we need to answer. 
 As far as French official DP policies are concerned, German historian 
Andreas Rinke has perceptively addressed France’s repatriation of its own DPs 
and its policy towards non-French DPs in both France and its occupation zone 
in Le Grand retour - Die französische Displaced Person-Politik (1944-1951).130 
Following in the footsteps of Wolfgang Jacobmeyer’s pioneering work, Rinke’s 
study emphasizes the critical influence of both the emerging Cold War and 
lasting French internal divisions.131  Drawing mainly on the archives of the 
French Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Prisoners, Deportees and Refugees 
[PDR], his work provides the closest thing we have to an archival history of the 
DPs in the French occupation zone. Rinke contextualises the DP problem within 
the broader framework of French repatriation efforts. His study offers interesting 
insights into French internal political tensions and the diplomatic constraints 
under which the French government operated. It also confirms how the 
‘experience of deportation’ significantly differentiated the French position from 
those of its Western Allies. But, for all its strengths, the study fails to encompass 
the cultural and social history of the ‘historic triangle’ of French, Germans and 
DPs. Little attention is paid to the management of DP camps or the ‘practices’ of 
relief work. As a result, the overall portrait that emerges from his work is that of 
a ‘harsh’ and unbending French DP policy towards non-French DPs, particularly 
if compared to the ‘caring’ American policy.  
 Admittedly, there is much truth in Rinke’s primarily diplomatic and 
institutional interpretation. But, in recent years, the emphasis on American 
‘generosity’ has given way to a more nuanced understanding of how American 
officials became both ‘protectors and jailers’, sharing ‘many of the same 
prejudices as the Germans.’132 More importantly, the study of UNRRA archives 
and PDR documents reveals that attitudes towards DPs within both the French 
military administration and its UNRRA counterpart in the French zone were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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never monolithic. The focus on UNRRA and PDR archives unravels a realm of 
historical contingency overlooked in Rinke’s work, which now allows us to 
pursue a more nuanced understanding of French attitudes towards DPs. 
Following in Rinke’s footsteps, Julia Maspero has written two well-documented 
articles on the impact of Polish DPs on post-war Franco-Polish relations. She 
highlights the diplomatic imperatives of the early Cold War and the underlying 
ambiguities of French high-policy (as explored here in chapter 3). But her focus 
is not on the social and cultural history of DPs in the French zone. 133   
 From UNRRA and PDR sources contradictory depictions of the DPs and 
contrasting ideas about how best to rehabilitate, control and feed them tend to 
emerge. This thesis attempts to reconcile these contradictory impressions in 
order to reach a fuller, more nuanced interpretation of French DP policy and 
administration. It probes beneath the formal structure of official instructions to 
reconstruct the ways in which repatriation, compulsion to work or pressure to 
consider emigration to France were put into practice. On the one hand, it shows 
that, for some administrators, relief was primarily a matter of procurement (a 
logistical problem of matching estimated relief needs with available supplies) 
while its implementation was viewed essentially as a matter of discipline. On the 
other hand, it demonstrates that some UNRRA relief workers saw their work 
very differently - as agents of ‘normalization’ and psychological ‘rehabilitation’ 
after years of wartime disruption. 
 Did UNRRA’s shift from ‘bread and butter’ relief to ‘science based’ 
rehabilitation fundamentally affect French DP administration? Did French relief 
workers resist the introduction of principles, categories, methods and 
instruments emanating from across the Atlantic? Was UNRRA a turning point, 
an experience in refugee management that created something fundamentally 
new? Were DP camps in the French zone places of ‘normalization’ and 
‘psychological rehabilitation’ – as advocated by New-Deal influenced relief 
workers - after wartime disruption? Or did they, on the contrary, bear 
resemblance with the refugee camps hastily built in 1939 in the South of France 
to accommodate Spanish Republican soldiers and civilians? These are 
questions that we need to answer. 
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Towards a transnational history of DP administration in the French zone 
 
 This study is an attempt to begin constructing a social and transnational 
history of French DP administration. In order to grasp the complexities of 
French DP administration, the thesis traverses the field of institutional history 
(particularly in its analysis of the administrative conflict between the PDR 
service and UNRRA in chapter one), diplomatic and political history (in its 
examination of the ministerial debates about the recruitment of DPs) and 
economic history (DP employment policies and the exploitation of the zone). 134 
But, its findings are primarily social and cultural in focus.  
 There are thus at least three respects in which this history can be defined 
as ‘transnational’: in its use of archives of UNRRA and the IRO documenting 
transnational connections between relief workers from different nations, in its 
attention to local discrepancies between official policy and universalist claims 
versus the diversity of practices observable in the field; and in its underlying 
contention that the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is in many 
respect an artificial one (an idea pursued most fully in chapter two).135 As Talbot 
Imlay and Dietmar Hüser have argued, any attempt to grasp the complexities of 
French foreign diplomacy during the early years of the Fourth Republic requires 
a sound understanding of the domestic context.136  The DP question is no 
exception to that. Furthermore, this thesis is attentive to local discrepancies. It is 
not only about French diplomats, occupation officials and UNRRA planners’ 
initial assumptions and the ways in which realities on the ground forced them to 
modify their policies and programmes. It is also about how local administrators 
and relief workers re-interpreted and shaped official policies in response to local 
factors. 
 This transnational approach opens up new ways of writing about the 
history of DPs and French administration in occupied Germany. This thesis 
brings into the narrative a whole range of international actors, encompasses a 
comparative dimension, and extends its field of vision from the political and 
diplomatic to the social. It has, however, its own limitations. Precisely because it 
draws mainly on relief workers and administrators’ reports, it is, in many 
respects, an asymmetrical history. This thesis is not an ‘inside story’ of DP life, 
but an investigation of DP actions and perceptions as filtered through French !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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eyes. Even so, the voices of refugees do emerge from the UNRRA and IRO 
archives, suggesting that DPs were not only ‘passive recipients’ but also ‘actors’ 
in their own history. For all that, this study does not place these voices at the 
centre of its inquiry. Furthermore, it pays greater attention to the daily-
interactions between French local administrators, UNRRA workers and DPs 
than to the tense interactions between DPs and their former German 
oppressors. Admittedly, this thesis acknowledges Germans’ perceptions of DPs 
as ‘criminal’ and ‘black marketeers.’ But, notions of contested victimization and 
symbolic revenge are not central to this investigation. 
 The thesis is also essentially a history of France and the West, rather than 
an exploration of France and the East. The history of ethnic cleansing in East-
Central Europe, the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Poland and the rivalries 
between the various DP ethnic groups in the French zone are only addressed 
insofar as they emerged in French documents. Of the civilians and PoWs who 
returned to the Soviet Union as of March 1, 1946 an estimated 6.5 per cent 
were ‘referred to the NKVD’ and 14.48 per cent were conscripted into forced 
labour battalions immediately upon arrival, according to Soviet government 
statistics.137  
 Moreover, this thesis neither covers the specific problem of DP children 
nor those of Jewish DPs. The archives of the French Occupation zone hold 264 
boxes emanating from the ‘Bureau des enfants’ of the service PDR, which have 
not been consulted.138 As far as Jewish DPs are concerned, the Fondation pour 
la Mémoire de la Shoah recently granted a bursary to Julia Maspero to examine 
their history, which should result in published work. Finally, this thesis restricts 
its geographical focus to the southern part of Germany, while acknowledging 
that the French Sector of Berlin accommodated a considerable number of 
Jewish victims of persecution as well as other, newer Jewish arrivals.139  
 Writing the history of the humanitarian actors who forged these 
transnational connections in the French zone has posed several methodological 
challenges. As will be explained in chapter four, UNRRA relief workers did not 
form ‘epistemic communities’, with a shared ‘set of normative and principled 
beliefs.’140 The prosopographical history of French relief workers was further 
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complicated by the fact that the UN Archives prohibit researchers from 
accessing UNRRA’s personnel files. Fortunately, many personnel evaluations 
were found in the boxes of the French zone and these compensate – at least in 
part – for this gap in the available source base. These documents remain 
patchy even so. It is conceivable, then, that the hundreds of French UNRRA 
personnel files would add new dimensions to the story. This limitation in the 
sources notwithstanding, the thesis not only looks at a unique group of 
international civil servants, but also at a collection of individuals, whose actions 
were shaped by their professional, personal and geographical surroundings. It 
is technically impossible to show all of the different individual experiences within 
UNRRA in the French zone; however, by extracting individual stories from the 
collective narrative, it is possible to gain a clearer insight into the subtleties of 
the French UNRRA milieu. 
 That being said, the wealth of historical sources presented another 
methodological challenge. Historical accounts of DP life in the French zone, as 
in the other western zones, are abundant. 141 DP life was methodically and 
voluminously documented by occupation forces, UNRRA and, later, the IRO, as 
well as by private voluntary societies and the DP themselves. The UN archives 
also hold an enormous volume of weekly reports written by field workers. These 
records are, in turn, complemented by the IRO archives which amount to nearly 
2000 boxes in total. The ‘series PDR’ of the French Occupation Zone archives, 
as well as the archives of Henri Frenay’s Ministry PDR, the archives of the 
Comité d’histoire de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (deposited in the French 
national Archives), and the French military archives (in Vincennes) also contain 
an large quantity of official reports documenting the different aspects of DP life 
in the French zone. As Iris Borowy notes in her introduction of the history of the 
League of Nations Health Organisation, 
 
 [A]s everyone familiar with archival work knows, findings depend on many 
factors, including time, money, stamina and often sheer luck. This fact is 
much regretted, because experience shows that often the unofficial 
version of events becomes very different from its official image […] 
Inevitably, one is left with this nagging doubt about whether this one box, 
which was not consulted, might not in fact contain this invaluable piece of 
evidence which would rewrite basic tenets of existing interpretations.142  
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This bears amplification in the French case, where there were pronounced 
discrepancies between official policy and practices in the field.  
 It could finally be objected that by focusing on two marginal groups within 
the zone (relief workers and DPs), this project loses sight of the bigger picture. 
The DP question was certainly not at the forefront of French authorities’ 
priorities, the return to France of the two million Absents and the broader needs 
of reconstruction being at the centre of the new republican elite’s 
preoccupations. Unlike issues such as denazification and reeducation, the DP 
problem was not a central pillar of French attempt to remake German society 
after the war. Equally, for UNRRA planners, the French zone was a marginal 
territory, accommodating only five percent of the overall DP population and (at 
its height in the summer of 1946) less than ten percent of its personnel. This 
thesis shows, nevertheless, that studying UNRRA and the IRO’s activities in the 
French zone has far broader implications. Firstly, it contributes to a better 
understanding of the contradictions and ambiguities inherent in French policies 
in post-war Germany. It shows that the study of French practices towards DPs 
can help us reassess the core objectives of the French occupation project as a 
whole. Significantly smaller, the French occupation zone has tended to be the 
‘forgotten zone.’ Historians have tended to characterize the French as a harsh 
occupant wanting retribution for four years of German occupation in France. 
Accounts of French soldiers’ rape and pillage in the early days of the 
occupation combined with the pompous feasts and lavish parades organized by 
the First French military commander-in-chief General De Lattre de Tassigny 
became ‘shorthand for an image of the French as the most revengeful, 
exploitative, ruthless and aloof of the western occupiers.’143 Since the early 
1980s, the historical reputation of the French zone has undergone a significant 
rehabilitation, with historians highlighting the complexities and ambivalences of 
French policy.144  
  While early scholarly work on the French occupation zone tended to focus 
on the extent of France’s political repression and economic exploitation of the 
zone, the end of the Cold War has witnessed the emergence of more balanced 
analyses which emphasize that the French occupation programme contained !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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important and successful policies for German renewal, reform and 
democratization. Historians have emphasized differences in approaches and 
policies between the conservative and militarist Cabinet of Pierre-Marie Koenig 
and the more socialist inclined administrateur Général Emile Laffon. The history 
of UNRRA in the French zone offers a powerful contribution in that direction. 
French practices towards DPs are deeply implicated in the mixed record of the 
French zone: French emphasis on private accommodation and employment led 
many UNRRA workers believe that they were more successful in normalizing 
DPs’ life than their American counterparts. Furthermore, some DPs benefited 
from the generous support of Raymond Schmittlein and were able to develop a 
rich cultural life. Yet, for the majority of DPs, French employment policies meant 
that they were often forced to work in unattractive manual positions under 
German supervision, making some feel that not enough had changed since the 
end of the war. 
 Secondly, this thesis should deepen our understanding of the limits and 
ambiguities in UNRRA and IRO’s global humanitarian crusade. It demonstrates 
that UNRRA’s revolution was only partially fulfilled in the zone. The complex 
and uneven picture of UNRRA and IRO’s activities that emerges here suggests 
that theories and practices of ‘new humanitarianism’ launched by the United 
Nations were not as coherent, innovative and ‘modern’ as UNRRA planners 
suggested. On the one hand, UNRRA experts promoted the secularization and 
internationalization of relief work; on the other hand, they fostered the 
development of religious and nationalist activities in a belief in their ‘therapeutic 
effects.’ 
 This thesis also complicates narratives regarding the American presence 
in post-war France and French-occupied Germany.145 This thesis suggests that 
the conflict between French occupation officials and UNRRA cannot be 
interpreted solely in terms of Americanization, imperialism and the unilateral 
propagation of a cultural model and ‘resistance’ to that model.146 Although there 
was a solid, even messianic ambition on the part of the Americans, the specifics 
of this ambition were far from self-evident. Furthermore, in the French zone, 
UNRRA headquarters was French-run and American UNRRA workers were far 
less numerous. In June 1947, a few weeks before UNRRA’s termination, 
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personnel in which he indicated that they should feel proud to have participated 
in this international organization. ‘Faced with calumny, we will respond by being 
even more active and on 30 June we will hold our heads up because we are 
sure that we have been the faithful executors of President Roosevelt’s 
generous thought.’ 147  Lenclud’s words suggest that his staff embraced the 
Administration’s international (or American) project. Unlike occupation 
administrators who, according to him, showed no awareness of the need to 
foster a spirit of self-reliance among those needing relief, Lenclud believed that 
UNRRA had spearheaded a large-scale programme in the field of 
‘rehabilitation’, through the development of social, recreation and cultural 
activities. Yet, this thesis will demonstrate that Lenclud’s statement cannot be 
taken at face value. Closer examination of Franco-American UNRRA relations 
reveal moments of heart-felt cooperation alongside persistent fears and mutual 
incomprehension of one another’s motives.148 
 Finally, this thesis offers a new perspective on the question of ruptures 
and continuities in the administration of refugees. Contemporary observers, 
including Hannah Arendt, often contended that DP camps were disturbingly 
reminiscent of Nazi concentration camps and French internment camps.149 The 
reality was far more complicated. DP camps departed in philosophy from the 
refugee camps hastily built in 1939 in the South of France to accommodate 
Spanish Republican soldiers and civilians.150 Initially designed as humanitarian 
shelters, the refugee camps for Spanish Republican exiles blurred the 
distinction between assistance and incarceration, paving the way for a larger 
network of internment centres used by the late Third Republic and the Vichy 
Regime. Unlike these disciplinarian internment camps established in France for 
Spanish and Central European refugees on the eve of the Second World War 
that sought to ‘control’ refugee activities, DP camps (referred at the time as 
‘assembly centres’) were primarily set up to provide temporary relief. As shall be 
explained, these centres were conceived by UNRRA experts as ‘safe havens’, 
as sites of normalization and rehabilitation.  
  Admittedly, as we shall see, spatial factors and French employment 
policies significantly limited DPs’ freedom of movement (DPs were forbidden to 
move beyond a five-kilometre radius from their assembly centre) and introduced 
elements of control and policing reminiscent of the immediate pre-war period. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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But, DPs’ lives were not exclusively defined by spatial confinement. Some DPs 
lived in private accommodation among the German population and benefited 
from the protection of occupation officials. As will be explained in chapter five, in 
some areas, a rich DP cultural life emerged. Furthermore, while the League of 
Nations failed to protect Spanish refugees, UNRRA officials acted – albeit at 
time insufficiently - as protectors of the DPs.151  Thus, despite widespread 
criticism of Allied DP policies, DP living conditions were significantly better than 
those of the Republican refugees in Gurs or Argelès in 1939. 
 The UNRRA years did not represent an entirely ‘new dawn’, however.  
Despite the concerted attempts by post-Liberation governments to present a 
France made new in 1945, the story of DP administration reveals continuities of 
thought with the inter-war years. These continuities were particularly evident in 
the persistence of gender discrimination and ethnic prejudices. Furthermore, 
attitudes towards DPs within the military government and UNRRA were never 
monolithic. Depending on their assigned tasks, political orientation, and perhaps 
also their wartime experiences, French occupation officials and UNRRA 
humanitarian actors constructed very different interpretations of the DP 
situation. Old and new methods and practices of relief work coexisted and 
mingled in the zone. On the one hand, UNRRA fostered the development of 
recreational activities in an attempt to ‘rehabilitate’ DPs; on the other hand, it 
contributed to the persistence of authoritarian and paternalistic visions of relief 
work.  
Summary of chapters 
 
 The following chapters begin with the creation of UNRRA in November 
1943 assessing the early negotiations between French high-officials and Anglo-
American UNRRA planners. At this time, French priorities hinged around the 
recognition of the Provisional Government and the organization of the return of 
French Absents. French planners were neither aware that they would be 
granted a zone of occupation, nor that this zone would hold ‘foreign’ DPs. The 
thesis ends with the recruitment of DPs for work in France and the transfer of 
responsibility to the newly established Federal Republic of Germany in July 
1950.  
 During the intervening period, France went through a process of regime 
change and republican restoration. And, while democracy was restored, French 
voters’ preferences gradually drifted to the political right. As far as international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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organizations are concerned, UNRRA disappeared in the summer of 1947 (in 
post-war Germany) to be replaced by the IRO, heralding a shift in emphasis 
from repatriation to emigration. In total, 11,081 DPs emigrated from the French 
zone to the United States, 9,971 to Australia, 7,952 to France, 3,399 to Brazil, 
3,312 to Canada, 2,787 to England and 2,448 in various countries.152 On 1 July 
1950, when the DP administration was entrusted to German authorities, from 
the original 80,000 DPs present in the autumn 1945 only around 8,000 
inémigrable DPs remained in the zone.153 
 Structurally, the thesis is divided into seven chapters. Although these are 
organized thematically, they also follow a chronological progression. The 
underlying chronological narrative helps clarify the evolution of DP policy, which 
was intertwined with the crystallization of the Cold War and the concomitant 
transformation of the political and economic situation in metropolitan France 
and French-occupied Germany. Part one (chapters one, two and three) 
examines the policies and priorities of French high-officials and UNRRA 
planners, exploring their many disagreements. As in many other aspects of 
French occupation policy, these chapters highlight the gap in perceptions 
between authorities in Paris and Berlin, Baden-Baden and Rastatt. Part two 
(chapters four, five and six) moves on to the lower level of humanitarian 
practices, examining how humanitarian actors, DPs and defeated Germans, 
divided by memory and experience, negotiated daily life. Part three (chapter 
seven) concentrates on of the final phase of the DP years in which the 
recruitment of DPs for France figured largest among policy concerns.  
 Chapter one opens with a contextualization of the diplomatic and political 
issues at stake in the DP problem. It demonstrates that French reluctance to 
participate in the international administration of DPs stemmed largely from an 
ambiguous diplomatic position. While publicly affirming their commitment to 
DPs’ prompt repatriation to the various Eastern repatriation missions, French 
diplomats and military authorities strove, behind-the-scenes, to recruit the 
healthiest DPs for the reconstruction of France. Chapter two explains that the 
recruitment of DPs defied consensus in France. Although there was widespread 
agreement over the necessity to repopulate France, Communist decision-
makers and their ideological fellow-travellers on the French left - particularly 
numerous within the Ministry of Labour and the Office National d’Immigration 
[ONI] - were strongly opposed to the recruitment of what they regarded as 
fascist DPs and ‘war collaborators.’ In this sense, as will be shown, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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bitterness of the debates over the recruitment of DPs for French reconstruction 
mirrored the nascent Fourth Republic’s internal divisions. Chapter three 
explores official debates over the issue of forced repatriation, demonstrating the 
impossibility of pursuing a policy of strict ‘neutrality.’ While these three chapters 
recognise the importance of diplomats and national politicians in formulating 
immigration and repatriation policies, they also stress the extent to which 
emigration and repatriation depended on how French administrators re-
interpreted and implemented their instructions within the zone. As we shall see, 
contradictory instructions from the Foreign Ministry in particular engendered 
differences in implementation. 
 Chapter four introduces French UNRRA relief workers to the reader. It 
explores their background and motivation, their training and their distinctive 
approaches to the DP problem. In contrast with American social workers, this 
chapter argues that French UNRRA recruits were neither equipped with 
professional expertise in case-work nor had a common set of cultural and 
professional values, which framed their attitudes towards DPs. It was a 
heterogeneous group, coming from all different regions and social backgrounds.    
But, despite the lack of harmonized selection procedures and training, it 
demonstrates the emergence of an inchoate ‘professional discourse’, based on 
the necessity to differentiate UNRRA activities from those of the PDR service in 
the zone. French UNRRA relief workers progressively embrace UNRRA’s 
mission of ‘self-help’ according to their own understanding of what were in DPs’ 
best interests. Chapter five concentrates on the realities of DP administration in 
the field and the ways UNRRA staff interpreted UNRRA’s rehabilitation mandate 
in the French zone. In the context of the escalating conflict with the PDR 
service, UNRRA officials progressively asserted their unique humanitarian 
expertise and ‘human sensitivity.’ Yet, UNRRA’s mission was only partially 
fulfilled in the zone. Old and new methods and practices of relief work coexisted 
and mingled in the zone. Chapter six demonstrates the emergence of 
alternative ways to ‘rehabilitate’ DPs in the zone. It examines the question of 
DP employment policies and analyses the cultural trends and values 
underpinning them. Chapter seven concludes with an assessment of the French 
recruitment of DPs for the reconstruction of the French economy. First, though, 
we need to return to 1943. 
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Chapter One: Unwelcome UNRRA? 
French diplomacy and the bureaucracy of relief 
 
Planning for the post-war world began long before hostilities ceased.1 
Memories of the catastrophic after-effects of the First World War, including the 
Spanish influenza, the Ukrainian famine and the major typhus outbreak in 
Russia, lent urgency to the advocates of a massive international reconstruction 
programme for those countries devastated by conflict between 1939 and 1945. 
UNRRA was one of the products of this Anglo-American ‘post-conflict 
planning.’2 Its aim was to supply war-torn countries and displaced populations 
with the basic resources necessary to begin the process of rehabilitation. 
Created at the mid-point between the landmark United Nations Declaration of 
January 1942 and the UN Charter of June 1945, UNRRA departed from its 
predecessor, the League of Nations, in both scope and organization. In the 
inter-war years the League of Nations had ‘functioned merely as the coordinator 
of relief operations independently carried out by private philanthropic 
organizations.’3  After 1945, UNRRA operated instead ‘through governments’ 
and ‘not by distributing alms to individuals.’4 It was hoped that the creation of 
this inter-governmental relief agency would help to prevent the inter-state 
competition and widespread inter-ethnic confrontation so evident after 1918.5 
 Integral to this new approach was, of course, the new, more 
interventionist – and internationalist - turn in American diplomacy.6 During 1943 
the majority of American policy-makers still believed that ‘American aims were 
best served within a multilateral, international relief organization.’ 7  Things 
changed, however, as the nascent Cold War unfolded. As Jessica Reinisch has 
recently argued, UNRRA’s brief existence corresponded with a radical re-
conceptualization within the American government of its foreign policy 
parameters. 8  From 1946 onwards US policy-makers increasingly saw the 
solution to relief needs in binding bilateral arrangements concluded between 
those countries in need of help and those willing to provide it. UNRRA’s very !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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existence thereby came under threat. In the summer of 1946, after the 
realisation that the financial contributions for the 1947 budget would not be 
forthcoming, it was decided that UNRRA would cease operations in 1947.9 As 
stated by Reinisch, the Truman administration ‘came to the conclusion that 
American agendas would only be fulfilled in specific and targeted aid projects. 
Later that year, those analyses led to the formulation of the Marshall Plan as an 
entirely new way of distributing aid.’10 Reflecting on this shift, William Clayton 
was particularly candid: ‘[t]he main priority […] was that we must avoid getting 
into another UNRRA. The United States must run this show.’ 11  
This chapter examines French policy-makers’ often-contentious relations 
with UNRRA, with Anglo-American planners more generally, and, lastly, with the 
installation of UNRRA’s administration in the French occupation zone. During 
1943 and the early months of the following year it could be argued that the 
principal concern of the nascent government-in-waiting, Charles de Gaulle’s 
French Committee of National Liberation, was the independence of Free 
France. Preoccupied with the necessity of securing aid for a liberated France, 
supporters of Free France in Algiers judged UNRRA against a basic criterion: its 
capacity to deliver essential supplies without undermining France’s national 
sovereignty. Their judgement on this score was harsh. Accepting UNRRA’s 
presence on French liberated soil was unlikely to compensate for the attendant 
loss of sovereign control over relief and rehabilitation. Although UNRRA 
planners often attempted to present the organization as the solution to purely 
technical and logistical problems of transporting essential goods into devastated 
areas, its relief programmes were, in fact, highly politicised.12 The distinction 
between so-called ‘liberated’ and ‘defeated’ countries and between ‘supplying’ 
and ‘receiving’ countries ‘reveal the geopolitics and political geography 
underpinning UNRRA’s relief project.’13  One obvious result was that Allied 
countries held priority over ex-enemy nations in UNRRA planning. This helps 
explain why, in February 1944, Jean Monnet informed René Mayer and René 
Massigli that the overriding aim of French UNRRA officials was to ensure that 
France was not classified as a ‘receiving’ country: 
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Our policy was driven by two essential considerations: on the one hand, 
ensuring that France remains entirely free from the control of an 
international body such as UNRRA, which lacks the financial and technical 
means to provide us with supplies and relief but which seeks to restrict our 
freedom to act; on the other hand, collaborating with this organisation in 
determined areas for action where it can be useful […].14 
 
Repatriation was one such field of action. From the start it was envisaged that 
UNRRA would play an important role in assisting the repatriation of nationals 
from allied nations. Committees on repatriation were, therefore, of great interest 
to France. Perhaps because of this, Monnet deplored the slow progress of the 
London-based UNRRA committees to whom the work of repatriation planning 
was assigned.15  
Further disappointment was to follow. UNRRA proved equally sluggish in 
its deployment of effective and adequately equipped teams to arrange interim 
provision for DPs after the German capitulation. Because of the military’s 
priority over UNRRA in the receipt of supplies, UNRRA struggled to equip its 
teams with the most basic of necessities before they entered the field. 
Returning from Germany after visiting a DP camp, M. Grammont, French 
delegate to the Standing Technical Sub-committee on Displaced Persons for 
Europe, bluntly stated in May 1945: ‘I merely wish to summarize the impression 
I had, and which all the delegates of allied nations must have shared, and it is 
this: the complete inefficiency and futility of UNRRA in the camp we have 
visited.’16 Reflecting on UNRRA’s delayed and ill-organized response to the DP 
crisis, Quaker John Corsellis concurred, commenting angrily: ‘[t]hey have had 
months of time to make their plans but when supplies started to arrive, there 
were no preparations made. Their whole sense of urgency is so different to 
ours.’17 The belated deployment of UNRRA teams in the field meant that they 
did not significantly assist in the repatriation of French Absents. 18 It was an 
inauspicious beginning for what was heralded as a new type of international 
organization. UNRRA’s absence from what was, in the eyes of many French 
people, their paramount domestic challenge significantly undermined the 
organization’s credibility in France. 
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Despite widespread disappointment about UNRRA’s early performance, 
in June 1945 the French provisional government nevertheless informed UNRRA 
planners that they were ready to ‘welcome’ the organization in France’s 
occupation zone.19 In the event, it was not until 18 February 1946 that the 
transfer of responsibilities from French authorities to UNRRA staff was officially 
agreed. As this delay implies, the transfer proved a difficult, messy affair, 
occurring at a time when UNRRA’s own existence was increasingly questioned 
internationally. The tetchy relationship between French and Anglo-American 
UNRRA planners raises a number of unaddressed historical questions that are 
central to this chapter. Perhaps the most basic is this: at a time when UNRRA 
was widely criticized as a cumbersome, costly and ineffective international 
organization, why did the French authorities invite the organization to play a 
prominent a role in their zone of occupation? Answering this question raises 
others. Did UNRRA’s presence serve ulterior French motives? Was it exploited 
as an international platform to advance broader French political aims?  And, 
finally, to what extent did UNRRA’s presence provoke argument amongst 
French leaders?   
Despite the proliferation of publications about UNRRA, there has been 
little reflection thus far on France’s contribution to this international project. This 
imbalance, while striking, is unsurprising. It may be imputed to what French 
scholars sub their country’s spécificité criante; namely, the ways in which 
French diplomatic, economic and cultural outlooks differed fundamentally from 
those of their Anglo-American counterparts as described in the introduction.20 It 
might also be partly explained by France’s second-rank position within UNRRA. 
This chapter argues that the history of French involvement in UNRRA offers 
fresh perspectives for the study of post-war international humanitarian projects. 
Admittedly, the domination of Anglo-American planners in UNRRA’s policy-
making organs was a fact. The agency was both directed and predominantly 
financed by the United States. Americans provided a third of its personnel, the 
US Treasury, on average, financed seventy-two per cent of UNRRA’s operating 
costs, and an even larger proportion of its supplies. 21  UNRRA’s official 
language was English and US staff held the leading positions in its internal 
administration. Both of UNRRA’s senior directors were Americans. Herbert 
Lehman, UNRRA director-general from November 1943 to March 1946, was the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19"George"Woodbridge"UNRRA:% the% history% of% the%United%Nations%Relief% and%Rehabilitation%Administration" (New"York:" Colombia"
University"Press,"1950),"p"xxviii"and"vol"2,"p."479."UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0425E0007E06,"Letter"W."Stawell,"Deputy"chief"of"operations"to"
The"Director,"US"Zone,"UNRRA"Headquarters,"28"January"1946."
20"Andreas"Rinke"Le%Grand%retour%N%Die%französische%Displaced%PersonNPolitik%(1944N1951)%(Krankfurt:"Peter"Lang,"2002),"p."16."
21"Woodbridge"UNRRA,%"Vol"3,"p."416.""
! 49 
former Governor of New York State. His successor, Fiorello H. La Guardia, was 
the former Mayor of New York City. But, as Jessica Reinisch points out, many 
smaller member states managed to negotiate relatively decent deals for 
themselves within UNRRA’s executive structures. 22 In many respects, this was 
the case for France too. Although its financial contribution to UNRRA was 
relatively limited, on 26 August 1945 France was classified among the 
organization’s contributing countries. With this came a seat on UNRRA’s 
Central Committee, a reward that, for instance a country such as Canada never 
achieved, despite its generous material contribution. 23  Furthermore, the 
proportion of French staff deployed in Germany was far from negligible. In 
December 1945, they represented eighteen per cent of overall UNRRA 
personnel deployed in Germany, a proportion marginally superior to the 
American presence (which was sixteen per cent). 24 
In making its case, this chapter draws on a wide range of untapped 
material from the French Ministry of Prisoners, Deportees and Refugees (Paris), 
the French military archives at Vincennes, the ITS Tracing Archives (at Bad 
Arolsen), the French Foreign Ministry and French occupation zone 
administration (both held at La Courneuve) and, finally, the UN archives in New 
York. It first provides a tour d’horizon of the dominant French political views of 
UNRRA soon after its inception. It then moves on to consider what, for French 
political leaders, were acid tests of UNRRA policy: resolving the issue of 
repatriations and, linked to this, tracing French civilians in formerly occupied 
territories. The chapter reveals that, much like their British and American 
military counterparts, French military and PDR officers were very disappointed 
by UNRRA’s performance during this initial phase of operations. Irritated by its 
slow and inefficient response, French authorities chose to maintain their own 
PDR service in France’s occupation zone independent of UNRRA structures. 
The decision to do so caused serious friction between Paris, Baden-Baden and 
Arolsen, delaying the transfer of responsibility from the military occupation 
administration to local UNRRA personnel. The third part of this chapter 
examines the resultant conflict between PDR and UNRRA authorities in the 
French zone. As explained below, UNRRA Zone Director, General Lenclud only 
began working in the zone in October 1945. His administration never managed 
to gain full recognition thereafter. This final phase in the contentious relationship !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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between French administrative agencies and UNRRA acquired a more Franco-
French complexion for the simple reason that an aggregate seventy per cent of 
UNRRA personnel in the zone were French citizens.   
 
The politics of procurement 
 
 Over the last two decades the emphasis on French diplomatic failures in 
the post-war period has given way to a more sympathetic reading of the extent 
to which French leaders influenced the reconfiguration of post-war Europe.25 So 
much so that positive assessments of France’s political influence on the 
European continent and of its ability to influence post-war international 
developments have become something of a new orthodoxy. 26  As Mark 
Lawrence puts it, the argument that smaller powers such as France markedly 
influenced post-war international developments has become ‘old hat.’27 Still, 
historians remain divided in their assessment of the coherence and 
effectiveness of the Fourth Republic’s foreign policies. 28  As Talbot Imlay 
observes, ‘[i]n attributing to France a unity of purpose and independence that it 
did not possess, it overstates the Fourth Republic’s influence in the international 
realm. Similarly, in knocking down what amounts to a straw man (the argument 
that France was completely dependent on others, most obviously the United 
States), the emerging orthodoxy risks overlooking not only the various 
constraints under which the French operated, but also an important dynamic at 
work in post-war foreign policy: the ability of the French to innovate when 
compelled to do so by outside pressure, principally from their allies.’29  
 The study of UNRRA opens a window onto these debates regarding the 
evolution of relations between French policy-makers and their Anglo-American 
allies, thereby offering an opportunity to reassess the new ‘orthodoxy.’ As 
Jessica Reinisch observes, ‘UNRRA’s brief existence […] corresponded 
precisely with the crucial interlude between the end of the Second World War !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and the beginning of the Cold War […]. On both sides of the Iron Curtain it 
became a yardstick for how much priorities had shifted between 1943 and 
1947, and formed a measure against which policies formulated in its wake were 
assessed.’ 30  As we shall see, UNRRA solutions were never unremittingly 
imposed on Paris by Anglo-American planners. That being said, French policies 
were far from coherent, the governing coalitions in office after August 1944 
failing to reach a consensus about the premises of French DP policy.31 Before 
considering the implications of this, we need to return to 1943. 
 In the autumn of 1943, whilst Anglo-American planners were delineating 
post-war relief and defining UNRRA’s internationalist principles in Atlantic City, 
French diplomats were preoccupied by rather different priorities. The outcome 
of the war was still far from certain. And the French Committee of National 
Liberation (Comité français de la Libération nationale [CFLN]), at the time 
embroiled in a bitter imperial confrontation with Britain over Lebanese 
independence, was striving to be recognized by its Anglo-American Allies as 
the undisputed government-in-waiting best placed to administer France at the 
Liberation. For French planners, the overriding concern was to re-establish 
national sovereignty and to ensure sufficient interim provision of basic supplies 
in liberated France.32 Whilst for British and American experts, UNRRA was a 
‘vessel into which wartime idealism flowed’, few – if any - CFLN planners or 
French political commentators attached great hopes to what remained an 
untested international organization.33 For French diplomats, UNRRA was, in 
many respects, a footnote to their lobbying for recognition in Washington. As 
UNRRA planner Goodman observed, ‘[the] attitude of the French National 
Committee towards UNRRA will, for some time, be almost inextricably bound up 
with broader political issues.’ 34  Participation within UNRRA was closely 
entwined with the matter of Provisional Government recognition by the US and 
British governments.35 
 The period of UNRRA’s creation and early deployment coincided with 
France’s liberation and its turbulent aftermath, events that also redefined the 
parameters of Franco-American relations and France’s place in the wider world. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In its negotiations with UNRRA, as elsewhere on the international scene, 
France was forced to confront the reality of its eclipse as a major world power, 
after the German invasion of 1940 and its quick defeat.36 In stark contrast with 
the days of Paris-centred peace-making in 1919, between 1943 and 1945 the 
key decisions concerning the post-war settlement were taken by the United 
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, often to the virtual exclusion of 
French representatives.37 France’s role in the newly established UN system 
was similarly diminished relative to its influence in the League of Nations during 
the interwar years.38 Hervé Alphand, member of the French UN Delegation 
spoke for many when he noted, ‘France is weak; it is a negligible country.’39  
 Whilst De Gaulle was striving to re-establish the machinery of republican 
government in France through a Provisional Government prior to the full re-
establishment of democracy via post-war elections, Anglo-American planners 
pressed for France to be administered, like Italy, by an Allied Military 
Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT).40 Echoing President Roosevelt, 
many American planners found the French fixation on issues of sovereignty and 
independence deeply wearisome. Even after the abandonment of the AMGOT 
project, UNRRA planner Brigadier Fraser reported that the ‘French [were] trying 
to manoeuvre UNRRA into the position of working under their control, a quite 
impossible position for the Administration.’ 41  This ‘American irritation’ was 
hardly new. Andrew Williams has convincingly demonstrated that ‘American 
irritation with Europe and the French in particular’ over questions of relief can be 
traced back to attitudes developed in the interwar period.42  
 
France would prefer to see its people starve than to have to ask for charity 
The resolutions passed at UNRRA’s first Council in Atlantic City in November-
December 1943 reflected the dominance of the two principal supplier nations, 
the USA and Britain. UNRRA staff agreed that the Administration would ‘help 
the people to help themselves’ by providing relief to those countries that were 
unable to pay. In a departure from the ‘soup-kitchen’ relief system used by the 
American Relief Administration in the Hoover era following World War I, which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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consisted of distributing only basic supplies under the immediate supervision of 
the various national Red Cross societies, UNRRA planners assigned 
responsibility for distribution to the recipient countries.43 Their aim in doing so 
was to help rebuild normal commercial exchanges and restore national 
sovereignty. Anxious to ‘prevent relief from being used as an instrument of 
international politics’, the declared aim was to distribute supplies on ‘an 
equitable basis irrespective of race, creed, or political belief.’44 In fact, UNRRA 
was soon to be vehemently criticized for being too accommodating of national 
governments. In Poland, for instance, the experience proved that supplies 
frequently went ‘to the wrong places and were used to the wrong purposes.’45  
 Ironically, for French provisional government specialists, UNRRA’s 
commitment to grant responsibility for the distribution of supplies to national 
governments in their liberated territories did not go far enough. They were 
determined to pursue their negotiations on supply matters directly with the allied 
military authorities, in other words outside UNRRA’s jurisdiction, and with the 
minimum of outside supervision.46 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
analyse in detail France’s contribution to the work of the six UNRRA Council 
sessions. One point, however, bears emphasis: during the first two UNRRA 
council sessions in Atlantic City and Montreal – France’s overriding aim was to 
ensure that it would not simply be designated a ‘receiving’ country. French 
planners were adamant that UNRRA should not intervene on French soil, 
emphasising that the country was in a position of ‘total independence’ with 
regards to the administration. Such insistence on national independence was 
not, however, atypical. The Czechoslovak and Yugoslavs Governments, for 
instance, also strove to obtain full control over the distribution of supplies in the 
autumn of 1944.47 And, as recent studies have demonstrated, despite UNRRA’s 
internationalist ambitions, the machinery of post-war relief tended to reinforce 
the primacy of the nation-state.48 
 Apart from the necessity of regaining national independence, there was 
little agreement regarding questions of procurement and post-war relief within 
provisional government circles. 49  Following their work in the Inter-Allied !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Committee on Post-war requirements, popularly known as the Leith-Ross 
Committee and created in September 1941, Free French planners took a 
similarly active role in the work of UNRRA Technical Committees both in 
Washington and in London.50 But communication and cooperation between 
Algiers, London and Washington proved problematic. French diplomatic 
services were chronically understaffed, their personnel severely overstretched 
and rarely in agreement with one another over policy priorities.51 On 24 June 
1944, UNRRA planner Colonel Delahaye noted that it was rare ‘to find a 
gathering of two or three Frenchmen even when more or less democratically 
minded […] prepared to speak with one voice.’52  According to him, tensions 
persisted within the Free French movement between, on the one hand ‘a 
somewhat aggressive slightly embittered national pride’ and, on the other hand, 
an ‘intelligible desire to retain the possibility of a maximum scale of relief should 
this be found actually necessary or politically desirable.’53 These frictions help 
explain why Gaullist personnel remained so prickly about the ‘eradication’ of the 
French language in favour of English in UNRRA’s conferences.54  
  Jean Monnet, who signed the UNRRA Constitutive Agreement of 9 
November 1943, was often in overt disagreement with de Gaulle.55 At the time 
of the Agreement’s signature, Monnet had three different missions: finding 
supplies for France’s immediate needs, preparing a programme of emergency 
reconstruction, and making plans for France’s longer-term economic recovery. 
Monnet is known for his pioneering ideas about European economic integration. 
But, as far as UNRRA was concerned, his priority was to restore France’s 
economic sovereignty. In accordance with the CFLN policy, Monnet stated that 
only a ‘national’ organization was able to take the necessary measures to 
ensure provision of food and relief in France.56 According to him, ‘independent 
organization, especially at a time of serious confusion and disorder in the 
country, could only worsen the situation and diminish the French 
administration’s own sense of responsibility.’57 After his experience in North 
Africa, Monnet even questioned UNRRA’s ability to provide an efficient and 
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quick response to Europe’s humanitarian crisis.58 He was angered that many 
Anglo-American planners directly negotiated with French military officers 
instead of the ‘Comité de la Libération.’59 Moreover, he was frustrated by what it 
viewed as a lack of adequate French representation on the all-important 
Administration Boards. He had, for instance, tried to negotiate the leadership of 
UNRRA’s European Committee for France only to find it entrusted instead to 
Leith-Ross.60 Arguably, French planners would have been more conciliatory 
had they been more intimately involved in UNRRA’s high-level planning. As it 
was, throughout 1943 and 1944 French planners had relatively little scope 
either to determine the relationship with their American counterparts or to shape 
UNRRA’s early development. As Andrew Williams suggests, French planners, 
leaning towards nationalisation and central control, disliked UNRRA’s 
organisational emphasis: ‘The key factor in UNRRA's organisational ability is 
decentralisation', as UNRRA Director Lehman had put it. But 'Planning' was the 
order of the day in Britain and France and that implied centralization.’61  
 
Alice-in-wonderland difficulties 
 At the level of high-politics, French planners were reluctant to cooperate 
fully with the new UN relief administration.62 At the lower levels of Technical 
Committees, working relationships did develop. The work of Professor André 
Mayer on the Standing Technical Committee on Health was, for instance, highly 
acclaimed. 63  Mayer was a strong proponent of technical and scientific 
cooperation with UNRRA, believing that the Anglo-Americans could bring 
precious knowledge and experience.64 UNRRA’s Health Division also valued 
the cooperation of the Fighting French Medical Authorities, notably General 
Sicé and his deputy Colonel Vignal, each of whom served on the Expert 
Commissions on Quarantine.65This medical cooperation certainly drew upon a 
longer tradition of joint action, the International Office of Public Health having 
been based in Paris in the interwar years. In London, some French planners 
also strove to encourage such cooperation in the field. In June 1944, Hervé !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Alphand (representative on the Committee of the Council for Europe) and 
former Minister of State Pierre Vienot advocated the deployment of UNRRA 
personnel in France.66 Vienot even envisaged the creation of a Franco-British 
Committee (‘with practical rather than honorific people on it’) to coordinate the 
work of voluntary societies in France, thereby fulfilling the same function as 
COBSRA (the Council for British Societies for Relief Abroad) did for British relief 
organisations.67 But the influence of these pro-UNRRA planners should not be 
overestimated. 
 The official position of the French government did not change significantly 
during UNRRA’s second council meeting, which convened in Montreal on 16 
September 1944. In spite of the extensive war-damage in their country, French 
representatives insisted that France should not be designated a simple recipient 
nation. Soon afterwards, in October 1944, an UNRRA mission opened in 
Paris.68  The UNRRA personnel in the French capital were warned that ‘if 
UNRRA was waiting for a formal written invitation from the French Government, 
UNRRA might well have to wait until the period of UNRRA’s usefulness had 
passed.’ 69 As John Alexander observed, the ‘French Govt. [was] in no mood to 
be beholden to anyone and would prefer to see its people starve than to have to 
ask for charity.’ 70 As mentioned earlier, this continual emphasis on 
‘independence’ and ‘national sovereignty’ must be placed within the broader 
context of growing popular resentment in the autumn of 1944 towards the 
United States. The American failure to provide adequate food for southern 
France, added to the length of time it had taken the Americans either to 
recognize the provisional government or to endorse its new army, worsened 
Franco-US relations. As Hilary Footitt observes, ‘from the French view point, the 
Allies appeared to be engaged in a deliberate exercise to promise much and 
deliver little.’71 In the autumn of 1944, de Gaulle, longing to break free from his 
country’s state of forced dependence on his British and American allies, signed 
a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union.72 No comparable alliance existed with 
either Britain or the United States.  
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 The lack of a coherent policy within UNRRA also impeded the growth of 
harmonious relations between French and UNRRA staff. 73 Planners in 
Washington, London and Paris often had contradictory priorities and relations 
between the different UNRRA divisions did not run smoothly.74 On 31 October 
1944, the Office of the UNRRA representative in Paris reported the following: 
‘Here we are in the same ‘Alice-in-Wonderland difficulties’ – as in all our dealing 
for the French, since I cannot commit UNRRA to do anything for the French and 
the French claim, with some justice, that they do not know what to ask UNRRA 
for if UNRRA will not state what UNRRA is prepared to do, if invited.’75 This lack 
of coordination between different UNRRA branches was particularly obvious in 
the planning of DP operations. DP divisions and committees had been 
established in Washington and London soon after UNRRA’s creation, but 
communication between them was nugatory. And, as Woodbridge observed, 
‘they suffered to an even greater degree than the rest of UNRRA from the 
nebulous nature of the work which they were supposed to supervise.’76 
 During the early phases of planning for DP resettlement, Franco-UNRRA 
difficulties were compounded by the lack of communication between Henri 
Frenay’s Ministry PDR in Algiers and the Gaullist liaison mission in London.77 
Frenay’s Ministry PDR officials were particularly concerned with the Allied 
planners’ sluggishness in making provision for the rapid repatriation of 
European DPs. As a result, Frenay largely developed his repatriation plan 
outside the UNRRA framework.78 In London a similar gap opened between 
relief planners from continental Europe and the Anglo-Americans, the questions 
of procurement and provisions for DPs becoming bound up with broader 
arguments about the food and other material entitlements of the German 
population. In July 1944 the French delegate sided with his Belgian opposite 
number against Sir Georges Rendel, a proponent of a lenient policy towards the 
Germans. An exasperated Rendel complained that ‘continental European 
Governments wished to see Germany on its knees.’79 As far as the repatriation 
of DPs was concerned, the main disputes revolved around the following points: 
 
1. The principle of the indivisibility of the repatriation of, on the one 
hand, PoWs and, on the other hand, the deportees and civilian prisoners 
2.  The abolition of national sovereignty […] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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3. The technical confusion and the inextricable interferences resulting 
from the use of Regierungsbezirke and […] Wehrkreise, as 
administrative circumscriptions 
4. […] The lack of clear instruction about the cooperation of national 
representatives within the UNRRA administration and the pleine 
participation of the national administrations during the operation period.80 
 
During the autumn of 1944 relations between the ministry PDR and G-5 military 
authorities worsened.81 Frenay remained critical of the allies for their lack of 
understanding of the DP situation. To take one instance of this, he vigorously 
protested against several BBC talks that were broadcast in PoWs camps in an 
effort to stir soldiers’ resistance. These broadcasts, he argued, were prone to 
provoke the Nazi authorities into retaliation against PoWs and French 
civilians.82 For their part, American and British military authorities reproached 
the Ministry PDR for its exclusive focus on French nationals, accusing Frenay 
was neglecting the problem of foreign displaced persons resident in France.83  
 
The ‘never ready UNRRA’ and the repatriation of French nationals84 
 
  For French planners, repatriation was not some abstract, dispassionate 
exercise. Describing the UNRRA Training Centre in Granville (Normandy), 
Commandant Dissard lamented that UNRRA did not share this outlook but 
instead considered repatriation as ultimately secondary to international 
rapprochement.85 This took little account of the fact that the overall total of 
French prisoners of war far outweighed those from Britain or the United 
States. 86  An even more urgent priority for France was the repatriation of 
approximately 650,000 French labour conscripts, 130,000 citizens from Alsace-
Lorraine and 136,000 political or racial deportees. 87  The fast and orderly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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repatriation of these Absents, as they were commonly called, was a critical 
domestic challenge for the new republican elite seeking to establish its authority 
– and prove its legitimacy - to a nation left profoundly divided by the war.88 Not 
surprisingly the government’s efficacy in handling the Absents was one of the 
most hotly contested issues of French domestic policies in 1945. 89  The 
Communist Party orchestrated a violent campaign against Henri Frenay, 
dubbing him l’obligé ou le protégé de Pucheu (a notorious Vichy collaborator). 
The former head of the Combat resistance movement found himself accused of 
supporting René Hardy and having betrayed Jean Moulin.90 Frenay’s historical 
reputation has since undergone a significant rehabilitation, but we should not 
lose sight of the fact that, at the time, the repatriation of French nationals was a 
deeply divisive issue.91 
 Relations between the PDR and allied military planners also continued to 
decline. Anglo-American authorities disapproved of France’s intention to 
conclude a bilateral alliance with the Soviet Union, predictably preferring that 
the provisional government sign up to a ‘multilateral agreement’ with UNRRA 
instead.92  But, in many ways, Anglo-American planners were again asking 
French policy-makers to accept something that they did not want. The 
repatriation of their PoWs, for instance, was not organized through the 
multilateral framework of UNRRA, but directly with local military authorities.93 
And these basic French concerns over the American military authorities’ lack of 
understanding did not dissipate after the mass repatriation of the summer of 
1945.94 
 
UNRRA teams arrived once the battle was over (Frenay) 
On 25 November 1944, UNRRA had signed an agreement with General 
Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF), providing that it should undertake the care of the DPs under military 
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command.95 Yet, as Ben Shepard observes, ‘without a logistic infrastructure of 
its own, UNRRA was dependent on the military for transport, food and supplies 
and frequently found itself in the role of the ‘kicked-around stepchild.’96 It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to examine SHAEF’s unpreparedness for the 
mantle of relief work that it assumed, not least in relation to the care and return 
of French PoWs. Suffice to note that this was something that, quite naturally, 
stirred French resentments towards the predominantly Anglo-American 
command.97 It is perhaps worth recording, in addition, that Andreas Rinke’s Le 
grand retour provides useful contextual information about the repatriation of 
these French nationals.98   
 If the UNRRA administration and Frenay’s PDR Ministry shared 
comparable grievances, they nevertheless viewed the practice of DP camp 
management in very different terms. French PDR staff had misgivings about the 
international composition of UNRRA teams and advocated the creation of more 
homogeneous, nationally based relief teams instead. 99  The more 
heterogeneous character of UNRRA teams was mandated under the 
organization’s resolution 37, which stipulated that ‘the staff of the administration 
should be of an international character, and selected upon the basis of 
individual competence, character, and integrity, without discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, race, nationality, or creed, and recruited upon as wide a 
geographic basis as is possible.’ 100  For French planners, the formation of 
French relief teams with a ‘psychological knowledge of their countrymen’ 
seemed more appropriate in order to provide the necessary ‘psychological’ 
support to displaced persons than the constitution of teams whose members 
often lacked any command of DPs’ languages or even a working knowledge of 
German.101 The French also came out in favour of more substantial recruitment 
of female personnel, arguing that women shared inherent nurturing qualities 
and were more likely to empathize with deportees.102  And, finally, French 
authorities deplored the fact that UNRRA failed to make use of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95"Woodbridge"UNRRA,"Vol."2,p."483."
96"Shepard"The%long%road%home,"p."137."
97"AN,"F/9/3153,"Procès"Verbal"de"la"Conférence"tenue"le"5"avril"1945"sous"la"présidence"de"Monsieur"Frenay;"Also"see"PDR6/741,"
Rapport"sur" l’activité"du"service"des"prisonniers"et"déportés"de" la"1ère"Armée"française,"période"du"25"mars"au"28" juillet"1945,"
Première"armée"française,"EtatEmajor"5ème"bureau,"Service"des"Prisonniers"et"Déportés,"N.571/5/PWX.DP."
98 "Annette" Wieviorka" ‘Le" retour" de" déportation’" in" La% France% de% 1945.% Résistances,% retours,% renaissances% (Caen:" Presses"
universitaires"de"Caen,"1996),"pp."135E140,"p."137."
99"AN," F/9/3153," Procès" Verbal" de" la" Conférence" tenue" le" 5" avril" 1945" sous" la" présidence" de"Monsieur" Frenay." Also" F/9/3309,"
Rapport"d’Olivier"Gobert"à"Cl."Pouzadoux,"3"February"1945"and"MAE,"HCRFA,"PDR"3/25,"Rapport"secret"sur"la"situation"d’UNRRA"en"
RhénanieEHesse"Nassau,"Coblence,"9"July"1946."
100"Woodbridge"UNRRA,%Vol."3,"p."74."
101"SHAT," 8" P" 22," Letter" from" C.G." First" Army" to" C.G." Twelfth" Army" group" (lettre" remise" le" 11" février" 1945);" 8" P" 33," Lettre" du"
Commandant"P."Sorbac"chef"de"la"MMFL"GE5"à"M."le"Lieutenant"Colonel,"chef"de"la"MMFL,"12th"AG,"4"May"1945."
102"AN,"F/9/3286,"UNRRA,"Standing"Technical"SubECommittee"on"Displaced"Persons"for"Europe,"draft"report"of"the"18th"meeting,"8"
May"1945."And"AN,"F/9/3110,"Note"sur"le"recrutement"des"équipes"féminines"françaises,"Paris,"6"February"1945."FD/MB"15."
! 61 
documentation gathered by the ‘Deportees’ section of the MFRA (Mission 
Française de rapatriement en Allemagne [MFRA]).103  Admittedly, UNRRA’s 
European Regional Office (ERO) commissioned a series of reports, which 
looked into the problem of psychological rehabilitation of DPs, and which 
included contributions from psychiatrists, sociologists, social workers and 
doctors primarily from Britain and North America.104 Yet, according to French 
officials, several key issues, including the specific psychological problems 
brought to the surface by repatriation, the different categories of ‘displaced’, as 
well as the specific nature of Nazi work policies, remained unanswered.105 
  If anything, the late deployment of ill-equipped UNRRA teams in the field 
(the first UNRRA teams only left England on 17 March 1945), as well as their 
initial mismanagement of DP camps, proved sceptical French planners right. As 
an early opportunity to prove SHAEF’s administrative competence and its 
capacity to work effectively with UNRRA, the liberation of Bergen-Belsen was a 
great disappointment for Frenay’s Ministry, the British military having 
underestimated the incidence of typhus and having failed to take effective 
measures on time.106 As many studies have shown, the initial period, in which 
UNRRA operated under SHAEF left an impression of pervasive chaos, 
inefficiency and ineptitude. The London office failed either to establish an 
effective field operation in France and Germany or to institute an effective 
working relationship with the military. 107  In the summer of 1945, Frenay 
concluded bitterly that ‘[o]n the whole, UNRRA teams arrived once the battle 
was over.’108 
  Despite UNRRA’s inauspicious beginnings, on 22 June the French 
government authorized it to continue the supervision of DPs in what would 
become the French occupation zone of Germany under the UNRRA-SHAEF 
Agreement.109  Why did French planners think that it was in France’s best 
interests to sign an agreement with UNRRA, when its early activity had been so 
disappointing? One should, perhaps, recall firstly that if French repatriation 
officers often complained about the lack of coordination between various !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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UNRRA services, they were anything but cooperative amongst themselves. 
Frenay was often in overt disagreement with General Koeltz, while the Mission 
Militaire de Liaison Administrative (MMLA) was frequently at odds with the 
services of the Ministry Prisonniers, Déportés et Réfugiés (MPDR).110 Again, it 
is beyond this chapter’s scope to examine in detail the tensions between the 
various French authorities in charge of the repatriation of French nationals. But 
the report quoted below, written by Lieutenant D’Astier de la Vigerie and sent to 
frenay on 15 June 1945, underlines the degree of animosity between serving 
French officials. It also reveals the lines of disagreement between former 
resisters and erstwhile Petainists: 
 
I have just returned from Schwerin, where I found total ignorance and 
incomprehension among the English. Regarding the French - 15 officers of 
the 'Mission Spéciale de rapatriement et de renseignements’ – [the] same 
ignorance, [and the] same incomprehension. The attitude of the latter was, 
simply put, scandalous. They live in the most incredible opulence, enjoying 
the highest comforts, possessing the fullest luxuries. They spend their time 
drinking, throwing parties and screwing [baiser – in the text]. They are 
neglecting relations with the Russians, letting the French die across the 
other side [of the border]. They are incompetent, and, moreover, Petainist, 
never ceasing to criticise the actions of the Government of the Republic 
and in particular those of the Minister of Justice and of you too.111 
 
This reminds us of the need for a more nuanced assessment of the lack of 
organisation and coordination between the various UNRRA services. But it also 
underscores the need to explain France’s rallying to UNRRA – the subject of 
the next brief sub-section.  
 
UNRRA as a ‘diplomatic protection’ 
 Former Quai d’Orsay Political Director René Massigli was a pivotal figure 
in presenting UNRRA’s case. Dubious about the Soviet Union, Massigli was a 
firm advocate of alliance with Great Britain and of France’s wholehearted 
commitment to what would become the ‘Western’ bloc.112  To that end, he 
valued UNRRA as a means to strengthen cultural, economic and political ties 
amongst the western allies. Aside from Massigli’s lobbying, several other factors 
account for the maintenance of UNRRA in the French zone. Firstly, other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Foreign Ministry experts shared his view that UNRRA could provide ‘diplomatic 
protection’ for the recruitment of DPs.113 As explained in the next chapter, the 
discreet and fast recruitment of the youngest and fittest elements among these 
war victims was an essential objective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But, 
since UNRRA Resolution 71 imposed on the organization an obligation to 
encourage the repatriation of displaced persons, the administration was not, in 
fact, well placed to provide this ‘diplomatic protection.’114 So perhaps we should 
attach greater significance to a second factor: French policy-makers’ eagerness 
to get hold of surplus supplies. An UNRRA Office for the Procurement of 
Surplus Military Supplies opened in Paris in August 1945.115 And, when the 
agreement between French authorities and UNRRA was eventually signed on 
18 February 1946, two letters were attached stipulating that UNRRA would 
‘within the limits of its resolutions’ assist in furnishing supplementary essential 
supplies.116 A third, more intangible factor was that French Foreign Ministry staff 
were particularly sensitive over issues of prestige and the manner in which 
France was represented internationally. As mentioned earlier, cooperating with 
UNRRA was only a small aspect of French diplomats’ work to restore France’s 
international influence. As R. de Varreux explained, the presence of UNRRA in 
the zone was simply one element of French cultural diplomacy; UNRRA 
constituting in many parts of the world an essential ‘economic and political 
observation point’ on France’s work as an occupying power.117 Gratified that, in 
August 1945 France secured a seat on UNRRA’s Central Committee, the 
provisional government subsequently ensured that the majority of the personnel 
working in the French zone were French nationals.118 To cap it all, in October 
1945, de Gaulle appointed General Lenclud as UNRRA’s operations director in 
the French occupation zone.  
 
The politics of disappointment: tracing French victims 119 
 Despite Massigli’s early announcement that UNRRA was to continue 
operating in the French zone and the selection of Lenclud, negotiations 
between French authorities and UNRRA headquarters remained difficult. In the 
American zone, UNRRA (unofficially) assumed responsibility for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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administration of DP camps on 1 October 1945. In the British zone, UNRRA 
assumed full responsibility on 1 November.120  However, it was only on 18 
February 1946 that an agreement was signed between French authorities and 
UNRRA in the French zone.121  While the details of the negotiations lie outside 
the focus of this chapter, one point bears emphasis: French military and civilian 
authorities throughout Germany, whether in Berlin, Baden-Baden or in Rastatt, 
viewed UNRRA’s arrival in the zone with a jaundiced eye.122 They believed that 
its presence had been imposed on to them by the all-too Parisian Quai d’Orsay.  
  In order to understand the sharp criticisms that emerged in the field, it is 
important to recall that France’s own repatriation efforts were relatively 
successful. By the middle of September 1945, more than 1.5 million Frenchmen 
had returned home.123  In addition, nearly 300,000 ‘foreign’ DPs had been 
repatriated from the French Occupation Zone. Yet, French fieldworkers 
continued to resent the constraints imposed on them by the American military 
authorities. Repatriation rates were patently unequal. In October 1945, for every 
one train loaded with Polish DPs departing the French zone, twenty-one such 
trains departed from the American zone. 124  French authorities eventually 
obtained more equitable transport allocations, American authorities conceding 
sufficient rolling stock for the French authorities to organize one train per week 
beginning on 16 November 1945.125 But other frustrations followed. 
  Inside the Allied Control Council’s Directorate of Prisoners of War and 
Displaced Persons in Berlin, French delegates took UNRRA to task over its 
failure to take sufficient account of its responsibilities for tracing DPs. The 
Directorate was largely preoccupied with the question of PoWs, German 
refugees, ex-Wehrmacht members and German minorities.126 As far as civilians 
were concerned, French prodding compelled the Directorate to raise serious 
concerns about tracing activities as well. In November 1945 matters came to a 
head. UNRRA had yet to respond to the Directorate’s demand that it should 
take control of the Central Tracing Bureau (CTB). The absence of any UNRRA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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representatives at the 7th and 8th Meetings of the Central Tracing Policy Board 
led French delegates to suggest that another international organization should 
take over the management of the CTB.127 
 Once again, the job of tracing victims was not some abstract, 
dispassionate exercise for the French authorities.128 In December 1945 the 
number of missing French was estimated at around 300,000. On top of that, the 
provisional government hoped to see around 27 000 absents return home.129 
As ‘Director for persons in captivity’ (known as Directeur captivité) General 
Godechevre observed, if tracing PoWs was easy due to the existence of a 
relatively up-to-date card system (i.e. which ran until July 1944) under the 
Geneva Convention, tracing deportees from Alsace and Lorraine was far more 
complicated.130 Statistical data on political deportees was non-existent and the 
Vichy regime had only assembled some scant documentation in regard to 
forced labourers. For French planners, the problem was urgent: victims’ families 
were pressing for answers more or less daily. Nor was this solely a matter that 
concerned the living. On 20 June 1947, in a moving letter to the French 
authorities, Madame Bezanier, mourning her twenty-year old son’s death in 
Bergen-Belsen, highlighted the symbolic importance of the return of his body to 
France; what she called ‘the ultimate consolation’ for grieving French mothers. 
‘For how long will this ultimate consolation be refused us?’ she asked.131 
 French authorities also feared that German memories would fade as time 
went by. According to General Kaepplin, the Director of the DP Service in the 
French zone, Germans showed a pronounced and dangerous ‘tendency to 
oblivion.’132 British and American UNRRA planners, oblivious to the urgency of 
the matter, failed to understand the specificities of French wartime experiences 
of displacement. This was particularly clear in the case of Alsace and Lorraine. 
According to Kaepplin, in their dealings with French nationals forcibly enrolled in 
the Wehrmacht, they should have understood that France was dealing here 
with a ‘national act of conscience.’133 General Godechèvre also underlined the 
issue’s importance from a security screening angle: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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First in Algiers, then during the operation in Italy, the French government 
was already thinking of the search of the Alsatians and Lorraines who, 
during the occupation, had been incorporated into the German forces. In 
general, the enlisting had been compelled; however, amongst these 
mobilized persons, some were volunteers and even Nazi propagandists. 
Groups of qualified officers, familiar with the different dialects and 
acquainted with military security questions, have been formed, in order to 
examine the situation of all the Alsatians and Lorrains.134 
 
  Whereas, overall, French planners were opposed to the creation of 
international teams for the immediate care of DPs, the International Tracing 
Service (ITS) archives show that they did advocate closer international 
cooperation in the tracing of war victims. According to French planners, 
international tracing experts should be deployed to resolve specific problems 
such as recovering medical records, finding mass graves, and exhuming 
bodies.135 At the most basic level, their experiences in the field revealed, as 
Godechevre explained, that it was infinitely easier to get the spelling 
(orthographe) of the surnames of its own nationals correct than it was those of 
other nationalities.136 Many simple – but damaging - mistakes had been made 
in early tracing lists because officers did not have adequate knowledge of 
German and were not capable of reading manuscript indications in Gothic 
letters.137  French planners believed that these mistakes could be prevented by 
a better coordination between the different national tracing missions. Therefore, 
they advocated the creation of an international body, which would centralise 
enquiries from national tracing missions.138  
 In early discussions about tracing, Anglo-American military authorities 
and UNRRA planners envisaged entrusting the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) with the task of operating the central service.139 The ICRC 
had extensive experience with PoWs, a large well-trained staff and a 
sophisticated card index system for the purpose of communications with 
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prisoners of war.140 But, ‘because of its national character’ and ‘owing to the 
lack of diplomatic relations between Switzerland and the USSR’, the ICRC 
declared itself unable to take control of the operation.141 UNRRA planners were 
extremely slow to make alternative arrangements. Although it was envisaged 
that UNRRA would play a role in tracing as early as March 1945, the European 
Regional Office (ERO) was sluggish. Only five employees had been assigned to 
the Central Tracing Bureau in July. Overwhelmed with work, the staff rapidly 
became ‘so discouraged that they were seeking release from their duties.’142 
Colonel J.R. Bowring, former director of the tracing service in the British zone 
was appointed as the director of UNRRA’s tracing service in November 1945.143 
His French opposite number, Director Godechevre approved (at least officially) 
of this appointment. 144 Yet, Bowring deplored that his mission was handicapped 
by his superiors’ lack of interest in tracing matters.145 He complained that he 
was made a scapegoat for the lack of entente between his superiors. 146 
Furthermore his relations with French and Soviet representatives did not run 
smoothly. Commenting on French and Soviet demands for a broad national 
representation on the staff of the CTB, Bowring confided to General Frederick 
Morgan that ‘their action and attitude [were] both rather silly.’147  
  The Central Tracing Bureau was eventually set up in 1946. In October 
it was entrusted to the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee 
Organization (PCIRO), which was supposed to replace UNRRA after its 
termination in June 1947.148 But despite the enthusiasm and commitment of 
director Bowring, UNRRA’s tracing activities left an impression of chaos and 
inefficiency:  
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 The legacy from UNRRA was an extremely heavy one, the worst 
aspect of it being the consequences of the decentralisation UNRRA had 
been compelled by circumstances to execute in the spring of 1947. 
Simultaneously to the reduction of the staff from about 400 to 40, the CTB 
was ordered to send back to the National Tracing Bureaux all the cases 
still unprocessed as well as all original documents concerning their 
nationals. Through lack of care and because of the urgency, enormous 
amounts of paper were created and sent to the National Tracing Bureaux 
and often the wrong ones. The NTB [were] totally unprepared and 
unequipped to deal with this avalanche […].149  
 
In tracing matters, expertise and international cooperation developed largely 
outside UNRRA’s framework. At the official level at least, the French 
government shared resources with the Belgian and Dutch governments. On 
Belgian government initiative a conference between representatives of the three 
countries was organized in Brussels in December 1945. 150 Six conferences 
between representatives of National Tracing Bureaus would follow (in Paris, 
Warsaw, Prague, Brussels, Prague again, and finally, The Hague), during which 
the exchange of expertise was encouraged.151 In quadripartite meetings about 
tracing, France acted as a representative of the interests of the Belgian and 
Dutch governments, the two western countries most severely affected by 
deportation after France. France thereby had a determining influence in pushing 
the ITS project.152As an undated official history of the ITS explained ‘even 
before it came to life, the ITS was an unwanted child. Those responsible for the 
setting-up of the PCIRO hoped to have nothing whatever to do with tracing. It 
was only accepted eventually when the French government in particular made it 
a condition to their joining IRO.’153  In June 1947, Dutch Liaison Officer Captain 
Van Banning noted that ‘it was established that in the French zone the tracing 
has proceeded further than anywhere else in Germany – When stating this it 
must however be considered that there were less Death Marches and 
Concentration Camps in the French zone than in other zones.’154 
 The specific problem of missing children or of children brought to 
Germany from surrounding Eastern countries, lies outside the parameters of 
this chapter. Yet one point bears emphasis: French authorities saw the legal 
and social problems connected with the guardianship of unaccompanied !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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children in very different terms to their Anglo-American counterparts.155 This 
issue became a source of tension between UNRRA child welfare specialists 
attached to the Central Headquarters and PDR authorities both in the French 
zone and in Berlin.  
 
In the French zone, UNRRA is in a very difficult position since the PDR 
has place definite limits upon child search and documentation, while at the 
same time National Liaison Officers there look to UNRRA to assist in 
locating, documenting and removing their children who are in German 
institutions and in German homes.156 
 
If UNRRA headquarters might be accused of paying insufficient attention to its 
tracing mission for adults, it was deeply concerned with the problem of 
displaced children.157 As Tara Zahra has compellingly demonstrated, children 
were at the symbolic heart of efforts to reconstruct Europe in the aftermath of 
the Second World War.158 The French implemented a plan to ‘repatriate’ all 
children born to French-German couples in wartime and occupied Germany.159 
In reality, as UNRRA child care consultant Eileen Blackey observed, the French 
were proposing an ‘extremely flexible interpretation of national status.’ They 
were anxious to receive all children who were ‘of French heritage, although only 
one quarter French’ or ‘any other children who might be available for 
resettlement in France.’160  
 In the pro-natalist context of the post-war Liberation (examined in 
further detail in the next chapter), refugee children came to be seen as ‘most 
valuable immigrants’ by virtue of their perceived ability to assimilate.161 As 
Jacques Tarbe de Saint-Hardouin put it, ‘these children of unknown parents 
represent[ed] a human treasure that a country with low population density 
[could] not ignore.’162 French historian Yves Denéchère argues that French 
authorities established a policy of ‘abandon/adoption’ in their zone, their goal 
being to monitor the abandonment by their German mothers of any children 
with French fathers and to organize their subsequent adoption in France. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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phenomenon constituted the ‘first great movement of adoption in France’, 
French authorities having compiled more than 15,680 dossiers relating to 
children sired by French occupation soldiers and German mothers.163  This 
policy provoked understandable anxieties among UNRRA child welfare 
specialists. Miss Buch for instance pointed out that ‘in addition to French 
children, or part French children, there is some indication that the French are 
moving children of other nationalities into France for adoption; Polish and 
Belgian children were mentioned particularly in this respect.164 Eileen Blackey 
also drew UNRRA Headquarters’ attention to the suspicious activities of one 
Anne Marie de la Morlais, a woman who had served as a welfare officer during 
the war setting up hostels for the illegitimate children of French deportees. 
Deported to Ravensbrück, she worked for the PDR service in Berlin after the 
Liberation. 165 
 
Madame de la Morlais reports that there are 4000 French children in Berlin 
and approximately 100.000 French children still in Germany. This, of 
course, is interpreting a French child to be any child with even a small 
percentage of French blood. Madame de la Morlais has set up what 
amounts to a flourishing social agency in Berlin. She has 600 cases of 
German girls, wives of Frenchmen, who are in Berlin with their children. 
These mothers will be permitted to go to France. […] She is very active in 
contacting all German officials and German institutions to determine the 
whereabouts of any French children.  Apparently she has become quite 
well known in Berlin and not infrequently German girls with illegitimate 
children come to her to give up the children. If she finds abandoned 
children on the streets or in parks, or if on a visit to a hospital she finds 
children who are not getting proper care […] she removes the child and 
sees to it that he gets proper care, with the idea, of course, that he will 
eventually go to France.166 
 
The chosen children were issued with new French ‘certificates of origin’ to 
replace their German birth certificates. These new certificates erased all record 
of the children’s origins and birthplace. The infants were then given new French 
names and assigned to French adoptive families. Tara Zahra has argued that 
only 484 such children were actually repatriated to France for adoption.167 But 
after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the French authorities’ 
desire to prevent problems from cropping up in the future led to the removal of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the administrative traces of this policy from German archives. One can therefore 
easily understand why PDR authorities viewed with a jaundiced eye the venue 
of UNRRA (and later IRO or ITS) child specialists.168 
 Overall, Franco-UNRRA tensions initially boiled down to clashes between 
French domestic and foreign affairs’ interests and Anglo-American priorities. 
Yet, as France’s position within UNRRA’s Administration improved, divisions 
between French policy-makers became more evident. As UNRRA became 
entrenched in the French zone, these administrative arguments took a more 
Franco-French turn. Disputes about whether the presence of UNRRA was 
needed revealed intractable conflicts between Paris and Baden-Baden, Baden-
Baden and Rastatt and Rastatt and Haslach. 
 
A Franco-French war? 
 
 Reflecting on UNRRA’s activities in the French zone, Germaine Loustalot 
noted in February 1947 that ‘the ‘French Occupation zone’ was only starting to 
get its house in order’ when UNRRA took over the responsibility for DP 
matters.169 The installation of French administrative services in the summer of 
1945 had indeed been chaotic, France, the vainqueur de la dernière heure, not 
having had much time to make plans for the administration of its zone.170  The 
geographic delimitations of the zone were confirmed on 29 June 1945 for the 
northern part of the zone and on 4 July for its southern part. Many regarded the 
two distinct territorial blocs assigned to France as a zone mutilée, profoundly 
rural and disorganised, and lacking either geographical integrity or even much 
shared history.171 On 15 July 1945 General Pierre-Marie Koenig took up his 
post of ‘General Commandant of the Military Government’ in Baden-Baden. The 
very same day, Emile Laffon became its General Administrator. For all that, the 
administration of the zone only became fully operative ten days later, on 26 
July.172  
 In the eyes of most French local administrators the DP question was 
primarily a matter of procurement. Its essence, in other words, was the logistical 
problem of matching estimated relief needs with available supplies. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Secondarily, dealing with DPs effectively was thought to be a matter of 
discipline. In this context, the presence of UNRRA, an international organisation 
completely independent of the French Military Government, was bound to 
complicate French disciplinary powers, making repatriation less straightforward 
as a result. Lieutenant-Colonel Gouraud, chief delegate for the Rhineland, 
articulated these viewpoints nicely: 
 
These camps are centres of indiscipline; Agitators, often coming from 
other zones, sneak in and foster a spirit hostile to France. In every region, 
Poles indulge in illegal practices […]. They often pretend that they are 
French and their acts produce a detrimental effect on Germans. 
Placing these camps under the responsibility of an international agency 
will not ameliorate the situation. The DP question is first and foremost a 
question of discipline. This discipline is the responsibility of the authorities 
[of the zone]. 173 
 
 The establishment of the PDR service in the summer of 1945 added 
impetus to French administrators’ early criticisms. The PDR service began 
working in Baden-Baden on 11 August 1945, two months before UNRRA set up 
its regional headquarters. 174  On 20 September, the PDR service was 
meanwhile formally installed within a castle in Rastatt.175 Part of the Direction 
Générale des Affaires administratives, the PDR service came under the 
authority of General Administrator Laffon.176 Its responsibilities were far broader 
than those of UNRRA. PDR officers gathered information about Frenchmen 
presumed missing or dead; they made provision for the approximately 330,000 
German civilians expected to return to the French zone; and they dealt with 
some 170,000 German PoWs. 177 PDR sous-director Alfred Poignant was 
particularly dismissive of the dozen or so UNRRA international teams, which, he 
complained, wore khaki military-style uniform but failed to display any insignia 
of grade or rank, unlike their Red Cross counterparts. According to Poignant, 
the military government had nothing to gain from the presence of UNRRA, 
standing only to lose sovereign control in key areas. ‘UNRRA has no supplies, 
no personal files, no transport resources, no means of communications,’ he 
hissed.178 Echoing Poignant, Mlitary Governor Koenig was equally hostile to the 
signature of the agreement with UNRRA, given that, in his own words, ‘UNRRA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173"MAE,"HCRFA,"ADM"40,"LieutenantEColonel"Gouraud"to"l’Administrateur"Général"Adjoint"pour"le"Gouvernement"Militaire"de"la"
Zone"Française"d’Occupation,"BadEEms,"27"October"1945."
174MAE,"HCRFA,"PDR1/33,"Note"de"service,"10"August"1945."
175"Haut"Commissariat"de"la"République"française"en"Allemagne,"Service"des"Personnes"Déplacées,"Sept%ans%d’activité%en%faveur%des%
personnes%déplacées%en%zone%française%d’occupation,%1945N1952,"rapport"dactylographié"et"illustré,[undated],"p."6."
176"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE1021E0084E11,"Histoire"de"l’UNRRA,"relations"avec"les"Autorités"Militaires"en"zone"Française,"by"Mr.G."Sebille."
177"MAE,"HCRFA," Bonn" 148," Letter" from"Général" d’armée" Koenig" to"Monsieur" Roger" Kaeppelin," 12" January" 1946;" Fiche" pour" le"
Colonel"Vrinat,"10"December"1946."Sept%ans%d’activité%en%faveur%des%personnes%déplacées%en%zone%française%d’occupation,"p."6."
178"MAE,"HCRFA,"PDR1/18,"Poignant,"Note"pour"le"Ministre,"28"July"1945."
! 73 
provided no material supplies’ and that was likely to ‘take control of DP centres 
at a time when the DP problem was expected to have almost ceased to exist in 
the zone.’179  
 UNRRA’s belated entrance into the field led many French administrators to 
question whether its establishment and the deployment of its international 
teams were necessary at all. In this characterization, UNRRA merely signified 
another unwanted layer in a policy-making process that was more than 
complicated enough. From its beginning to its end, the history of PDR-UNRRA 
relations (at the level of authorities in the zone) was punctuated by innumerable 
petty administrative and personal quarrels. Moreover, due to the belatedness 
with which its headquarters were set up - on 24 October 1945 - UNRRA was 
only ‘able to start and develop normally much later (7 or 8 months later) than in 
the two other zones.’ 180  An UNRRA memorandum described the resultant 
problem: ‘Relations with the PDR have always been very difficult due to the fact 
that the PDR did the job before UNRRA’ and ‘wanted the whip hand.’181 As 
explained below, UNRRA’s administrative effectiveness in the French zone only 
really made itself felt in the summer of 1946, by which time its termination was 
being contemplated in London and Washington. In March 1946 the resignation 
of Herbert Lehman, during UNRRA 4th Council session in Atlantic City revealed 
just how serious the threats were to the organization’s survival.182  
 
The whip hand 
 As we have seen, before the signature of the Franco-UNRRA agreement 
on 18 February 1946, jurisdictional boundaries between France and the UN’s 
relief administration remained unclear and contested. 183 Tensions were 
particularly acute in the southern part of the Zone, in the Baden-Württemberg 
area, where DPs remained under PDR control until late 1945. By February 
1946 UNRRA had taken responsibility for fourteen DP centres accommodating 
a total of 44,000 DPs, at which point signature of the agreement with the French 
government resulted in UNRRA taking over an additional twenty-one DP 
centres holding another 19,000 inmates.184 The February 1946 accord also 
prompted sharp increases in UNRRA staff. In November 1945 UNRRA had a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179"MAE,"HCRFA,"Bonn"159,"Général"de"Corps"d’Armée"à"Novateur,"[January"1946?]."
180"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0432E0005E04,"Employment"Branch"[April"1946"?].""
181"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0412E0012E05,"Monthly"report,"French"Zone"of"Occupation"for"the"month"of"October"1945,"7"November"1945."
182"ArmstrongEReid"and"Murray"Armies%of%peace,"p."63."
183"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0417E0010E09,"E.J."Bastiaenen,"Historique"du"centre"DP"de"Fribourg,"vingtEdeux"mois"au"service"de"l’UNRRA"en"
Zone"Française"d’Occupation,"1"June"1947,"p."1."
184"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0417E0002E09,"rapport"succint"sur"les"activités"de"UNRRA"en"zone"Française"depuis"le"18"Février"1946."
! 74 
total of 244 workers in the French zone.185 In February 1946 the organization 
counted 321 ‘class I’ personnel, a figure which rose to 579 by July, alongside a 
further 142 ‘class II’ and 82 ‘class III’ staff.186   
 If the 18 February agreement was tardy, it was also profoundly confusing. 
It granted PDR officers the right to check for fraud and other irregularities in DP 
camps’ administration, but it did not allow them to intrude on administrative 
matters. 187  UNRRA directors were told that they were responsible for the 
internal organization of their camp, that PDR officers were in charge of external 
problems (including policing and control) and that Military Government liaison 
officers retained responsibility for the definitive categorization of DPs by 
nationality and, therefore, for repatriation. 188 On the one hand, PDR officers 
derided the February 1946 agreement as a deeply ‘unfair bargain’, Laffon 
noting that ‘[t]he PDR Direction, charged with ensuring the payment of 
UNRRA’s expenses has a very thankless role […] Held responsible for order 
and discipline amongst DPs, it is often regarded as a hindrance and an obstacle 
by UNRRA officers.’189 On the other hand, UNRRA blamed PDR officers for not 
fully complying with the agreement’s terms.190 
 Cumbersome administrative machinery, combined with extremely poor 
transport and communication facilities also impeded the growth of more 
harmonious relations between the PDR service and UNRRA’s management. As 
UNRRA tracing officer Linden suggested, French administration was 
handicapped by extraordinarily complicated machinery. 191  To make things 
worse, UNRRA’s administrative structure was similarly incoherent. UNRRA’s 
subdivision into two district sectors was at odds with German administrative 
practices and with the five administrative divisions recognized by the French.192  
  On 31 January 1946, UNRRA numbered eleven teams in the northern part 
of the zone (three in Koblenz, and one each in Kaiserslautern, Landstuhl, 
Homburg, Lebach, Pirmasens, Trier-Kemmel, Trier-Feyen, and Kandel). There 
were ten more in the southern part of the zone (at Gutach, Emmendingen, 
Freiburg, Rottweil, Balingen, Biberach, Wangen, Reutlingen, Leutkirsch, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Lindau).193 For the PDR, this distribution of UNRRA’s teams seemed arbitrary.  
In February 1946, UNRRA Zone headquarters was moved from Rastatt (also 
home to the Direction PDR as we saw) to Haslach, some seventy-five 
kilometres from Baden-Baden. This rendered effective communication between 
the two services harder still. 194  The UNRRA administrative structure was 
eventually adapted to the zone on 22 July 1946.195 The Northern and Southern 
districts were replaced by three Supervisors’ offices, one in Neustadt, one in 
Freiburg, and one in Tübingen.196  
 From the perspective of UNRRA, these administrative difficulties were 
compounded by the fact that each of the French administrative districts often 
pursued its own, autonomous policy.197 Admittedly the administrative structure 
of the zone was very hierarchical. But, regionally and locally, military and PDR 
officers retained considerable room for manoeuvre.198 In fact, as Martial Libera 
observes, eight decision-making entities existed in the French zone: General 
Koenig and his Cabinet, Emile Laffon and the GMZFO (Gouvernement Militaire 
de la Zone Française d’Occupation), the GFCC  (Groupe français du Conseil de 
Contrôle) in Berlin and the five Superior Delegates.199 The majority of these 
Superior Delegates were former Gaullist military commanders inclined to assert 
their jurisdictional rights to the full.200   
 In June 1946 UNRRA authorities acknowledged that the relations with the 
military authorities were improving in the northern part of the zone but 
complained about the pointless lines of partition between the three district 
administrations. ‘A lot of time, diplomacy and travel are necessary to be able to 
impose a common policy on the three territories’ they concluded. 201  For 
instance, an UNRRA Employment Officer found 70 DPs residing in a camp in 
Saarland willing to work for IG-Farben in the Palatinate area. Yet, administrators 
in the Palatinate refused these DPs access, claiming that the positions in 
question should be filled by locally available DPs.202 Examples like these and 
the issues thrown up by them recur throughout this thesis. 
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Personal rivalries 
 Conflicting personalities and leadership styles also impeded the growth 
of more harmonious relations between French and UNRRA officials. Describing 
his uphill struggle to gain acceptance within the French zone, Lenclud gloomily 
noted in October 1946 that, since his appointment as director of the zone a year 
earlier, UNRRA had developed within a ‘poisoned atmosphere’, its 
administrative structure challenged from all sides. 203 To a degree he was right: 
the administrative war between the PDR service and UNRRA headquarters 
preceded the signature of the 18 February agreement and was undoubtedly 
intertwined with the battle between General Koenig and Administrator Emile 
Laffon.204  
This escalating conflict, which rapidly transformed itself into a veritable war 
between services, is a familiar tale in the history of the French occupation 
zone.205 Internal rivalries, coupled with a complex decision making-process, fed 
political and jurisdictional conflicts between the military government headed by 
Koenig and the Civil Cabinet led by Laffon.206 The argument between them, in 
many ways, boiled down to questions of form and instances of injured pride 
between two different leaders with fundamentally different managerial styles. 
Pierre-Marie Koenig was a career army officer, hero of Bir-Hakeim in 1943, and 
deeply loyal to General De Gaulle. He attached enormous importance to 
questions of hierarchy, decorum and bienséances. Emile Laffon, on the 
contrary, was a young and brilliant lawyer who, while admiring De Gaulle, never 
shared his dogmatic and partisan vision of French grandeur. Driven by 
resistance ideals, this bright technocrat could be impatient and authoritarian.207 
The two men’s views on the optimum policy to adopt in Germany also 
differed.208 Koenig’s Cabinet was relatively conservative; Laffon’s entourage 
left-leaning. 209 Constituted mainly of young former resisters, this civil 
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administration was driven by its reformist impulse, an informality of tone, and 
little respect for military hierarchy.210 
Koenig enjoyed a much better personal relationship with General 
Lenclud.211  Lenclud was another career army officer, a Saint-Cyr graduate 
whose family had suffered a great deal during the war. One of his sons was 
killed by the Germans, another had been held hostage.212 His appointment, by 
de Gaulle in October 1945 was largely honorific.213 On amicable terms with 
Koenig, Lenclud was, by contrast, openly condescending towards both the PDR 
Director and its Administration: ‘[The Directeur des Personnes Déplacées]’s 
local representatives in the main come into that category of persons usually 
referred to as “poor types” whose only preoccupation is to create as much 
nuisance as possible to UNRRA teams, in order to justify their existence and 
please their “Directeur”.214 Lenclud insisted that the high-ranking French military 
officers working for UNRRA had far better credentials (and social backgrounds) 
than those of the PDR: ‘If an impartial comparison should be made at each level 
between the UNRRA officials and the PDR officials it would easily be 
established that the honour and advantage would go to UNRRA. We have 
within our ranks: One General de Corps d’Armée (four stars) – one Brigadier 
General – One General Medical Corps – five senior officers of the General 
Staff.’ 215 General Lizè de Marguerrittes, appointed on 16 May 1946 as UNRRA 
liaison officer, was also a prestigious General, and a decorated member of the 
Resistance. Formerly military commander in Baden-Baden, ‘he made a name 
for himself [amongst the French administration] due to his extreme severity, 
adopting an uncompromising position on [questions of] behaviour and 
disciplinary issues.’ 216  He was exactly the sort that Lenclud (and Koenig) 
favoured, and just the type that Laffon’s staff held in contempt. 217  Ever 
obsessed with questions of prestige and reputation, Lenclud logged a formal 
complaint against PDR Director Poignant whom he claimed had ‘unjustly’ 
criticized three UNRRA team directors of honourable families and impeccable 
military pedigree. Exasperated, he asked the military government for ‘moral !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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reparation’ in February 1947. 218 UNRRA’s archives suggest that Lenclud and 
his entourage were almost as much preoccupied by questions of prestige, 
recognition and reputation as by the fate of the DPs.  
 Unlike Lenclud, Poignant was not a military man but a professor of 
German, an Agrégé d’allemand, who had worked in the interwar years at the 
Lycée français in Algiers.219 He joined the international service of the PDR 
Ministry in July 1944. In December he became ‘chef d’Etat-Major de la Mission 
Française de Rapatriement en Allemagne.’ 220  Poignant certainly shared 
Frenay’s contempt for UNRRA’s sluggishness and its high administrative costs. 
He never entirely accepted UNRRA’s authority over what he regarded as his 
private fiefdom. 221 According to him, the Foreign Ministry agreed to UNRRA’s 
involvement for ‘high political reasons’, but DPs did not benefit from its 
presence. Like General Administrator Laffon, he also thought that UNRRA did 
not provide any sort of diplomatic protection for DPs recruited to work in 
France.222 If anything, it generated diplomatic frictions, UNRRA staff ignoring 
the delicate (diplomatic) nature of their work, as will be explained in chapter 
three. It would, however, be wrong to think that Poignant was opposed to 
‘international organisation’ as such, a fact confirmed when, in the summer of 
1947, he became Director of the International Refugee Organisation in the 
French Zone. 
 In order to grasp Poignant’s opposition to UNRRA, we need to recall that 
the DP problem did not rank highly amongst the Military Government’s priorities 
and that the PDR administration also struggled to gain recognition amongst 
high officials. In January 1946 the Commissariat Général pour les Affaires 
Allemandes et Autrichiennes (CGAA) believed that the PDR mission should be 
terminated by June 1946.223 During the same month Koenig affirmed that the 
DP problem would soon be solved. ‘A great proportion of the Polish DPs will 
want to be repatriated. The 5,000 Balts will be resettled in Saarland and the 
Intergovernmental Refugee Committee will transport Baltic DP students into 
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French universities. This will leave a maximum of 35,000 DPs in the zone’ he 
said. 224 
 
An escalating conflict 
Examples of petty quarrels between Lenclud and Poignant abound in 
PDR and UNRRA archives. The evidence suggests that the conflict escalated, 
minor incidents being increasingly blown out of proportion. The first dispute 
erupted in June 1946 when Lenclud sent three letters of protest about the PDR 
Direction to Emile Laffon and to UNRRA Central headquarters. The first letter 
concerned the threatening methods employed by local officers in the region of 
Mulheim to coerce DPs into repatriation.225 The second letter concerned itself 
with the unacceptable behaviour of some PDR officers and the third stemmed 
from the uncooperative attitude of the French Red Cross after it officially 
announced the termination of its negotiations with UNRRA in regard to its 
responsibilities for the welfare of children in the care of the UN. Lenclud’s 
argument was not with the right of the Red Cross to run local crèche facilties 
but, rather, with its temerity in acting without informing him.226 
 According to Lenclud, PDR Director Poignant added fuel to the flames 
by writing a confidential report damning UNRRA in the summer of 1946. In late 
June, Paris duly requested a written assessment of UNRRA’s activities in the 
Zone. While UNRRA’s headquarters provided a highly positive account of its 
action, the PDR administration wrote a bluntly unfavourable report which was 
soon leaked. 227 Things soon escalated further. On 11 August 1946 Lenclud 
informed Sir Frederick Morgan, overall head of DP operations in Germany, that 
he had learned ‘from a personal source that Mr. Poignant […] [was] urging 
General Koenig to allow the agreement which expires on 18 August to lapse.’228 
Meanwhile, officials in Paris tended to side with the PDR ‘A priori it is tempting 
to believe the PDR since their views concur with those of the PDR Division in 
Berlin, the British and the Americans all of whom considered that UNRRA is in 
an appalling state.’ 229 
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In September 1946, Lenclud compiled a thirteen-page report responding 
point-by-point to the PDR’s criticisms concerning the lack of professionalism 
among UNRRA staff, their alleged involvement in the black-market, the 
statistical inaccuracies allegedly evident in UNRRA accounting, their inefficient 
screening and their general tactlessness. He accused the PDR in return of 
having hired equally unsuitable individuals.230  He noted that three UNRRA 
officials from the Pirmasens team were dismissed because of their alleged 
involvement in the trafficking of goods destined for DPs. Other PDR officials 
implicated in this affair were still in office. In addition, he recorded somewhat 
defensively that ‘[t]he UNRRA field supervisor in the Province of Baden, was 
arrested, […] following complaints lodged by the UNRRA Director and this is a 
most outstanding example of the severity of the UNRRA administration in 
matters of integrity.’231  Finally, his response to the allegations made about 
UNRRA’s disproportionate cost was that ‘it costs France nothing.’ 232 
 
Une entreprise d’oisiveté  
In this heated administrative environment, Emile Laffon supported many of 
Poignant’s claims. He believed that the Franco-UNRRA agreement constituted 
an unfair economic bargain, French authorities providing basic supplies for DPs 
and UNRRA distributing them: ‘[This] agreement rests on an équivoque: the 
distribution body [UNRRA] is not accountable to the provider body [France] and 
can, according to the law, preserve its independence […].’ 233  Economic 
considerations played a significant role in the anti-UNRRA tenor of his 
statements.  
A displaced person costs on average 360 marks a month; he would have 
certainly cost less if UNRRA had implemented a policy of restriction. The 
figures show that, without UNRRA, a displaced person would cost in 
average 60 marks less; this means that for 51 000 displaced persons 
(from January to June) one would have saved 18.360.000 marks for six 
months. 234 
 
Although, according to UNRRA sources, the French zone had received 500 
tons of food, eighteen tons of clothes, eight tons of soaps and 438 trucks in July 
1946, administrators believed that UNRRA was costing France more than !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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money than it brought in.235 In November 1946 Laffon urged Koenig to prevent 
the French government from signing an agreement with any international 
organization, liable, like UNRRA, to be ‘completely irresponsible and costly’ and 
without any real interest in either ‘repatriating, redeploying or putting DPs to 
work.’ 236 In the same report Laffon explained that the DP situation was much 
better in those regions where UNRRA was not present as the majority of DPs in 
these areas were working. Speaking from the perspective of Saarland, Gilbert 
Grandval concurred. He believed that UNRRA workers were too concerned with 
cultivating their popularity among DPs and insufficiently attentive to restabilising 
law and order.237 The Superior Delegate of Württemberg was of the same 
opinion, claiming that UNRRA was ‘une entreprise d’oisiveté’, which did not 
encourage DPs to work.238 
So embittered did this UNRRA-PDR conflict become that, at the end of 
1946, the Paris authorities opened a confidential investigation into it. The 
resultant report signed by Roger Bloch, Sous-Secrétaire d’Etat, Commissaire 
Général aux Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes, concluded that it was 
essentially a trifling argument between incompatible personalities. 239 In 
accordance with this report, this chapter has demonstrated that the contentious 
relationship between the service PDR and UNRRA in the French zone was 
essentially linked to inter-French arguments between rival administrative 
services and personal rivalries. But, beneath this administrative conflict, were 
there more profound disputes about relief policies and methods?  How were the 
problems of DP administration framed, discussed and understood by UNRRA 
humanitarian activists and by PDR officers in the field? Were the tensions 
between the service PDR and UNRRA merely the product of conflicting 
personalities, bureaucracies and leadership styles, as Roger Bloch suggested? 
This is what the next chapters of this thesis investigate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As we have seen, French planners were at best circumspect, at worst 
wholly condemnatory in their statements about UNRRA. The sources of French !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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scepticism can be located within two very different genealogies. On the one 
hand, anti-UNRRA attitudes were certainly linked to anti-American 
sentiments. 240  Within UNRRA, ‘the balance sheet indicates an undeniably 
Anglo-Saxon and American orientation of international relief.’241 Criticisms of 
UNRRA were part of a broader denunciation of America’s assumption of 
leadership in reshaping the post-war world. De Gaulle himself displayed little 
enthusiasm for the UN system in 1944-1945. Long before famously dubbing it 
ce machin in 1961, De Gaulle expressed misgivings about the United Nations. 
He recalled in his memoirs that he saw with ‘sympathy but not without 
circumspection the nascent organization’, suspecting that the United States 
would use the organization to garner an enormous political clientèle to the 
detriment of France.242 France only signed the UN Declaration on 1 January 
1945 and de Gaulle accepted the invitation to the founding conference of the 
United Nations in San Francisco in June 1945 begrudgingly. 243 Many other 
French leaders proved equally unenthusiastic about the creation of this inter-
governmental relief agency, due to their memories of the League’s alleged 
failures in the inter-war years. Georges Bidault, although often presented as the 
ideological heir of Briand, was, for instance, sceptical about the UN system. His 
biographer Bezias argues that Bidault was profoundly marked by the 
experience of the failure of collective security in the inter-war years. 244 Although 
Glenda Sluga has recently emphasized the strength of the internationalist spirit 
in post-war France, there was certainly less optimism in France than in America 
or Britain that UNRRA would inaugurate an international system ‘which 
enshrined principles of universality, the equality of nations and national 
sovereignty’, becoming thus ‘a new and improved League of Nations.’245 
 This chapter has also argued, however, that there was more at stake than 
a mere reflex of patriotic frustration against the imperialist motives behind 
American humanitarian aid or any lack of enthusiasm for a new and improved !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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League of Nations. As the issue of tracing shows, French policy-makers did, on 
occasion, advocate international cooperation. Yet many French policy-makers 
were dismayed by American and British insensitivity to the cultural impact of 
occupation on continental Europe. Anglo-American lack of familiarity with the 
problem of deportation bred enormous differences in perspective, as much 
concerning relief needs and requirements as future international collaboration 
more generally. French policy-makers doubted that UNRRA would do much 
either to help France rebuild itself, to put the legacies of foreign occupation to 
rest, or to restore its sovereignty. Surrounded by the devastation caused by 
years of enemy occupation and preoccupied with the question of the 
repatriation of French absents, they feared that Anglo-American missionary 
internationalists were, paradoxically, incapable of providing an adequate 
response to Europe’s humanitarian crisis.246 The late deployment of UNRRA 
teams, coupled with the lack of assistance provided for the repatriation of 
France’s own nationals, confirmed and often exacerbated these French doubts. 
This was an inauspicious beginning for what was heralded as a new and 
improved relief organization. 
 In Germany, the presence of UNRRA was mainly perceived as being 
imposed by the Quai d’Orsay. Authorities in Baden-Baden and Rastatt only 
begrudgingly accepted its presence under the condition that the majority of its 
personnel would be French and that the organisation was likely to bring with it 
money and basic supplies, including all-important fuel and trucks. 247 As this 
implies, arguments about economic interest played a significant role. In his 
correspondence with Koenig, Laffon and Poignant, Lenclud insisted that 
UNRRA would bring expert personnel paid in sterling, bringing crucial foreign 
currency into the French exchequer.248 Ironically, one could find exactly the 
same arguments rehearsed in the British zone with regard to US dollar 
shortages.249 Yet, UNRRA’s material and financial provision soon fell short even 
of French authorities’ minimal expectations.  
 Though Lenclud’s military background and his wartime credentials might 
have been thought an asset in negotiating relationships with French military 
authorities both at headquarters and in the field, neither he nor his 
administration gained full recognition in the zone. The overall portrait of UNRRA 
that emerges in French PDR reports is distinctly unfavorable: French !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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administrators recurrently decried this international agency as a waste of 
money, they persistently criticized flaws in its personnel and they condemned 
its cumbersome bureaucracy. Some PDR officers even feared that UNRRA 
relief workers might harbour more sinister, ulterior motives. ‘There is a common 
tendency in certain circles to consider UNRRA officials as foreign intelligence 
services’ agents’ deplored Lenclud.250 Although no evidence was found about 
the presence of spies amongst French UNRRA recruits, these fears were not 
completely unfounded. Frederick Morgan and others had ‘long claimed that 
UNRRA was ‘honeycombed with spies.’251 And in 1947 a number of high profile 
American UNRRA staff members who had spied for the Soviet Union were 
unmasked.252 In the French zone, the personal battle between Poignant and 
Lenclud was only finally resolved in August 1947, when IRO replaced UNRRA. 
Lenclud was dismissed and Poignant appointed at the head of IRO.  
Admittedly, UNRRA was also widely criticized in the British and American 
zones by military commanders who regarded it as both costly and cumbersome. 
General Kenchington, Director of the Displaced Persons Division in the British 
Zone of Occupation, argued that UNRRA was overstaffed with a neglectful, 
untrained and ineffective personnel and that it pursued policies contrary to 
British government interests. Profoundly disappointed by UNRRA’s 
performance, he warned Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin that ‘no way at all 
[should] UNRRA be replaced by another international organisation displaying 
the same level of irresponsibility.’253 Even more surprising, UNRRA director of 
Operations in Germany, General Morgan admitted that the organization’s 
administrative machinery was vast and cumbersome. He even deplored his own 
staff’s lack of professionalism: ‘no discipline, no hierarchy, no confidentiality.’254 
For all that, UNRRA’s shortcomings were arguably worst in the French zone. Its 
administration arrived much later by which time the competing ambition of the 
PDR service had to be contended with. Furthermore, as explained in the next 
two chapters, French DP policies were highly contradictory, leaving room for 
conflicting interpretations and intractable disagreements between the PDR and 
UNRRA officials. 
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Chapter Two: Ideal labourers or unwanted fascists?  
French debates about the recruitment of Eastern European Displaced 
Persons (DPs) 
  
But we need to act quickly. We have already wasted precious time. The 
selection mentioned above would have led to remarkable results if it had 
been carried out straight after the Armistice; It would have been unnoticed; 
in any case, it would not have caused international complications at a time 
when the legal status of most DPs was not clearly determined (ex. Poles). 
The more we wait, the harder the operation will be. Already, we won’t be 
able to bring in the Balts, which the Russians will claim in full and that we 
have committed to return. We are at risk to see the same thing happening 
tomorrow for the Poles. 1 
 
In the spring of 1945, the fast and orderly repatriation of DPs ranked among 
the foremost priorities of UNRRA and the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied 
Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). Amongst these and other Allied authorities, 
there was substantial agreement that sending DPs home remained a 
prerequisite for the reconstruction of devastated European countries and the 
restoration of national sovereignty. All governments demanded the prompt 
return of their nationals. French authorities anticipated, however, that some 
DPs, notably those who had voluntarily collaborated with the Nazis, would 
refuse to return home for fear of retaliation or legal punishment.2 Moreover, for 
French policy-makers, DPs constituted an enticing demographic opportunity to 
replenish a French population denuded by war. Indeed, viewed from a 
demographic and socio-economic stand, DPs constituted an unmatched 
reservoir of white, European, young, healthy and malleable workers. 3 
Approximately three fifths of the DP population was aged between eighteen and 
forty-five; men were more numerous than women.4 Introducing young and 
robust elements from Europe into France’s flagging population might go a long 
way to reinvigorating the nation.  
Government officials and social observers promoted both the recruitment of 
single men on short-term contracts and the entry of families of assimilable DPs 
on a more long-term basis. On the one hand, DPs promised a temporary 
solution to France’s growing demand for workers. Reverting to the practice 
adopted after the First World War, French officials initially focused on attracting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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single men to work for short periods of time.5 On the other hand, deep-seated 
anxieties about France’s demographic decline inspired French-policy makers to 
begin seeking out those assimilable DPs judged capable of producing French 
offspring and being transformed into French citizens.6 Collectively, DPs were 
thereby constructed in terms of a potentially valuable ‘blood transfusion’ able to 
counter the menace of long-term stagnation threatening the French nation.7 As 
we saw in chapter one, DP children were the most valued of all, their youth 
promising better prospects for seamless integration into French society.8  
  What is clear is that DPs were therefore central to French population 
politics after World War Two. French officials also concurred that swift action 
was essential if ‘international complications’ with the Soviet Union were to be 
averted. Moreover, they worried that other European countries might act first, 
picking ‘the cream of the crop’ in DP camps.9 By April 1945, the Commission 
Interministérielle de l’immigration already envisaged the entry of large numbers 
of DPs to France alongside the recruitment of thousands Polish soldiers of the 
Anders Army residing in England and the entry of German Prisoners of War.10  
In June Gaston Palewski, the Director of De Gaulle’s personal cabinet, initiated 
a recruitment operation ‘in close liaison with the Army and the Secret 
services.’11 In that same month, military officials approached Lieutenant-Colonel 
Szymanski to guarantee the emigration of Polish DPs before the termination of 
SHAEF; in other words, before having to negotiate directly with the Lublin 
government.12  A week later Minister of Labour Alexandre Parodi posted a 
formal request with SHAEF’s Major General Lewis for the admission of 20,000 
miners, 10,000 agricultural workers and 5,000 builders to France, all to be 
selected from existing DP workers.13  
Recruiting DPs on this scale was a risky diplomatic venture, particularly for 
those hailing from the territories annexed by the Soviet Union after 1939 (as will 
be explained in the next chapter). Yet, on 20 July 1945, French Foreign Minister !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Georges Bidault approached both Marshal Montgomery for the recruitment of a 
further batch of DPs residing in the British zone and General Eisenhower for a 
similar number to be gleaned from DPs in the American zone. Three days later 
Bidault followed up his initial requests with a letter to General Fraser, the 
French UNRRA delegate.14 He wrote: ‘I recall in this respect that the entry of 
those workers into France is considered as a temporary measure for the 
duration of their contracts, namely 6, 9 or 12 months. When those contracts are 
due to end, the workers, will if they so wish, be free to proceed to the country 
which they will have chosen as their final residence.’15 Lastly, on 28 August 
1945 Bidault enjoined Military Governor General Koenig to comply with a policy 
in the French zone that he summarized in the following terms:  
 
1) Not impeding in any way, and even, insofar as we can, facilitating the 
repatriation of persons who expressed the desire to do so. 
2) Taking full account of the economic and demographic necessities of our 
country in our attitude towards healthy and usable elements that, for 
some reason, refuse to return home. It is obvious that this second course 
of action must not appear overtly in the current discussions in Berlin.16 
 
This official injunction illustrates vividly the ambiguities of French DP policy. 
Almost from its inception, French diplomats sought ways to balance the 
demands of the Soviet Union and Eastern countries with France’s pressing 
labour needs. While publicly affirming their commitment to DPs’ prompt 
repatriation to the various Eastern repatriation missions, many members of the 
Quai d’Orsay, the Military government and the Conseil de Contrôle in Berlin 
strove, behind-the-scenes, to recruit the healthiest DPs for the reconstruction of 
France. As explained in the previous chapter, seen from the French point of 
view, one of the underlying reasons for maintaining UNRRA in the French zone 
was the hope that this international organization would in practice facilitate DPs’ 
recruitment.17 
French policy-makers’ efforts to recruit DPs were not, however, solely 
motivated by French manpower needs. They was also shaped by the conviction 
that German over-population posed an inherent security threat to Europe.18 For 
many French officials, it remained axiomatic that German overpopulation was a 
root cause of Nazi expansionism. Therefore, neither the Quai d’Orsay nor the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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French military government in Germany wanted to see DPs permanently settled 
in Germany. 19 They further dreaded that the intermingling of various ethnicities 
in Germany might serve as a breeding ground for rebellion.20 Yet, with the influx 
of some 12 million German expellees, Germany’s own population had grown by 
7.5 per cent since 1939 with obvious threatening implications for France’s 
security.21 As Tara Zahra puts it, ‘[b]y strategically draining Germany of its 
‘excess’ population […] French officials hoped to prevent Germany from rising 
again to seek Lebensraum (living space) in the East and West.’22  
Despite the early high hopes attached to it and intense diplomatic 
negotiation surrounding it, it was not until April 1947 that a coordinated 
recruitment scheme was launched in the French zone, quickly followed in the 
summer of 1947 by equivalent efforts in the British and American zones. These 
initiatives lagged behind the earlier Belgium’s equivalent ‘Operation Black 
Diamond’ scheme and the British ‘Westward Ho!’ scheme by almost a full 
twelve months.23 Moreover, as will be explained in chapter Seven, the French 
programme achieved very meagre results.24 This raises unaddressed historical 
questions. Why, despite France’s early and eager interest, did the recruitment 
of Eastern European Displaced Persons not start until April 1947? Did 
difficulties and delays stem essentially from diplomatic considerations in the 
context of the nascent Cold War? Were they, on the contrary, linked to 
domestic ideological divisions that surfaced in the immediate aftermath of the 
Liberation? Or was French sluggishness instead more deeply related to abiding 
prejudices about the inability of Slavic populations to assimilate in France? 
These questions are investigated in this chapter. 
 Let us begin with UNRRA. To the disappointment of French officials in 
their occupation zone, the UN agency did not offer the diplomatic framework for 
rapid DP transfers to France. Indeed, to some degree, it did the opposite, 
UNRRA Resolution 71 imposing an obligation on its field staff to encourage the 
repatriation of displaced persons, rather than facilitating DPs’ recruitment to 
third countries.25 This setback was less critical to the delayed implementation of 
France’s recruitment scheme than several other related factors. One was an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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overspill from emergent political rivalries in France. In the highly competitive 
political environment characteristic of the first years of the Provisional 
Government and the Fourth Republic, the question of the recruitment of DPs 
provoked deep splits between political parties, population experts, diplomats 
and occupation authorities. Put simply, the bitterness of the debates over DP 
recruitment mirrored the nascent Fourth Republic’s internal divisions. On one 
hand, some French planners saw DPs as a rich source of human capital for the 
economic and social reconstruction of France. As explained earlier, the 
philosophy behind their approach was strongly nationalist and republican. They 
were determined to transform young refugees into assimilated immigrants and 
thus into model citizens of the French national community. On the other hand, 
communist decision-makers and their ideological fellow travellers on the French 
Left were strongly opposed to the recruitment of what they regarded as fascist 
DPs. A May 1946 British Foreign Office report picked up this point: 
 
The Minister of Reconstruction, Industrial Production and Labour are all 
Communists. Moreover, the Communist sympathies of the majority of 
French trade unions make it necessary for the French government to be 
very careful of accepting refugees whose political outlook is likely to give 
rise to conflict with French workers and therefore to industrial trouble. This 
applies particularly to dissident Poles and Yugoslavs. We have already 
experienced the reluctance of the French to accept anti-Warsaw Poles, in 
spite of France’s need of manpower.26 
 
Certainly the recruitment of DPs elicited particularly virulent opposition from the 
Ministry of Labour. From November 1945 to May 1947, with the exception of 
Daniel Meyer’s brief interlude at the Ministry in December 1946-January 1947 
during Léon Blum’s caretaker government, the Ministry of Labour was solidly 
directed by Amboise Croizat, a former metal worker, trade unionist, and long-
serving communist organiser.27 As explained more fully below, trade unionists 
also played a significant role in opposing DP recruitment. At the Liberation, 
union chiefs enjoyed unprecedented access to immigration control by dint of 
their presence on the Board of Directors of the newly created Office National 
d’Immigration (ONI).  
But there was more at stake that this political and ideological opposition 
emerging from within the Ministry of Labour and the ONI. Beneath the surface 
of what was an ostensibly political and ideological opposition lay a labyrinth of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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economic fears, a traditional protectionist reflex, as well as a raft of moral and 
cultural concerns about the ‘assimilability’ and ‘desirability’ of DPs.  As we shall 
see, population experts and policy-makers were obsessed with the issue of 
assimilation.28 They evaluated the cultural and economic desirability of DPs in 
nationalist, political, gender, class, religious, professional and age-specific 
terms. And their assessments varied widely. While some judged DPs to be 
valuable migrants, others believed that they were inassimilable from a cultural, 
economic, political or biological standpoint. Alongside DPs’ ethnic origins, their 
wartime experiences raised several concerns. Among these, the strength of 
their national (and religious) sentiments, evidence of collaboration with the 
Nazis, and the perceived consequences of their moral and sexual degradation 
in Nazi labour camps stood out. These preoccupations were, in turn, informed 
by memories of the difficult integration of Polish workers during the interwar 
years. And they were sharpened by moral fears sparked by more recent French 
experiences of deportation. Thus, the challenges posed by the recruitment of 
DPs were far greater than a division between anti-communist and communist 
arguments might imply. Debates over the recruitment of DPs triggered 
controversy about how far DPs could or should be assimilated into the nation 
state, about the presumed superiority or inferiority of races, and about the 
nature of French national identity itself. 
Pursuing some of the themes developed in the recent historiography of 
France’s post-war immigration policies, this chapter follows the approach of 
historians Dietmar Hüser and Talbot Imlay in demonstrating that one cannot 
grasp the full ambiguities of French foreign (and here) DP policies without 
examining the domestic disputes that shaped them.29 It examines the reasons 
why contradictory official instructions about the recruitment of DPs reached the 
French zone, thereby exacerbating the conflict between the PDR Direction, 
UNRRA officials and relief workers described in the previous chapter. The 
argument developed here also engages with new trends in the historiography of 
immigration control, which emphasise the complexity of institutions involved in 
the management of immigration and the highly contradictory nature of state 
practices.30 Its source base draws primarily from government and occupation 
agency correspondence that reveals French officials’ anxieties and perceptions. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The work of social scientists, practitioners of the scientific study of working 
practices (science du travail), jurists, demographers, racial theorists and 
journalists are also used, albeit not in a systematic matter, to shed light on the 
cultural context in which official debates unfold. (Chapter Seven returns to this 
theme, digging deeper into the discrepancy between official instructions, local 
perceptions and administrative practices.) 
With this in view, the aim of the remaining chapter sections is threefold. First 
is to explain that the diplomatic risk of antagonizing the Soviet Union and 
Poland played a decreasing role in French calculations. Second is to show that 
contradictory perceptions of DPs stemmed from conflicted memories of the 
interwar years and wartime experiences as much as from Cold War tensions. 
And, third is to demonstrate that, despite concerted calls for increased 
economic immigration, debates over the recruitment of DPs revealed a France 
that was neither particularly welcoming nor remotely united in the immediate 
post-Liberation period.31 
 
Facing a demographic emergency 
 
Like many European countries, France faced a huge labour shortage at the 
Liberation. The Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism considered that 
French reconstruction required twenty billion man-hours, or, more meaningfully, 
500,000 supplementary workers. 32  Anxious debates about manpower 
requirements were aggravated in France by a lingering fear of demographic 
decline dating from the 1880s, an anxiety that was fuelled by the losses France 
experienced during two world wars. 33  As Paul-André Rosental points out, 
demographic preoccupations haunted the political culture of France since the 
late nineteen-century.34 Yet, in 1945, a sense of emergency exacerbated this 
long-running demographic obsession.35 As Karen Adler puts it, Liberation was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the ‘demographers’ moment.’ Amid all the rivalry and discord intrinsic to the 
resistance and the Vichy experience, one note of agreement remained: France 
was under-populated. On this, socialists, communists, Gaullists and Christian 
republicans all concurred with the disgraced collaborationists of the far right.’36 
Pétain had indeed associated national weakness with the low birth rates and 
famously pinned the defeat of 1940 on ‘too few children, too few arms, too few 
allies.’37  
On 3 March 1945, De Gaulle even echoed his former Vichy opponent 
when he told the Constituent Assembly (Assemblée Consultative), the proto-
parliament elected to devise the constitution of the Fourth Republic, that France 
needed ‘12 million babies’ in the next ten years. He went on to identify 
immigration as a critical policy priority.38 As population experts Robert Debré 
and Albert Sauvy observed, everyone agreed that France could not rise from 
the destruction ‘with the weakness of the elderly’; it needed instead the élan de 
la jeunesse to undertake bold reforms.39 This sense of demographic emergency 
inspired Francis Perrin of the newly-created Institut National d’Etudes 
démographiques (INED) to declare that the millions of DPs crowding Europe’s 
refugee camps represented an invaluable resource for France. ‘There are 
currently masses of available candidates for immigration in the world. Now is 
the moment to choose those who will be the most easily assimilable. In two 
years, it will be too late.’40 
 Memories of the economic crisis of the 1930s also prompted French 
authorities to consider measures to protect the native workforce. At the end of 
the war, France faced enormous food and housing shortages. A quarter of the 
housing stock had been destroyed during the war and post-war reconstruction 
initially prioritized the rebuilding of ports, railways and roads, rather than new 
housing stock.41 Industrial infrastructure was in ruins, production levels had 
plunged, shortages were fuelling inflation, and factories were out-dated and in 
urgent need of modernization. Despite the commensurately large reconstruction 
demands, fears of unemployment shaped immigration debates. 42  Trade 
unionists and workers’ representatives feared the arrival of migrant workers. 
They believed that DPs, like foreign migrants in general, undermined the labour !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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market by accepting inferior wages and more limited social protection. 43 
Economists, practitioners of work sciences and workers’ representatives 
recalled that unemployment had fostered the rise of Nazism. Full employment 
was regarded as an ‘absolute necessity.’44  
Debates about the recruitment of DPs must be situated within this 
extraordinary context of the immediate post-war years when immigration 
debates were shaped by the contradictory demands of demographic emergency 
and the necessity to protect the national workforce and guarantee full 
employment. Successive coalition governments embarked on a radical 
redefinition of France’s immigration policies and an institutional redesign of its 
mechanisms of immigration control. 45  Furthermore, the Liberation briefly 
transformed the balance of power between employers and workers. As Robert 
Gildea notes, ‘employers were weakened and discredited by what amounted to 
the failure of capitalism in the 1930s and for having profited from the 
Occupation by producing for the German war economy.’46  The ‘nationalization’ 
of immigration control gave trade unionists unprecedented access to 
immigration control mechanisms. Not only did workers’ representatives gain 
unparalleled representation, but their expectations of democratic decision-
making and free collective bargaining in the workplace were equally 
unprecedented. 47 
 In order to fully grasp the reasons behind the delays that affected the 
launch of the DPs’ recruitment scheme, we need therefore to return to the 
institutional and legislative transformation that occurred between April and 
December 1945.  
 
Institutional rivalries 
Debates over the recruitment of DPs occurred in the context of a surfeit of 
institutions (surproduction institutionnelle) in charge of population planning.48 
This multiplication of administrative agencies exacerbated rivalries between 
official actors and outside experts who voiced more widespread population 
concerns. After the Liberation, the provisional government created a new 
Ministry of Population and Public Health, which replaced the former Ministry of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Health. This was quickly followed by a decree in March 1945 establishing the 
Haut Comité Consultatif de la Population et de la Famille, a Consultative 
Committee on Population and the Family, which was originally created in 1939, 
but subsequently suppressed by Vichy. Six months later, in October 1945, the 
Institut national d’études démographiques (INED) was founded. Closely linked 
to the Ministry of Population, the INED became the key instrument of 
‘populationist’ research and policy, placing scientists and scientific planning at 
the centre of government thinking.49 Just a month later, a 2 November 1945 
ordinance equipped France with a comprehensive juridical system to control 
immigration flows. The Office National d’Immigration (ONI) was vested with sole 
control over the recruitment and entry of foreigners into France. Almost at a 
stroke, the ONI thus became a vaste bureau d’embauche national designed to 
safeguard the French nation, ‘through an effective selection process based on 
considerations of health, employment and moral conduct’ as well as protecting 
foreign workers ‘against diverse forms of exploitation’ and the abuses that many 
had previously experienced.50 Both employers’ organizations and trade unions 
were represented on the ONI’s board of directors. Not until the decree issued 
on the 26 March 1946 was the ONI firmly placed under the joint supervision of 
the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Population. 
As in many other domains of French planning, this panoply of measures 
to regulate immigration and population growth did not represent some sort of 
‘year zero.’51 Pro-natalist measures were devised by proponents, both official 
and non-official, in the inter-war years. 52  State intervention in immigration 
control took shape in the First World War, was extended in the 1920s, and 
expanded further under Vichy.53 Even so, the inter-war period saw France !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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become the largest recipient of immigrants in the industrialised world. 54 Nearly 
three million foreigners arrived in France in these years, and three-quarters of 
all demographic growth could be attributed to immigration.55 Several studies 
have also drawn attention to the continuities in personnel and ideas between 
Third Republic institutions and the newly created administrations of the late 
1944 and early 1945. 56 They have demonstrated that ethnic and racial 
stereotypes continued to shape the logic of immigration in post-war France. 
Perhaps in no area have the claims for continuity been more pronounced 
than in that of the Consultative Committee on Population and the Family. 57 
Georges Mauco was the secretary of the Consultative Committee, charged with 
advising the provisional government on the proposed new statute on 
immigration. Mauco’s views echoed the scientific racism of the Vichy years. His 
‘racial hierarchy’ typifies the persistence into the Liberation era of the anti-
Semitism that had poisoned the late Third Republic.58  Like Jews, Eastern 
European DPs did not rank highly in his hierarchy of desirability. Germans, on 
the contrary, were rated amongst the most desirable candidates for immigration 
to France, alongside ‘Nordic’ migrants such as Scandinavians, Finns, Danes, 
Irish, English, Belgians and Swiss nationals. 59  
To be sure, some scholars question whether the influence of Mauco was 
quite so critical. According to Patrick Weil, the role of Vichy collaborator Mauco 
within the remaking of French nationality in 1945 mirrored an ideological 
division between, on the one hand, ‘the more timorous and clearly anti-Semitic 
approaches’ to national revival, and, on the other hand, a more ‘egalitarian 
conception of the French republic’ promoted by French résistants, such as 
René Cassin, President of the Legal Committee of the CFLN, and Adrien Tixier, 
Interior Minister in Charles de Gaulle’s provisional government.60 More recently, 
Greg Burgess has argued that historians have paid disproportionate attention to 
Mauco’s views. ‘[B]y placing him and his racial ideas at the centre of their 
historical analyses, they in fact attribute him with a disproportional influence on 
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law-making and policy.’61  Certainly, in the debates over the recruitment of DPs, 
the Consultative Committee exerted limited influence, particularly when 
compared to that of the Ministry of Labour or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.62  
Related to these debates, Alexis Spire’s work has prompted fresh 
reflection on France’s enduring institutional culture thanks to his examination of 
the administrative processing and jurisdictional disputes between the Ministry of 
Population, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Interior.63 Scrutinizing the 
influence of trade-unions in the ONI, he has convincingly demonstrated that 
‘immigration policy [is] not only the product of legislation, but also the 
implementation of a set of practices, involving several administrative entities 
each driven by their own rationale.64 At the level of national government, Spire 
distinguishes three such ‘rationales’ at work: the first, a demographic rationale, 
was promoted by the Ministry of Population. It focused on the search for 
assimilable migrants in order to repopulate France. The second, a ‘police 
rationale’, was embodied by the Ministry of Interior, which sought to ensure that 
migrants posed no threat to public order. Finally a ‘manpower rationale’ 
operated within the Ministry of Labour, which tried to reconcile the (often 
contradictory) needs of the French economy with the necessity to safeguard the 
interests of the existing French national workforce. 65 In the case of DPs, as 
explained in the introduction, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also had its own 
rationale, which was strongly influenced by France’s security needs.  
In matters of DP policy, the Ministry of Population felt that its 
demographic injunctions were progressively swept away, if not completely 
ignored.66 Population Minister Robert Prigent endorsed the recruitment of DPs. 
After touring Germany, he declared ‘[H]aving witnessed their clean and skilfully 
arranged interiors in these ruined barracks […] we are convinced that they 
could restore our abandoned villages and revive dying lands.’67 Unlike interwar 
Polish migrants who still hoped to return to their own country one day, Prigent 
argued that the DPs offered ‘long term demographic solutions.’68  He believed 
that the immigration of DPs, ‘à caractère permanent’ might offset the 
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depopulation of the French countryside (les campagnes françaises).69   His 
views were reminiscent of interwar theories on agricultural colonisation, notably 
those advocated by Jean Duhamel in 1927. In contrast with the recruitment of 
single male workers on temporary work contracts, Duhamel championed the 
entry of families, which would be settled in rural areas either as tenant farmers 
or landowners. 70 He believed that rural life was preferable for the integration 
and assimilation of Polish workers when compared to an urban and 
industrialized environment.71   
For all the enthusiasm of its Minister, the Ministry of Population had no 
representative in the Parliamentary information mission, which travelled through 
the three Western zones between mid February and March 1947. This 
Parliamentary Mission was charged with assessing the professional aptitudes 
and ethnic background of DPs. It was originally composed of two 
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bousquet and Perrier), three 
representatives of the Ministry of Labour (Maillet, Briquet and Guerard), a CGT 
representative, a Confédération Générale de l’Agriculture (agricultural trade-
union) representative, an interpreter, and an ONI representative.72 They were 
soon to be joined by a representative of the charbonnages de France (National 
Coal Board), a representative of the French Confederation of Christian Workers 
(CFT) and a representative of the Ministry of National Economy.73  On 4 June 
1947, when plans for the recruitment of DPs were finally implemented, the 
resulting initiatives were entrusted to an ONI delegation, directed by Mr. 
Hornez, representative of the Ministry of Labour.74 Once again, the Ministry of 
Population was not represented.  In addition, ‘the requirement that each entrant 
possess a work permit from the Ministry of Labour meant that immigration which 
did take place under the auspices of the ONI would necessarily be tied to the 
domestic employment scene and not to long-range demographic 
considerations.’75  
On 15 April 1947, the Minister of Population sent a letter of protest to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, recalling that, according to the decree of 24 
December 1945, ‘all the questions regarding immigration and population were 
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within its remit.’76 Despite this apparently unequivocal statement, he had not 
been consulted concerning the draft agreement to be signed with the American 
and British Authorities: 
 
Regarding the content of the problem, I feel I ought to formulate some 
reservations: 1) It seems that the draft agreement does not take into 
account demographic considerations regarding the origins of Displaced 
Persons 2) Some commitments are made concerning the arrival of 
displaced persons’ families without prior enquiry to determine whether 
there was sufficient housing to accommodate them.77 
 
Without doubt, the Ministry of Population was progressively erased from the 
decision-making process. Yet its demographic considerations were not entirely 
dismissed. DPs’ ethnic origins and the ‘assimilation’ values attributed to them 
continued to structure official attempts to regulate their entry.78  
Admittedly, the ordinance passed on November 2, 1945 officially banned 
the use of ethnic criteria in the immigrant selection process. The agreement 
concluded with British and American authorities in June 1947 similarly 
dismissed DPs’ ethnic origins. 79 But the pressure to take such factors into 
account persisted informally and a preference for certain ethnicities was 
undeniably maintained.80  The debates over the recruitment of DPs pointed to 
what Paul-André Rosental has famously termed France’s obsession 
assimilatrice.  This obsession went hand in hand with an identity-related 
nationalism, which justified all sorts of ethnic taxonomy.81  As Karen Adler 
observes, immigrants ‘had to be selected as individuals, but individuals from 
some categories were less likely to pass muster than others.’ 82  As she 
concludes, ‘To separate profession, health and class from ethnicity is to 
misconstrue ethnic typologization for sociology.’83   
Alexis Spire has demonstrated that Italians topped French charts of 
probity at the Liberation, while Algerians (apart maybe from North African 
Berbers) were deemed impossible to assimilate. ‘Progressively, at the 
Liberation, the category of the Italian migrant who intended to settle definitively 
in France and later on to be joined by his family, is established and 
institutionalized, in contrast with the Algerian worker, who was seen as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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temporary labour force, expected to return home eventually.’84 Agricultural trade 
unionist René Massot argued that the workforce that one could find in DP 
camps offered, from a professional point of view, more ‘guarantees’ than those 
originating from Italy.85 But did everyone concur on this? And how did this 
obsession assimilatrice impact on DPs?  
 
Obsession assimilatrice 
French policy-makers concurred that DPs had to be ranked alongside 
foreign workers. French attempts to recruit DPs were not a charitable 
enterprise: French planners were only interested in good and healthy workers 
able to work in specific fields, notably in French mines and agriculture. In other 
words, France was eager to transform Europe’s post-war humanitarian crisis 
into an economic and demographic opportunity. Admittedly, the 1947 
Parliamentary Mission recommended encouraging the recruitment of DPs who 
had been persecuted by the Nazis, arguing that this would both hasten their 
assimilation and do them a humanitarian service. 
 
The visit to the various camps revealed that a certain amount of individual 
humanitarian cases seemed interesting in regard to their rapid 
assimilation: These are 
a) DPs with relatives in France 
b) DPs having particularly suffered under the Nazis (one of them had 
been held four years in Buchenwald) 
c) DPs who have worked in France 
d) DPs having lost all their families and ties with their countries of origin.86 
 
In practice, the French recruitment scheme rarely did justice to the suffering of 
the war’s various victims. The closer scrutiny of DPs’ health, professional skills, 
and ethnic origins shows that DPs were treated above all as a large migrant 
group upon whom France could call for its own needs. They were to be 
admitted within the streams of foreign workers and their legal status was fixed 
to their work and residence permits. By holding them to the same regulatory 
regime as applied to other foreigners, French authorities diminished the DPs’ 
distinct moral status as persons in flight from oppression.  
Experts advocated a selection policy that focused on DPs’ professional 
ability, their health and physical aptitude, their social background and, finally, 
their behaviour. Only those DPs considered to be physically fit and with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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greatest capacity for adjustment were to be selected. By April 1945, the Fifth 
Bureau of the First Army had already assessed the Polish DP population and 
established that the majority of Polish workers were in good physical 
condition.87 Various prospecting missions were then sent to Germany in the 
autumn of 1945. The Ministry of Agriculture, for instance, dispatched a 
recruitment mission to the American occupation zone in Western Germany. This 
mission concluded that the mass of DPs constituted the ‘only available 
reservoir’ for labour, Belgium, Italy, Spain and North Africa being unable at that 
time to provide France with the workers it urgently required.88 The mission 
exhorted the French government to launch its recruitment program forthwith.89In 
the same vein, a report from Monsieur Perrier, technical adviser and chef du 
service de repartition de la main d’oeuvre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
urged the government to act quickly before DPs were attracted by other host 
countries offering better working and living conditions, such as Canada, 
Australia and South Africa.90   
Immigration discourses about the desirability of certain DPs over others 
and their relative aptitudes for work and reproduction revealed the persistence 
of ethic prejudices in post-Liberation France. Despite hosting several post-war 
European Zionist organizations and allowing the transit of migrants to Palestine 
through French territory, French governments showed no interest in Jewish DPs 
as migrant workers.91 The official reason – not borne out by any evidence - was 
that Jewish DPs lacked the professional skills that France required.  More 
pertinent were enduring prejudices. Anne Grynberg has, for example, 
highlighted the ‘anti-Jewish’ tone of the Communist party and L’Humanité’s 
editorial comment.92  France was not the only country to display prejudice and 
discrimination towards Jewish migrants; New World countries were equally 
hostile. Suzanne Rutland has, for instance, shown that in Australia ‘Jews were 
seen as undesirable because they were considered ‘clannish, aggressive and 
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cosmopolitan’, a group which did not assimilate easily and whose loyalty would 
always be suspect.93  
Some French officials also cast doubts on the assimilation potential of 
DPs as a whole. In January 1946, a Foreign Ministry memorandum stated this 
bluntly: ‘currently, it does not appear possible to recruit a stable and good 
quality workforce amongst Displaced Persons […] Nevertheless, in the case of 
a rapid demobilization of PoWs and as a consequence of a severe workforce 
crisis, France could envisage the use of DPs for temporary work.’ 94  In 
diplomatic negotiation, Raymond Bousquet repeatedly explained to his British 
counterparts that the Germans were better workers than the Slavs who were 
difficult to assimilate. Bousquet pointed out that Poles who had been in France 
since 1920 were now returning in large numbers to Poland.95 He even argued 
that ‘from a security point of view’ it was preferable to leave badly assimilated 
Poles in Germany than to transfer them to other western countries: 
 
Monsieur Bousquet added that France would prefer to see Slavs installed 
in Germany near the French frontier and to see Germans emigrate to 
France from the point of view of security. It was doubtful whether all 1,5 
million displaced persons could be removed from Austria and Germany 
and it would be preferable to leave Slavs in Germany rather that Germans. 
Sir George Rendel, reflecting on the ways in which the Volkdeutsche had 
served before the war as an outpost for Nazi infiltration, doubted whether 
this proposal would add to European security.96 
 
A significant number of Polish workers residing in France did indeed decide to 
return to Poland between 1945 and 1948. Robert Poignant from the Ecole 
Nationale d’Administration (ENA) noted the trend, commenting that ‘it seems 
that the Liberation has prompted a veritable fever of return in the Polish mining 
communities.’ 97 France signed three diplomatic agreements with Poland (on 20 
February and 28 November 1946 and on 24 February 1948), permitting the 
return of Polish workers to Poland.98 Although it is very difficult to establish the 
precise numbers involved, official figures varying between 10,000 and 80,000 
workers, the movement in question was undoubtedly perceived by many French !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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officials as a sign that the attempted integration of interwar Polish migrants had 
failed.99   
In post-war ethnic taxonomies, the morality of Baltic DPs was also often 
favourably contrasted with the high criminality and lack of work ethic observed 
among Polish DP camps.  Agricultural trade unionist René Massot considered 
Baltic people by far the most desirable migrants in terms of the professional 
standards they upheld. Banatais, Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians and Yugoslavs’ 
were ranked, in turn, below them. 100 According to Massot, Balts were skilful and 
educated people, but the majority of them were former farm-owners and rural 
employers. They therefore aspired to the same position and hoped to re-create 
‘Baltic communities’ in France. Furthermore, their staunch anti-communism 
foreshadowed other assimilation problems. Unlike others, most notably Poles, 
many Baltic Displaced Persons were neither forced labourers nor former 
concentration camp inmates, but had fled westward in 1944 as the Soviet Army 
advanced.101 Because their countries no longer existed as independent states 
but only as Soviet republics, ‘they behaved more as representatives of their 
former Baltic states than as DPs’ and preserved their nationality, their 
particularism and their language. 102 According to Massot, this constituted a 
hindrance to their rapid assimilation. He therefore advocated the recruitment of 
Poles ‘despite a qualitative inferiority’: 
 
Given that Poles were very numerous in French agriculture before the war, 
that, on overall, they were good workers and satisfied [their employers], 
that, besides this, many employers have some knowledge of the Polish 
language, the recruitment of those refugees should be the one giving the 
most tangible numerical results, despite a qualitative inferiority if compared 
to other nationalities.103 
 
Other observers attributed negative psychological characteristics to Poles. 
This was reminiscent of late-nineteenth century theories that nations were the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘products of a process of heredity that transmits and fixes certain psychological 
characters in a people as in a family.’104  Enarque Robert Poignant observed 
that one should not underestimate the emotional element in the Polish 
character ‘In the Polish soul, feelings of anger, enthusiasm, attachment and 
depression reach levels that we [as French] do not know.’ 105 If stereotypes of 
Poles as unreliable and lazy workers were frequent, many reports singled out 
the commendable traditions, strong work ethic, exemplary hygiene and stronger 
sense of community amongst the Baltic DPs. 106  
 
The Baltic peasant is strong, energetic, independent […] Overall, the race 
is beautiful and healthy; families are not large, two or three children on 
average, and these children are beautiful and immaculately kept […] 
Honest and clean, Baltic people rapidly assimilate foreign languages; 
there are many interpreters among them. Each one of them has the 
command as well as his mother tongue, of a second or third languages: 
Russian, German, English or French (There was a French high school in 
Riga). 107 
 
French authorities were not alone either in favouring the entry of Baltic DPs or 
in casting a sceptical eye over the recruitment of Jewish migrants. The British 
government also favoured the entry of Baltic DPs over Polish DPs.108 Its first 
recruitment scheme, tellingly named the ‘Balt Cygnet Scheme’, was aimed at 
Baltic women recruited to supply domestic staff for hospitals and sanatoria in 
Britain. Baltic women were judged as displaying the highest moral standards.109 
As Silvia Salvatici observes, the whiteness associated with the name ‘Cygnet’, 
coupled with the feminine element, linked racial and gender criteria in order to 
present the scheme in a favourable light to British employers.110 
The report of the French Parliamentary mission reflects these 
ambiguities. Racial hierarchies were incorporated in a new language of 
economic productivity, psychological stability and cultural assimilability.  From a 
moral standpoint, according to this report, Baltic DPs topped the scale of 
probity, ahead of Yugoslavs, Hungarians and Poles: 
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If one can make generalization on a question as delicate as this one, the 
different authorities concurred in admitting that, from a moral point of 
view, the Baltic people are at the top, followed by the Banatais, the 
Yugoslavs, the Ukrainians and then the Poles. It is nevertheless believed 
that the former, who in the months following the Liberation proved to be 
undisciplined, underwent a remarkable recovery. It was also said that 
reemployment and age play a considerable role in their morality. 111 
 
Alongside DPs’ racial or ethnic traits, attention was paid to their ability to speak 
French, their professional skills, their age, their wartime experiences and their 
professed willingness to ‘assimilate’ in France. Given their supposed French 
origins, the Banatais often figured amongst the most desirable DPs. But, if so, 
why was their recruitment so controversial? 
 
Our cousins, the Banatais112 
The conflicting perceptions of the Banatais exemplified the contradictions of 
French post-war discourses about DPs. The recruitment of the Banatais also 
raises fascinating questions about how the French constructed identities in the 
post-war years. Having fled the advancing Red Army and found refuge in 
Germany, Banatais (mainly of 
Romanian, Yugoslav and Hungarian 
origin) re-claimed their eighteenth-
century French roots, their ancestors 
having been transferred from Alsace-
Lorraine to colonize the Banat by 
Empress Maria Theresa. This 
reclamation of ‘Frenchness’ was 
driven by their efforts to conceal their 
intensive collaboration with the 
Nazis. As a result, the recruitment of 
the Banatais, officially presented as 
a ‘return to the motherland’ in 
France, offers a window onto wider 
French experiences of collaboration 
and ‘forced enrolment’ in the 
Wehrmacht.  
The Banatais example is particularly interesting as it demonstrates 
refugees’ ability to shape government policy. At the Liberation, Banatais groups !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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organised local committees in Germany and Austria, lobbying French 
authorities and presenting themselves as good migrants of ‘French origins.’113  
These committees were particularly active: they printed their own certificates 
highlighting their French ancestry and demanding to be repatriated to Alsace-
Lorraine.114 To support these claims, they sent petitions to various authorities in 
Alsace-Lorraine 115  and they edited memoirs and leaflets emphasizing their 
French origins, downplaying their Nazi affiliation, and highlighting their 
agricultural skills.116As Maranda Vultur points out, the myth of the ‘good subject’ 
and of the civilizing role of the colonizer was an integral part of their self-
portrayal and presumptive ‘French’ identity.117  
For the American authorities, Banatais’ committees were first and 
foremost constituted by former SS and Nazi-affiliated personalities.118 Some 
French officials agreed with this view, whereas others regarded them essentially 
as ‘victims of wars’, comparable to the Alsatian Malgré-nous. Others were less 
sympathetic. According to former Free French General Koeltz, it was ‘a well-
known fact that these elements were in previous generations the pioneers of 
Germanism in the Balkans.’119 His fellow Gaullist General, Pierre Koenig did not 
hold them in high his esteem either. In a telegram dating from June 1946, he 
spat out his real opinion: ‘These people are sagouins [filthy pigs] who only 
remember France because they are expelled from the Banat. Yet, it is 
expedient to follow them so I give 5000 marks for the Munich Council.’120 
Jacques Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin was equally disparaging. He insisted that this 
German minority distinguished itself during the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia 
by their participation in atrocities, thus revealing their real allegiances.121  
Laffon provided a more nuanced judgment. He recognized that the 
Banatais’ political sentiments were profoundly Nazi, but that, their dubious past 
notwithstanding, they constituted a particularly ‘advanced’ and skilful population 
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who had transformed the Banat into the granary of central Europe.122 Writing in 
Le Monde, Francis Cabour went further in an article tellingly entitled a ‘French 
minority of Central Europe.’ Without denying their German influence, he 
highlighted the Banatais’ recent efforts to cultivate their French origins and to 
teach their children French.123 More importantly, the French PDR Direction in 
the zone defended Banatais’ interests and helped them establish a French 
school in August 1946 in Kandel, in order to prepare their integration in France. 
124 A French instituteur (teacher) thought there around 70 children.125 
For all that, the strongest appeals in support of the Banatais came from 
Alsace-Lorraine. In October 1946, the Meurthe-et Moselle departmental council 
expressed an official ‘wish’ to welcome the Banatais.126  
 
Fig. 4. Les Dernières nouvelles du Haut-Rhin, February 1947.127 
In February 1947 the Dernières nouvelles du Haut-Rhin published a series of 
articles on the Banatais written by Maxime Fels, comparing their situation to 
those of the Malgré-nous who were forcibly enrolled in the Waffen-SS. ‘There 
were thus 30,000 former compatriots of the Alsatian and the Lorrainers who 
experienced, despite the distance, the separation and the centuries, the same 
tragic fate as their brothers in the land. Dramatique pendant de l’Histoire.’ 128  
The Banatais’ wartime experience was clearly being used here as a means to 
rehabilitate the memory of their Alsatian brothers who were also ‘forcibly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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enrolled’ by the Germans. In the same vein, in August 1948, L’est républicain 
published an investigation about ‘our cousins from the Banat of Temesvar’ 
carried out by Sacha Simon. He presented France as their ‘second homeland’, 
the country of their ancestors.129  
 As these examples suggest, perceptions of DPs were closely related to 
individual and community memories of France’s own wartime experiences. As 
Maxime Fels’ studies testified, the Alsacien-Lorrains projected their own 
memories of ‘forced enrolment’ onto the Banatais. In many respects, the 
situation of DPs was comparable to those of the French STO. The memory of 
the STO remains problematic in France. As Adler observes, the  ‘STO remained 
a historically and politically sensitive topic, one that no French historian tackled 
in depth and on a national scale before 2010.’130 Yet, as Dominique Veillon 
notes, ‘if many of these men were aware of not having been ‘heroes’, they 
refused the label of traitors. Were they not instead victims?’ 131 If the distinction 
between voluntary labour and forced labour did not fundamentally affect their 
situation during the war, it was charged with moral and patriotic meaning at the 
Liberation: 
 
With regard to the wartime experience, Ulrich Herbert states that the form 
of engagement – voluntary or enforced – was disregarded by the German 
authorities and did not fundamentally affect either the terms of the 
contracts or the living conditions of the workers. With regard to the post-
war experience, the distinction between voluntary labour and forced labour 
was charged with moral and patriotic meaning and became central to the 
experience of homecoming and reintegration.132 
 
 Following in the footsteps of Pieter Lagrou and Karen Adler’s work on the 
legacy of France’s wartime experiences, one can argue that the Banatais hold a 
mirror to the way that the people of Alsace-Lorraine framed their own wartime 
suffering, revealing, in the process that French memories of the war were not 
only more fragmented, but more politically divided than historians have 
previously assumed. 133  
Whatever the high hopes of some in relation to it, the recruitment of 
Banatais produced very meagre rewards for France.134 According to the PDR !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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official history, the recruitment of Banatais generated nothing but 
disappointment: 
  
Disappointment for the Banatais when their representatives […] suddenly 
emigrated elsewhere. Disappointment as a result of the impossibility of 
realising their project of group settlement in France. Disappointment at the 
way their emigration was carried out; when the head of a household left, 
other members of the family waited 120 days before being able to join him 
[…] Disappointment for the PDR Direction which could not obtain from the 
metropole the advantages that the Banatais were expecting. 
Disappointment for the Banatais themselves who, lulled into unmet 
promises, abandoned their hope of being one day admitted to France and 
then refused the offers that were made to them. 135 
 
Chapter Seven examines how French administrators implemented the 
recruitment. It shows how the lack of cooperation between the various French 
administrations and the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) impeded the 
smooth entry of DPs to France. But, before this, we need to return to the issue 
of DPs’ alleged or real collaboration with the Nazis. 
  As the example of the Banatais illustrates, the question of DP wartime 
collaboration exacerbated divisions across the French political spectrum. The 
issue of collaboration was a particularly efficient political weapon for French 
communists. The trauma of war and fascism, the sense of guilt deriving from 
Occupation, the fact that the French Communist Party – le parti des 75,000 
fusillés – emerged from the war draped in national colours, and the catastrophic 
post-war financial and economic situation all came together to place la citadelle 
communiste in a paramount position in French intellectual, political and cultural 
life. 136  If French communists deliberately exaggerated the extent of DP 
collaboration, it was perhaps partly because they were themselves trying to 
erase the memory of the Nazi- Soviet Pact and their de facto alliance with 
Germany in the eighteen months that followed. As Robert Gildea observes, 
‘[s]ince the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany, they had borne the brunt 
of repression by the Germans and Vichy, and were now at the forefront of those 
for whom the Liberation meant the inauguration of a new, purified republic, 
staffed by a new political class forged by the Resistance and the sweeping-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135"SeptNans%en%faveur%des%personnes%déplacées,"p."45."
136"Pierre"Milza"‘L’année"1947"dans"les"combats"culturels"de"la"guerre"froide’" in"Serge"Berstein"et"Pierre"Milza"(ed)"L’année%1947"
(Paris" :"Presses"de"Sciences"Po,"2000),% "pp."411E436,"p."413";"Sophie"Coeuré" ‘Communisme"et"anticommunisme’" in" JeanEJacques"
Becker"et"Gilles"Candar"(ed)"Histoire%des%gauches%en%France.%Volume%2"(Paris:""La"Découverte,"2005),"pp."488E507";"François"Furet"
The%passing%of%an% illusion.%The% idea%of%Communism% in% the% twentieth%century" (Chicago:" the"University"of"Chicago"Press,"1999),"p."
384."
! 109 
away of discredited elites by administrative purges of the police, army, judiciary, 
civil service, business and media.’137 
 
Disputing DPs’ value: Collaboration, Anti-communism and Apathy 
 
At the Liberation, the Ministry of Labour and the Confédération Générale du 
Travail (CGT), France’s largest trade union confederation, each came under the 
sway of Communist syndicalistes. They were to play a critical role in blocking 
DP recruitment. Communist participation in the Resistance had given the party 
an aura of legitimacy that was confirmed in the results of the October 1945 
election to the Constituent Assembly. The French Communist Party (PCF) did 
defend the interests of those foreign migrant workers who had participated in 
the French resistance. ‘By their participation in the Resistance’, the Party 
argued, ‘migrant workers have acquired a right to citizenship.’138 It supported 
the Comité d’action et de défense des immigrés (CADI) and encouraged the 
creation of the Association française pour la défense et l’assimilation des 
immigrés (AFDAI). 139  As Stéphane Courtois argues, in the new ‘national’ 
conjuncture of the Liberation, the Party adopted a Jacobinist and integrationist 
discourse. 140 Yet, from a communist point of view, those Eastern Europeans 
who refused to return to their Soviet-annexed homeland were intrinsically 
undesirable. 141  As explained in the introduction, a strong political and 
ideological opposition to fascist DPs emerged from within the French 
Communist-controlled Ministry of Labour and the newly-created ONI.  In March 
1946 the ONI was entrusted to Bernard Auffray, an ardent defender of Spanish 
refugees and exiles from Central Europe. Under his leadership, the ONI 
recruited numerous trade unionists to its staff. 142 As a result, the CGT, closer 
than ever to the PCF, played a significant role in formulating a discourse hostile 
to DPs.   
 In contrast with departments, such as the Ministries of Industry and 
Agriculture, that were considered to be ‘technical’, the Ministry of Labour 
portrayed itself as a primarily social institution, one that was particularly 
committed to developing privileged relations with the trade unions. 143  The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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atmosphere within the Labour Ministry was highly politicized. 144  Recent 
research suggests that the Liberation was regarded by Ministry insiders as an 
unprecedented ‘political opportunity’ to replace a discredited ruling elite with a 
younger, more socially-minded group of republican reformers.145  As Bruno 
Béthouart observes, former members of government and prominent figures of 
the mutualist movement worked together with Church leaders, political and 
trade union activists and employees trained either in ‘Communist schools’ or 
‘departmental CGT unions.’146 Despite their doctrinal and political differences, 
most of these politicians had undergone their political initiation in the interwar 
years.147  When, in May 1947, socialist Daniel Meyer arrived in the Ministry after 
the final eviction of the Communists from the tripartite coalition in office since 
1944, he decried what he described as a veritable ‘colonization’ of the Ministry 
by the Communists.148  To grasp the significance of DPs’ alleged collaboration, 
it is also worth recalling that the Ministry had been severely affected by the 
épuration [purges]. As Jean-Pierre Le Crom observes ‘the administrative 
épuration had hit senior members of staff harshly, replacing many [personnel] 
with Resistants [who were] charged with implementing a significantly different 
policy from those of their Vichy predecessors.’149  
 The question of collaboration with the Nazis was often mentioned in public 
discourse about DPs. This did not apply solely to Eastern European Displaced 
Persons; it also affected Italian migrants. In a press conference on 27 March 
1947, responding to the Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens 
(CFTC)’s concern that the CGT was carrying out ‘political recruitment’ in Italy, 
Ambroise Croizat argued that no ‘political selection’ should take place and that 
choices about which migrants to accept should not take into account their 
political or religious views, with the sole exception of those ‘who compromised 
themselves either in carrying out fascist activities or in voluntarily collaborating 
with the Nazis.’150  In September 1947, Catholic columnist Henri Fesquet used 
the pages of Le Monde to denounce the politicization of DP recruitment. He 
lamented the fact that trade-unionists presented DPs as des ‘troupes de choc 
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des ennemis de la République’, to whom France should close its border.151 
Julien Racamond, representative of the CGT, retorted that this mass of people 
could easily find work in their own country if their past activities did not forbid 
them to do so. For him, most DPs had betrayed their own country and 
collaborated with the Nazis. In the same vein, the fédération du sous sol (a 
mining federation) published an article condemning the extension of the 
recruitment to the American zone, and affirming that certain recruits had 
swastika tattoos.152  
 
Inter-war years and wartime legacies 
 In the autumn of 1945, the Ministry of Labour’s opposition to DP 
recruitment provoked argument between the various French administrative 
agencies in Germany. For their part, the French authorities in Berlin reported 
considerable progress in their negotiations with their American and British 
counterparts. 153  On 30 November 1945, Military Governor General Koenig 
contacted the Provisional Government asking it to accelerate the recruitment of 
DPs. Koenig noted the significant number of farmers and servants among 
Polish DPs in particular. These were all potentially useful labourers. ‘Any further 
delay,’ he noted, ‘would represent a considerable number of working hours lost 
for our national economy.’154  Koenig’s plea was echoed twenty-four hours 
earlier by the Inter-ministerial Committee for German Affairs, a standing 
commission concerned with the economic burden that DPs imposed on the 
French occupation zone, which reiterated the necessity to begin recruitment as 
soon as possible. 155  
In both Berlin and Baden-Baden, French Authorities expressed frustration at 
the fact that, after so much effort spent in negotiating with the Western Allies, 
the Ministry of Labour could suspend the recruitment of DPs arbitrarily. This 
seemed all the more absurd since the Ministry was at the time planning direct 
negotiations with the Warsaw government to launch a recruitment scheme in 
Poland. On 28 December 1945, Berlin Administrator Commandant Domergue 
vehemently complained about it. (His report is quoted at length as it clearly 
illustrates the diplomatic implications of the Ministry of Labour’s decision) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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A few points should be made about this decision of the Ministry of Labour: 
1) It is in contradiction with the decision taken by the Inter-ministerial 
Committee of the German and Austrian Affairs (Comité interministériel des 
Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes), on 27 November, under De 
Gaulle’s presidency, a decision that approved the recruitment in Polish 
camps… 
2) It does not take into consideration the demographic point de vue and 
make the assimilation of the workers that will now arrive difficult. 
We can indeed recall the influence that Polish and Italian priests and 
schoolteachers had on their fellow workers […] and the way they 
combatted very effectively our influence. Tomorrow trade-unionist leaders 
will replace these priests; admittedly, they will defend the democratic 
conceptions in place in Eastern Europe, but they will also remain closely 
tied with their governments. 
3) Regarding our Anglo-Saxon Allies, this decision of the Ministry of Labour 
leaves us in a very difficult situation. 
a) We are asking our Allies to hand over German Prisoners of War 
but we are refusing to take in Polish workers in DP camps. 
b) For months, we have been negotiating an agreement with UNRRA 
concerning these displaced persons and their statute in France. The 
agreement is signed or will be signed very shortly. 
c) On 20 July, M. Bidault wrote to Marshall Montgommery and to 
General Eisenhower to ask them to authorize in their respective zone the 
recruitment of Poles […]  
A whole range of negotiations have then been conducted by the 
Labour Division of the GFCC which have led  
In the British zone: to the recruitment of 3000 workers that we now 
refuse to admit in France. 
In the American zone to the organization of a recruitment mechanism 
which is working well […] (The recruitment has stopped and 600 
miners are en souffrance in a camp of the 7th Army)156 
 
As this report makes clear, Communist decision-makers and their 
ideological fellow-travellers on the French Left feared the excessive influence of 
Polish priests on Polish DPs. These fears were partly rooted in memories of the 
interwar years, when Polish communities isolated themselves from French 
mining communities in Northern France. Supported by Miners’ employers, 
Polish priests established many parishes. 157  Polish migrants’ ostentatious 
demonstration of their Catholic devotion contributed their stigmatization by 
French miners’ groups. 158 While left-leaning French workers saw themselves as 
anti-clerical and militant (political activists), they associated Polish workers with 
employers and malign clerical influence. 159  Admittedly, some pro-natalists !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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might have valued pious DPs’ catholic sentiments and strong sense of family 
and prolific birth rates.160 So much so that, for many Communists (as well as 
some population experts), the main obstacle to Polish assimilation was the 
presence of Polish priests.161 
 After the trauma of war, collaboration and fascism, perceptions of Polish 
Catholic sentiments and their supposed allegiance to right-wing views acquired 
more sinister undertones. This may be gauged from the draft report of the 
February 1947 Parliamentary mission.  
 
Upon its arrival, two radically opposed views divided the Delegation. 
a) For some, DPs are fascists because the fact that they do not want to be 
repatriated to their own countries proves that they collaborated with the 
enemy… that they are fascists. 
Hence DPs were asked insidious questions about their wartime activities 
and about their reasons to refuse repatriation (Ministry of Labour and CGT 
leanings)  
b) For others, there are certainly collaborators among DPs but they are 
lampistes and, beside this, France, given its desperate manpower 
situation, cannot afford to be fussy (Agriculture – National Economy – 
Houillères).162 
 
Clearly, this issue of collaboration revived painfully fresh memories.  For those 
who had been persecuted during the Occupation, the prospect of recruiting 
‘collaborators’ was unacceptable. CGT representative Doutre’s bitter opposition 
to DPs’ illustrated the importance of this issue: 
 
As the journey progressed, these opposite tendencies became closer 
together and an agreement was reached on the following questions:  
a) the recruitment of DP (the common report will be in favour of it) 
b) A very severe security control before the recruitment and the possibility to 
turn back any DP who would turn out to be opposed to France social and 
economic order 
c) The guarantee, repeated over and over again, that recruited DPs would 
not be handed over to the Soviets (MM. Briquet – Guerard – Perier – 
Colombet – Marrot – Legendre). Every delegation member agreed on this 
particular point. 
d) The only member of the delegation who remained irreductible, that is to 
say that continued to say that all DPs are fascists, was M. Doutre, a CGT 
representative. He nevertheless seemed moved every time that he 
encountered political deportees. 
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Two of them in Schömberg (French zone) were deported to Dachau like 
he was.163 
 
If the majority of DPs were arguably not former war collaborators at all, there 
were self-evidently some fascist sympathizers amongst them.164 For one thing, 
the leadership cadres of the DP camps included many individuals who had 
indeed collaborated with the Nazis. For another thing, as will be explained in the 
next chapter, DP leaders encouraged the revival of folk traditions, traditional 
literature and religious activities in the camps, fostering a ‘long-distance 
nationalism’ with characteristics redolent of the Vichy regime.165 Contemporary 
observers and historians alike have demonstrated that the adoption of new 
social and political roles during prolonged life in the camps, alongside the 
intrinsic sense of depersonalisation and homelessness of DPs, proved a potent 
mixture for the development of nationalist activities.166 Furthermore, DPs camps 
accommodated a certain number of conservative and authoritarian personalities 
who had certainly collaborated with the Nazis. As the Cold War unfolded, these 
DP leaders increasingly sought to identify DPs as principled refugees from 
communism. 
 
Fig. 5. A DP makeshift chapel in the French zone167 
 
In France, Communists and their ideological fellow travellers on the 
French Left were not alone in their wariness towards DPs’ nationalism. 
Government officials and social observers feared that Polish DPs would form !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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unassimilated pockets within the nation after their arrival in France. The 1947 
Parliamentary mission recommended breaking up DP communities, by 
encouraging their settlement throughout French territory.168 
 
We noticed the power that certain leaders often exercised [over DPs]. It 
will be essential to curtail this in order to prevent the formation of 
communities […] which represents a security risk and a threat to smooth 
assimilation. We must not loose sight of the fact that DPs are not voluntary 
emigrants prepared to accept a foreign civilization with alien habits, but 
refugees whose gazes remain fixed on their homelands, and therefore try 
to recreate its ambiance while waiting the time to return home. 169 
 
Anxieties about DPs’ nationalist sentiments were further aggravated by 
concerns about the lasting effects of camp-life on the morality of these former 
slaves of the Nazi regime. As a result of their prolonged life in camps, DPs were 
regarded as having fallen prey to a variety of social and mental maladies. The 
most frequent diagnosis was that DP suffered from ‘apathy.’170 
 
Camp life, criminality and idleness 
In Germany, French officials raised concerns about DPs’ nervousness, their 
poor hygiene, a prevalent apathy and a general reluctance to work. General 
Koeltz, for instance, while endorsing negotiations with American authorities for 
the transfer of 25,000 DPs from the American zone to the French zone, 
expressed, his doubts about both Polish workers’ aptitude to work and their 
ability to assimilate in France: 
 
It is an unfortunate fact that the majority of these Poles refused to work, 
using different excuses. The main reason is that they get to like [doing 
nothing] and settle in, little by little, in a life of leisure. Another reason is 
that there are reluctant to leave the Polish community, which defends 
their rights… An expert of the Labour Division in the French zone has 
thus declared that there was a minimum of 20,000 fully capable of 
working Poles and who refused to work […] Reports of our Military 
governors proved that these Poles are often troublemakers and are 
looting the areas surrounding the camps where they are confined. 171 
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In Germany, rumours about a characteristically Polish lack of discipline and 
unwillingness to work circulated. 172  Observers singled out DP idleness, 
drunkenness, loose sexual behaviour, evasion of work and violence. A military 
official, working in Ravensburg, lamented that there were many criminals 
among the DP population. According to him, DPs were more inclined to theft 
and black-marketing than the surrounding German population. ‘Thinking only 
about robbing, committing crime without a moment of hesitation, the transfer of 
these foreigners to France could cause nothing but an outbreak of 
criminality.’ 173  These fears were exacerbated by complaints formulated by 
Belgian authorities that the DP population contained many ‘éléments 
perturbateurs’ and ‘indésirables.’174 
As will be further explained in chapter Six, stereotypes of DPs as morally 
lax, natural criminals and black marketers were commonplace. Many 
occupation officials downplayed the productive value of DPs. They insisted that 
camp life and forced idleness had had devastating moral effects on DPs.175 
René Mayer alleged, for example, that camp-life catalysed the development of 
an ‘appalling mentality.’ ‘One can say that the majority of Poles have lost the 
habit of work and that it would be dangerous to introduce them in France prior 
to their re-education […].’ 176 Such perceptions of lazy and allegedly criminal 
DPs flourished in the zone. 177  Many reports insisted on worsening 
aggressiveness and defiance of authority among the remaining Polish DPs.   
 These anxieties were intrinsically linked to the fears sparked by France’s 
own experience of deportation. In The Legacy of Nazi Occupation, Pieter 
Lagrou provides a fascinating insight into French concerns of the moral decay 
occurring in Nazi work camps. French authorities were alarmed by the moral 
state of French labour conscripts and feared that they had been contaminated 
by the promiscuity and amorality allegedly prevalent within Nazi work camps. 
Based on an examination of the reports of the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne 
(JOC), a Catholic workers’ youth movement, Lagrou notes a widespread 
concern that forced economic migration was a form of ‘crude 
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proletarianisation.’178 Labour conscripts were described as anti-social, sexually 
perverted and unstable elements. According to Lagrou, such ideas permeated 
the thinking of Frenay’s ministerial planners for repatriation, something evident 
in the following Ministry statement: 
 
 There is […] another indication of the incidence of moral panic in the 
general climate surrounding the repatriation of workers from Germany: the 
contamination-psychosis. Repatriates were portrayed as carriers of all 
sorts of disease, from which the physically weakened liberated populations 
had to be protected by all possible prophylactic and legislative means. The 
epidemic-psychosis revealed the Malthusian anxieties of defeated, 
occupied and humiliated societies […]179 
 
Analysis of the correspondence between various regional offices and the 
Ministry of Agriculture also showed how widespread were these anxieties about 
Polish apathy, lack of work ethic and propensity to theft.  As early as February 
1945, minutes from the Ministries of Agriculture and Labour reported a hostile 
attitude towards Polish recruits among rural and industrial employees. On 24 
February 1945, during an inter-ministerial meeting held at the Ministry of 
Labour, the Labour Inspector of Limoges complained about Polish ‘lack of will’ 
and their uncooperative ‘frame of mind’, deploring the Polish workers’ refusal to 
work because they lacked clothes and shoes. He further added that most of 
them had large families, with too many ‘children and pregnant women’, or, in 
other words, inaptes au travail.180 The Polish consul of Périgueux concurred, 
arguing that Polish workers from his region were very ‘hard to please.’181 A 
month later, the Commission régionale de la main d’oeuvre lamented the fact 
that a substantial number of Polish refugees refused to work in the North of 
France.182  In Lorraine, local authorities deplored the involvement of Polish 
refugees in alcohol trafficking and black-market activities with American soldiers 
stationed in the Meuse region. 183   These complaints led the Minister of 
Agriculture to voice its own concerns about the ‘instability of DP manpower’ in 
October 1945. Indeed, he informed the Ministry of Labour that rural employers 
were reluctant to take on DPs after the ‘unfortunate experience of Polish 
workers coming from the Ardennes.’ He explained that most rural employers 
were not willing to pay for the introduction of DPs, anticipating trouble in placing 
DPs in suitable employment if the State failed to pay the necessary frais !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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d’introduction.184  According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the problems that 
these DPs posed were not technical (i.e. due to their lack of training) but, rather, 
were ‘psychological.’185  In fact, the attitude of the Ministry of Agriculture was at 
this point highly ambiguous: on the one hand, it urged the Foreign Minister to 
‘go along’ with the recruitment; on the other hand, it cast doubts on the 
professional value of Polish workers.  This hostility persisted throughout 1947 
and 1948. In February 1948, the Préfet Roger Gromand observed that ‘some 
even wonder if France really wants labourers.’ 186 Certain French employers, 
particularly in rural areas, were accused of harbouring ‘an état d’esprit quite 
hostile to these workers.’187 
 
Success or failure of the recruitment operation in Germany depends 
essentially on whether the problems occurring in France itself get solved. 
If we create, in France, among employees circles and workers’ groups, a 
favourable climate to the labourers coming from Germany, the demand will 
equal the possibilities. 188 
 
 In summary, in the post-war years, the recruitment of DPs elicited 
opposition from different quarters. The searing memories of collaboration, 
added to recollections of previous waves of Polish migrants and the alleged 
influence of their priests, exacerbated negative perceptions of allegedly fascist 
and conservative DPs. While many trade unionists feared the arrival of what 
they regarded as anti-communist reactionaries, many employers were 
apprehensive with regard to the professional value of DPs, fearing that camp 
life had had devastating effects on their morality and work ethic. Overall, French 
public opinion was hostile to the entry of foreign migrants. In 1947, an 
investigation made by INED revealed that only thirty-three per cent of the 
French population were in favour of the entry of foreign migrants.  Yet, by the 
beginning of 1947, France desperately needed workers to realise the Monnet 
Plan. 189  For their part, government officials increasingly realised that France 
could not afford to faire la fine bouche [be fussy]. 190 The National Assembly 
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evidently agreed, particularly having approved the Monnet Plan on 14 January 
1947.191  
The February 1947 Parliamentary Mission recognized the difficulties in 
obtaining precise and accurate information about DPs’ wartime activities. Its 
report mentioned the existence of an incomplete ‘Fichier Berlin’, providing a list 
of individuals who had voluntarily worked for the Germans. It nevertheless 
concluded that one should not overestimate the importance of collaborators 
among DPs:  
 
These elements are a tiny minority. Alongside leaders who exert a 
massive influence in a milieu d’oisifs often gullible, there is a mass of 
individuals – for the most part young – that French life will be able to 
mould. […] This is essentially a safety question that the Ministry of Interior, 
which is not represented in our Mission, will have to solve. 192 
 
Furthermore, it offered a more nuanced review of Polish workers’ alleged 
inclination to crime and amorality:  
 
The reputation that some nationalities built for themselves dates back to a 
period when Germany was in a state of total anarchy at the mercy of 
gangs […] The harmfulness of these groups mainly came from individuals 
who were liberated from common jails in Poland […] But the different 
camp directors that we have interviewed concurred that, since last year, 
order has been restored […] It is important to acknowledge that camp life 
damages an individual’s personality and potentially reduces their moral 
values. Gregarious instincts flourish. Forced idleness for individuals used 
to active life, and in some case, a desire of revenge towards Germans are 
the main causes of these trouble; they explain – if not justify – the past 
attitudes of some DPs. 193 
 
Yet, the Mission still specified that DPs had to be ‘rehabilitated’ and 
‘reeducated’, pointing to their ‘gregarious instinct’ and irrational fears of official 
forms and inquiries. 194 René Massot reached the same paternalistic conclusion: 
DPs were not intrinsically bad, but care was needed in reintegrating them into 
normal work and family conditions: 
 
Admittedly some objections can be made against DP regarding their 
willingness to work and certain aspects of their behaviour before and since 
their integration in camps; but their tragic existence in the last several 
years should help us to understand and excuse some of the grievances 
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and make us firmly believe that, once reintegrated into normal work and 
family conditions, they will give us satisfaction. 195 
 
Launching the recruitment 
 
In February 1947, France declared itself prepared to take in 50,000 DPs, 
to help ‘rectify [the] serious manpower situation.’ 196 By this point the impending 
liberation of German PoWs (a requirement reiterated by the American 
authorities on 3 December 1946), coupled with the prospect of a worsening 
economic crisis due to the severe winter weather, jeopardized the 
implementation of the Monnet Plan. 197  Although the American authorities 
accepted the principle of the transformation of PoWs into free workers, ‘skilled 
and untrained volunteer miners [were] most urgently required’ for the Monnet 
Plan.198 56,000 German PoWs accounted for fully twenty per cent of French 
coal production at the time.199 Their imminent departure was paralleled by a 
significant reduction of the imported coal supplies from the Ruhr. As the Ministry 
of National Economy put it, ‘the entire economic outlook [was] dominated by the 
coal problem.’200 Coal impinged on France’s entire program of economic and 
financial development and on its political stability. 201 
Negotiations about the recruitment of DPs with the British and American 
authorities were therefore resumed. Paris Ambassador Alfred Duff Cooper 
informed the British government that although Amboise Croizat anticipated 
‘difficulties with the trade unions’, he was disposed to consider the recruitment 
of DPs.202 Several factors explained this shift. In the spring of 1947, Croizat was 
becoming increasingly isolated within the government.203 Given the persistence 
of restrictions and privations, a growing hiatus between workers and the 
Communist Party was emerging. 204 Furthermore, the attempted recruitment of 
Italian migrants had produced meagre results. It proved unexpectedly costly as 
well. As mentioned earlier, Polish workers settled in France were also returning !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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home under the newly-signed agreements on voluntary repatriation with the 
Polish government.205 In Germany, France feared losing valuable labourers to 
Belgium or Britain. Since the spring of 1946 Belgian and British recruitment 
missions had been prospecting DP camps for robust, young workers. French 
authorities, particularly interested in young DPs aged between sixteen and 
twenty-five and willing to work in mines were worried that none would be left. 206 
Finally, the impending termination of UNRRA also drove France into finding a 
solution to the DP problem in its zone. For all that, it took until late March 1947 
before the Comité intérministérielle économique (Interministerial Economy 
committee) finally approved the recruitment scheme.207  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ultimately played a considerable role in 
launching the recruitment programme. As explained in the introduction, for 
French diplomats, the question of the recruitment of DPs was inherently linked 
with that of German migrants. The launch of the recruitment scheme paralleled 
France’s progressive alignment with the West. In March 1947, the Moscow 
Conference of Foreign Ministers occasioned, what Maurice Vaïsse terms, an 
‘agonizing reappraisal’ of France’s foreign policy, Foreign Minister Bidault 
gradually realizing that, without Anglo-American support, French German 
objectives could never be attained.208 At the conference, Bidault nevertheless 
pressed his views concerning the German population. According to him, ‘there 
should be no transfers of German population beyond those already agreed at 
Potsdam, […] transfers specified by Potsdam should now stop, […] emigration 
of Germans should be encouraged and […] the settlement of displaced persons 
in Germany should be forbidden.’209  Admittedly, there were divergences of 
views between experts in the Quai d’Orsay. 210   But one area of outright 
agreement appeared to endure: France needed both to recruit German workers 
and to avoid the settlement of DPs’ in Germany.211  
Procedure came into play here. British and American officials required that 
France accepted the principle of recruiting DPs before negotiating the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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recruitment of Germans.212  And the Americans in particular lamented the fact 
that France refused to accept Polish DPs, while striving to recruit Germans. 213 
As a result of the manpower shortage in the bi-zone, they were reluctant to 
accept the principles relating to the recruitment of German expellees. French 
agencies were, on the contrary, eager to get rid of as many Eastern European 
DPs as they could. During informal negotiations at the Quai d’Orsay, an 
American official observed: ‘If the manpower situation in France is so critical, 
why on earth are you sending back thousands of Polish workers in Poland? […] 
And why are you refusing the DPs that we are offering to you?’214  Bousquet 
responded by stating that France considered the recruitment of DPs an 
‘indispensable supplement’ to meet the requirements of the Monnet Plan, and it 
considered the recruitment of German labour to be a form of compensation for 
the loss of German PoWs.215 American authorities seemed immune to this line 
of argument. They insisted that the French government placed them in a very 
difficult situation in relation to their British allies: 
 
I was in Paris, two weeks ago, to participate in the negotiations initiated 
with the French government on this question. The French delegates 
refused our offers of DP manpower […] Purely political considerations 
have prevailed over the needs of the French economy; at this conference, 
the delegates of the (communist) Ministry of Labour have refused our 
offer. 
Nonetheless, the attitudes of your representatives place the American 
military government in a delicate situation: on one hand, the government 
has committed itself to you to authorize in its zone the recruitment of 
German migrants for France; on the other hand, it has committed itself to 
Great Britain, by virtue of the Byrnes-Bevin agreements, to retain all the 
material and human resources of the American zone for the bi-zonal 
economy […] Yet, the exportation of German workers will put a strain on 
the economic recovery […] and will aggravate the manpower crisis which 
is already severely affecting industries in the two zones.’ 216 
In June, members of the US Congress even threatened to withdraw Marshall 
Plan assistance from ‘any European nation refusing to open its borders to a 
reasonable number of DPs.’217  
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 French authorities eventually signed agreements for the recruitment of 
DPs with the American, the British and the Inter-Governmental Committee on 
Refugees’ authorities on 10 June 1947. 218 These Agreements only concerned 
non-German Displaced Persons but several letters were exchanged on the 
same day rendering the terms of this agreement applicable to the recruitment of 
Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche in the British and French zones of 
Austria.219  An annex to the British agreement stipulated that 2,000 DPs would 
be recruited in the French zone by British authorities and 14,000 DPs in the 
British zone by French authorities. 220 According to the terms of the agreements, 
American and British authorities had to pay the entire maintenance expenses of 
the Selection Centres involved. They also had to provide DPs with footwear and 
clothing. In practice, due to financial difficulties, the British authorities did not 
follow this requirement to the letter.221 The agreement further stipulated that 
miners’ families could join them after sixty days, and families of other workers 
after ninety days. Once DPs were in possession of work contracts, they were to 
receive a residential permit and a temporary labour permit.  They were to be 
paid at the same rate as French workers and were entitled to join the trade 
union of their choice. The following DPs were to be returned to the American 
zone: ‘DPs who have rescinded their contract for a valid reason, DPs who have 
not the aptitude to work in France, DPs who by action or propaganda become a 
danger to public order.’222  
 
Conclusion 
 
In Britain, DPs’ love for freedom and preference to remain in the West was 
regarded as constituting the ‘spirit and stuff of which we can make Britons.’223 
This was certainly not the case in France. In the philo-communist context of the 
Liberation, the recruitment of DPs defied consensus. The bitterness of the 
debates over the recruitment of DPs mirrored the nascent Fourth Republic’s 
internal divisions. On the one hand, Eastern Europeans were often perceived 
as culturally more assimilable than North African colonial migrants. Therefore, 
Ministry of Population personnel and their representatives in the field advocated 
the recruitment of young and able-bodied white workers. On the other hand, 
Communist decision-makers and their ideological fellow-travellers on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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French Left - particularly numerous in the Ministry of Labour and the ONI - 
opposed the recruitment of those they regarded as fascist DPs and wartime 
collaborators.  
Admittedly, the communist-dominated Ministry of Labour constituted the 
most vehement opponent of recruitment. But, as this chapter demonstrates, 
opposition to the recruitment went beyond the limited circles of communist 
trade-unionists and labour experts. The issues posed by the recruitment of DPs 
were far greater than this political opposition between the MRP-dominated 
Ministry of Population and the Communist-dominated Ministry of Labour would 
suggest. It was also shaped by nagging worries about German overpopulation 
and the inherent security threat that this posed to Europe. It also triggered wider 
controversy about how far DPs could or should be assimilated into the nation 
state and about the relative superiority or inferiority of races. Although the 
ordinance passed on 2 November 1945 officially banned the use of ethnic 
criteria in the selection of immigrants, this chapter shows that ethnic prejudices 
continued to structure French immigration policies. While Baltic and Banatais 
DPs topped the scale of probity, stereotypes of Polish and Ukrainian DPs as 
morally lax and more inclined to theft remained widespread. Yet, if DPs 
undoubtedly faced discrimination with ethnicisant overtones, the ‘ethnic 
discourse’ surrounding them was never entirely coherent. Indeed, the issue of 
wartime collaboration, as well as the strength of their nationalist sentiments, 
blurred these ethnic taxonomies still further.  
The trauma of war and 
collaboration weighed heavily in 
these the debates. Discussion of 
DPs’ alleged collaboration offer a 
window onto wider French 
experiences of resistance, 
collaboration and ‘forced 
enrolment’ in the Wehrmacht. As 
the example of the Banatais 
illustrates, French officials, trade 
union leaders and other social 
commentators projected their 
own wartime experiences onto 
DPs. While Communists acted 
with exaggerated ferocity against DPs, perhaps in an attempt to purge the 
memory of the years 1939-1941, Alsatians projected their own memories of 
 
Fig. 6.  The ‘Malgré-nous’ of the Balkans, 31 
August 1949. 
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‘forced enrolment’ onto DPs. To some extent, the Banatais mirror, and 
Lorrainers and Alsatians self-projection onto their ‘brothers in suffering’ reveal 
that the memory of the war was more fragmented that historians previously 
assumed. 224  
Despite widespread scepticism, the recruitment scheme was cautiously 
implemented in April 1947. This was partly the result of an urgent need for 
manpower to enact the Monnet plan; partly a consequence of wider diplomatic 
bargaining to secure the entry of German migrants. Although the Ministry of 
Labour ‘officially’ rallied to the DP scheme, anti-DPs attitudes persisted at lower 
administrative tiers within the Ministry and the ONI. As will be explained in 
chapter Seven, most of the ONI field agents working in Germany were hostile to 
the entry of what they regarded as anti-communist and reactionary migrants. 
Little wonder that by December 1947 the recruitment scheme had yielded 
meagre results: 6,625 DPs only had entered France.225 A month later, an official 
investigation concluded that Communist ONI agents were sabotaging the 
recruitment programme. Paradoxically, as we shall see in chapter Seven, when 
France was finally ready to recruit DPs - in 1948 - many refused to emigrate to 
what they regarded as a quasi-communist country. 
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Chapter Three: Between East and West? 
Debates over repatriation and the limits of neutrality in the field 
 
At the end of May 1945, in Neustadt, a small town in the north of what would 
soon become the French occupation zone, Russian DPs spontaneously 
organized a commemoration of their release from German clutches. During this 
ceremony, they thanked their American liberators, paying tribute to Roosevelt. 
In his weekly report, UNRRA Dutch relief worker Van den Bogaert captured the 
event in rather poor English: 
 
The Russian Commandant had had painted, portraits of the Yalta Big 
Three group, of Marshal Stalin and of other prominent Russian Officers. 
These were displayed on buildings round the square. 
A large and life-like portrait of President Roosevelt so lately deceased, 
was mounted the day before which the entire Center parade and the 
proceedings opened with a General Salute from the Guard […] At an 
appropriate moment, early in the speech, the Russian Commandant called 
for one minute’s silence in honour of President Roosevelt. The President’s 
portrait which up to now had been veiled in black crepe, was unveiled. The 
Russian Commandant then continued his speech thanking the American 
Army for liberating them […]1 
 
Van den Bogaert’s story illuminates one aspect of a local American-Russian 
entente made in Germany. Relief workers and Russian DPs were neither aware 
of the growing tensions between the Great Powers nor could they imagine the 
speed with which post-war European political realities would transform the 
stakes of their repatriation from post-war Germany. Although one should neither 
over-estimate the importance of these international encounters, nor presume 
their durable impact on the post-war order, it seems clear that experiences of 
displacement created fleeting opportunities for international cooperation amidst 
the German rubble. 2  In Eric Hobsbawm’s words, the Second World War 
generated a brief ‘moment of anti-fascist unity’.3  The creation of the Munich DP 
University exemplified these cross-national solidarities amongst DPs. Dedicated 
to reviving humanism and internationalism after years of oppression during the 
Nazi regime, this self-organized DP institution brought together over 2,000 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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students representing twenty-eight different nationalities, the majority hailing 
from the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Russia and Latvia.4   
Alongside these inspiring endeavours, early signs of political divisions 
were, however, becoming visible. With the common enemy gone, the ‘anti-
fascist’ front was sorely tested in this DP land by those who refused 
repatriation.5 While Neustadt’s DPs celebrated their US liberators and were 
eager to return home, others nearby were in hiding; some even threatened to 
commit suicide rather than face forced repatriation to the Soviet Union.6 In 
Wangen, Principal Welfare Officer Grace Garvey reported that ‘there [had] been 
much agitation in all the camps and villages over the repatriation’. 7 Evidently, 
the issue was central to creeping Cold War tensions among the displaced. At 
the level of high-politics, it caused friction between the Western Allies and the 
Soviet Union, hastening the demise of the wartime alliance.8 For the Soviet and 
Eastern European governments repatriation represented the denouement of the 
anti-fascist struggle. In their eyes, any honest DPs should be prepared to return 
home to participate in the reconstruction of their homelands. Those who 
preferred to stay behind were, according to this logic, quislings, enemies of 
democracy and traitors to the anti-fascist cause. 9  On the ground, deep 
ideological divides also tore political committees apart. As Anna Holian 
observed, ‘a few years before the Cold War brought the era of anti-fascist unity 
in Europe officially to a close, some of its fault lines were already visible in the 
concentration camps’. 10  To take one instance, debates about repatriation 
precipitated the dissolution of the anti-fascist International Prisoners’ Committee 
in Dachau, destroying any vestiges of Hobsbawm’s ‘anti-fascist unity’.11 
The politically charged meanings and contested readings of repatriation 
lie at the heart of this chapter. Admittedly, there were considerably fewer DPs 
and political prisoners committees in the French occupation zone. But the 
French case still offers fascinating insights into the issues at hand. As explained 
in the previous chapter, French tripartite governments sought ‘a third way’ in 
international affairs, French diplomacy striving to position itself between East !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and West to secure a pivotal role between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the 
Eastern bloc. But was a position between East and West sustainable when it 
came to repatriation? Here several questions remain unaddressed. Was ‘forced 
repatriation’ a source of French embarrassment in the United Nations General 
Assembly comparable to that posed later by decolonization? What, if anything, 
characterized the French approach to repatriation? Did UNRRA’s presence 
protect DPs refusing repatriation? And finally, how did French military 
authorities and UNRRA humanitarian workers confront the challenges 
presented by the emergence of anti-repatriation activities and, more broadly, by 
DPs’ politics in the French zone? 
 This chapter first examines French debates about repatriation - both at 
the diplomatic level and within the zone - in the wider contexts of the reinvention 
of the French Republic and the emergence of new discourses of human rights. 
It highlights the lack of uniformity within French repatriation policy, tracing 
deeper connections to French ambiguity toward the Soviet Union. It then 
focuses on UNRRA’s attitude to repatriation in the French zone, exposing the 
limits to the principle of neutrality and the actual politicization of relief work. It 
argues that the history of UNRRA in the French zone exemplified the difficulty, if 
not the impossibility, of sustaining ‘impartial’ and ‘neutral’ relief work in 
peacetime. Moreover, as we shall see, UNRRA’s idea of neutrality was not 
intrinsically ‘neutral’, a fact made plain by the emergence of DP politics. 
 
The historiographical context 
 
Historians disagree about the significance of the Soviet factor in shaping 
French repatriation policy. According to Mark Elliot, France was the Soviet 
Union’s most ‘pliant Western government’, as Soviet repatriation activities in the 
Camp Beauregard (outside Paris) testified. ‘Witnesses […] attested to 
abductions undertaken without interference from the French police. The 
meddling of the Kremlin’s officials on French soil became so commonplace that 
Parisian wags declared that German occupation had been replaced by 
Russian’.12  Wolfgang Jacobmeyer and Nikolai Tolstoy concur, suggesting that 
the French adopted a pro-Soviet position in their zone of occupation, 
implementing a more Draconian forced repatriation policy than their Western 
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Allies.13 According to Jacobmeyer, ‘only the French government did not side 
with her Western Allies (one of many examples of a French post-war 
Sonderweg) and concluded a little known agreement with the Soviet Union […] 
on the forcible repatriation of Soviet DPs including Balts.’14  
Other historians place greater emphasis on differences between the 
policies France adopted at home and in its occupation zones in Germany and 
Austria. Georges Coudry suggests that the methods employed in the French 
zone were less brutal than those employed in France.15 Mark Wyman reaches 
the same conclusion, arguing that ‘France allowed the Soviets to conduct 
manhunts for Soviet citizens on French soil for months, [but] the French Army of 
Occupation in Germany was much less cooperative’.16  In his work on the 
French occupation zone in Austria, Klaus Eisterer also contends that the French 
were less cooperative with the Soviets than earlier historical accounts 
indicate.17 To be sure, Soviet complaints relating to the French zone in Austria 
outnumbered those about the French zone in Germany.18  But, Pavel Polian, 
who has worked extensively on Soviet archival documents, contest Eisterer’s 
interpretation and largely rehabilitate Tolstoy and Jacobmeyer’s views.19 Polian 
quotes a report indicating that the Soviet authorities were satisfied with the work 
carried out by French administrators in regards to the repatriation of Soviet 
nationals and ‘anti-Soviet’ elements.20 Polian adds that repatriation persisted far 
longer in the French occupation zone of Germany (until 1952) than in the other 
Western zones.21  
More recently, Andreas Rinke, Adolphe Lesur and Julia Maspero have 
demonstrated that French DP policy was more complex and ambivalent than 
earlier accounts allow.22 Satisfying Moscow’s demands was certainly consistent 
with the orientation of French foreign policy between 1945 and 1947. But other 
interests often superseded these diplomatic necessities. Although Andreas !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Rinke argues that France’s overarching aim was to reduce the number of 
Displaced Persons in its zone, he shows that a consistent plan only took shape 
in the months between late 1945 and early 1946. Prior to that, decision-making 
was fractured and bent to changing circumstances.23  Drawing on a meticulous 
analysis of French diplomatic archives about Polish citizens originating from the 
East of the Bug River and established in France, Adolphe Lesur concurred. 
‘Contrary to common belief, [French] reserves and opposition to Soviet 
manoeuvring are obvious. This is amply demonstrated in French diplomatic 
archives for the period of autumn 1944-spring 1946, thus before the 12 
February 1946 UN Resolution defending DPs’ rights’. 24 Julia Maspero has also 
argued, for her part, that French authorities devised a ‘double-game policy’ 
when it came to the repatriation of Polish DPs.25 
The research in this chapter goes beyond such interpretations, adopting 
a new approach by focusing on a wide range of untapped archival material 
originating from the archives of the French occupation zone and UNRRA. While 
recognizing the importance of diplomats and national politicians in formulating 
repatriation policies, it argues that repatriation crucially depended on how 
French administrators first re-interpreted and then implemented these 
instructions in the zone. Highlighting conflicting perceptions within the zone, the 
chapter exposes the vicissitudes of repatriation, unravelling a realm of historical 
contingency left largely obscure by previous scholarship. 26  This approach 
allows for a more nuanced understanding of French attitudes towards 
repatriation. It probes beneath the formal structure of official instructions to 
reconstruct the ways in which repatriation was put into practice. In doing so, it 
reveals that attitudes towards repatriation within the military government and 
UNRRA were not monolithic. As in many other aspects of DP policy, actors in 
Paris, Berlin, Baden-Baden, Rastatt and Haslach (for UNRRA) had 
contradictory requirements and therefore pursued divergent policies.27   
Internal rivalries, coupled with a complex decision making-process, fed 
political and jurisdictional conflicts between political planners, military 
authorities, UNRRA officials and relief workers in the field. As a result, 
contradictory instructions were often sent out. Encouragement of repatriation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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varied, depending on where DPs lived, who they knew, whether they worked or 
not, which French or UNRRA officials they encountered, how hostile to 
repatriation they were, and what nationality they held. The chapter also shows 
that despite their coercive restrictions, neither UNRRA nor the military 
authorities prevented an autonomous DPs politics from emerging. The conflict 
between the PDR/UNRRA Directions, coupled with the considerable autonomy 
of local administrators in the various Kreise of the zone, opened critical spaces 
for DPs’ contestation. The chapter thus adds an essential social and cultural 
dimension to Rinke and Maspero’s diplomatic and institutional interpretations. 
 
The threat of repatriation 
 
At the Liberation French officials tried to establish France’s place in the post-
war order by asserting Resistance values and humanitarian traditions. In a 
period in which human rights gained unprecedented visibility in international 
politics, ‘resistance was the language of the small countries facing the Big 
Three.’ 28  Reviving asylum rights and individual liberties as core political 
principles were part of the reaffirmation of core Republican ideals after the 
erosion of asylum in the late 1930s and under Vichy.29 At UNRRA council 
meetings French representatives endorsed British and American rhetoric about 
individual freedom and democratic rights, but they were also anxious not to 
alienate Eastern delegations. In the summer of 1945, French delegates 
therefore fashioned the position of a ‘disinterested bystander’ between East and 
West, hoping to assume the role of mediator between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.30 This proved untenable. In July 1946, Eleanor Roosevelt publicly 
rebuked France for its policy of forced repatriation from its metropolitan territory. 
A French Foreign Ministry note observed that ‘it would be pointless to deny that 
the French government found itself at the Liberation confronted with a situation 
for which it was not able to demand a resolution in accordance with 
international law’.31 The next section examines French official attitudes towards 
forced repatriation, exploring the extent to which France tied its international 
standing to a defence of human rights.  
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Repatriation in context 
At the war’s end the largest single group of displaced persons were 
Soviet nationals. Unlike other displaced persons in the three western zones, 
they could be forced to return home. This Soviet exception was agreed at the 
Yalta Conference, American, British and Soviet authorities having concluded 
secret agreements for the reciprocal exchange of liberated civilians and 
PoWs. 32  At Yalta, the Allies promised that Soviet citizens would be sent 
eastwards first. 33 There nevertheless remained considerable confusion 
regarding DPs hailing from territories annexed by the Soviet Union during the 
war, notably Eastern Poland and the Baltic States.34  In the initial months 
following the Liberation, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Latvians, Lithuanians and 
Estonians were sometimes compelled to submit to repatriation. In an effort to 
hide their status, many took cover under an assumed nationality. Polish 
nationals, however, were not subject to forced repatriation or, at least, were not 
supposed to be.  
Although the United States and Britain never repudiated these elements 
of the Yalta accords, military officials progressively undermined them, notably 
by limiting Soviet repatriation officers’ access to DP camps. On 18 May 1945 
the military command secretly agreed to exclude Baltic DPs from the forced 
repatriation process. 35  On 4 September General Eisenhower went further, 
confining forced repatriation to three categories of people: Soviet citizens who 
had been captured in German uniform; those who had been in the Red Army on 
or after 22 June 1941 and who were not subsequently discharged; and those 
who had voluntary rendered aid to the enemy.36 As Juliette Denis observes, this 
policy stemmed from the peculiar status of Baltic DP citizenship, British and 
American authorities having recognized de facto but not de jure the annexation 
of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union.37 
In marked contrast with its Western Allies, French decision-makers had 
to comply with what was known as a politique du donnant-donnant with the 
USSR in order to guarantee the return of French internees and the repatriation 
of the Malgré-nous: POWs from Alsace-Lorraine who had been forcibly enrolled 
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in the Wehrmacht and captured by the Red Army. 38  As Catherine Klein-
Gousseff observes, ‘quite surprisingly […] the history of repatriation began with 
facts rather than official agreements’.39 In the French case repatriation began 
with the liberation of 1,500 Alsaciens-Lorrains held in the Soviet camp at 
Tambov on 7 July 1944. 40 A gentleman’s agreement regarding repatriations 
was subsequently reached between the French Foreign Ministry and the Soviet 
ambassador in October 1944, the point at which Moscow officially recognised 
the GPRF.41This was soon supplemented by an official accord on repatriation 
concluded between Paris and Moscow on 29 June 1945. This agreement was, 
in some respects, more radical than the bilateral agreements concluded by the 
British and American authorities at Yalta. 42  As Polian observes, the main 
difference between the Anglo-American Yalta decisions and the Franco-Soviet 
accords lay in the Protocol to the latter. Within it, France committed itself to 
repatriate all Soviet citizens, including those who were likely to be prosecuted 
for their collaboration with the Nazis.43 French authorities also signed a treaty of 
repatriation with Czechoslovakia regarding their respective ‘prisoners, 
deportees and refugees’ on 21 November 1944.44   
These accords quickly led to massive population transfers to the east. 
From 1 July 1945 to 1 January 1946, an estimated 102,160 Soviet DPs, 14,727 
Polish DPs, 13,187 Yugoslavs, 1,788 Czech DPs, 16,000 Dutch DPs and 2,000 
Austrian DPs were repatriated from the French zone.45 Soviet nationals were 
repatriated first, followed by Yugoslavs and then Poles.46 By December 1945, 
French PDR authorities estimated that only 600 to 800 Soviet nationals 
remained in their zone.47 Yet, in July 1947, Soviet authorities claimed that 9,805 
Soviet DPs were still residing there, including 753 Russians, 2,731 Ukrainians 
from Galicia, 903 Estonians, 2,666 Latvians and 2,752 Lithuanians.48 Despite !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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their promises, Soviet officials did not grant equivalent access to French 
repatriation officers in the Soviet territories as the French conceded to Soviet 
officers in their zone. 49  On 4 September 1946, General De Villeuneuve, 
Director of Koenig’s Foreign Affairs Service, informed General Davydof that if 
Soviet officials continued to block the activity of the French Mission in the Soviet 
zone, as had been the case since August, the Soviet Mission would meet the 
same fate in the French zone. 50  Increasingly, the French authorities were 
coming to resent the supposedly reciprocal protocol. 
Admittedly, French repatriation policy originally bore fruit. In October 
1945, 294,690 French internees were repatriated from the Soviet Union.51 As 
Catherine Klein-Gousseff has shown, the first phase of the repatriation of 
French nationals (from the spring to the summer of 1945) was carried out swiftly 
and effectively. 52  By the end of 1945, however, the Soviet Authorities 
considered the repatriation of French PoWs almost over. Echoing this, the 
Communist Ex-Servicemen’s Minister Laurent Casanova announced the near 
completion of the repatriation of French citizens from the Soviet Union in the 
summer of 1946. A trite, inaccurate statement, it provoked an outcry among 
Deputies within the French Constituent Assembly.53 In October 1946, at least 
13,000 French families still awaited news of their missing relatives.54 While a 
minority of these PoWs certainly did not want to return home, either for fear of 
retaliation or because of new attachments in the USSR, the majority were, in 
effect, being held hostage by the Soviets.55 This was in retaliation for perceived 
French reluctance to repatriate Soviet nationals from Germany and Austria.56  
Drawing on Soviet sources, Catherine Klein-Gousseff argues that from 
1946 onwards Soviet policy was determined by the non-return of its nationals 
located in the French occupation zones. Detention of French PoWs was indeed 
a retaliatory action against alleged French wrongdoings. 57  Despite French 
protests to the contrary, Soviet suspicions were not without grounds. As 
Adolphe Lesur and Andreas Rinke’s research suggests, French attitudes 
towards forced repatriation were highly ambiguous. In order to avoid 
confrontation with Moscow French authorities publicly stated that they were 
complying with the 29 June Franco-Soviet agreement. However, in tandem with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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these public statements, French officials allowed some Eastern Europeans to 
enlist in the French Foreign Legion thereby avoiding repatriation.58 Others were 
told that they would soon be able to settle in France.  
In this immediate post-war period, French policy was in fact highly fluid. 
The situation was particularly confused for Eastern European DPs who 
originated from territories unattached to the Soviet Union, prior to 1 September 
1939. Faced with uncertainty regarding their fate, many Baltic DPs fled from the 
French zone, seeking refuge in the American zone.59 In December 1945, there 
were approximately 6,000 Baltic DPs in the French zone, the overwhelming 
majority of them residing in the Württemberg area (5,658).60 The exact number 
of Ukrainians is unknown.61 Ukrainians tended to be registered according to 
their last known citizenship or were classified as stateless in official records.62 
Until December 1945, official instructions about whether or not they could be 
forcibly repatriated were contradictory. Faced with mounting requests from local 
administrators and unsure of the correct course of action to take, the Secrétariat 
Général pour les Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes urged the Foreign 
Ministry to send more precise instructions in November 1945. 63  The next 
section summarizes the attendant debates in Paris and then examines how 
these highly contradictory instructions were interpreted in the zone. 
 
French official debates over ‘forced repatriation’  
To understand the growing confusion over repatriation from the French 
zone, it is worth recalling that the issue was extensively discussed in France 
prior to the signature of the 29 June agreement. In November 1944, an 
estimated 93,918 Soviet citizens were in French territory. 64 These included 
soldiers who had fought in the Wehrmacht’s Vlassov Army and forced labourers 
of the Todt Organization (both groups principally located in Alsace and 
Lorraine), plus several escapees who had joined the French Resistance.65 
Repatriation to the USSR of members of each of these groups began in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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November 1944. 66 Earlier that autumn an inter-ministerial commission was 
established to coordinate French repatriation plans bringing together 
representatives from the PDR Ministry, the War Ministry, the Interior Ministry, 
the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.67 Several ministers wanted to 
avoid forced repatriation. Three main reasons account for this: respect of 
French liberal traditions (stressed by the Foreign and PDR Ministries), the 
desire to recruit healthy DPs (emphasized by the War and Foreign Ministries) 
and finally the expectation that any war criminals should face trial (crucial for the 
Ministry of Justice).68 The Ministry of Justice focused in particular on former 
soldiers from the Vlassov Army known to have committed crimes on French 
soil. 69 A 29 May 1945 letter from Georges Bidault further suggested that France 
was inclined to adopt a sympathique position in regards to Baltic DPs because 
of the former warm relations between France and the Baltic States.70 However, 
the necessity to avoid any confrontation with the Soviet Union eventually 
prevailed in June 1945 and French policy-makers therefore dropped the 
requirement for consideration of individual cases.71  
 French diplomatic archives nevertheless reveal that French diplomats 
were finding ways around the Agreement as early as August 1945. 72  As 
explained in the previous chapter, the very presence of UNRRA in the French 
zone stemmed in some measure from this desire to recruit DPs and avoid 
forced repatriation. French diplomats hoped that UNRRA would provide 
‘diplomatic protection’. The French delegation welcomed the vote of Resolution 
71 at UNRRA’s council, which stipulated that UNRRA could extend relief to 
refugees without the prior consent of their respective national governments. It 
thereby left the door open for emigration to France. 73 The delegation even 
wanted provision for the resettlement of ‘non-repatriable’ DPs in host countries 
to be expressly stated (although they did not publicly admit their preference).74 
A few weeks later, the French Foreign Ministry stated that forced repatriation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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should only be applied to those who hailed from territories belonging to the 
Soviet Union on 3 September 1939.75 This was the position of the Direction 
d’Europe within the Quai d’Orsay. 76 On 15 October 1945, a telegram was sent 
to the French zone. Referring to the Polish-Soviet border agreement dating of 
16 August 1945, it stipulated that Polish DPs, originating from territories 
attached to the Soviet Union since 3 September 1939, had the right to choose 
whether or not to be repatriated.77   
Within the Quai d’Orsay, the Direction des Unions disagreed with this 
interpretation of the 29 June Franco-Soviet Agreement. According to the 
Direction des Unions, France could legitimately oppose the repatriation of Baltic 
DPs who left their countries at the time of its annexation by the USSR. But this 
only affected a tiny minority; as for the others, it ‘appeared difficult to find 
irrefutable legal argument’.78Admittedly, jurist Jules Basdevant had convincingly 
demonstrated that repatriation unlike population transfer did not entail ‘un 
caractère de contrainte’.79 But France’s overarching interest, according to the 
Direction des Unions, was to nuance its position about ‘individual freedom of 
choice’ in regards to the Soviet Union in order to avoid an open clash. 80   
On 20 December 1945 the Foreign Ministry reached a compromise 
between these contradictory positions, advising General Laffon that Baltic DPs 
should not be forcefully repatriated but conceding that Soviet Repatriation 
Officers should be granted access to DP camps to encourage them to return 
home. 81 Laffon was already following this policy, as we will see in the next 
section. As Adolphe Lesur notes, France’s official position shifted before the 
adoption of the 12 February 1946 landmark resolution. This shift was based on 
the assumption that those who left their countries before annexation to the 
USSR were not covered by the Agreement and that those who became Soviet 
citizens after the annexation should not be repatriated because ‘repatriation 
unlike population transfer was optional’. 82  But this repatriation policy was not 
uniformly applied. The evidence suggests that disagreement over the question 
between Berlin and Baden-Baden lasted until April 1946 at least.83 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The passage of a 12 February 1946 UN General Assembly resolution 
provided French authorities with an irrefutable legal argument against forced 
repatriation. As Daniel Cohen points out, this landmark resolution officially 
recognized the right of asylum, stating that: ‘No refugees or displaced persons 
who have finally and definitively, in complete freedom and after receiving full 
knowledge of the facts […] expressed valid objections to returning to their 
countries of origin… shall be compelled to return to their countries of origin’.84 
But, as Cohen also observes, this resolution did not represent utter failure for 
the Communists: ‘Repatriation, even if voluntary, was still being framed… as the 
only suitable policy to solve the DP crisis.’85 Furthermore, direct reference to the 
resettlement of DPs outside their homeland was avoided. We still need to clarify 
how French administrators in the zone implemented the contradictory official 
instructions issued prior to this UN Resolution. Furthermore, to what extent 
were these instructions altered in the face of local realities? 
 
Daily acts of violence?  Dealing with Soviet Repatriation officers in the 
field 
As we have seen, French policy regarding forced repatriations was shaped by a 
variety of factors in the months following the liberation. Efforts to placate the 
Soviet authorities were highly significant, motivated by the paramount 
imperative of securing the release of French Pows held on Soviet territory. Yet 
this was far from the only influence weighing upon French actions and the 
French authorities remained uncomfortable with the very idea of forced 
repatriation, seeking means of adapting, or circumventing, their agreement with 
Moscow. The contradictory pulls upon official French policy left considerable 
room for manoeuvre for officials on the ground to develop their own approaches 
to the repatriation question.    
 Inside the zone, there was considerable confusion over the summer of 
1945: while, as we have seen, repatriation raised serious concerns for some; for 
others, bombarded with alarming reports concerning rampant DP criminality, 
repatriation, whether voluntary or forced, appeared an expeditious solution to 
the DP problem. PDR representative, Captain Vuillemin put it bluntly: 
 
Supplies that we provide to DPs represent a substantial loss that could be 
otherwise sent to France. On one hand, DPs’ looting economically 
weakened the country: they have for instance stolen 800 sheep since the 
occupation of the Kreis. On the other hand, they create a general feeling !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of insecurity harmful to the prestige of France […] Furthermore, Russians 
from the Vlassov Army kept the product of their looting in France: watches, 
jewellery, cars. Are they going to leave with those objects? 86 
 
For some administrators, memories of the Vlassov Army, coupled with alarming 
complaints from local Germans, encouraged the belief that they had to get rid of 
DPs as quickly as possible. But attitudes towards DPs were not monolithic. 
Contrary to Vuillemin, his boss, Colonel Jacquot, considered it remarkable ‘that 
retaliation was so insignificant and incidents so limited’ after the unprecedented 
and extraordinary level of atrocity and brutality committed against Slavs.87 In 
August 1945, Lieutenant Rétrain noted that repatriation of Soviet citizens should 
be considered as completed. According to him, Soviet repatriation officers were 
only staying to kidnap Baltic and Ukrainian DPs and to carry out ideological and 
political propaganda amongst Germans. 88  There was some truth to this. 
Historians have demonstrated that Soviet Repatriation Missions remained in 
Germany, not only to return the maximum number of DPs to the Soviet Union 
but also to cover Moscow’s espionage activities in the West.89  
French administrators watched the harsh methods employed by Soviet 
officials with mounting unease.90 In Wangen, an UNRRA relief worker even 
reported the abduction of a DP chef from an UNRRA canteen.91 In October 
1945, after visiting Tubingen, Commandant Roche reported that all Ukrainians 
firmly refused to be repatriated. DPs’ opposition was ‘poignant and dramatic’, 
some shouting ‘Shoot us here.’ 92  In the previous month Emile Laffon had 
issued an instruction for Ukrainian DPs, stipulating, 
 
Ukrainian nationality does not exist. Those who claimed Ukrainian 
nationality are either of Soviet citizenship (those who held this citizenship 
on 1 September 1939) of Polish citizenship (those who held that 
citizenship on 1 September 1939) or Stateless (those who hold a Nansen 
passport). 
1) Under SHAEF Administrative Memorandum N.39, UFSET instructions 
dating from 19 July 1945, the Yalta Agreements and the Franco-Soviet 
Agreement of 29 July 1945, Soviet citizens must be repatriated, 
irrespective of their personal desires. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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2) Ukrainians who claim Polish citizenship […] cannot be repatriated against 
their will.  
3) Stateless [persons] enjoy a special status assigned to them by the quality 
of statelessness. 93 
 
In October Laffon affirmed that, while France opposed forced repatriation, it had 
to resign itself to allowing Soviet officers to faire le tri as those DPs formerly 
residing in the east of the Curzon Line were concerned.94 In order words, 
France had no choice but to grant Soviet officials wide access to - and control 
over - Soviet nationals. For Laffon, forced repatriation was nevertheless ‘an 
anti-liberal solution that repelled all French men, and, at their head, the 
Government.’95  
As Mark Elliott comments, the Soviet Union was ‘in no mood to make any 
concession.’ Known Soviet fatalities in World War II numbered close to twenty 
million, compared to 541,000 for France, some 300,000 for the United States 
and approximately 330,000 for Britain.96 Historians have also demonstrated that 
the Soviet repatriation campaign was a ‘sophisticated operation’, employing 
both legal and illicit practices, including deception, kidnapping, bribery and 
threats.97 In Neustadt, Soviet Officers encouraged French PDR officers to drink 
using Russian women as ‘honey traps’ during Franco-Russian dinners, so that 
the officers would later facilitate repatriation.98 Soviet Officers also circulated 
leaflets, journals and films aimed at cultivating homesickness.99 Forged letters 
allegedly written by relatives were distributed to convince people of safe 
conditions in the Soviet Union.100 In 1947 a French administrator reported that 
DPs gathered in the Repatriation Transit Centre in Immendingen were plied with 
alcohol until their convoy departed for the USSR.101  
Aware of the difficult situation awaiting DPs in their countries of origin 
and sensitive to the criticisms circulated in the British and American zones 
about illiberal France, Koenig, Laffon and Poignant were loath to let Soviet 
Repatriation Officers operate in the French zone.102 But, they were all too aware 
that the prompt repatriation of French nationals largely depended on the 
preservation of cordial relations with Soviet officers. They were therefore forced !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to engage in a delicate diplomatic exercise, striving to maintain a working 
relationship with Soviet officials, aiming to make small concessions while 
avoiding handing over any DPs.103 
In December 1945, for instance, Poignant instructed Commandant 
Roche to search out DPs resisting repatriation. 104  In February 1946 he 
reiterated that Soviet officers had the right to ask for the list of Soviet citizens 
living in the zone, to visit (accompanied with a French officer) Polish and 
Ukrainian camps and to regroup Soviet DPs in Stetten, Tübingen and 
Langernargen. Litigious cases were submitted to a Commission Mixte des 
Nationalités. 105  French reports suggest that this commission nevertheless 
tended towards liberal findings, granting the majority of DPs the ‘right to choose’ 
on the basis of the 12 February Resolution. 106  Furthermore, Poignant 
developed close personal relations with Soviet officers sympathetic to France. 
In July 1946 he deplored the departure of Miss Ivanova, a Mission interpreter, 
noting: ‘There is every reason to believe that […] her dismissal is as much due 
to her liberal views as to her sincere attachment to France.’107 
None of this meant that Soviet intimidation stopped after the adoption of 
the 12 February 1946 UN resolution, or that French authorities were above 
using the threat of repatriation themselves. On several occasions, UNRRA 
Director Lenclud protested against illegal arrests of Ukrainian and Baltic DPs.108 
But these detentions and subsequent expulsions were not the result of PDR 
instructions; rather they demonstrated the difficulties that the PDR experienced 
in implementing a centralized plan for regulating repatriation. PDR personnel 
confronted a zone riddled with differing local arrangements, making the 
implementation of a coherent policy impossible. In April 1946, disagreement 
between the PDR Direction and the General Director of Justice over the 
condemnation of a Baltic DP to forced repatriation after the theft of a bicycle 
highlighted the lack of uniformity in the zone.109 The dispute demonstrates that 
repatriation measures were, on occasion, harnessed to local policing priorities, 
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local officials deploying the threat of repatriation to remove foreigners who 
posed a security threat. 
The zone’s internal administrative dynamics thus gave local officials the 
leeway to use repatriation – and, equally important, the threat of repatriation – 
to control the DP population. In Horb, for instance, UNRRA’s Team 591 Director 
complained about Commandant Frenot’s brutal methods, which consisted of 
putting ‘strong pressure on DPs’ by letting them know that those who refused 
repatriation would lose their nationality and be ‘Germanized’.110 In Reutlingen, 
UNRRA Team Director Fabry also complained about the ‘climate of panic 
created by the local military government against DPs (citing requisitions, 
arrests, and expulsions).111 On 17 June 1946, Laffon instructed his personnel 
that although the Franco-Soviet agreement remained in force, France would 
comply with the UN’s 12 February Resolution, making compulsory the 
repatriation of DPS suivant les frontières antérieures au 1er septembre 1939. 112 
But, in July 1946, French UNRRA Director J.J. de Marnhac asked UNRRA 
Headquarters to intervene to put a stop to a Soviet manhunt in Biberach that, 
he said, was reminiscent of practices that ‘we had hoped would have been 
ended for ever.’113 ‘These unfortunate people are arrested everywhere, in fields 
where they have worked as peasants for four years; in DP camps; even in the 
private home of an UNRRA officer where they worked as a domestic servant.’114 
 
Between policy and practice 
  In her study of migrant rights in inter-war France, Mary Dewhurst Lewis 
demonstrated that ‘through improvisation and negotiation, local authorities and 
immigrants established boundaries of inclusion and exclusion along quite 
different lines than those intended by state policy. Over time, this cycle of 
confrontation and accommodation led to policy changes at the center.’115 In the 
French zone, repatriation was similarly negotiated at many levels of social 
exchanges – in diplomatic affairs, in the frequent encounters between PDR 
officials and Soviet Repatriation officers, and locally in the ways UNRRA Team 
directors and local administrators interpreted official instructions and interacted 
with DPs. This is clearly evident in the repatriation of Polish and Hungarian DPs 
during which French military and PDR authorities maintained close, albeit 
ambiguous ties with Polish and Hungarian officials hostile to repatriation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In May 1946 there were an estimated 6,400 Hungarian nationals, [plus 
some 4,600 PoWs and 1,800 civilians in the French zone]. Although 
Hungarians were not granted DP status in the other zones, they benefited from 
a privileged status in the French zone.116 Several reasons account for this: 
Hungarians enjoyed a relatively good reputation among military officials as 
disciplined and hard-working DPs, and French authorities maintained close ties 
with Hungarian military leaders hostile to their repatriation as they were grateful 
for the protection that Hungarian officials had offered to French PoWs during 
the Nazi years.117 Poignant singled out the contribution of the ‘comte André 
Szechenyi’ for its protection of French prisoners.118 Other reports suggest that a 
Hungarian military chief, one Colonel Sticky, the ex-commandant of an artillery 
group stationed near Friedrichshafen in Württemberg, had refused to fire his 
guns when the French First Army arrived.119 In order to avoid confrontation with 
Hungarian authorities the PDR Director decided to maintain the Hungarian Red 
Cross as an unofficial organization, while, ‘for the record’, publishing an 
announcement in the German press that camps were being allocated for the 
repatriation of Hungarians.120 
The same ambiguous ties were to be found with Polish officials hostile to 
repatriation. As mentioned earlier, there was no repatriation agreement for 
Polish DPs, but a ‘good will understanding’.121 As Julia Maspero shows, this 
allowed French PDR authorities to pursue a ‘double game’ in the zone, 
maintaining representatives of the Polish Exile Government in London in the 
zone far longer than their British and American Allies in order to promote the 
recruitment of DPs for France.122  On the one hand, PDR officials tried to 
encourage repatriation by any means possible.123 Locally, this conflicted with 
UNRRA team directors, who thought that their duty was to protect DPs (as we 
will see with the Mulheim controversy discussed in the next section below). On 
the other hand, the PDR directorate continued to work with representatives of 
the Polish exile Government in London, even organizing a meeting between 
representatives of the London Government and those of the officially-
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recognized Warsaw Government in February 1946.124 As might be expected, 
collaboration between the two missions proved impossible. However, while 
authorities in Paris ostensibly severed diplomatic ties with representatives of the 
Polish exile Government in June 1945, UNRRA archives reveal that London 
representatives continued to operate in the zone. In response to a protest from 
the official Polish Repatriation Mission, Poignant re-affirmed in June 1946 that 
the London Polish Mission had been dismantled in the zone.125 But in October 
UNRRA Team 20 Director Faucette also reported that former London Liaison 
Officer Lt. Hornung remained in the Gneisenau camp and exerted a strong 
influence over the remaining Polish DPs.126 As in the earlier case of DPs 
recruited to the Foreign Legion, the employment of Polish DPs in the 
Compagnie de Groupements Auxillaires Etrangers (GAE) exemplified French 
ambiguities.127  GAE companies were set up in March 1946 to watch over 
German PoWs.128 These groups were themselves composed of former Polish, 
Hungarian and Yugoslav PoWs and, in August 1946, they employed nearly 
2,000 DPs, organized into fourteen separate ‘companies’ whose DP members 
received the same salaries and social benefits as French soldiers.129 According 
to the PDR service’s official history, the GAE, thanks to their military discipline, 
enjoyed ‘terrific success’ among DPs.130 Yet, they were also a recurrent source 
of tension with Eastern European Governments, which suspected that these 
paramilitary units provided cover for former collaborators.131   
 To sum up, in November 1945 there were an estimated 59,973 Polish 
DPs in the various Kreis of the zone.132 The first wave of repatriation occurred 
soon afterwards with 13,700 Polish DPs repatriated between 16 November and 
13 December 1945.133  8,541 Polish DPs subsequently left the zone between 
13 December 1945 and 21 March 1946.134 Repatriation rates rose substantially 
in the spring of 1946, with 3,064, 6,107, 8,679 and 2,859 Polish DPs repatriated 
in March, April, May and June 1946 respectably. On 18 August 1946 it was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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decided that Polish DPs should receive sixty days’ rations (2,000 calories per 
day) if they accepted repatriation.135 This contributed to a surge in repatriations 
that autumn.  In total, 41,893 Polish DPs were repatriated from September 1945 
to January 1947. 136  These were the figures for the officially coordinated 
repatriation; some DPs certainly found their own ways to travel before such 
repatriation began.137 In comparison with the British and American zones, these 
rates were considerably higher.138 But, as this chapter explains, these figures 
masked a more complex reality. French attitudes towards repatriation were 
never rigidly inflexible; nor did the zone function as a unitary entity pursuing a 
single clear objective. As a result, repatriation was highly contingent on where 
DPs lived, whom they knew and what nationality they held. 
Reflecting on the forced repatriation of Soviet nationals in France in the 
context of the ‘reinvention of the Republic’, Greg Burgess has recently argued 
the following. 
 
This historic episode—for its historians, the tragedy—of the Soviet 
repatriations not only illustrates a transition between war and peace, it also 
illustrates a transition between wartime expediency and the realisation that 
humanitarian responsibilities were an integral element of the peace. 
Asylum emerged again as a principle of rights when confronted with 
deprivation of individual liberty and the hostility of the Soviet Union to its 
nationals exposed to western influence. […] Its conclusion came in the 
convergence of national concerns about asylum and protection with the 
developments towards the international refugee regime under the United 
Nations. On 12 February 1946, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution that recognised the urgency of the international problem of 
refugees and displaced persons and the need to assure their protection 
under international agreement.139 
 
But can the same be said about repatriation from the French occupation zone? 
Were French authorities’ attitudes only shaped by their sense of humanitarian 
responsibilities?  
Without question, forced repatriation was for Koenig, Laffon and 
Poignant an ‘anti-liberal’ solution repellent to free French men. At the level of 
Military Government policy-making in the zone, measures against forced 
repatriation were taken even before the 12 February UN Resolution. But, as far 
as the implementation of these universal ideals was concerned, the story told 
here shows that the threat of repatriation neither completely disappeared on 12 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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February nor was equally felt throughout the zone prior to that resolution. In 
March 1950, DPs from Neuenbürg officially complained to the International 
Refugee Organization about Soviet Officers’ intimidation, unannounced visits to 
DPs’ houses, other methods of ‘demoralization and psychological pressure’  
such as retaliation against family members at home in Eastern Europe.140 
Furthermore, debates about repatriation were strongly influenced by French 
labour needs and, therefore, dependent on the perceived economic 
‘productiveness’ of particular DP groups. French authorities were by no means 
uniquely, or indeed primarily, concerned with individual rights and universal 
humanism. The imperative of production generated a multifaceted racial 
discourse, which differentially treated useful DPs and unwanted ones. As 
explained in chapter two, many Baltic or Banatais DPs were protected against 
forced repatriation, despite their alleged wartime collaboration, due to their 
presumed productivity and capacity to integrate with the French population. 
 
UNRRA: the limits of neutrality 
 
The issue of repatriation also exposed the limits of UNRRA’s neutrality.141 
Although UNRRA’s staff were told that they ‘constitute[d] a body of truly 
international servants, who [were] devoted, not to the interests of any one 
nation, but to the objectives and principles of UNRRA’, the organization found 
itself thrown into the arena of international, Cold War politics.142 As a result, its 
policies were ambiguous and inconsistent, sensitive, much like the French 
authorities’ attitudes, to changing circumstances. As mentioned earlier, UNRRA 
Resolution 71 stipulated that UNRRA’s primary task was to promote 
repatriation. The organisation was itself to exist only as a temporary agency. 
But UNRRA officials never devised clear instructions about how that policy was 
to be applied in the field. The result was greater leeway for individual 
interpretation.143 In the spring of 1946, as criticisms of UNRRA mounted and as 
its end was being contemplated, UNRRA’s official position gradually shifted 
more towards encouragement than forcible repatriation. But, even then, the 
degree to which these pro-repatriation measures were applied depended 
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considerably upon individual officials and varied significantly from one camp to 
another. 
 As explained earlier, French diplomats hoped that the presence of a 
neutral and apolitical organization would facilitate relations between French 
officials and Eastern European repatriation officers in the French zone. They 
also believed that UNRRA would serve as a legal justification for the non-
application of forced repatriation policies: UNRRA was expected to be the 
mediator should a conflict occur between French and Eastern European 
governments. In practice, UNRRA fell short of the French authorities’ 
expectations. Instead of promoting mutual understanding, it created divisions. 
While UNRRA officials vehemently challenged the PDR Direction over its use of 
unorthodox methods and for condoning forcible repatriation, the PDR Direction 
accused UNRRA of preventing repatriation and creating unnecessary conflicts. 
On 23 May 1946, for instance, Laffon passed on to General Lenclud a protest 
letter written by twenty-three Polish DPs from the Schiltach (Gutach) centre in 
which they complained about the difficulties that they encountered over 
repatriation.144  UNRRA team Director Durand, who was cited in this affair, 
argued that this petition was mainly the result of the manoeuvring by a 
dishonest DP.145 But, in July 1946, Laffon reiterated his criticism that UNRRA 
was not putting enough effort into repatriation. ‘[T]he facts remain that UNRRA’s 
first objective, in accordance with its statutes, was the repatriation of volunteers 
and that UNRRA teams did not comply eagerly with their mission, despite the 
instructions that they received from UNRRA headquarters in the French 
zone.’146 In less measured terms, a French administrator concluded his report 
on UNRRA activities in the Rhineland by observing ‘UNRRA never made any 
effort to encourage DPs to return to their homelands. It is very likely that their 
staff did not want to lose a clientele whose departure would mean the 
suppression of well-paid and easy jobs.’147   
Eastern European official Repatriation missions repeatedly accused 
UNRRA of protecting war criminals, particularly those with Stateless status, 
while also fostering anti-repatriation propaganda.148 In January 1946, the Polish 
Government lodged a complaint with UNRRA’s European Regional Office !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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concerning the anti-repatriation activities of London-affiliated representatives at 
the Trier Camp.149 Nine months later, Soviet officer General Davydof officially 
protested against the anti-repatriation attitudes of the Biberach, Pirmasens and 
Lindau UNRRA teams.150 Two months after that the Polish Repatriation Mission 
remonstrated against ‘anti-repatriation’ DP leaders who were allegedly 
protected by UNRRA in the Landstuhl DP camp. 151  For its part, UNRRA 
reproached the Polish and Soviet repatriation missions for their remoteness 
from DP camps and their consequent failure to build ‘intimate contacts with their 
fellow compatriots.’152 UNRRA Director Lenclud decried such ‘double standards’ 
responding vigorously to attacks on the organization.153 
But why did UNRRA fail to maintain its neutral image in the French zone? 
Did it really protect DPs who refused repatriation? The next section traces the 
shift towards repatriation at UNRRA headquarters’ level and then examines the 
discrepancy between policy and practices at the lower level of the zone. 
 
The paradoxes of neutrality 
If Eastern European governments increasingly saw UNRRA as an 
instrument of the West, there was, in fact, minimal agreement within UNRRA’s 
upper echelons regarding repatriation. 154  Without question, Resolution 71 
testified to UNRRA’s efforts to encourage repatriation. But, as UNRRA’s official 
historian observes,  
 
One deputy director general insisted that no person would return home 
unless conditions (affecting accommodation, food and recreation) in the 
camps were clearly worse than conditions in the home countries. Another 
deputy director general vehemently insisted that the displaced persons 
having suffered so much would not return until they had been, physically 
and psychologically, built up so that they would have the strength to face 
the undoubtedly difficult life that awaited them. Some people felt that 
vocational training, by instilling confidence and giving an individual a 
means of supporting himself aided repatriation; others were convinced that 
such activities held the students away from their home country.155 
 
In theory, UNRRA teams were only committed to voluntary repatriation. In 
practice, ‘some UNRRA officials placed more emphasis on pushing repatriation 
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than did others. This fact led to confusing changes in directives.’156 UNRRA’s 
first Director General Herbert Lehman (1 January 1944 until 31 March 1946) 
strongly opposed forced repatriation.157 His successor Fiorello La Guardia, on 
the contrary, tended to encourage it. 
In the French zone, Lenclud presented himself as committed to encouraging 
repatriation but opposed to forcibly pursuing it. In fact, he was very slow to send 
precise instructions to his field-workers. The slowness with which his 
headquarters was put in place, coupled with the bureaucratic competition 
between the PDR and UNRRA officers, created a great deal of administrative 
confusion. Requests about eligibility and repatriation procedures abound in 
UNRRA archives.158  In November 1945, the detachment of Wurzach asked for 
instance: 
 
1) Where can DPs find information about emigration to the U.S.[…] 
2) Can a Yugoslav DP repatriated two months ago (2 September) 
communicate with [his co-nationals still in] the French zone? 
3) Does a German woman who has married a Yugoslav become a 
Yugoslav citizen? Can she join her husband who has been repatriated to 
Yugoslavia?159 
 
On 4 March 1946 the French UNRRA section circulated administrative order 
N29, detailing the different categories of DPs eligible for UNRRA assistance.160 
But not only was this instruction slow to reach individual teams, it also 
contradicted orders issued by the PDR (notably in relation to Hungarian DPs). 
This clearly suggests the lack of overarching governmental guidance.  
On 29 April 1946 General Bulletin No. 9 established a list regarding the 
DPs entitled to UNRRA assistance. These included nationals from Allied 
Nations, Italians, Stateless persons or people with undetermined nationality, 
and nationals from ex-enemy nations ‘forced to leave their country of origin or 
residency by the enemy in reason of race, religion or activities in favour of the 
United Nations’.161  (Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary were classified as ex-
enemy or enemy nations.) Among the special categories were Stateless 
persons, Jews refusing repatriation, and DPs who had been persecuted by the 
enemy. The Ukrainian group was not ‘yet’ recognized as a nationality: 
Ukrainians were either Soviet nationals (If they were citizens of the Soviet Union 
in September 1939), officially stateless, or citizens of other nations such as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Poland.162  A welcome clarification, but the evidence suggests that UNRRA 
Directors did not always comply with these instructions. In April 1946, in 
Biberach, the UNRRA team Director infuriated Soviet Repatriation Officers by 
recognising Ukrainian DPs as a discrete category.163 In Freiburg, a similar 
problem arose when UNRRA organised a football match between ‘Ukrainians- 
Lemberg’ and a German team.164 
UNRRA team directors thereby implemented directives based on their 
own understanding of what was being asked of them. 165 In May 1945 UNRRA 
Director Taylor and Welfare Officer Wiley reported placing a Russian family 
‘threatened’ by Russian officers on a farm remote from their DP camp in 
Kaiserslautern.166 In Lindau, Jean Gerbier made great efforts to ensure that he 
was complying with UNRRA directives but in September 1946 he was 
reprimanded by UNRRA headquarters staff for providing unauthorized 
assistance to Hungarian DPs. In his response to the complaint, he asked ‘Why 
is one blamed for commendable intentions – a simple intervention of our 
superiors would have prevented this’. 167 Gerbier’s frustrated response 
demonstrates the difficulties, despite the best of intentions, of maintaining 
neutrality. Confusion and disquiet persisted in the field until 1947. On 17 
January UNRRA Team 209 Director De Marnhac in Biberach protested that he 
had yet to receive basic information about repatriation contained in Resolution 
92 of March 1946. He also queried an instruction sent by Laffon on 2 October 
1946 mentioning emigration: were DPs to be recruited or to be repatriated?168  
In this context of French UNRRA’s escalating conflict with the PDR service 
(discussed in chapter 1), the issue of repatriation became increasingly 
politicized. Lenclud recurrently criticized the PDR’s unorthodox methods, 
deploring that the PDR’s overarching goal was ‘to repatriate the DPs as quickly 
as possible’ by ‘stick[ing] bayonets in their behinds.’ 169  The first open 
confrontation between the two services over the issue of repatriation occurred 
in June 1946. On 7 and 8 June announcements were published in various 
German newspapers in Mülheim, Münsingen and Baden announcing a new 
regulation to be applied as from the 20th – and informing DPs that ‘all the 
advantages which they have heretofore enjoyed will no longer be accorded to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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them’. These notices invited Poles to take the last repatriation trains due to 
leave on 25 June.170 UNRRA voiced loud complaints about the threatening 
character of these notices, an impression enhanced by the fact that they were 
written in German. ‘UNRRA is the sole administration for Centres, and 
consequently is alone qualified to notify the displaced persons of all decisions 
concerning them’ commented Lenclud.171 He continued: 
 
Whereas the necessity for repatriation has not escaped us, and we have 
brought all possible aid to this operation, which is one of UNRRA’s primary 
missions, the pressure exerted on the Poles, the threat of depriving them 
of their status of Displaced Persons and of their nationality, is not in 
keeping with the neutrality that UNRRA imposed upon itself in this matter. 
[…] The effect produced on the Poles was deplorable and yet did not have 
the desired effect, since the train which left Mulheim on 5th June contained 
only 515 persons, and that which left Munsingen on 7th June 563 persons, 
despite the threats of the DP officers and the German officials.172 
 
The fact that these notices were directed solely at the Poles also created 
tensions between Poles and DPs of other nationalities, as well as between 
Poles and Germans.173 It seems beyond question that in this instance local 
officials in Mülheim, Münsingen and Baden went too far and condoned forcible 
repatriation.174 But, as explained previously, their attitudes stemmed from the 
re-interpretation locally of what their instructions actually meant. 
  As David Forsythe has demonstrated in his analysis of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), neutrality is a matter of constructed 
image.175 In directly and doggedly opposing the PDR direction over the issue of 
repatriation, Lenclud not only failed to understand the subtlety of French policy 
but also seriously compromised UNRRA’s posture of neutrality. This lent weight 
to criticism that UNRRA itself failed to send clear instructions to its personnel. 
As a result, Laffon reproached UNRRA officers for failing to understand the 
‘delicacy’ of French policy. For example, French authorities seized upon the fact 
that UNRRA’s Director of the Southern District publicly informed his teams that 
French authorities intended to recruit Polish personnel as foreign auxiliaries. His 
actions, the French insisted, proved that tactless and insensitive UNRRA 
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workers caused unfortunate diplomatic incidents by leaking confidential 
information.176 
 
UNRRA Repatriation Propaganda campaign (autumn 1946 – spring 1947) 
 Faced with a spate of criticism, the UNRRA Council’s policy shifted 
towards greater emphasis on repatriation in the spring of 1946. On 28 March, 
after prolonged and acrimonious debate at UNRRA’s Fourth Council meeting in 
Atlantic City, a conciliatory gesture towards Eastern European governments 
was made in the form of Resolution 92. It, coupled with Resolution 100, 
required the administration ‘to remove any handicaps in the Assembly Centres 
to the prompt repatriation of displaced persons […] wishing to be repatriated’.177 
This resolution called for the complete registration of all displaced persons in 
these assembly centres, accurate information about those displaced nationals 
willing to return to their homeland being expected to speed up the repatriation 
process.178  A series of tough new measures were also sanctioned by the 
Council to remove obstacles to repatriation and reduce the number of camp 
inhabitants. These included the removal of camp leaders and UNRRA 
personnel known to oppose repatriation.179  
 These changes reflected newly appointed Director General Fiorello La 
Guardia’s marked inclination to shift UNRRA’s focus away from welfare work 
and towards repatriation.180 Welfare programmes were increasingly seen as 
encouraging a sense of ‘permanency’, DP camps coming under fire within the 
Administration for being too comfortable. Leisure activities were increasingly 
transferred to voluntary agencies and DP populations were frequently moved 
between camps so they did not become too settled. In the summer of 1946, 
UNRRA adopted the Sixty-Day Ration Scheme (dubbed derisively by the United 
States Army as ‘Operation Grubstake’ and by the British as ‘Operation 
Carrot’). 181 Even so, as Laura Hilton recalls, these policies were unevenly 
implemented. Messages coming from UNRRA headquarters were still mixed; 
Director General Frederick Morgan was, for instance, ‘a strong anti-Communist 
who placed little weight behind implementation of Resolutions 71 and 92’.182 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176"UNRRA,"SE0421E0029E02,"R."Schurmans,"Acting"Director"Team"576"à"Mr."Moreland,"District"Dirctor,"14"January"1946."
177"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0420E0006E02,"UNRRA,"European"Regional"Office,"Order"No."40,"Removal"of"DP"Leaders"impending"repatriation,"
12"September"1946."
178"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0412E0012E04,"Bulletin"Général"N.18,"application"de"la"Résolution"92,"12"July"1946."
179"Reid"and"Armstrong"Armies%of%peace,"p."183."For"the"French"zone,"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0421E0025E07,"Réunion"des"Directeurs"de"
Team,"25"September"1946."
180"Reid"and"Armstrong"Armies%of%peace,"p."183."
181"Woodbridge"UNRRA"Vol"2,"p."515."
182"Hitlon"‘Pawns"on"a"chessboard?’,"p."93."
! 153 
Moreover, the UNRRA order to discontinue all educational, recreational and 
other cultural activities was soon withdrawn in the American zone.183  
As for the French zone, the evidence suggests that the implementation of 
Resolution 92 was delayed. At a welfare officers’ meeting in mid-August 1946, 
UNRRA officials realized that the majority of their personnel ignored it. 184 In its 
monthly report of October 1946, the French UNRRA management committee 
lamented the fact that its ‘personnel in the field were slow in appreciating the 
importance that UNRRA attached to repatriation’.185 This was hardly a new 
concern. In June 1946 it lamented its difficulties in exercising effective control 
over its field workers. 186  Still, UNRRA headquarters addressed several 
instructions clearly highlighting the need to encourage repatriation. In the 
summer of 1946 several official bulletins containing information about Poland 
were circulated.187 Team Directors were asked to regroup DPs who were willing 
to be repatriated. Yugoslavs were to be sent to the Tuttlingen Centre, 
Czechs/Slovaks to Calw, Italians to Liebenau, Hungarians to Blönried, Soviets 
to Immendingen and Poles to Villingen.188 Repatriation posters with the slogan 
‘Poland calls you’ were circulated, repatriation committees created, Sixty-day 
ration exhibitions organized and clothes distributed to those willing to be 
repatriated.189  
! !
Fig. 7/8. Repatriation propaganda190 !
To cap it all, on 24 September 1946 Lenclud issued a declaration to all Polish 
DPs encouraging them to return to their homeland.191  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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UNRRA also provided information in response to questions known to 
concern Poles within the camps. Practical questions were answered (‘How do I 
get work?’, ‘Do I have to pay for tools?’, ‘Can I be sure that my children will 
have the opportunity to attend school?’, ‘Is it planned to establish collective 
farms?’)192 In Freiburg, for instance, despite the fact that most DPs were living 
in private accommodation, UNRRA organized regular meetings with DP 
representatives, and translated into Polish information originally sent in French 
by the headquarters. Several conferences and two permanent exhibitions (one 
in Freiburg, one in Emmendigen) were also arranged in which maps of Poland 
were prominently displayed.193   
 
Fig. 9. UNRRA’s repatriation speech to Polish DPs, 9 November 1946.194 
 
But, as Team 572 Director Durand suggested, the involvement in these events 
of ‘committees for repatriation’ themselves comprised of DPs who refused to be 
repatriated suggested that success was always unlikely.195 Harsh measures 
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Ehingen, for instance, the Chief of the camp was replaced.196 At the Polish 
Lycée of Schwenningen, three Professors were also dismissed by UNRRA 
authorities for circulating anti-repatriation propaganda.197 Lastly, in November 
1946, the DP committees in Horb were dismantled for engaging in black-market 
activities and anti-repatriation propaganda.198  
Alongside this intensive repatriation campaign, UNRRA carried out a vast 
screening operation, the aim being to evict former collaborators and non-eligible 
DPs from its camps. As a result, by August 1945 a distinction between eligible 
and non-eligible DPs was made, Resolution 71 stipulating that the 
‘Administration [would] not assist displaced persons who may be detained […] 
on charges of having collaborated with the enemy’.199 For all that, it was only in 
August 1946 that screening operations gathered real pace.200 
 
Between protection and exclusion: UNRRA’s screening operation 
Over the summer of 1946 ‘screening consulting commissions’ were 
established within each UNRRA field team, their purpose being to make 
preliminary arrangements for the Zone’s Permanent Screening Commission. 
Studies of screening operations in the British and American zones have 
highlighted that British and American relief workers knew very little about 
Eastern European minorities, their languages and dialects, or the animosities 
between differing ethnic groups. They were thus incapable of understanding the 
complex issues involved in screening.201 The Allies’ imperfect knowledge of the 
complex composition of the DP population was aggravated by the tendency 
among DPs to lie or withhold information about their wartime activities and their 
dates of entry to Germany.202 A few examples prove the point. 
In Kaiserlautern, Team Director Paul Bayle, Welfare Officer Vatin-
Pérignon and representatives of the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian 
communities carried out the screening operations. In total, 229 DPs were 
screened: 141 obtained the full ‘DP status’, 23 DPs were excluded and 65 were 
registered as ‘doubtful cases’. Among those excluded, some were Hungarian 
DPs, others were Stateless who came voluntarily to Germany during the war 
and, finally, some were Baltic Volkdeutsche.  The ‘doubtful cases’ included DPs !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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enrolled in the Wehrmacht and Baltic DPs who fled the advancing Red Army.203 
These results, at least on paper, conformed to the eligibility regulations laid 
down by UNRRA. But this was not always the case. In Koblenz, for instance, 
Polish Commanders conducted the screening operation. According to an 
UNRRA supervisory report, these DP representatives excluded any DPs they 
chose to eliminate because of their own prejudices.204 This was not the only 
case of blatant partiality. In Freiburg, the Director of Team 206 followed ‘his 
personal feelings’ rather that strictly applying UNRRA’s rule. ‘There is every 
reason to believe that he acted as a dictator’, commented one of his 
supervisors. 205 The same occurred in Gutach and in Ravensburg where ‘The 
Director…continued to follow the old ways of a PDR officer; he did not read the 
General Bulletin N.19 and retained the spirit of a security officer, seeing in each 
DP who did not share his sympathies a suspect.’ 206  
After these preliminary screening operations, three teams composed of 
representatives of the Polish Repatriation Mission and UNRRA officials toured 
individual DP centres.207 During March 1947, the Permanent Commission had 
visited forty-three teams and twenty-four Detachments, that is to say sixty-
seven Centres comprising a total DP population of 37,128. 15.7 per cent of the 
population screened were judged to be suspicious: 
 
1182 DP’s were excluded, that is to say 3.2%. 
1217 DP's were put forward for exclusion; and 
2826 DP’s were submitted as being doubtful cases.208 
 
For some UNRRA field workers, UNRRA’s rigid policy meant that it came to be 
regarded as ‘an administration, which no longer wishes to do anything for the 
DPs’. 209 It is nevertheless worth noting that the number of DPs excluded in the 
French zone was considerably lower than in the British and American zones. 
Admittedly, screening operations were eventually abandoned in the 
American zone due to widespread criticism. 210 By then, of some 320,000 DPs 
screened by the US army in cooperation with UNRRA, 12.3 per cent were 
declared ineligible for DP status. In the British zone, 10.4 per cent were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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disqualified. By contrast, only 2.8 per cent of those screened were deprived of 
their DP status by UNRRA officials working in the French zone.211 Furthermore, 
considerably more DPs were included in the ‘persecutee’ category in the 
French zone (including Berlin):  in December 1946, 1,127 were categorized this 
way within the French zone compared to 742 in the US Zone and none at all in 
the British. The reason was simple: the French applied this category to those 
who were persecuted by the Nazis even if they were not displaced by war.212  
So did UNRRA’s presence stimulate or discourage repatriation? The 
answer to this question is superficially simple: if we look solely at UNRRA 
Council policy the need to encourage repatriation was strongly emphasized. 
Beneath the surface, the realities were more complex. Firstly, the French 
UNRRA Administration was slow to send clear instructions to its field workers. 
As a result, some team directors believed that they were entitled to mention 
emigration opportunities to DPs, thereby creating conflicts with Eastern 
European Repatriation Missions. 213  Secondly, due to the personal and 
administrative conflict between the PDR and UNRRA’s management, Lenclud 
did not offer unqualified support to French repatriation efforts. Perhaps more 
importantly, Lenclud broke the ‘neutrality’ principle by publicly denouncing the 
French authorities’ ‘double-game’ policy. As a result, the French PDR service 
and Laffon’s civil cabinet concluded that ‘repatriation was carried out without 
UNRRA’s help’.214 
Lack of coordination between the two competing administrations was 
particularly glaring in the organization of the Polish repatriation centre in 
Villingen. In September 1946, Lenclud opposed Laffon’s decision to install the 
transit centre in a former stalag in the town.215  According to him, French 
authorities were transporting DPs in conditions ‘often inferior to those of 
animals’.216 In September 1946 Welfare Officer Rozale observed that the sight 
of the camp provoked a physical revulsion in her. ‘I arrived in Buchenwald in 
April 1945; apart from the corpses on the floor, the camp was clean and fleuri 
[dressed with flowerbeds]. Here, I did not know where to start.’217 The camp 
rapidly acquired a terrible reputation, although evidence suggests that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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conditions within it progressively improved.218 The lack of UNRRA support for 
these repatriation efforts not only angered French authorities; it also 
exasperated UNRRA’s field workers themselves. In March 1947, Team 777 
Director Dalichampt reported: 
 
The problem […] is the following: disembarking living beings, gathering 
them, taking them on board, and during these operations, maintaining 
adequate living conditions. The way in which these different categories of 
civilized people are crammed together in barracks and cattle trains is 
absolutely disgusting; one cannot help but wonder if it was necessary to 
go to so much effort to rehabilitate these uprooted people if all such efforts 
finally ended with such an appalling conclusion. It is outrageous to see 
young soldiers travelling in luxurious carriages while elderly, pregnant 
women and babies are pitifully set up. 219 
 
 
The challenge of DPs’ politics 
 
 Following in the footsteps of Hannah Arendt’s work on national 
sentiment among refugee communities, historians have illuminated the central 
role that nationalism played in post-war Germany. They have demonstrated that 
camp life catalysed the development of a ‘long-distance nationalism’ among 
DPs, who conserved strong affective ties with their home countries and strove 
to influence politics there.220 DP nationalism provided a communal means to 
overcome the test of displacement and to cope with the sense of 
depersonalisation, homelessness and social downgrading that was exacerbated 
by life in the camps. 221  Recently, Anna Holian has highlighted the rightist and 
anti-communist tenor of these various DP nationalist movements, 
demonstrating the central role that authoritarian and fascist personalities played 
in the shaping of DP politics.222 Like the German expellees, Holian argues the 
DPs ‘were an avant-garde of anticommunism’.223 
  Even so, remarkably little attention has been paid to these issues 
within the French zone. This last section is not an inside story of DP nationalist 
activities in the French zone but, rather, an account of DP nationalist and anti-
communist activities as seen through French eyes. Despite the strict official ban !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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on anti-repatriation propaganda and the various restrictions imposed on DP 
committees by French authorities, evidence suggests that anti-repatriation 
activities flourished in the zone, indicating that far from being passive recipients, 
DPs were active participants in the shaping of French repatriation policies.  
What did UNRRA and the PDR service know about DP anti-communist 
activities in the zone? And to what extent were French attitudes’ marked by 
ambiguity, despite their official commitment to curtail DPs’ anti-repatriation 
activities? 
 
Anti-communist protests 
DPs never formed a homogeneous group. They were rigorously separated 
by nationality. They had experienced the war in sharply different ways. And they 
displayed varying degrees of political consciousness. Their anticommunism 
also varied, DP elites being divided along inherited pre-war and wartime 
political and ideological lines. 224  Reflecting on the Ukrainian Women’s 
movement, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak argues: 
 
Like much of DP politics, the story of the organization of women in the 
camps is not very pretty. What happened, essentially, was that the 
women’s movement – which despite signs of strain before World War II, 
had nevertheless remained united outside the Soviet Union – split. The 
most outspoken feminists, such as Milena Rudnytska, Olena 
Sheparovych, and Mariia Strutynska, who also happened to be politically 
moderate and opposed to the rhetoric of the nationalists, were pointedly 
excluded from the new organization of women that was created in the 
camps.225 
 
 In short, most Polish DPs opposed returning to a ‘Poland occupied by the 
Russians and dominated by communists.’226 Ukrainian DPs were hostile both to 
Russian and Polish occupation and expressed their desire for an independent 
Ukrainian state.227 Russians DPs in turn opposed what they regarded as the 
‘un-Russian’ Bolshevik leadership of the Soviet Union. 228  And Baltic DPs 
opposed the Soviet occupation of their countries. As Holian observes, a 
common thread linked these various anti-communist movements nevertheless: 
essentially, they were ‘anti-ideologies’, creating a sense of coherence by 
emphasizing what was to be rejected. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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[DP] Anticommunism was synonymous with anti-Bolshevism and anti-
Sovietism. At issue was the system of rule in the Soviet bloc in all its 
aspects – political, economic, social and cultural – and especially the 
extent to which the Soviet Union suppressed or permitted national self-
determination. [Anti-Communist DPs] had little interest in formulating a 
broader critique of communism as an ideology. 229  
 
Admittedly, the French zone was not the centre of gravity of DPs’ politics. In 
marked contrast with the American zone, and to a lesser extent with the British 
zone, DPs had minimal room to engage in associational life or to develop 
cultural activities in the French zone. Their freedom of movement was strictly 
limited, a circular dating from 27 September 1945 preventing them from moving 
more than five kilometres from their place of residence.230  Furthermore, Laffon 
and Poignant were mistrustful of elected DP committees. 231  Rejecting the 
UNRRA proposal to place decision-making in the hands of elected committees, 
Laffon suggested that aid workers should instead entrust authority to an elected 
‘homme de confiance’, a practice that was previously used in PoW camps.232 
Furthermore, the French zone lacked large urban centres, it had fewer major 
DP camps and its authorities offered DPs considerably less material support.  
None of this prevented DPs from beginning to organize self-help 
committees even before the formal end of hostilities.233 The Comité Polonais de 
Ravensburg was, for example, created on 16 May 1945.234 In Freiburg a DP 
Committee was established the same month.235 National bank holidays were 
celebrated throughout the zone.236 In Freiburg, Baltic DPs set up a popular 
university to present and enhance Baltic art, literature and folklore. 237  In 
Wangen, the Ukrainian group ‘Kalyna’ organised regular concerts playing 
traditional Ukrainian songs. At first glance, French authorities seemed to have 
taken an unequivocally hard line against DP anti-communist leaders. On 2 
October 1945, the dissolution of all DP Committees that had not received an 
official recognition was ordered. 238 And on 1 February 1946 the War Ministry 
issued an order banning all ‘Polish groups’. 239 On 27 December 1946 it refused !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to certify the National Yugoslav Committee. 240  And the Association des 
Combattants Polonais was only formally recognized in August 1947. In addition, 
French authorities refused to authorize the publication of DP newspapers. As a 
result, an active DP press was almost non-existent in the zone.241 Polish DPs 
were not alone in lamenting the fact that they could not publish their own 
newspapers. In 1946, l’United the Lithuanian Relief Fund of America mourned 
the fact that there was no Lithuanian newspaper in the French zone.242 French 
authorities also restrained DPs entrepreneurial initiatives. 243  Significant 
disparities were, however, to be found between localities. 
In Ravensburg the PDR authorities largely relied on DP committees. In 
Freiburg UNRRA’s administration required DP committees to be set up. So 
these committees were simply asked to change their titles and to avoid directly 
contacting the French military or German authorities in case of any disputes.244 
Moreover, although the Association des anciens combattants polonais was not 
officially recognized until 1947, Laffon unofficially gave them material help, long 
before that.245 The evidence also suggests that some Baltic officials benefited 
from the support of some French officials, building on personal contacts 
developed in the interwar years. 246  Baltic DPs found, for instance, an 
enthusiastic supporter in the military government in the person of Raymond 
Schmittlein, an early Gaullist who had lived in Lithuania and Latvia between 
1934 and 1940 working as a professor and as foreign correspondent for the 
Havas news-agency.247  Furthermore, as explained in the previous section, 
French administrators maintained cordial relations with Polish and Hungarian 
military officials hostile to repatriation.  
In June 1946, UNRRA Director De Fos reported that Captain Lipski from 
the Polish Mission of the Vatican, ‘apotre du non-retour en Pologne’, distributed 
shoes, clothes and soap drawn from the supplies of the Sanders Army.248 From 
late 1946 further evidence of anti-communist activities mounted in the French !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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zone. In Rottweil, the Polish Committee was dissolved pour des raisons 
diplomatiques after publishing a political note in September 1946.249  Posters 
and proclamations encouraging DPs to accept repatriation offers were torn 
down in Balingen, Rotweil and Villingen in December.250 Political leaflets and 
anti-repatriation newspapers, often originating in the American zone, circulated 
widely within the French.251 Letters emanating from deportees in Siberia were 
distributed.252 In Mulheim, nine Polish DPs previously repatriated to Poland but 
now back in the French zone were found, for instance, promulgating anti-
repatriation propaganda.253 
More significantly, a firestorm of protest erupted among Baltic DPs on 10 
March 1947 at the opening of the Moscow Conference.254 In several camps, 
Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian DP Committees announced the start of a 
hunger strike to protest against the Soviet occupation of their countries. Various 
Baltic committees issued letters in which they argued that all totalitarian regimes 
and, more precisely, the Nazi and Communist ones, were similar. In a letter 
infused with human rights rhetoric, the Reutlingen Lithuanian committee 
lamented that their tragedy was their holocauste à l’hôtel de la liberté.255 They 
compared their victimhood condition to that of the Jewish Displaced Persons.256 
It was hardly surprising that the most visible protests were organized by 
Baltic DPs. 257  Unlike other DP groups, and notably Poles, many Baltic 
Displaced Persons were neither forced labourers nor former concentration 
camp inmates. Many had instead fled westward in 1944 as the Soviet Army 
advanced.258 The overwhelming majority of them lived in the Württemberg area 
and were intellectuals who came into Germany after June 1940.259 As Eder 
observes, because their countries no longer existed as independent states but 
only as Soviet Republics, ‘they behaved more as representatives of their former !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Baltic states than as DPs’ and preserved their nationality, their particularism and 
their language. 260  On 4 June 1947, during a meeting between the PDR 
Administration and Soviet Repatriation Officers, Soviet General Bassilov stated 
that Baltic war criminals had organized numerous committees – described as 
‘veritable laboratories of anti-repatriation propaganda’ - notably in Ravensburg, 
in Freiburg, and in Tübingen.261 All of this was taking place while such political 
activities technically remained forbidden in the French zone (as in the other 
zones), something that the Council of Foreign Ministers reiterated in April 1947 
when an agreement was signed prohibiting all committees ‘which may be found 
to be engaged in activities hostile to the interests of any of the Allied Powers’.262  
 
An elitist movement 
The description of these anti-repatriation protests should not, however, lead us 
to conclude that DP anticommunism was a ‘mass movement’, nor that all DPs 
were infused with strong anti-communist sentiments. Historians are divided in 
their assessments of the importance of the political explanation (or in other 
words the ‘anti-communist explanation’) for non-Jewish DPs’ refusal to accept 
repatriation offers.263 Wolfgang Jacobmeyer argues that many Poles lacked the 
ability to make politically-informed decisions, suggesting that they were primarily 
driven by concerns about material security and fear of punishment.264 Dyczok 
estimates that thirty to forty per cent of Ukrainian DPs were political refugees 
who took a conscious decision to leave their home and that sixty to seventy per 
cent were forced labourers.265 Other historians, on the contrary, maintain that 
Poles, Ukrainians and Russians were categorically opposed to communism.266 
Holian is more nuanced. According to her, the DP political explanation reflected 
DP elites’ efforts to build a consensus against repatriation. They created a 
‘global framework for individual concerns, one that edited out “merely” personal 
or economic considerations as well as politically problematic ones such as fear 
of retaliation for collaboration’. 267  According to Holian, conservative and 
authoritarian leaders played a significant role in the shaping of this ‘broad 
consensus’ and in the formulation of this political explanation.  
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The leadership cadres of the anti-communist DP movement certainly 
included numerous individuals who had collaborated with the Nazis. Reflecting 
on Lithuanian DP politics, Tomas Balkelis concurs, arguing that Lithuanian DP 
elites made ‘a strenuous effort to forge ‘a single national community’ from a 
mass of disorganised and socially stratified refugees.’268  In doing so, they 
attempted to create a positive image of themselves in the West and ‘to preserve 
(or construct) a sense of collective worth’.  Aldis Purs comes to the same 
conclusion in his analysis of Latvian National Politics: ‘Latvian DP identity 
became cemented and ‘packaged’ as national identity for Allied 
consumption.’269  This was also arguably the case in the French zone. Political 
prisoners and former prisoners of war played a significant role in the 
development of DP anti-communism. PoWs had organized themselves during 
the Nazi period and had accumulated greater amount of savings, as 
L’Association des Combattants Polonais in the French zone testified.270 
This is all the more interesting since, according to Holian, the political 
explanation was less prominent in the French zone. She cites the result of the 
UNRRA repatriation poll of May 1946 in support of her claim. Conducted in the 
three western zones, the poll was the first (and last) systematic sounding of the 
DP population. It asked DP three questions. ‘What was their nationality? Did 
they want to return home? And if not, why not?’ Answers were submitted 
anonymously. The results revealed not only a ‘broad popular opposition to 
repatriation’ but also the extent to which opposition had come to be defined in 
political terms. 271 While the poll does not present comprehensive picture of DP 
opinion regarding repatriation, it provides insight into the differences between 
the three Western zones in relation to DPs’ commitment to remain in exile. In 
the French zone, out of 31,232 DPs from the major groups (Balts, Polish, 
Russian, Yugoslav and Jewish) interrogated, 3,845 said yes to repatriation, 
19,210 no and 8,177 refused to participate. In total, 61.5 % of the population 
interrogated said no, a figure considerably lower than in the British zone 
(79.3%) and in the American zone (88%). 272  Abstention was considerably 
higher in the French zone. Furthermore, if one examines only the figures 
relating to Polish DPs (without a strong anti-repatriation drive akin to the Balts 
or Jews) one finds that they were even lower. Out of 26,154 interrogated, 7,276 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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did not participate, 3,768 said yes and 15,110 said no. In total, 57.8% refused 
repatriation, unlike 76.2 % in the British zone and 84.4% in the American 
zone.273   
From an UNRRA perspective, these results tended to suggest that 
collective resistance to repatriation was weaker in the French occupation zone, 
Polish DPs placing greater emphasis on economic factors than on political 
motives. For UNRRA officials, this difference stemmed from the fact that many 
Poles in the French zone worked in the German economy. ‘They therefore 
enjoyed greater economic security’. 274 In May 1947, thirty per cent of the DPs 
worked for UNRRA, twenty-one per cent for the military government or the 
French economy, and thirty-nine per cent within the German economy.275 The 
greater proportional integration of DPs within the German economy was 
paralleled by a greater integration of students into German universities. 276 But, 
the relative weakness of the political explanation can also be traced back to 
three other factors: DP elite awareness that French authorities were more 
hostile to their constructed ‘anti-communist’ and ‘national’ identities (DPs were 
less likely to be seen as ‘Cold War heroes’ in the French zone); the (relative) 
absence of activists and political leaders able to construct this ‘broad 
consensus’ among the mass of DPs in the French zone; and DP leaders’ 
appreciation that they needed to remain discreet if they wanted to preserve the 
unofficial protection that PDR officials granted them.  
In sum, reasons for refusing repatriation greatly varied among individuals 
and over time. They were shaped by DPs’ past experiences and by the post-
war context: by political and economic conditions in their home countries, by 
conditions of DP life in the zone and, later on, by opportunities (or supposed 
opportunities) for emigration. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter supplements the multiple historiographies with which it 
intersects, including the history of forced repatriation of Soviet nationals, the 
history of the remaking of French asylum in post-war France, the history of the 
French occupation zone and the history of UNRRA. Amid the vast literature on 
DPs in post-war Germany, numerous studies examine forced and voluntary 
repatriation to the Soviet Union and Poland as well as DPs’ strategies to avoid !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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it. But, as Polian observes, most of the English-language histories have focused 
on the British and American zones. The French case has been less well 
researched. Following in the footsteps of Coudry, Polian and, more recently, 
Rinke’s work, this chapter has highlighted the complexities of French attitudes 
towards repatriation. It has demonstrated the vicissitudes of repatriation, 
repatriation incentives being highly contingent on changing circumstances, 
institutional rivalries, local realities and DPs’ nationality.  Contrary to widespread 
historical presumptions about French insensitivity, supposedly exemplified by 
the handing over of Baltic and Ukrainian DPs in the autumn of 1945, French 
positions changed in Paris (and in the zone) well before the adoption of the UN 
landmark resolution of 12 February 1946.  
The chapter’s originality lies in its uses of UNRRA and PDR archives. 
These allow us to move below the level of national government and policy. 
While it recognises the importance of diplomats and national politicians in 
formulating repatriation policies, the chapter has revealed how repatriation also 
crucially depended on how French administrators re-interpreted and 
implemented these instructions in the zone. Contradictory instructions from the 
Foreign Ministry engendered differences in implementation. As in many other 
aspects of French occupation policy, this chapter has also highlighted the gap 
in perceptions between authorities in Paris and authorities in Berlin, Baden-
Baden, Rastatt and Haslach. It suggests that although a policy between East 
and West (consistent with the main orientation of French foreign policy at the 
time) was difficult to implement as far as repatriation was concerned, the PDR 
Direction nevertheless attempted to balance French labour needs with the 
requirements of the Soviet/Polish Repatriation Missions. Their double-game 
policy was a delicate diplomatic exercise, hampered by the presence of 
UNRRA.  
But, the zone was not monolithic, nor should it be analysed as such. The 
PDR service’s difficulties were compounded by the lack of coordination 
between different administrative agencies and by the autonomy of local 
administrators. In this respect, this chapter reveals as much as it obscures. 
Indeed, more research needs to be done at the local level of daily encounters in 
order to know exactly where and when DPs were more likely to avoid forced 
repatriation and to engage in anti-repatriation activities. This would allow us to 
better understand why in Mulheim PDR officers believed that they had the right 
to use the threat of repatriation to exclude Poles, while (in the same period) in 
Ravensburg, local authorities allowed the development of anti-repatriation 
activities. This problem had important domestic repercussions. In the Soviet 
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Union, several French POWs found themselves held hostage as a result of the 
non-repatriation of Soviet DPs. This generated acrimonious conflicts within the 
French Parliament. As Catherine Klein-Gousseff observed, ‘[a]lthough the 
number of French detainees in the Soviet Union probably amounted to less 
than a hundred, and not thousands as it was claimed at the time, their detention 
became [in France] one of the living symbol of the emerging Cold War’.277  
While this chapter shows that French diplomats signed an agreement 
with UNRRA in the hope that it would facilitate French administrators’ work with 
Eastern European Missions, it reveals that the presence of UNRRA largely 
complicated French PDR actions in the zone. Several reasons account for this: 
the lack of a clear and consistent message from UNRRA’s central headquarters 
and the subsequent delays in implementing a pro-repatriation policy, the bitter 
personal and administrative conflict between the PDR/UNRRA Directions, and, 
finally, the lack of relief workers’ training in Eastern European politics and 
history. In doing so, this chapter raises interesting questions about the limits of 
‘neutral’ and ‘impartial’ humanitarian aid. It is in many respects paradoxical that 
UNRRA personnel succeeded in providing neutral humanitarian aid in the 
Soviet Union, but substantially failed to do the same in the French zone. 
Beyond what this history says about UNRRA and the French occupation zone, 
it thereby offers an opportunity to raise questions regarding the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of humanitarian action. Were young and largely untrained relief 
workers able to make informed decisions about who should be repatriated and 
who should not, who was a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ DP, who deserved assistance and 
who did not? Were they really able to detect dishonest stories and to resolve 
possible conflicting statements? What were the perverse effects of this ‘justice 
d’intuition’?278 
Following the massive misuse of humanitarian aid in the Rwanda refugee 
camps between 1994 and 1996, humanitarianism has undergone ‘a painful 
introspection’ since the late 1990s. Humanitarian theoreticians and practitioners 
have questioned the fundamental principles of humanitarian aid and exposed its 
sometimes perverse effects, showing that humanitarian organizations are often 
motivated by the same un-altruistic incentives that affect other organizations.279  
Without question, the gravity and scope of the problem in the French zone is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
277"KleinEGousseff"Retour%d’URSS,p.%12."
278"Cohen"‘The"West"and"the"Displaced’,"p."132."
279"Fiona" Terry" Condemned% to% repeat?% The% Paradox% of% Humanitarian% Action% (Ithaca:" Cornell" University" Press," 2002);" Arthur" C."
Helton"The%Price%of% Indifference.%Refugees%and%Humanitarian%Action%in%the%New%Century" (Oxford:"Oxford"University"Press,"2002);"
Sarah"Kenyon"Lisher"‘Collateral"Damage."Humanitarian"Assistance"as"a"cause"of"conflict’"International%Security"28"(2003),"pp."79E
109;"Dangerous% Sanctuaries:% Refugee% camps,% civil% war% and% the% dilemnas% of% humanitarian% aid" (Ithaca:" Cornell" University" Press,"
2005)."
! 168 
not comparable to what happened in Congo-Zaire: UNRRA did not become a 
tool of war, nor did DPs spread civil war. But the example of UNRRA in the 
French zone reveals that the organization sometimes lent assistance to 
authoritarian and fascist DP leaders (who were sometimes more literate and 
better placed to develop strategies against repatriation) while excluding other, 
more deserving DPs. Instead of discrediting UNRRA’s administration as a 
whole, this chapter has therefore stressed the organizational difficulties 
experienced, despite the best original intentions to uphold neutrality: most relief 
workers lacked adequate training, few spoke the languages they needed, and 
many did not know the reality of Soviet and Nazi methods. In so doing, the 
chapter adds to wider discussion about the moral dilemmas of humanitarian aid, 
the most emblematic examples of the time being the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC)’s tilt towards Mussolini’s Italy and its guilty silence during 
the Nazi period. As Rainer Baudentistel has demonstrated, the ICRC’s 
neutrality was distorted in the late 1930s by conservatism and racism, its 
committee being inclined to see Ethiopia as an uncivilized region that should 
never had been admitted to the League of Nations.280 During World War Two, 
as we know, the International Committee knew about the concentration camp 
system but said nothing due to its policy of confidentiality, in order to pursue its 
work on behalf of the Prisoners of War held by Nazi Germany.281 Seen in this 
light, UNRRA emerges with rather more credit. 
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Chapter Four: When most relief workers had never heard of Freud 
French UNRRA humanitarian actors  
 
 In June 1947, American UNRRA welfare officer Elise Zach was stationed 
in the French zone, where she had helped organize relief for almost two years. 
Contemplating the end of her service with UNRRA, she identified three main 
obstacles that hampered the UN administration’s activities in the French zone. 
One was the scarcity of material and financial resources. Another was the 
shortage of personnel trained in what she called the ‘modern concept of 
welfare.’ 1  Third was the lack of agreement between relief workers of differing 
cultures and nationalities about the objectives sought. Despite UNRRA’s 
internationalist ambitions, French staff predominated among its staff in the 
French zone. The wartime experiences and educational backgrounds of French 
recruits were markedly different from those of their American co-workers. ‘A 
considerable percentage of welfare personnel had nurses’ training, very little 
knowledge of sociology and even less of psychology. American methods of 
casework and group-work were, on the whole, quite unknown.’2  In Zach’s eyes, 
‘[t]he difference in the approach to welfare may perhaps [be] most strikingly […] 
illustrated by the fact that a French welfare worker in one of the most 
responsible positions had never heard of Freud.’3 According to her, French 
relief workers were uninterested in the psychological dimensions of relief work, 
preferring to focus on providing material assistance to DPs. Zach’s observation 
reflects the discrepancy between differing allied visions of relief work, some of 
which drew on current psychological and psychoanalytic theories while others 
remained more traditionally oriented to short-term welfare. ‘The main emphasis 
was upon concrete services and material help, the distribution of supplies. I met 
welfare workers who with an empty warehouse saw their main field of activity 
disappear. This stemmed no doubt from different training in the Western 
European countries where the emphasis seems to [have been] placed on 
physical care and tangible services.’4  
 As we have seen, UNRRA’s creation ushered in new forms of refugee 
humanitarianism, based on an American-style understanding of self-help and a 
trust in science. Like Zach, many American UNRRA recruits saw themselves as 
‘professionals of rehabilitation’, concerned not only with material assistance but 
also with DPs’ emotional and psychological needs. Admittedly, few of them !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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were trained psychologists or psychoanalysts, but most did have cognate 
educational qualifications and psychoanalytic theories informed their work.5 In a 
shift from earlier relief efforts, UNRRA planners aimed to provide more than a 
mere ‘soup kitchen’ charity.6 Along with filling refugees’ stomachs, dispensing 
clothing, shelter and health care, they intended to meet DPs’ emotional 
requirements. In the summer of 1944, UNRRA’s Welfare Division commissioned 
an international committee of psychiatrists, psychologists and sociologists to 
prepare a report on the psychological problems to be confronted in the field.7 
Submitted in June 1945, this report maintained that ‘[t]he United Nations 
Administration is concerned not only with Relief – that is with making provision 
for material needs – but also with Rehabilitation  - that is with the amelioration of 
psychological and social suffering and dislocation. For man does not live by 
bread alone.’8 In aiming to ‘help DPs to help themselves’, UNRRA planners 
linked the psychological rehabilitation of individual displaced persons to a 
broader campaign to cultivate democratic values in post-war Europe.9 
 This shift from providing bread and butter to psychological rehabilitation 
was initiated two decades earlier during the humanitarian campaigns that 
followed the First World War.10 Many of the experts who helped create UNRRA 
were veterans of the relief efforts following the earlier global conflict. Many 
among them believed that better coordination and planning would have saved 
more lives and that humanitarian action was, in part, an effort to ‘reconstruct’ 
the individual. This transformation also paralleled the rapidity with which 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis developed in the early twentieth-century United 
States. In the inter-war period, US social workers began to organize as a 
profession, divorcing themselves from their philanthropic origins. 
‘Psychoanalysis was attractive at this moment because it offered a set of 
scientific methods and theories that justified social workers’ claims to possess 
professional, scientific expertise.’11 Finally, UNRRA’s project bore the imprint of 
the New Deal.12 For American UNRRA planners, with the creation of the new 
organization, ‘the transition from the private to the public realm in relief and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rehabilitation marked a further internalization of New Deal-style problem-
solving.’13 
 If American social workers descended on the European continent armed 
with the psychoanalytic theories and practices of social work that dominated the 
United States at mid-century, most French relief workers remained unfamiliar 
with the new concepts and approaches involved.14  Zach was not alone in 
lamenting both that French social workers ‘had never heard of Freud’ and were 
unacquainted with wider ‘case-work’ principles. Case-work entailed focusing on 
DPs’ emotional problems, on their individual backgrounds and circumstances. 
In France, Charles Joy, the director of the American branch of the Unitarian 
Service Committee (USC), which took charge of a colony for Spanish refugee 
Children, also maintained that French social workers were incapable of 
addressing the perceived psychological consequences of war and 
displacement. ‘The problem of neurotic and psychotic children is a serious one’ 
he noted. ‘France’, he concluded, ‘has not made in the field of psychiatry the 
progress she has made in other fields.’15 Little wonder, then, that most of 
UNRRA’s French recruits had never heard of Freud. 16  By 1945 the 
professionalization of the position of assistante sociale (female social worker) 
was far from complete. Indeed, the legislation governing this new professional 
corps was only implemented in April 1946.  Faced with a severe shortage of 
social workers during the war, French authorities had recruited many staff 
lacking proper training. Even among those with specialist qualifications, there 
was a rift between those with ‘medico-social’ backgrounds and those who had 
been trained in ‘pure social work.’ 17  
But may we infer from all this, as Zach’s observation rather invites us to 
do, that French UNRRA relief workers rejected the Administration’s 
rehabilitation project? Did unprofessional and inexperienced French relief 
workers disregard UNRRA planners’ injunction to ‘help DPs to help 
themselves’? Or, did they try, on the contrary, to meet DPs’ emotional needs in 
the process of rehabilitating them? In other words, what were the 
consequences of UNRRA’s shift from providing bread and butter to 
psychological rehabilitation in the French zone? This question raises another, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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more basic one: did UNRRA’s ‘humanitarian revolution’ affect the French zone? 
These questions are what the next three chapters investigate. But, first, this 
chapter examines French relief workers’ backgrounds, their previous 
experiences, and their mental baggage.  
 
The historiographical context 
 
The creation of UNRRA is often described as a crucial moment in the 
professionalization and modernization of global humanitarianism.18 By contrast, 
this thesis argues for a more nuanced assessment of UNRRA’s humanitarian 
revolution.19 According to Daniel Cohen, the DP experience transformed the 
ideology and practice of modern humanitarianism in at least three respects: it 
attracted a new generation of aid workers dedicated to liberal internationalism 
and modern welfare techniques; it standardized the use of refugee camps as 
humanitarian enclaves and sites of stabilization; and it inaugurated an era of 
humanitarian ‘governmentality.’ 20  According to Cohen, an abundance of 
statistics, reports, and censuses, along with the enforcement of uniform 
nutritional, medical, and housing standards strove to fashion what were 
heterogeneous DP groups into a cohesive ‘refugee nation.’21 In the French 
zone, however, these transformations were only partially fulfilled. To be sure, 
much as elsewhere, UNRRA relief workers were required to fill in a plethora of 
scientific reports about calories, sanitary conditions and DPs’ medical status. 
Yet, as will be explained in the next chapter, the use of camps as humanitarian 
enclaves was more limited. Furthermore, the majority of French UNRRA relief 
workers were neither wholly committed to liberal internationalism, nor to modern 
welfare techniques. 
 While UNRRA was presented as an exercise in international cooperation, 
the majority of its personnel in the zone were of French origin. In October 1945, 
for instance, sixty-six per cent of UNRRA personnel were French.22 In February 
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1946, the proportion rose to sixty-eight per cent for the southern district.23 
These figures were themselves indicative of the limits to international 
cooperation in the field. While recent studies have highlighted the rift separating 
American professional approaches from British Bountiful Ladies’ non-
professional, un-theoretical and old-fashioned approach to welfare, very little 
attention has been paid to French UNRRA recruits.24 Most American recruits 
had high-level qualifications, substantial records of service with the Department 
of Social Welfare, but no direct experience of displacement. On the contrary, 
most British recruits - particularly women – arrived with prior experience of relief 
work during the war years, whether as civil servants or on behalf of voluntary 
agencies. Educational attainment among the British personnel was, by contrast, 
highly variable. 25  This chapter will demonstrate that French relief workers’ 
backgrounds were even more heterogeneous. It will be suggested that, in 
contrast with American social workers, French UNRRA recruits neither had 
substantial professional expertise in case-work nor a common set of cultural 
and professional values, which might have helped frame their attitudes towards 
DPs. Heterogeneity was, instead, the defining feature. Regional and social 
differences were extremely pronounced among the demobilized soldiers, 
nurses, former wartime volunteers and out-of-work businessmen who 
comprised the French relief cohort.  
 Disciplining this workforce was a serious matter for French UNRRA 
headquarters.26 Authorities expressed their shock about the immorality of young 
female welfare officers, who allegedly slept with Germans and indulged 
enthusiastically in black market activities. Imposing norms of personal and 
professional morality proved very difficult. On the one hand, UNRRA offered 
extremely high wages to people who had just experienced four years of 
hardship and privation, making low-price black market luxury goods 
understandably tempting. On the other hand, employment with UNRRA was 
meant to be temporary. 27 Transfers from one team to another were frequent. 
UNRRA personnel thereby lived in a state of ‘perpetual instability’, this 
uncertain status creating frustration and discouragement.28 
 Without doubt, UNRRA authorities had neither the time nor the necessary 
incentives to turn this entire heterogeneous group into committed, professional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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social workers. Ill-equipped to cope with the pressures brought to bear on them 
in the field, some young UNRRA recruits either resigned or succumbed to the 
temptation of black-marketing or, even worse in UNRRA official’s eyes, immoral 
sexual behaviour. Others, however, gradually adopted the administration’s 
expected professional norms. Faced with growing criticism from within official 
occupation circles, many UNRRA recruits became increasingly eager to 
demonstrate their capabilities as social workers. The French zone therefore 
witnessed the emergence of an inchoate ‘professional discourse’, which grew 
out of the necessity to differentiate UNRRA activities from those of the PDR 
service in the zone. French UNRRA relief workers progressively embraced the 
organization’s declared mission of ‘self-help’ albeit adapted to their 
interpretation of what DPs’ best interests were.  
 
An extremely heterogeneous group 
 
 In October 1946 an article in Ici-Paris examined worsening suicide rates 
following the French defeat in 1940. It detailed the story of a beautiful young 
Parisian woman, of Iranian origin, who, after several suicide attempts, decided 
to join UNRRA. ‘Out of desperation, she just signed up to be an UNRRA 
interpreter. She is going to Germany, fully contented, as she was told that she 
is sixty-five times more likely to be the victim of a terrorist attack.’29 Without 
doubt, this story was anecdotal. Yet the evidence suggests that French workers’ 
enrolment with UNRRA was not always driven by the most laudable intentions. 
While some former Resistance recruits were driven by patriotic duty and the 
need to alleviate the suffering of their brothers in arms, others were attracted by 
what was perceived at the time to be a ‘fashionable profession.’ Indeed, as Cyril 
Le Tallec shows, being an assistante sociale was considered to be chic and à la 
mode among young French bourgeois women. 30  The profession of ‘assistante 
sociale’ was nonetheless in crisis, Catholic organizations expressing the fear 
that the role attracted women for the wrong reasons, among which, the desire 
for independence, the job’s snobbish caché, and heightened (and, it was 
implied, undeserved) standing in the adult world. 31 Other UNRRA recruits were 
simply motivated by UNRRA’s pay scales - UNRRA offered extremely high 
wages paid in sterling at a time when both shortages and inflation plagued the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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economy in France. Finally, and for a smaller minority, working in the zone 
conferred the possibility of escape from a shady past. 
 American relief workers were particularly critical, or even contemptuous, of 
French recruits. Many Americans were skilled workers, who had a relatively 
idealistic understanding of the task ahead of them prior to deployment. 
American relief worker Susan Pettiss recalled, for instance, that many of her 
colleagues were driven by a ‘pervasive idealism.’ They hoped that a ‘world 
community with new social systems and international relations’ would emerge 
from the unprecedented magnitude of wartime devastation. 32  For them, 
UNRRA’s humanitarian mission represented dedication, a ‘sacred flame burning 
inside men and women wearing the organization’s uniform.’33 French recruits, 
however, did not seem to share their enthusiasm, ‘sense of sacrifice’ and 
commitment to UNRRA’s mission. In October 1945, Susan Pettiss confided to 
her aunt that ‘UNRRA did a very poor job of recruiting on the continent. There 
are good personnel from Belgium, Holland, and a few good English. The French 
are notoriously bad. A few UNRRA personnel can do more harm as far as 
prestige is concerned than a dozen good people.’34 Like Zach and Pettiss, 
many Americans believed that the French were incompetent.35 Official UNRRA 
historian Woodbridge noted that their employment was often a ‘reward for 
wartime services in the underground movements.’ According to him, ‘[i]t was 
only in its recruitment of French nationals […] that the Administration was 
injured by the employment of a large proportion of unsuitable individuals.’36  
 At the organization’s highest levels, as explained in chapter One, 
employment with UNRRA undoubtedly did constitute a reward for wartime 
service. General Lenclud, for instance, was appointed by De Gaulle in 
recognition of his wartime credentials and the fact that he had lost a son. His 
close collaborator, General Lizé de Marguerrittes, was also a well-respected 
resister. These Generals were more devoted to the restoration of French 
national honour than to the necessity to foster an internationalist spirit in the 
German ruins. But was this the situation for all French recruits? 
 
The lack of harmonized selection and training 
The UNRRA administration had to recruit a very large number of individuals in a 
very short period of time. In December 1945 the organization employed 5,169 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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people in Germany alone. Sixteen per cent of them hailed from the United 
States, thirty-one per cent from Britain and the Commonwealth, eighteen per 
cent from France, and thirty per cent from other European countries.37 Although 
the professionalization of international relief work was among its main 
objectives, UNRRA largely disregarded the question of standard qualifications 
during the recruitment of French workers. While it imposed rigorous entry 
requirements on American recruits (candidates had to be between 30 and 55 
years of age with a minimum of five years’ experience in social work in 
government or voluntary agencies as well as having the required professional 
qualifications), many French recruits had neither impressive educational 
backgrounds nor professional experience.38 What lay behind this was the high 
demands for social workers in France, which forced UNRRA to ease its 
requirements regarding age and professional experience. Furthermore, French 
UNRRA workers were usually selected by Anglo-American recruiters unfamiliar 
with the French academic system. 39 Welfare supervisor Germaine Loustalot, 
who had participated to the recruitment, recalled: 
 
The atmosphere in which this recruitment was carried out was very 
unusual. People with goodwill and zealous people came to us. They 
belonged to the Resistance. Many of their former companions in arms 
were in Germany, in the concentration camps. They wanted to join them, 
to alleviate their pain and, in some way, to finish the struggle that they had 
started together. The war was at its height. There were also people 
coming to us, whose main motivation was to go, to go anywhere, to do 
anything, at any price. Above all, they wanted to go. And, finally, there was 
the mass of those who did not know what to do, Business and Industry 
were not working, and were attracted by UNRRA’s high wages [...].40 
 
Loustalot explained that former tramway conductors, attracted by UNRRA’s 
relatively well-paid posts, were recruited as ‘cooks’ while young untrained 
women were recruited as nurses. 41  Not only was the recruitment system 
haphazard, but salaries and grades arbitrarily varied. 42 ‘We have recruited in 
haste’ observed Loustalot. ‘This haste was completely uncalled for; In three 
case out of four […] the recruits remained during long and tedious weeks in 
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transfer centres in France or Germany; some have waited up to four or five 
months before being deployed with their teams!!!’43 
French authorities soon became aware that many unsuitable candidates 
were being recruited by the administration. 44  In early April 1945, French 
Commandant Merpillat and Captain Dissard warned that some of the French 
welfare recruits were too young and inexperienced compared to their 
counterparts from Belgium and Holland. 45 Several reasons account for this. 
PDR Ministry archives reveal that few French social workers matched UNRRA’s 
ideal type.46 As we have seen, the agency’s initial criteria for appointment were 
a university degree in social work and from two to five years of professional 
experience.47 Fluency in English was often stipulated as well. French authorities 
responded that UNRRA’s rigid job specifications excluded suitable candidates. 
While France lacked fully-qualified nurses and social workers, it possessed a 
large cohort of young women with field experience, who had assisted refugees 
and other war victims while working in the Resistance. It was believed that 
UNRRA should make the most of this reservoir of experienced women. In the 
boastful words of a French observer, 
 
France is one of the countries which has experienced the most important 
population movements in the last five years; it has faced several DP 
problems (exodus, evacuation of devastated towns, displacement of 
population during Allied landings and Allied bombings, relations with the 
maquis); It has gained an experience that one needs to take into account 
and possessed local teams particularly trained and working effectively.48  
 
Evidence suggests that requirements were indeed adjusted and that large 
numbers of doctors and social workers were transferred to UNRRA bypassing 
formal interview selection.49 Some, such as the female members of the MMLA 
had relevant experience and the necessary ‘sense of sacrifice.’ Others, 
however, were neither committed nor sensitive to the DP problem. For instance, 
between eighty-five and ninety per cent of the French UNRRA doctors were 
compelled to work for the organization because they were still on Army active 
service. Some resented this position, not least because, as a result of their 
mobilization, they earned less than an internationally-recruited UNRRA nurse.50  
 In the French zone, UNRRA authorities often complained about the lack of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sufficient experienced personnel.51 It remains impossible to gather systematic 
information about UNRRA recruits in post in the zone, UNRRA staff personal 
files being closed for historical research. Some team reports and personal 
evaluations nonetheless offer clues about the diversity of French men and 
women’s backgrounds.  Some French recruits had exceptional language skills 
and educational backgrounds. For instance, Suzanne Balasko-Moreau was 
forty-three when she joined UNRRA in January 1946.  Hired to be a ‘translator’, 
she was then re-designated as a Welfare Assistant. Agrégé, she spoke fluent 
French, Spanish, English, Italian and Portuguese, her language skills refined 
during 1941 to 1944, when she had worked in a camp for British women and 
children in Troyes. 52 Other evidence suggests she was untypical. The 
backgrounds of French UNRRA welfare or assistant welfare officers working in 
the Southern District is, in this respect, revealing. In January 1946, the welfare 
department only numbered nineteen welfare women officers, two Belgian, one 
American and sixteen French. Among the French, three were qualified nurses, 
three had a ‘baccalauréat’, three were assistante sociale, three held no 
qualifications, one was a surintendante, one had a Red Cross diploma and two 
failed to provide information about their educational backgrounds. 53 Their field 
supervisor often complained about their casualness and lack of 
conscientiousness, lamenting that they were exasperatingly over-confident for 
their ages. 54 Yvonne Florence Renée Blaise was a typical example.  She joined 
UNRRA in April 1946 at the age of twenty-six as an Assistant Welfare Officer, 
receiving £600 a year.  She had no social work background, just a baccalauréat 
in History and Philosophy.55 In her personal evaluation, her supervisor noted 
that she was good but ‘a little bit too self-confident.’ 56 Her colleague Miss Boute 
‘placed the interest of her love affairs above the interest of her work, and for 
that she [was] criticized by everyone.’57  
 UNRRA male workers’ backgrounds were equally diverse. Some were 
former POWs. UNRRA Director Marcel Dalichampt was, for instance, forty 
when he joined UNRRA. According to his immediate superior, captivity had left 
him very ‘mature’ in attitude, and thus better equipped to understand DPs’ 
emotional needs. 58  His colleague, fellow UNRRA Director Gadras, was a 
former social worker previously responsible for a large-scale wartime relief !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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scheme for French DPs that involved supervising twenty-three ‘departments’ in 
the South of France, totalling nearly seventy social workers. 59  Capitain 
Raymond and UNRRA Team Director Vincent had also worked for the Foreign 
Refugees Service in France.60  Another UNRRA Director, Jacques Bauche, was 
awarded the prestigious ‘compagnon de la Libération’ in recognition of his 
resistance work. 61  Others had backgrounds in business, industry or state 
administration. In Lindau, Jean Gerbier organized his team along commercial 
managerial lines, his aim being to obtain ‘a peak efficiency in the […] 
customers’ (the DPs) satisfaction.’ 62   
 
Fig. 10. Jean Gerbier's team, Lindau.63 !
Finally, some French UNRRA recruits were demobilized soldiers. 64 In early 
1946, as UNRRA authorities recalled, the demobilizing French Army regarded 
UNRRA as ‘a dumping-ground for their surplus personnel.’ 65  ‘We were 
inundated with a stream of officers, boasting numerous honours and years’ 
experience, to whom it was always difficult to explain that our regulations 
absolutely prohibited our accepting their offer of services. (It is, though, hard to 
explain the age limit to a dapper Cavalry colonel of fifty-three; and I would 
suggest that in future organisations more latitude be given).’66 The employment 
of demobilized soldiers was not a specifically French phenomenon.67 But it 
certainly created intractable problems of integration that were nicely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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summarized by Czech refugee Frank Munk, Director of UNRRA’s training 
programme. He was, he said, dubious about the conversion of ‘a soldier, 
strongly imbued with nationalism, into a good international civil servant.’68 
In sum, the French personnel recruited by UNRRA had strikingly different 
backgrounds, work experience and motivations. Most attended a short training 
program organized in Granville, a small town in north-western France. There, 
enthusiastic instructors attempted to kindle the ‘sacred flame’ of UNRRA’s 
mission. 69  UNRRA recruits were given a ‘Memorandum of the Provisional 
Conditions of Employment on Field Service’, explaining the organization’s 
purpose and the scope of its activities. Recruits were told that they constituted a 
‘body of truly international servants’ devoted to the interests of the forty-four 
nations that had created it. Their aim was to help people to help themselves 
‘without discrimination as to race, creed or political belief.’ 70  As French UNRRA 
relief worker Jacqueline Lesdos observed in her memoirs, this training was 
undoubtedly idealistic and grandiloquent. ‘But weren’t we in the period of the 
grands enthousiasmes nécessaires?’ 71  In practice, training activities were 
vague and ‘confusing.’ The lack of guidance about field conditions made the 
stress laid on theory seem out of place.72 The lack of harmonized selection, 
combined with this insufficient training, left French recruits poorly prepared for 
the challenges they confronted in the field. Upon entering Germany, the 
majority of them had neither clear ideas about the organization’s principles nor 
about how to articulate them in practice. As Elise Zach observed ‘circumstances 
became the teacher.’ 73  While some learned how to adapt to the field’s 
requirements, others became rapidly disillusioned with the Administration. By 
December 1945, a series of resignations, defections and purges brought home 
just how hasty the first phase of recruitment had been.74 
 
Professionalization and humanitarian wage hierarchy 
UNRRA introduced perceived status differences that were not based upon 
training, ability, or experience, but rather on the relative position of particular 
personnel within the organization’s pay grades.75 These ranged from three to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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twelve, a Team Director normally holding a grade ten, an Assistant 
Administrator a grade six, and a typist a grade three.  In the French zone, 
grades three to six were said to be ‘non-commissioned officers’ and grades 
seven to twelve ‘officers.’76 The Administration also imposed the same khaki 
uniform on its entire staff from directors to drivers. In the ‘intermingled mix of 
races’ present in the German ruins, wearing the Allied uniform proved to be of 
vital importance, as young French doctor Henri Mora recalled.77  
 
Fig. 11. UNRRA Doctor and Nurse, Ravensburg78 !
Yet, although all French recruits received this khaki uniform, French men felt 
that their American and British counterparts were better ‘dressed’, either 
because they were given more than one uniform or because their uniform 
looked more stylish.79 More importantly, French recruits resented the fact that 
their wages were considerably lower than those of their American, and to a 
lesser extent, British co-workers.80"
 In the spring of 1945, for instance, a French UNRRA Deputy Director 
bitterly complained about the fact that his ‘subordinates’ earned more than him 
‘I received a English Welfare officer who earned £900 a year, that is £200 more 
than me.’81 His sense of injustice was intensified by the fact that most of the 
British and Northern American recruits could not speak German. Pierre Durand, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Director of the team in Gutach, was also unpleasantly surprised by his wage 
packet. He was recruited by the Champs Elysées’ bureau in Paris as a Mess 
Officer with an annual salary of £400. He only accepted the position because he 
was told that he would be promoted. At the time, he ‘ignored what the UNRRA 
hierarchy meant.’  In Granville, his appointment was renegotiated and he was 
appointed Team Director, which saw his salary rise from £400 to £850. But 
months after this promotion he was still waiting for the money to be transferred 
to his account. 82 Complaints like these alongside reports of consequent 
resignations abound in French and UNRRA archives.83 Reflecting on UNRRA’s 
humanitarian wage hierarchy, an UNRRA supervisor highlighted the necessity 
to adopt standardized wages: ‘I do not personally believe that any international 
organization will achieve good international relationships amongst its own staff 
unless the pay and conditions for all are equal and unless the staff itself is 
picked in such a way to ensure that the individual members of it can 
comprehend the meaning and substance of international work.’84 
If French UNRRA recruits did not necessarily and systematically earn less 
than their British counterparts, it is nevertheless true that there were glaring 
inconsistencies in UNRRA’s wage levels.  
 
Fig. 12. Nominal roll – District Headquarters French Zone North85 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As the pay roll above shows, French UNRRA Director Dufresne (Trier-Kemmel) 
earned £300 less than British Director Edwards (Trier Feyen) but £100 more 
than British Director Evans (Homburg). He earned the same salary as French 
Principal Welfare Officer Vatin-Perignon (Kaiserslautern) and £150 less than 
British Welfare Officer Dingle (Lebach).86 Yet Vatin-Perignon had neither social 
work experience nor relevant qualifications. Furthermore, she was, according to 
her supervisor, ‘charming’ but incompetent.87 Dingle was not a professional 
social worker either; but according to her supervisor she had extensive relief 
work experience and was highly capable.88 
UNRRA’s wage rates were particularly iniquitous for nurses who received 
considerably less money and were assigned lower UNRRA grade levels (which, 
in turn, determined eligibility for housing, transportation, and other social 
amenities) than less-qualified Welfare Officers and Deputy Directors. 89 In 
Freiburg, for instance, satisfied by the work of his nurse, the UNRRA team 
Director asked if she could be appointed Welfare Officer. Welfare Supervisors 
refused, arguing that they had ‘always been strict on this issue of promotion 
when those concerned did not have professional social training.’ 90 That said, 
many welfare officers, as explained earlier, lacked relevant professional 
experience or qualifications. A comparison between the salary of UNRRA 
assistant welfare officers Simone Quenet and Yvonne Florence Renée Blaise 
illustrated plainly the administration’s inconsistencies. Simone Quenet was a 
typical former resistance recruit with extensive experience of social work and, in 
January 1945, she was made Assistant sub-lieutenant FFI. 91 She duly entered 
UNRRA at the age of thirty-five as assistant Welfare Officer with an initial salary 
of £450. 92 Yvonne Florence Renée Blaise, on the contrary, had no social work 
background. She joined UNRRA in April 1946 as an Assistant Welfare Officer 
with an initial salary of £600. 93 Nor was this an isolated anomaly.94  
  The fact remains that by 1946 forty-four per cent of UNRRA employees 
were women. Some French male UNRRA recruits resented the grade and 
power conferred on women appointed as Welfare Officers. But, despite what 
would today be called UNRRA’s claims of gender blindness, the positions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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allocated in the field were, in large measure, ranked along gender lines: most 
camp directors were men, while the majority of the welfare officers were 
women. Admittedly, women could progress rapidly through UNRRA’s career 
structure, positions in the field affording them a certain sense of 
empowerment. 95  In Koblenz, English Welfare Officer Housley recalled that 
Italian DPs preferred to be ‘bossed by the women members of the team, who 
could get anything done without any difficulties, including the most dirty jobs in 
the camp.’ 96 Describing her relationship with other UNRRA services, she 
maintained that it was difficult to be recognized as a department within their 
own right. ‘[T]here is still a slight tendency on the part of some people to look 
upon us as a ‘bun and orange’ outfit, and to use us as “maids of all work” to do 
all the odds and ends of work.’97 Conflicts between male team directors and 
female welfare officers or nurses were numerous in the French zone, male 
directors apparently feeling threatened by women’s sense of empowerment. In 
Biberach, Miss de Witt was, for example, forced to leave by Team Director de 
Marnhac after having complained about shortcomings in the local administrative 
team. 98 In Gutach, UNRRA Team Director Pierre Durand issued Miss Menereul 
a letter of reprimand for disobeying his instructions: ‘you seem to forget that, 
until proved otherwise, you have to obey your Director.’99 This problem was 
neither specific to the French zone nor to French recruits. Francesca Wilson, 
who served with Quaker missions after World War I and with UNRRA, warned 
that all the ‘unaccustomed power’ of women in the field could easily intoxicate 
relief workers, transforming them into dictators overnight.100 ‘Obscure women in 
their hometowns, they exact obedience from their subjects once they are the 
Queens of Distressed Ruritanians.’101 
In sum, in spite of UNRRA’s clear professionalization and internationalist 
ambitions, its wage rates were profoundly unfair, tending to reinforce national 
and gender inequalities. In the French zone untrained relief workers were often 
attributed better grades than fully qualified social workers. This not only 
exacerbated tensions between French nationals and their British and American 
co-workers but also caused friction between French men and women, revealing 
the persistence of old gender prejudices. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Employment in UNRRA: ‘a reward for wartime services’? 
 
 Perhaps, as Woodbridge suggests, the experience of defeat and national 
humiliation exacerbated French recruits’ resentment towards any sign of unfair 
treatment. Defeat, collaboration, economic plunder, worker deportations and 
unprecedented persecution threw France into a profound crisis of confidence.102 
As a result, for many French officials in 1945 the chief value of relief work was 
not material but symbolic.103 French military reports stressed the importance of 
the presence of French relief worker’ teams in Germany for reasons of national 
prestige.104  In May 1945, Commandant Sorbac, deplored the integration of 
French female MMLA (Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative), teams into 
UNRRA.  ‘It is essential, in my opinion, that French female teams, who have 
until now done almost all the work for DPs, continue to operate independently 
from UNRRA and in French uniform because it constitutes the best of all 
propaganda for our country.’105 
 It is, of course, impossible to provide a collective analysis of the impact 
that the defeat and the occupation had on individual UNRRA French relief 
workers whose wartime experiences were so different. Some had participated in 
the French anti-Nazi resistance, while others had compromised themselves with 
the Vichy regime and the Nazi occupiers. In the winter of 1944-1945 many 
French collaborationists sought refuge in Germany, Petain’s administration 
having fled to Sigmaringen castle.106 As Jacques Audiard’s fictional film a Self-
made hero illustrates, some of these former collabos remained in Germany 
after the war, ‘re-inventing’ their past to conceal their erstwhile collaboration. 
Ironically, the sight of Baden-Baden’s bath and thermal spas and the richness 
of its mondaine life brought back memories of Vichy to many contemporaries.107 
Communist leaders declared that ‘Vichyites’ had ‘created a little Vichy’ in 
Baden-Baden. Their claims were not completely unfounded as the Commission 
of Inquiry sent to investigate conditions in the French zone reported in April 
1946 that thirteen of the zone’s highest-ranking officials were implicated in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Vichy regime. 108  Some of these officials had deliberately been placed in 
Germany in conformity with a ‘politque d’éloignement’ (policy of removal) for 
upper-echelon civil servants who were particularly competent but had 
‘compromised themselves with the Vichy Regime.’109 The evidence suggests 
that some UNRRA officials had similarly shady pasts or had tried to reinvent 
their war credentials. 110 Others saw UNRRA as an escape from retaliation at 
home.111 Such was the scale of this problem that the French PDR service 
accused UNRRA of having re-employed ‘dubious staff members demobilized by 
the French Military Government’, ‘whereas, by contrast, reliable French 
candidates, either former prisoners or deportees, were removed from UNRRA 
teams.’112 Meanwhile, among the UNRRA workers who had actively participated 
in the anti-Nazi struggle, some had worked in London, mixing with British and 
American Army officers, while others had been isolated in the French 
countryside.  This chapter is not only looking at unique professional groups, but 
also at a collection of individuals, whose attitudes towards DPs were shaped by 
their personal histories and political orientations. By extracting individual stories 
from the collective narrative, it is possible to gain a clearer insight into the 
complexities of the French UNRRA milieu. 
 Here, we will examine three particular cases, the aim being to 
demonstrate how French experiences of the war affected French UNRRA 
recruits often in diametrically opposite ways. First, we will look at the history of 
the MMLA, a cohort of young female auxiliary relief workers, trained in London 
with the Auxiliary Territorial Service [ATS]. They saw their work with DPs as a 
‘patriotic mission’ and their entry into Germany as a continuation of their 
wartime struggle for ‘liberty, anti-fascism and the motherland.’ Then, we will look 
at the peculiar story of Jacqueline Lesdos, a nurse from the movement Combat, 
who decided to join UNRRA in order to find her brother who had been deported 
by the Nazis. Her story is marked by profound distress, bereavement and over-
identification with the DPs. Finally, we will look at the grievances of some 
UNRRA recruits (particularly male ones) about their inability to wear military 
insignia or carry a gun. Framed in the broader context of the crisis of ‘French 
manhood’ following the defeat of 1940, French men might have suffered from 
what we could term a ‘complex of the civilian’; French UNRRA men finding it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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difficult to adjust to their status of non-combatants, their uniform without galons 
and their low status within both UNRRA’s wage hierarchy and the administrative 
structures of the military government in the French zone. 
 
The MMLA, les demoiselles De Gaulle 
Created in August 1943 and led by Claude Hettier de Boislambert, the first 
MMLA teams were trained during the war with the British ATS in Camberley and 
Wimbledon.113 Under the command of Claude de Rothschild, they were initially 
expected to serve as a sort of advance guard for Repatriation Officers, liaising 
with the British and American forces in their dealings with French civilian and 
military authorities. By the time that UNRRA took charge of these groups in May 
1945 they had extensive experience both in providing relief and working 
alongside British and American troops, an expertise that made them stand 
out.114   
Sent to France in June 1944, they assisted the invading armies with 
refugee relief and epidemic control from the initial allied landings in Normandy 
through to the Ardennes counter-offensive in the winter of 1944-45. Even so, by 
3 October 1944 the MMLA still numbered only 231 volunteers.115 Working in the 
immediate vicinity of the frontline, they performed impressively, arranging for 
the evacuation, feeding and billeting of French civilians in northern France.116  
As Rothschild’s account below explains, particularly colossal challenges were 
presented by Soviet DPs for whom MMLA teams in the Verdun region sought to 
organize repatriation convoys: 
 
It is rare that convoys pass off without incidents; thefts, suicide and murder 
attempts, revolts; During one of the last missions, all the refugees, led by a 
Russian Commandant, refused to detrain; we had to wait for a formal 
instruction from the Russian Embassy before executing the 
disembarkation. Following this incident, fourteen Russians were shot in 
public ‘as an example.’ Another time, the train was shelled along the way; 
a severely brain-damaged eight-month-old baby had to be operated on 
there and then. To top it all, in a subsequent trip, Russians stole around 
thirty wine barrels during a break in Angouleme; nearly all of them were 
drunk when they arrived in the camp. 117 
 
Despite their devotion to duty and their extraordinary achievements, the female 
MMLA teams struggled to gain official recognition. Debate about whether they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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should be sent on into Belgium and Germany raged throughout the winter 1944-
45. 118 In her memoirs, Vagliano recounted that she moved heaven and earth 
with Claude de Rothshild to secure permission to continue their work outside 
France.  ‘Quite frankly, the military administration think that we are absolutely 
superfluous – we do not belong to its world – and it does not understand why 
we do not want to keep calm and stand idly by in Paris.’119 Although they finally 
managed to convince the military administration to deploy them abroad, 
arguments about their status and role persisted. French PDR Minister Henri 
Frenay was, for instance, overtly critical about the deployment of MMLA officers 
to Germany.120   
 This lack of official recognition must be placed within the broader context 
of the difficult integration of French women into French resistance movements. 
Historians of the French female resistance have compellingly demonstrated that 
women’s integration in military formations was difficult and that military officers 
tended to confine women to social work. 121 The terms given to them 
(Merlinettes, Marinettes, Rochambelles…) reflected half condescending half 
affectionate, or in other words, paternalistic attitudes.122 This was even more the 
case in Free France than in the resistance intérieure. Officers within the French 
army and the Ministry PDR – each bastions of conservatism - valued female 
auxiliary social workers primarily for their putative ‘nurturing’ and ‘motherly 
instincts.’123 Since the seventeenth and eighteenth century, even in paternalistic 
society in which the public sphere was often restricted to men, missionary 
philanthropy and charitable organizations had created spaces and significant 
social roles for women.124 Women’s aid was also appreciated because it eased 
the strains put on soldiers and freed men for combat. As Jean François 
Muracciole has shown, in the end, the situation of French women in Free 
France remained paradoxical. ‘On one hand, the Gaullist movement gave them, 
albeit reluctantly, an official status […] and they participated to the Victory 
Parade on 18 June 1945. But, on the other hand, their promotion within the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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movement’s hierarchy remained very limited […] Aspiring since its foundation to 
incarnate French legitimacy; the Gaullist movement reproduced les ostracismes 
de sexe of the Third Republic.’125 For many French male officers, the end of the 
war implied that women resisters, if they did not return to the household, would 
at least confine themselves to a professional sphere deemed suitable for their 
sex.126  
It was against this background of residual prejudice that the first MMLA 
teams entered Germany at the end of February 1945, six weeks earlier than the 
first UNRRA teams, making them ‘the first Allied women in uniform authorized 
to enter Germany.’127 In March 1945 Captain de Rothshild reported that thirty-
six teams were deployed. In the American sector, three teams were working 
with the First Army, three with the Ninth Army, eleven with the Third Army, four 
teams with the Seventh Army, and three with Com. Z. Twenty volunteers were 
employed on a sanitary train. In the British sector, twelve teams were following 
the Twenty-First Army Group.128 DPs bombarded MMLA women with difficult, 
often unexpected problems. Law and order was often non-existent at this point. 
Many DPs committed crimes including theft, assault, rapes and murders against 
the German civilian population. In Zella-Mehlis, Captain Cambournac reported 
that anarchy and theft were the norm. ‘In a thirst for vengeance, a group of 
foreigners led by the French destroyed a significant part of the Mercedes 
factory, while others set fire to the town hall.’ 129 Frequently, MMLA women ran 
camps without a security guard, and sometimes were assaulted by those they 
were trying to help.130 Even when a police force was established it was an 
insubstantial, mostly unarmed, and ineffective force. Commanding the female 
team IX in Hanau, Sub-Lieutenant Chalufour catalogued the insoluble 
disciplinary problems facing them:  
 
a) Gendarmerie inexistent; as a result, plunders conducted by DPs […] a 
murder in the Russian community. 
b) Fifteen Security guards in principle in charge of keeping a watch on the 
entrance of the camp; but, in fact, deployed to protect warehouses !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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against looting. Example of a wine cellar where the only way to stop 
wine smuggling and drunkenness was to bore holes into all the wine 
vats… 
c) Successive order and counter-orders given by the Police 1) Complete 
ban on freedom of movement [at night]; this was impossible to 
implement because of the many entrances of the camp and the 
difficulties in differentiating DPs from Germans 2) Permission to circulate 
from 7am to 7pm which led to greater confusion and a rise in looting. 131 
 
Administrative confusion did, however, offer these young women greater 
autonomy in the field and the MMLA ‘girls’ seized the opportunity to exercise 
authority over daily operations. Their duties frequently provided leadership and 
supervisory opportunities. Vagliano recounted in her memoirs that before the 
arrival of Captain Ball in the G-5 department, she did things her own way (‘n’en 
faire qu’à sa tête’).132 She clearly drew satisfaction from her enhanced authority. 
‘Until early December, there were only three French Liaison Officers: for us, it 
was still three officers too many, we did not want them to encroach on our 
territory so we gave them a cold reception […] Given our ages, we viewed them 
as war veterans from 1939-40.’ 133 Vagliano’s memoirs point to the frustration 
felt by many young MMLA women for whom it was extremely difficult to obtain 
instructions or essential materials.134 George W. Davis, a Displaced Persons 
and Refugee Officer with the Third Army, noted that it proved very difficult for 
MMLA staff to be accepted among their male counterparts.135 Claude Hettier de 
Boislambert also explained in his memoirs that the MMLA women faced a 
barrage of criticism and tasteless jokes.136  Their resourcefulness, sense of 
initiative and courage nevertheless drew the admiration of their US 
commanders. As this report testifies, American military authorities pressed for 
the MMLA female teams to be allowed to follow them into Germany: 
As to the MMLA Teams, some of their O[fficers] and other ranks have 
been in the field with this G-5 Section, since the battle of Normandy. In 
many perilous circumstances, in France and in Belgium, the coolness and 
the gallantry of these girls has been appreciated, and in every 
circumstance, the work of these teams has been efficient and trustworthy. 
The training of the MMLA female teams for relief duties, their skill at 
nursing, their psychological knowledge of their fellow countrymen and 
country women, their motherly instinct towards women and children of all 
allied nations would certainly be a great help to this G-5 section, when 
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large numbers of French and other allied PW and DP (male and female) 
shall be met. 137 
 
How might we reconcile American praise for MMLA female workers’ work and 
the widespread hostility towards them among French officers? 
  One reason for this dichotomy lies in the MMLA women’s inclination to 
rebelliousness. As French historian Muracciole points out, engagement in Free 
France was a more difficult choice for a young woman than a young man 
because of the moral and cultural constraints of French society in the late 
1930s. It implied leaving everything behind: country, work, studies and family.138 
As a result, MMLA women developed a certain sense of independence and 
empowerment. In the preface of Vagliano’s memoirs, former resister Maurice 
Schumann recounts that when he met MMLA women for the first time in Bayeux 
they stuck their tongues out at him ‘as young boarders would mimic an old 
dormitory supervisor’ because he had asked them ‘to tone down their laughter 
out of consideration for the suffering that surrounded them.’ 139  In her 
autobiographic novel l’épopée des AFAT, Eliane Brault provides numerous 
examples of disobedience, provocation (young women singing bawdy songs) 
and rule-breaking such as, for instance, claiming (‘stealing’ might be more 
accurate) staff cars that would otherwise have gone to senior (male) officers.140 
Official reports frequently referred to the MMLA women’s resourcefulness and 
their peculiar talent for scrounging. Vagliano herself requisitioned ten trucks in 
Cologne to evacuate a camp in April 1945.141   
 More was at stake than their inclination to rebelliousness, however. MMLA 
girls frequented the officers’ mess, they drank, they gambled, and they danced 
with American soldiers. Vagliano recalled that romances flourished between 
MMLA girls and American GI’s, some of which soon went awry. 142  These 
encounters between American soldiers and young French MMLA teams 
certainly stirred anxieties among French men about the potential risk of 
Americanization through sex. When the MMLA teams arrived in Verviers, 
rumours spread that the American army had installed a ‘brothel for its troops 
and had hired military women in uniform.’143  As Mary Louise Roberts has 
recently argued, many feared that Americans with their cigarettes, chewing gum 
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and chocolate would give ‘even the daughters of good families the illusion of an 
easier life.’144 
 Charles-Henry-Guy Bazin summed up the problem as it was perceived by 
Frenchmen at the time: ‘France, for Americans, like Germans, means Paris and 
girls.’145 While French authorities fretted that the lure of American commodities 
might lead a new class of women into prostitution, sexual encounters between 
American soldiers and French girls came to symbolize a loss of French 
respectability and honour, as well as the suppression of French culture by 
American wealth and power. As Roberts puts it, ‘[a]t first symbol of liberation, 
sex ultimately became a sign of French subservience to American power.’146  
The mythical British popular complaint against ‘over-sexed, over-paid and over-
here’ Americans in uniform encapsulated many of the tensions surrounding the 
presence of GI’s on the home front, but the expression was equally applicable 
to American relief workers in devastated Europe. As David Ellwood has recently 
argued, the widely-anticipated resentments created by the spate of 
relationships between liberators and liberated was exacerbated in 1944-45 by 
the gap between the opulence of American lifestyle and the starvation of the 
people that they were liberating, the ideology that the liberators brought with 
them and, more importantly, by their lack of (historical, cultural or mental) 
preparation for all the responsibilities awaiting a liberation force in modern 
times.147    
 
Jacqueline Lesdos, a nurse from Combat 
In many respects, the first French MMLA female teams’ backgrounds and 
experiences were atypical. They spoke fluent English. The majority of them 
certainly came from relatively wealthy families and boasted advanced 
education.148 They formed young and homogeneous teams and got along with 
their American co-workers with whom they had worked for months. This was, 
however, not the case for the great majority of other French relief work recruits. 
Encounters between French relief workers who had spent over four years under 
enemy occupation in France and freshly disembarked, confident and ‘over-fed’ 
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Americans were less cosy.149 Jacqueline Lesdos, a nurse from the Combat 
movement, found it extremely difficult to forge strong bonds with her American 
co-workers. For many resistors, who had lived for months hidden in the forest, 
American soldiers’ armament and food supplies seemed almost obscene. ‘They 
had everything and we had nothing.’150 Lesdos’ account conveyed a similar 
impression of envy and, perhaps, bewilderment. The world of UNRRA and the 
world of the Resistance were, for her, opposites: 
 
At UNRRA, I was still an Officer, but… a civilian Officer in uniform, 
attached to the American Army […] Je ne portais donc plus de galon. 
We all wore trousers, shirts and battle dresses, in the pocket of which I 
found a curious object, unknown to me: a “préservatif", the army called it a 
“condom”. 
Aware that the intermingling of population exposed their “boys” to various 
risks (venereal diseases, paternity…), the Anglo-Saxons had pragmatically 
provided condoms to all their troops, women and men, without any sense 
of shame… 
The hard combats de l’ombre were over, the harshness and rapacity of the 
Feldgrau soldiers had disappeared […] But, for me, the chaos and… 
pleasant “laisser-aller” of certain spheres of Liberated France was also 
gone. […] On top of the uniform, they gave us the PX cart which allowed 
us to benefit from the many advantages of the famous “Post Exchange” 
…we could get everything at incredible prices: from cigarettes and beauty 
accessorizes to condoms, but also luxury goods, from everywhere, Swiss 
clocks and Scandinavian silverware… 
The American Army was the richest in the world… and this was obvious to 
everyone…151 
 
Lesdos’ account constitutes an especially interesting site through which to trace 
issues of revenge, mourning and national rivalries. With their condoms, healthy 
bodies and fat wallets, American soldiers’ priorities and visions of the future 
were diametrically opposite to hers. 152  Not surprisingly, she struggled to 
integrate into her UNRRA team. While she forged powerful emotional bounds 
with the DPs, she did not connect with her US co-workers.153 Lesdos did not 
share their idealistic visions of the task ahead of them. In July 1945 she also 
discovered that the Nazis had killed her brother. While she could not help but 
hating Germans, she was horrified at the sight of young American soldiers 
‘fraternizing’ with German women. In a very moving letter written to her mother, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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she related her visit in April 1946 to Neuengamme camp where her brother was 
murdered: ‘Standing next to the grave, I have hated, and hated so fiercely. 
Instead of this banal inscription, I would have wanted to read on the cross ‘to 
the victims of the German people who have left all these horrors occurring on 
their soil.’ No one people deemed civilized would have accepted the effects of a 
dictatorship so abominable had this people not been characterized by their 
attachment to discipline…’154 
 
Fig.13. Jacqueline Lesdos, Carte du combatant, 3 May 1950. 155 
 
According to her, American soldiers could not fathom the reality of Nazi 
barbarism. Working in the American zone, she stated: 
 
From the end of 1945, rare among them were the real combatants. The 
great majority […] had returned to the US. The first recruits, who had 
liberated the death camps, had a clear idea of Nazi barbarism… For the 
latter recruits, nice “boys” coming from another planet, with the minimum 
of briefing, we had the impression that without wanting to admit it [se 
l’avouer] they felt closer to their very organized enemies […] than to the 
poor soul of Central Europe and even than us French, far too Latin for 
their taste. 156 
 
Historical research has since confirmed that romances flourished between GIs 
and frauleins, American soldiers being ‘unable to conceive women as the 
enemy’ and increasingly seeing themselves ‘as providers and protectors of the 
starving, impoverished enemy population.’ 157 Indeed, fraternization was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sufficiently widespread for the non-fraternization order to be abandoned in 
October 1945. American soldiers were not the only fraternizers, however. All too 
aware that French soldiers had a ‘natural tendency towards familiarity, a taste 
for conversation and a weakness for women,’ the French High Command 
distinguished itself from its Allied counterparts by not even trying to forbid 
fraternization. 158  As the presence of several hundred Besatzungskinder 
testifies, sexual encounters between French men and German women were 
numerous. In 1952, André François-Poncet reckoned that 10,000 
Besatzungskinder had French fathers.159 
 Meanwhile, Jacqueline Lesdos resigned in July 1946, convinced that she 
could not ‘rehabilitate DPs’ as she was so devastated by her brother’s death. 
She strongly empathized with the DPs. ‘In every one of them, I could see my 
suffering brother… They could feel it.’ 160 In the absence of a body to bury, she 
seemed to have invested DPs’ bodies with her own pain.161 Commenting on the 
DDT powder sprayed by healthy American soldiers on dishevelled DPs, she 
noted ‘the sight of these unfortunate people waiting in queues resignedly in a 
sorry state… while these young boys, full of life, were joking around and 
laughing, which, although they meant no harm, upset me profoundly.’ 162 
Evidence suggests that she forged powerful emotional bonds with the DPs. She 
wrote ‘[t]he Polish camp in itself justified my presence here […] Poles expected 
a lot from me, and very quickly, we got along, so much so that I learned their 
language.’163 In December 1945, she received a letter from a Polish DP who 
had returned home. Commenting on the death of his parents and brother, he 
expressed his thirst for revenge and signed ‘Votre ami polonais.’164  For her, the 
fact that DPs remained in camps, behind barbed wire, a year after the 
Liberation was simply unbearable.   
Building on the research findings of psychologists and experts in 
contemporary humanitarian work, Jennifer Carson underscores the 
psychological impact of traumatic witnessing in her work about the Quakers’ in 
post-war Germany. 165 Reflecting on the effects of experiencing the liberation of 
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workers can themselves become ‘immersed in the trauma material’, increasing 
the possibility of the trauma becoming ‘so real’ that it feels like the relief 
worker’s own experience.166 In the case of Lesdos, the negative effects of this 
over-identification were aggravated by her family bereavement. As Pat Jalland 
observed in her work on loss and grief in England, ‘we need to bear in mind that 
individual bereaved people had no guidelines during the Second World War to 
help them understand their grief or cope with it […] they faced their loss before 
psychiatrists had constructed theories of grief which impacted on the broader 
culture.’167  
It is possible that Jacqueline Lesdos modified her original account before 
depositing it in the National Archives in 1995. But the original letter that she 
received from her Polish DP friend, as well as her original letter of resignation, 
reveal a personal story of suffering, loss and thirst for revenge. In the absence 
of other primary texts written by former resistors, it is difficult to reconstruct 
these hidden, but profoundly important effects of the war. Her testimony still 
remains a powerful reminder that mass death was experienced, as Piketty 
points out, locally and intensely, amongst ‘communities of the bereaved.’ 168 It 
is, in this respect, worth noting that the death rate amongst resistors was 
particularly high: one out of fifteen resistors died, and nearly thirty per cent were 
deported to concentration camps.169 
 
The complex of the civilian 
Although Lesdos’ account sheds light on the tensions between French and 
American workers, one could oppose her personal history with that of American 
relief worker Pettiss to illustrate the gaps between French and Americans’ 
emotional baggage and their attitudes towards relief work. Pettiss, who recently 
published her memoirs, was a middle-aged woman with extensive social work 
experience, while Lesdos was a young nurse in her early twenties. Pettiss went 
to Germany driven by a spirit of adventure and eager to escape a disastrous 
marriage; Lesdos was, on the contrary, preoccupied by the fate of her missing 
brother. Whereas UNRRA’s internationalist ambitions appealed to Pettiss’ 
idealism, Lesdos disdained the grandiloquent rhetorical air of the period.170 And, 
finally, while Pettiss found the constant availability of male companions a help !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘in the healing process of a failed marriage, a restoration of [her] self-confidence 
and a reassurance of [her] feminine attractiveness’, bereaved Lesdos was 
angered by the same young, healthy, cheerful and naïve American soldiers.171  
The only thing they had in common was money. As Petiss observed, ‘[f]or once 
in my life I seem to have enough money.’172  And yet to seem these two women 
as personifying opposite tendencies amongst French relief workers would be 
simplistic and, in many ways, misleading. 
 First, French relief workers were anything but united amongst 
themselves. Recalling the encounters between her Liaison-Secours teams 
(auxiliaries from a resistance movement) and the freshly-hired women in Paris 
in autumn 1944, Eliane Brault depicted their contempt for these arrivist ‘Parisian 
military’, newly recruited by the Ministry PDR. 173 Unlike the MMLA teams, the 
Liaison-Secours teams were sent to Germany, but not systematically 
assimilated into UNRRA. Brault’s account also reveals another feature of 
French relief work: the importance attributed to military insignia and wartime 
credentials. For her colleagues and herself, those who had not fought in the 
Resistance did not deserve the status of ‘rescuers.’  Her account offers an 
interesting example of a certain convergence between the language of the army 
and that of humanitarianism. 174  For many former participants in anti-Nazi 
resistance, their work with DPs marked a continuation of their wartime struggle. 
But for those without resistance backgrounds, it was perhaps a way to do a 
military service and compensate for having played no direct part in fighting the 
war. 
French recruits, and perhaps more importantly, male recruits seemed to 
have been especially pained by their non-combatant status. Unlike the 
Quakers, who strove to ensure that they were not identified with the military, 
some French UNRRA recruits longed to adopt military ‘grades.’175 As many 
historians have shown, the experiences of defeat and captivity threatened 
masculine authority, exacerbating soldiers’ feeling of de-masculinization, fears 
of adultery, and anxieties that war had reversed gender hierarchies, women 
taking advantage of the exceptional circumstances of war to free themselves 
from traditional morality.176 In the context of national humiliation following the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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defeat of 1940, French men attempted to reassert their presumed lost 
authority.177 In Shorn Women, Fabrice Virgili has, for instance, shown that the 
20,000 tontes carried out in Liberation France to punish women who had 
horizontally collaborated with the Germans illustrated the attempts of French 
men to re-virilize France after the defeat of 1940.178 Some of the tensions 
between UNRRA’s male and female French recruits exposed similar attempts to 
regain power and virility. 
 Epitomizing these frustrations among French male UNRRA staff was their 
inability to carry a gun or wear military insignia. As early as February 1945 
French Liaison Officers raised this issue ‘It seems utterly impossible for them to 
go to Germany without carrying a firearm.’179 In Landstuhl, American Director 
Bryce Ryan concurred: ‘the ability to carry a gun and a military symbol is 
significant in dealing both with other military units and with German supply 
sources.’180 As Ryan’s statement implies, this problem was neither specific to 
the French zone nor to French recruits. Malcolm J. Proudfoot, an army officer in 
charge of refugee relief operations and the author of a detailed study on the 
topic published in 1957, noted indeed that in the three Western zones ‘the 
civilian and the soldier were as oil and water, and dependence on the military 
was resented to the end.’ 181 It remains a feature of modern humanitarian 
intervention, UN field workers sometimes showing signs of an inferiority 
complex towards military actors. As Sandra Whithworth shows, the UN Blue 
berets ‘who seem to derive real satisfaction from peace operations might find 
that the military they have joined views peacekeeping as a less honourable 
activity than traditional military concerns, and they may express their own 
disappointment in missing the main show – armed conflict and welfare.182 
 The institutional rivalry between the PDR administration and UNRRA, 
when combined with gender anxieties deriving from the war, significantly 
aggravated these problems of status among relief workers in the French zone. 
French officials frequently complained that UNRRA Directors were assigning 
themselves military grades without authorization. On 12 January 1946 Lenclud 
formally informed all the District Directors that this would be severely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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punished.183 As discussed in chapter one, French civilian administrators, among 
them PDR officers, also accorded themselves military ranks. In the secluded 
and mondain French community of occupied Germany, material entitlements 
became intertwined with this contestation over recognition of authority. As 
Karen Adler has recently demonstrated, ‘[t]he French military in post-war 
Germany was very different from the army which had just helped to win the war 
– or believed it had.’184 
 
Fig. 14. General Lenclud visits Lindau, 15 November 1946.185 !
  In his study of French male civilian workers’ encounters with German 
women during their captivity in Germany, Patrice Arnaud has highlighted a 
French Liberation inferiority complex towards British and American military 
personnel ‘crowned’ with glory and money.186 Material assistance was often 
central to the intimate Franco-German relationships during the war, German 
women not only having ‘made the first move’ but also having ‘bought’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Frenchmen’s love.’187This was not specific to Franco-German intimate relations, 
the majority of relationships between American troops and German women also 
revolving around the exchange of goods for sex, companionship, or services.188 
Material goods, as much as military insignia, were symbols of virility. Admittedly 
the majority of UNRRA male recruits were not former captives. But their ability 
to ‘buy’, if not love, at least recognition still seemed to matter to the majority of 
them. In Lörrach, UNRRA staffer P.J. Wegmann wrote to a senior official 
explaining the confusion of the quasi-civilian status he and his peers held: ‘At 
the mercy of the good or bad will of an officer of the Military Government (either 
favourable or enemy of UNRRA) we can either obtain adequate housing or 
being relegated with our families in an attic. Depending on the weather 
conditions, we can be allocated one or four persons for our Mess. We cannot 
raise any objection – except perhaps – the plea that you give us some 
clarification about the equivalence between our grades 7, 8, 9, and 10 and the 
military ranks of the French Army.’ 189 
To be sure, one must be cautious in assessing the war’s effects on male 
integration into UNRRA due to the scarcity of eyewitness accounts and the 
diversity of French wartime experiences. In reading documents in French and 
UN archives, one cannot but be struck by both the recurrence of male 
complaints about UNRRA’s hierarchy and unfair wages and by the frequency of 
grievances about men’s inability to wear military insignia and carry a gun. 
Although this may seem peripheral to larger issues, notably those of the 
recruitment, training and practices of French UNRRA recruits, it reveals the 
complexities of French sentiments. For some UNRRA recruits, joining the 
organization was less about aiding DPs and applying ‘scientific methods’ to 
alleviate their suffering than about their own personal sense of having missed 
out in the war years, something that fired their efforts to regain authority and 
prestige. Gender tensions were, in this sense, bound up with broader questions 
of national identity and efforts to come to terms with the recent past.190 
 
‘Not ready to live the mixed life that was offered to them’ 
 
 UNRRA’s planners sought to create a cohort of professional social 
workers devoted to liberal internationalism and modern methods of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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humanitarianism. Barring the achievement of this objective were the plethora of 
different motivations and backgrounds of the personnel employed in the field. 
Demobilized soldiers rubbed shoulders with committed social workers, 
inexperienced recruits worked alongside well-trained anti-Nazi resisters. In the 
French zone, the employment of a cohort of young and undisciplined recruits 
posed severe problems to French UNRRA and occupation authorities. 
Disciplining this workforce was a serious matter for French UNRRA 
headquarters. 
 
Professional misconduct 
UNRRA authorities often complained about the lack of discipline and obedience 
of their fieldworkers.191 Cases of professional misconduct were frequent in the 
French zone. Numerous complaints were made the lack of respect for their 
superiors shown by these personnel. UNRRA Assistant Director R. Schurmans 
bemoaned the ‘poor quality’ of some recruits and the ‘anarchy’ that prevailed in 
some areas.192 A local observer in the Rhineland captured the mood: ‘Overall, 
UNRRA staffs do not work to death. Their work is not monitored; everyone does 
what they fancy doing.’193 Complaints ranged from accusations of smuggling 
family members into DP camps, absence without leave, and the failure to apply 
UNRRA’s own directives to serious misdemeanours such as black-marketing 
and theft. 194  In January 1946, General Lenclud enjoined Moreland, the 
Southern District Director, to bring his staff into line: ‘it is no longer permissible 
for orders not to be followed or for reports not be sent.’195 Cases of professional 
misconduct were not, however, confined to lower-level staff. In September 1946 
a scandal broke out after a Field Supervisor was discovered using envelopes 
emblazoned with a swastika for his daily correspondence. 196 Similarly 
reprehensible, Schurmans deplored that his immediate superior Colonel Marlier 
had postponed a meeting to go ‘hunting wild boar.’197  
 Even worse, pillaging, theft and black-marketing flourished in the zone. In 
January 1946 UNRRA fieldworkers were arrested in Freiburg for trafficking 
cigarettes.198 French occupation officials and UNRRA authorities certainly tried !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to curb such black-market activities but imposing norms of professional conduct 
took time.199 Furthermore, high-officials were sometimes involved. For instance, 
Field Supervisor Thomasset was arrested in the summer of 1946 for trafficking 
and purloining a variety of goods for which he eventually received a six-month 
conditional sentence.200 The evidence suggests that black-marketing activities 
continued regardless. In March 1947 UNRRA Protective Officer Lefebvre 
reported seventeen ‘new cases’ involving organization staff, including four thefts 
and two whole fieldwork teams placed under investigation. Moreover, a 
substantial wine trafficking operation was also discovered in the North of the 
zone in which several UNRRA officers were implicated.201 Consequent arrests 
tarnished UNRRA’s reputation. As PDR Officer Muller observed, criminal 
proceedings revealed ‘the emptiness that existed behind the great UNRRA 
façade,’ the anarchic and self-interested behaviour of UNRRA staff conflicting 
with the occupation administration’s ideals.202 
 The misbehaviour of young women aroused still greater concern, 
confirming Catholic fears that members of the assistante sociale would 
transgress traditional morality and be exposed to the ‘horror and vice’ of DP 
life.203  Cases of fraternization with German men were, as we have seen, 
commonplace, but the results could wreck careers. In the summer of 1946, one 
such scandal broke in Gutach. UNRRA Welfare Officer Jacqueline Chabrier 
was found guilty of having an affair with a former SS member disguised as a 
DP.204  
 
Fig. 15. Miss Chabrier, Welfare Officer, Gutach, April 1946.205 !
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Team director Durand reported that the ex-SS man ‘was seen at Miss 
Chabrier’s place at hours when he was not supposed to be there, or in other 
words, at hours when a DP n’avait rien à faire at a Welfare Office.’ 206 As a 
result of this scandal, the team Director received an official reprimand for failure 
to screen the supposed DP properly. Miss Chabrier was reassigned to another 
team.207  Another of her team colleagues, welfare officer Jeanine Crappier, 
meanwhile became pregnant and married a DP.208 
 Over the spring of 1946 several more ‘scandalous’ pregnancies were 
unearthed in the French zone. In Landstuhl, Welfare Field Supervisor Le Goff 
found a young member of the team four months pregnant and in floods of tears. 
The father of her child was a member of the team who had a German mistress. 
Le Goff’s solution was pretty straightforward: ‘For her, for UNRRA, for the 
profession of assistante sociale she must leave us.’ 209 But much the same thing 
happened in nearby Kandel. Le Goff therefore urged UNRRA headquarters to 
devise a series of rules for women in the field: ‘These women should neither be 
allowed to live in the camp nor in private accommodation near the camp. 
Furthermore, they should be absolutely forbidden to have anything to do with 
the Mess […] They do a few favours, gain some sense of authority and soon no 
one in the team dares utter un mot de blame.’210UNRRA authorities were 
acutely concerned about the attitudes of young French women. Southern 
District Welfare Officer Miss Roberts recalled that the consequent difficulties 
were so widespread that she spent more time ‘on the problems of UNRRA 
[women staff] than on those of the Displaced Persons properly so-called.’211 
Welfare supervisor Loustalot believed that ‘unlike their Anglo-American 
sisters, [the] girls from France were not ready to live the mixed life that was 
offered to them.’ Employment with UNRRA afforded them access to an 
unbelievable bounty of goods: 
 
We have to remember that these women found themselves alone in teams 
of more than fifteen persons; they were in a hostile land, withdrawn, without 
intellectual resources and they did not necessarily speak the common 
language of the community. Working hours were long, very long. Mental 
fatigue, physical exhaustion and loneliness were their daily lot. We should 
not forget another important factor: we had just experienced four years of 
severe rationing, with almost complete suppression of alcohol, tea, coffee; 
Overnight, we had access to a rich and abundant food with coffee. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Admittedly, this was very pleasant. But, it created an overheated and 
nervous atmosphere. The sum of all these factors, combined together, 
meant that many of the young recruits, some were not even twenty one 
years old, did not cope, the consequences of this being at times tragic.212 
 
Not equipped to cope with the pressures brought to bear on them in the field, 
some resigned while others succumbed to the temptation of black-marketing or, 
even worse, immoral sexual behaviour. As the statements of Le Goff and 
Loustalot suggested, it was not merely the US workers that these women 
angered. They also profoundly worried their French superiors who feared that 
their actions threatened France’s prestige.  
 
The emergence of a professional ethos? 
So far, this chapter has insisted on the discrepancy between UNRRA planners’ 
aspirations to transform international humanitarianism into a modern profession 
and their inability to exercise effective control over field workers to realize 
UNRRA policy goals. Dogged by its transitional status, UNRRA failed to put in 
place the necessary prerequisites to the modernization and professionalization 
of humanitarianism. But is this negative portrait the whole story? Did UNRRA’s 
call for professionalism have no impact whatsoever in the French zone? Was 
the French UNRRA milieu completely impervious to the organization’s 
overarching ambitions, whose New Deal origins seemed alien to them? In order 
words, is the history of UNRRA in the French zone to be understood only as 
history of differences? Or were there more fruitful transfers of expertise between 
French, British and American relief workers? 
 Faced with increasingly acrimonious criticisms emerging from within PDR 
official circles, UNRRA authorities and some field workers progressively 
adopted the language of the Administration. They strove to defend their 
capacity as social workers and to demonstrate that they were providing a better 
service than the PDR. Arguing that PDR administrators had no awareness of 
the need to foster a spirit of self-reliance among those needing relief, UNRRA 
workers prided themselves on developing social and cultural activities in DP 
centres and on facilitating DPs’ rehabilitation.213 While PDR administrators were 
wholly preoccupied with questions of discipline and repatriation, UNRRA 
workers increasingly presented themselves as agents of re-education and 
rehabilitation. They argued that their mission was to ‘help the people to help 
themselves’, echoing UNRRA’s famous motto, which was supposed to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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summarize the programme that UNRRA aimed to implement.214 Reflecting on 
UNRRA’s activities over preceding months, General Lenclud reminded his staff 
in a June 1947 circular that, ‘faced with calumny, we will respond by being even 
more active and on 30 June we will hold our heads up because we are sure that 
we have been the faithful executors of President Roosevelt’s generous 
thought.’215 Was this merely a ‘façade’? 
 As will be explained in the next chapter, several obstacles blocked the 
achievement of UNRRA’s mission in the zone. First, there was no consensus at 
the highest level of the administration about what this mission actually entailed. 
As recent studies have highlighted, there was little agreement upon goals or 
priorities in matters of welfare.216 These tensions had a knock-on effect on 
UNRRA authorities in the zone. The history of the Welfare Section in the French 
zone exemplified the tensions between a still inchoate notion of refugee 
management and older humanitarian traditions. In the French zone, a traditional 
vision of relief work (seen as a matter of discipline, procurement and work) 
came up against newer approaches to relief work influenced by American 
understandings of self-help. Second, there was a discrepancy between the 
number of ‘scientific reports’ that UNRRA relief workers were required to 
complete (detailing DPs’ calorific intake, their living conditions, and the services 
provided by each teams) and the limited means at their disposal to put these 
actions into practice. As a result, some teams produced detailed reports on 
welfare activities in their camps but were unable to provide accurate figures 
about the number of DPs under their management, essential information for the 
Military Government’s monitoring of the DP population. Not surprisingly, French 
authorities were often at loggerheads with UNRRA team directors over 
questions of numbers and the filing of reports.217 Frequently one encounters 
criticisms of poor accounting standards in UNRRA camps; sometimes even 
complaints of non-existent financial scrutiny. After visiting all UNRRA camps 
within the French Occupation Zone, Administrator Léon concluded in 
September 1946, ‘from all my inspections, it emerges that UNRRA 
headquarters has never given precise instructions about the management of 
camps. Your instruction about the administration of DP camps has been 
circulated tardily and no order has been given to follow it. In all the centres 
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visited, I have not found a single healthy administration or instances of accurate 
accounting.’218 
 Finally, as explained in the previous chapter, UNRRA authorities failed to 
issue clear instructions about repatriation and whether it should take priority 
over all other activities. The French military government and UNRRA 
headquarters sent contradictory instructions about which nationalities were 
eligible for protection and whether DPs would ultimately be eligible for 
emigration. As Welfare Officer Travis observed: 
 
In the beginning the personnel without a background in this type of work 
had no clear understanding of its individual functions and duties, and were 
not thoroughly familiar with UNRRA policies and procedures. Personnel at 
all levels were often called upon, in the course of duties, to interpret broad 
UNRRA policies which they felt ill-equipped to do because the basic broad 
policies and their effects upon individuals could only be interpreted with a 
thorough knowledge of UNRRA Council Resolutions.219 
 
Although every team should have been supplied with copies of UNRRA 
resolutions, even when such directives were supplied, they were poorly adapted 
for the French zone. As Travis concluded, ‘Directives from Central 
Headquarters were usually intended for administration in camps and more often 
than not were inapplicable in our dispersed communities. Therefore it was 
necessary for us to adapt these directives to our conditions, which made some 
of the organizational work possible only in more populated communities.’220 
 In sum, faced with growing criticism, some UNRRA workers tried to 
defend their skills as social workers. As we shall see, they made efforts to foster 
international entente, to educate DPs and to entertain them. In addition to 
encouraging DPs into work, they helped them set up theatres, sports clubs, 
drama and musical activities. In doing so, they attempted to show that they 
were providing more than the PDR administrators. They reinterpreted UNRRA’s 
mission of ‘helping DPs to help themselves’ according to what they understood 
as being in DP’s best interests, albeit with limited success. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The majority of French UNRRA relief workers were neither fully 
committed to liberal internationalism nor to modern welfare techniques. They !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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had never heard of Freud, they were not experts, nor were they members of an 
epistemic community, ‘with a shared set of normative and principled beliefs.’221 
Upon entering Germany, the majority of them had neither clear ideas about the 
organization’s principles nor about its objectives and ideals. Few shared the 
belief too apparent among American’s relief workers that wearing the 
organization’s uniform entailed a special vocation and a ‘sacred flame.’ 
Furthermore, unlike the French Missions Vaticanes for instance, UNRRA teams 
were not confessional.222 French UNRRA recruits did not seem to be driven by 
religious aspirations. That said, the absence of religion from UNRRA’s largely 
secular narrative can be questioned. First, recent studies of avowedly-secular 
contemporary NGOs, such as Médecins sans Frontières, have proved that 
religious beliefs strongly motivated many volunteers even though these 
individuals were rarely explicit about their faith or spiritual needs. 223 
Furthermore, as will be explained in the next chapter, most UNRRA relief 
workers deemed religion to be an asset in DPs’ rehabilitation’s process.224 
French UNRRA workers formed a heterogeneous and, to some extent, 
divided group. Some had been active resisters, while others had compromised 
themselves with the Vichy regime and the Nazi occupiers. Tensions existed 
between these ex-resisters and those who were derisively labelled the Parisian 
soldiers, between snobbish and wealthy daughters of good families and 
democratic relief workers, between trained social workers and inexperienced 
young recruits, between despotic directors and empathetic nurses. Many of 
those who had participated in the fight against the Nazis regarded their work 
with DPs as a continuation of their wartime struggle. By contrast, for some of 
those who had missed out on resistance glory, enrolment with UNRRA offered a 
way to compensate for past inaction. For some UNRRA recruits, particularly 
men, wearing the UN uniform seems to have been accompanied by a distinctive 
inferiority complex relative to fully-fledged military personnel.  Far from sharing 
the ideals and principles of UNRRA planners, they were mainly concerned with 
questions of prestige, with official recognition of their status as occupation 
officials, and with the material entitlements they felt should come with it, itself 
part of a wider crisis of national identity in immediate post-war France. 
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The lack of a harmonized selection process, when added to the 
insufficiency of training failed to prepare French recruits for the challenges they 
confronted in the field. While some learned quickly on the spot, others became 
rapidly disillusioned with the Administration or, worse, got involved in black-
market activities, thefts or what was perceived at the time as immoral sexual 
behaviour. Disciplining this workforce was a serious matter for French UNRRA 
headquarters. But imposing norms of personal and professional morality proved 
difficult. In part this was circumstantial. UNRRA offered extremely high wages 
(although with a pronounced gender bias towards men) to people who had just 
experienced four years of hardship and privation. Luxury goods were accessible 
at very low price on the black-market. In part it was contingent on UNRRA’s 
temporary mandate.  
Without doubt, UNRRA authorities lacked the time or the incentives 
necessary to turn this heterogeneous group into professional social workers. 
The fact that UNRRA’s general instructions were poorly adapted to the situation 
in the zone, and sometimes not wholly relayed to fieldworkers in the first place, 
further contributed to uneven performance. Yet there were cases of successful 
adaptation, some fieldworkers progressively adopting the professional language 
of the administration and embracing, albeit sometimes idiosyncratically, the 
humanitarian shift from mere provision of material relief to deeper ‘psychological 
rehabilitation.’ They strove to defend their capacity as social workers and to 
demonstrate that they were providing a better service than the PDR. In doing 
so, they helped implant the tenets of UNRRA’s humanitarian revolution within 
the French zone. This is what the next chapter investigates. 
 
 
! 209 
Chapter Five: By the DPs, for the DPs? 
UNRRA’s welfare work in the French zone 
 
In June 1945, American UNRRA Officer Bryce Ryan was stationed in 
Landstuhl, a small town under American occupation, which was soon to be 
transferred to French occupation authorities. There, the American military 
authorities, working in combination with the DP themselves had the local DP 
camp fully under control.1 So much so that Bryce Ryan and his co-workers were 
becoming bored: 
 
Surely on a continent said to have something like fifteen million displaced 
persons, there are places where an UNRRA team can be utilized.  […] In 
our present location, where we have been for more than two months, it 
would be mild to say that we are under-employed. With the exception of 
the welfare officer, we are simply excess baggage […] After two months of 
watchful waiting in Washington, nearly four months of the same in London, 
even a most patient man must near vomit to have the same conditions 
thrust upon him in the field. Do you think that it is too much to ask for an 
assignment in a place that is not so constantly reminding us of our high 
degree of dispensability?2 
 
When Ryan signed up for relief work, he did not imagine being so comfortable 
or so inactive. ‘We have excellent food, superb beds, plenty of service, and very 
fine friends among the Poles and the military. And I personally at least am paid 
a good salary. But quite a number of us didn’t come to Europe with the idea of 
being the United Nations first pensioners.’ 3  Profoundly disappointed, Ryan 
begged UNRRA authorities to reassign him: ‘Give me, and I hope my team, an 
assignment or tell me plainly that UNRRA has no place for me, so it won’t be 
necessary to waste more of my time and UNRRA’s money.’ 4 
 Bryce Ryan’s account vividly illustrates the discrepancy between relief 
workers’ expectations and the situation that they confronted in the field. Upon 
arrival in Germany, many UNRRA teams encountered suspicion and hostility. 
The majority of military officers and DPs knew little about UNRRA team 
workers, nor did they hold them in high esteem.5 They viewed UNRRA entirely 
as a supply and transport agency.6 Establishing good relationships with the 
military authorities and obtaining supplies often demanded far more political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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acumen than traditional social work. As Bryce Ryan noted, ‘[t]he plain fact is 
that we have been confronted with the job of working out individually in the field 
a system of relationships with the army which London and Washington planners 
could never even agree upon on paper.’ 7 While some military commanders 
accorded UNRRA teams ‘fairly liberal scope’ to operate, others curtailed their 
activities or simply ignored them.8 Moreover, UNRRA’s dependence on the 
military for basic food supplies, shelter, and transport often hampered relief 
workers’ efforts. As UNRRA Director Bastiaenen observed, ‘where we expected 
to have considerable supplies to cover all DPs’ necessities, we had to be 
content with only providing few essential services and making vague promises 
for all the rest.’ 9 
Bryan’s frustrating experience was not atypical.10 In June 1945, UNRRA 
Field Supervisor Drake-Brockman expressed his anxiety over the emergence of 
a ‘spirit of disgruntlement’ in the field.11 Often isolated, many UNRRA workers 
felt neglected and had the ‘unfortunate impression’ ‘that nobody [was] 
interested in their work.’ 12  In September, Wangen’s UNRRA Director 
commented that ‘our chief problem at the moment seems to be WAITING. 
Waiting is worse than working; but for the sake of the DPs we must try to be 
patient.’13  Three month later, UNRRA Team Director Schurmans threatened to 
resign if an agreement between French and UNRRA authorities was not signed. 
According to him, UNRRA was a vaste organisation d’escroquerie.14 While 
frustration mounted among UNRRA staff, French military commanders and 
occupation officials had criticisms of their own. UNRRA was accused of failing 
to get to grips with urgent DP relief tasks for which, as we saw in chapter one, 
the service PDR was judged better equipped. 
 These reciprocal disappointments rose in inverse proportion to the 
original hopes that UNRRA had inspired. UNRRA planners were determined to 
avoid the errors of 1919. The organization’s Director-General Herbert Lehman 
declared, ‘[w]e have been called upon twice within a span of a lifetime to devise 
a peace in which all men can live in freedom from fear and from want. We failed 
once. We dare not fail again.’15 The creation of UNRRA certainly ignited hopes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that better coordination and what Veteran Quaker relief worker Francesca 
Wilson famously dubbed ‘planning-mindedness’ would facilitate an orderly 
transition from war to peace, in contrast to what had occurred in 1918.16 In 
practice, however, the Administration failed either to send consistent 
administrative orders or to establish effective communications with its field 
workers.17 Quarrels within these higher levels of the administrative hierarchy 
produced confusion in the field.18 As a result of these disagreements, relief 
operations were frequently marked by improvisation and inefficiency.  
Over the last two decades, historians have highlighted the discrepancy 
between UNRRA’s aspirations to transform refugee humanitarianism and its 
inability to exercise effective control over its field operations.19 They have also 
demonstrated that UNRRA’s response to the DP crisis was less coherent than 
earlier studies suggested. In the field, there was little agreement about the 
meaning of ‘relief’, ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘welfare.’ 20 UNRRA’s new methods of 
refugee management, promoted by New-Deal influenced relief workers, were 
vigorously contested by members of older charitable and religious organizations 
and by UNRRA’s own continental recruits. 21 Yet, for all its shortcomings, 
historians tend to agree that UNRRA transformed the methods and ideology of 
refugee humanitarianism by placing rehabilitation at the forefront of its work.22 
UNRRA wanted the DPs to acquire habits of self-reliance after their prolonged 
exposure to Nazi brutality. Although the Administration was never entirely 
successful in its rehabilitation programmes, it did promote new forms of expert 
knowledge about displaced persons. As a result, UNRRA represents a 
foundational moment in the development of modern techniques of refugee 
management.23  
Building on this already dense scholarship on UNRRA and DPs in post-
war Germany, this chapter explores two phenomena: the extent to which these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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new ‘methods’ penetrated the French zone and the ways in which the 
organization’s local staff interpreted UNRRA’s rehabilitation mandate. To do so, 
it first examines UNRRA’s aspirations to transform international relief and 
provide more than ‘bread and butter’ relief before considering the obstacles 
confronted. Particular attention is given to UNRRA relief workers’ efforts to 
‘rehabilitate’ and entertain DPs. As explained in the previous chapter, the 
majority of UNRRA relief workers were French, untrained in ‘modern 
techniques’ of welfare. While British and American relief workers approached 
the DP problem armed with the psychoanalytic theories and practices of social 
work prevalent in the USA and the UK at mid-century, the overwhelming 
majority of French relief workers embraced their own normative standards and 
were subject to quite different influences.24 In the context of the escalating 
conflict with the PDR service, UNRRA officials progressively asserted their 
unique humanitarian expertise. They justified their presence in the zone on the 
grounds that they were providing welfare activities and expanding the 
boundaries of refugee welfare. Their motto was to encourage activities ‘by the 
DPs, for the DPs.’ 25 While PDR agents were, according to UNRRA officials, 
solely interested in disciplining and repatriating DPs, UNRRA authorities 
encouraged the development of theatrical shows and dance events; they 
provided welfare services to DPs with special needs; and they represented both 
recreation and entertainment as crucial elements of DPs’ rehabilitative 
processes. 
This chapter nevertheless tempers the assessment – argued most 
forcefully by its officials – that UNRRA contributed to the democratization and 
modernization of relief work in the French zone. Instead, it demonstrates the 
absence of clarity or consensus about what ‘rehabilitation’ actually entailed. 
Thus, while many UNRRA relief workers encouraged the development of 
recreation and entertainment activities, others condemned them; while some 
UNRRA Directors allowed DPs to elect their own representatives, others 
opposed such measures. This chapter argues, therefore, that UNRRA’s mission 
was only partially fulfilled in the zone, where, in practice, old-style paternalism 
and newer methods of relief work co-existed uneasily.  
We therefore need to dwell on the complicated process of confrontation, 
imitation and compromise that defined relations between French, British and 
American relief workers. Doing so demonstrates how specific contextual, 
cultural and ideological factors drove the emergence of alternative ways of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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arranging interim provision and ‘rehabilitating’ DPs in the French occupation 
zone (a point more fully explained in the next chapter). The complex and 
uneven picture of UNRRA’s activities that emerges in this chapter suggests that 
theories and practices of ‘new humanitarianism’ launched by the United Nations 
were less coherent, innovative and ‘modern’ than UNRRA planners suggested. 
Ambiguity was everywhere. To give one example, UNRRA experts promoted 
the secularization and internationalization of relief work while, at the same time, 
fostering the development of religious and nationalist activities proclaiming their 
‘therapeutic effects.’  
  
Responding to chaos 
 
Throughout its brief five-year existence UNRRA faced criticism from 
across the globe. International lawyers, political scientists, social policy experts 
and politicians scrutinized and debated every aspect of its operations. They 
lamented the chaos that was engulfing the UNRRA China programme.26 They 
raised concerns about UNRRA’s relief programmes in Eastern Europe, 
maintaining that UNRRA supplies were ‘going to the wrong places and were 
used for the wrong purposes.’27 Yet, according to UNRRA official historian 
George Woodbridge, no operation caused so much controversy as the DP 
operation.28 One of the most cogent arguments against UNRRA was that it 
neither fed and clothed, nor housed, repatriated and resettled the DPs. Military 
commanders argued that they could have run DP camps better.  Army men 
wondered why they had been replaced by more numerous and highly paid 
international civil servants and pondered whether this represented a wise use of 
aid funding.29  
According to Woodbridge, UNRRA’s raison d’être lay in the field of ‘human 
rehabilitation.’ Certainly, military commanders could run DP camps efficiently, 
but – and this was the crucial point - they could not ‘rehabilitate’ DPs: 
 
UNRRA, however, while anxious for efficiency, also wanted to rehabilitate 
the individuals in the camps; it wanted to achieve the objective so often 
and so sincerely expressed by its first Director General – to help people to 
help themselves; it did not want to run the camps, it wanted the residents !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to run them. Any mother who has tried knows that, when she first teaches 
her children how to perform simple household tasks (bed-making, 
dishwashing, cleaning), it requires far more time to teach the children to do 
such work and to supervise their doing it than to do the work herself. That 
was precisely the situation that confronted the Administration. 30 
 
Such words reflected a widespread belief that the war had damaged human 
minds as surely as it had destroyed Germany’s industrial infrastructure. 31 
According to Woodbridge, UNRRA relief workers contributed to this human 
rehabilitation by fostering camp self-government, supervising educational and 
vocational training, developing welfare and recreational activities and providing 
specialized childcare.32 
Malcolm Proudfoot, an army officer in charge of refugee relief operations 
and the author of a detailed study on the topic published in 1957, concurred. 
UNRRA’s distinctive contribution to the DPs lay in helping them to ‘restore a 
normal life’, preparing them to ‘make a new start as happy, well-adjusted 
human beings.’33In the 1950s, UNRRA’s emphasis on ‘rehabilitation’ and on the 
democratization of camp organization (‘by the DPs, for the DPs’) was presented 
as one of the distinctive features of new-style humanitarianism. Admittedly, the 
use of large refugee camps to assuage post-war chaos was not a novelty.  But 
relief workers’ aspiration to ‘regenerate’ and ‘rehabilitate’ DPs on such a large 
scale was unprecedented.34 Woodbridge and Proodfoot’s positive assessments 
raise several questions. Was ‘rehabilitation’ an equal priority for all UNRRA field 
workers? What did ‘rehabilitation’ mean to them? And was UNRRA’s 
rehabilitation programme as successful as these two experts suggest? 
 Since the 1950s publication of Woodbridge and Proudfoot’s books 
historical research has deepened our understanding of UNRRA’s activities in 
the field of ‘rehabilitation.’  First, historians have shown that UNRRA’s practices 
were less innovative than the two authors indicated.35  During the 1920s, for 
instance, the League of Nations advocated investment in Greece to assist the 
integration of refugees from Turkey. The League’s programmes included a 
technocratic agenda of ‘rehabilitation’ meant to transform refugees into fully-
fledged members of society once they had been helped to get over the trauma 
of displacement.36 Second, scholars have demonstrated that there was little !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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agreement within the organisation as to what UNRRA’s three buzzwords: 
‘relief’, ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘welfare’ actually meant. 37   George Woodbridge 
admitted himself that the term ‘rehabilitation’ was never precisely defined.38 As 
a result, DP camps became ‘laboratories’ in which expert knowledge was 
acquired, debated and contested.  
Dean Acheson, who was present at UNRRA’s creation, recalled that the 
word ‘rehabilitation’ was hastily added to the body’s title without being clearly 
defined. 39  ‘Rehabilitation’ was sometimes used to refer to entire nations, 
sometimes to the psychological reconstruction of the individual. According to 
Woodbridge, several attempts were made to define the term. Experts concurred 
that ‘it was to be coterminous with relief’ and that it ‘was to be limited to 
assistance to agricultural production, to those industries which produced ‘relief 
goods’ and to the restoration of essential public utilities’40 In other words, at the 
macro level, rehabilitation occupied the middle-ground between short-term 
‘relief’ and long-term ‘reconstruction.’41 As far as DPs were concerned, the term 
was often associated with re-educating and improving DPs’ psychological well-
being. 42 It was typically equated with returning DPs to normality. But what 
constituted ‘normal life’? For French UNRRA nurse Jacqueline Lesdos 
rehabilitating meant reconstructing both ‘nations’ and ‘individuals.’ It meant 
‘healing bodies and spirits’, restoring DPs’ dignity and their faith in life (foi dans 
la vie retrouvée).43 For many American social workers, it meant reinstating pre-
war social norms that they believed DPs had forgotten during the war.44 
Rehabilitation often implied that DPs were not behaving completely normally 
and were suffering from various pathologies resulting from wartime and 
displacement trauma.45 If the definition of ‘rehabilitation’ remained vague, the 
practical meaning ascribed to it changed over time. In the first weeks following 
the Liberation, UNRRA’s rehabilitation efforts had three aspects: hygiene, 
housing and discipline.46 Once the immediate challenges of cleaning, housing 
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and disciplining DPs had been met, UNRRA relief workers focused on 
developing activities designed to prevent idleness.  
 
A ‘North and South’ divide: UNRRA teams under US and French control 
UNRRA was established later in the French zone than in the British and 
American zones.47 In August 1945, there were fewer than a hundred UNRRA 
relief workers in the zone. 48  Prior to the creation of the French UNRRA 
Headquarters in October 1945, most UNRRA teams were located in the 
Northern part of the zone (Rhineland-Palatinate; Saar), regions liberated by the 
US army. The first teams arrived there in April 1945 and were situated in 
Landstuhl, Lebach, Kaiserslautern, Homburg, Pirmasens, Neustadt, Pfaffendorf, 
Baumholder and Trier.49 Only four UNRRA teams (Freiburg, Biberach, Wangen 
and Rottweil) operated in the South, the territory of Würrtemberg being 
controlled by the First 
French Army.50  
Other factors 
contributed to this 
sharp North-South 
divide in the French 
zone: first, UNRRA 
teams were simply 
more numerous in the 
North where 
predominantly 
Anglophone personnel 
were more readily 
available; second, the 
management of DPs was contingent on the availability of suitable camps. In the 
Southern territory under French control, DPs were largely confined to smaller 
camps, even to private accommodation.51 How exactly were DPs assigned to 
particular camps in the North and South? And how were the daily routines 
within these DP camps organized? 
 Upon arrival in the field, relief workers encountered markedly contrasting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Fig. 16. UNRRA Teams under American Control, 22 June 
1945. 
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situations. To be sure, the French zone had suffered considerably less damage 
than the others, particularly the Soviet and British zones.52 But life in what 
would become the French zone was not without its difficulties. Money and staff 
were short, transports were disrupted, communications with UNRRA 
headquarters were difficult and relations with the Army could be strenuous. 
Cleaning and dusting DP camps with DDT powder, repairing camp facilities and 
registering DPs were among the most pressing issues.53 In some areas, DP 
camps were entirely controlled by the military and UNRRA activities were 
relegated to registration and welfare.54 At Baumholder, for instance, the UNRRA 
Director proudly reported the team’s record of 952 registrations in one day.55 
Elsewhere, UNRRA teams were charged with running transit camps, distributing 
supplies, preparing repatriation and disciplining DPs.56 Establishing order was 
particular important: DP camps were regarded by many military commanders as 
potential sources of social and political unrest quite apart from being seen as 
breeding grounds for infectious diseases.57 
 The focus on reducing the threat of epidemics and facilitating repatriation 
often meant that there was little room for concerns of individual welfare in the 
first weeks following the Liberation.58 Shortages of housing, food and drugs, in 
combination with DPs’ weakened immune systems, presented a scenario in 
which it was believed that epidemics would flourish if left unchecked. Welfare 
workers were always concerned about how the DPs took care of themselves 
and their living spaces. Instilling a sense of personal hygiene was a crucial part 
of the rehabilitative process. Very often, cleanliness was associated with 
morality and self-respect; lack of cleanliness was, on the contrary, regarded as 
a sign of deviancy.59 Neustadt camp was in a poor condition when the UNRRA 
team deployed there in April 1945.60 With the help of the DPs, the camp was 
efficiently dusted and cleaned and, by June, the director reported: 
 
We were fortunate in that we had little infectious disease to contend with. 
The camp kept completely free from Typhus fever although the camp was 
overcrowded and congested. The good luck we enjoyed was I think due to 
several factors: good weather with abundant sunshine, the Russian liking !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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for clean clothes and clean bodies, and the liberal use of DDT powder.61 
 
In Niederlahnstein, by contrast, no comparable improvements were made. Its 
UNRRA Field supervisor expressed his frustration over the camp’s low hygiene 
standards: 
 
Sanitary arrangements are entirely inadequate and no proper attention is 
being paid to this problem. There is no proper sanitary control or 
inspection and dumps of garbage, trash and dirt were discovered in front 
and even within the living quarters. In some cases the conditions were 
considered intolerable.62  
 
Admittedly, poor sanitation did not necessarily imply that DPs’ rejected the 
values and hygiene standards imparted by UNRRA welfare workers. It might 
simply stem from a lack of soap, hot water and other hygiene supplies. It is, 
however, obvious that some DPs considered the intimate physical inspections 
and X-ray examinations they were forced to undergo deeply humiliating.63  
 Like military officers, UNRRA relief workers paid particular attention to the 
problem of venereal disease. Many believed that DPs were more prone to 
contracting VD than the rest of the German population. As Lisa Haushofer 
demonstrates, DP women were perceived as ‘contaminating agents’ and 
became a preferred target for VD control measures.64 UNRRA’s chief medical 
officer in the Pirmasens camp noted, for instance, that ‘the DPs have a very 
active sexual life which is favoured by the fact that they live in communities and 
gather frequently, by the lack of occupation, the consumption of alcohol, the 
lack of hygiene education and of any knowledge of the consequences of these 
kind of diseases […], factors which facilitate their spread.’65 In some camps, 
compulsory examination of all DP women took place and scenes of public 
humiliation occurred when a camp nurse announced positive results in the 
presence of large numbers of inmates. 66  These processes reveal the 
persistence of prejudices against DPs, the assumption of DPs’ contamination 
leading to various coercive and humiliating measures, such as tighter 
restrictions on freedom of movement. This, in turn, fostered tensions between 
UNRRA relief workers and DPs. 
 These tensions were often exacerbated by language difficulties. The great 
majority of UNRRA relief workers neither spoke DPs’ languages, nor German. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As Bryce Ryan noted, UNRRA’s Administration should have paid greater 
attention to language skills. He, for instance, operated in a Polish DP camp in 
which no team member spoke Polish.67 Even worse, some team members 
could not even communicate amongst themselves. The first teams deployed in 
the French zone were set up in the UK, giving their members an opportunity to 
get to know one another before they entered the field. They were, however, 
soon joined by other, hastily-formed teams, ‘thrown together’ at the last minute 
at the Granville training centre. These new teams lacked homogeneity.68 Team 
15, located in the Saar, was such disparate team. Its doctor was Polish, while 
its nurse was French. Unsurprisingly, the problem of language was real. 69 Its 
English welfare officer recalled: 
 
This did not work out very well – in the first place we could not get an interpreter, 
and I had to do my best, in my limited German, to help. By the time he had 
asked, in French, what was the matter, and I had repeated it in German, and the 
nurse had repeated it in Russian, and a reply had come back by the same route, 
much time had elapsed, and the result was of questionable value.70 
 
Furthermore, as Ryan observes, UNRRA relief workers should have been given 
basic information about DPs’ political attitudes and history. ‘In this camp an 
understanding of the relationships between ‘True Poles’ and Ukrainian Poles 
would have been most helpful – and the relations of each to Russia.’71 In other 
words, the aspiration to transform international humanitarianism into a modern 
profession clashed in the field with basic problems of communication and 
ignorance about DPs’ history, their wartime experiences and their political 
sensitivities. 
 Alongside the promotion of personal cleanliness, disciplining DPs was 
another urgent task. Its importance was amplified because German and Allied 
military officers alike tended to see DPs as natural ‘criminals’ and delinquents. 
As Jacobmeyer and Rinke have demonstrated, public perceptions of DPs were 
particularly negative among the German population. 72  Following well-
established anti-Semitic and racist stereotypes, Germans associated DPs with 
rampant criminality.73 These perceptions bore little resemblance with reality. 
Admittedly, crimes and theft were committed in the French zone, as elsewhere. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In Lebach, for instance, the UNRRA team director reported that ‘the Russian 
portion of the camp contains a bad element which has access to a number of 
arms and has been responsible for a number of murders and other unsavoury 
incidents.’74 Stocks of food, cigarettes, medical materials and drugs were being 
looted. Relief workers also complained about alcohol abuse amongst Russian 
DPs. 75  Yet, the great majority of DPs were neither as ‘apathetic’ nor as 
promiscuous as UNRRA experts predicted. They were, in many ways, better 
organized, more demanding and more independent than anticipated. Relief 
workers’ first impressions often remarked on how unexpectedly resourceful DPs 
actually were. Far from being ‘children’ unable to organize themselves, as 
Woodbridge portrayed them, DPs frequently proved themselves able to manage 
their everyday lives and rebuild their communities. 
 
DPs’ resourcefulness 
 As explained in the previous chapter, the prevailing view among UNRRA 
experts constructed an image of DPs as broken individuals suffering from 
various pathologies of displacement. According to the June 1945 report on the 
Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons, DPs could be expected to be 
troublesome, defiant, apathetic and backward. The authors of this report 
warned that ‘however great the physical devastation caused by German policy, 
the moral and psychological disturbance is probably greater.’76  
 
If we define ‘morale’, for our present purpose, as ‘the possession of a 
sense of ‘belonging’, of an agreed sense of purpose and of satisfaction 
over achieving one’s purpose’, then we can see that forced workers are a 
group in which morale, in this sense, is low. In these circumstances, […] 
various inevitable human reactions tend to occur. Alcoholism, delinquency 
and promiscuity, for example, are common; for they are usually the most 
easily available ways of mitigating the painful emotional tension of low 
morale situations, the sense of isolation from a friendly community, and 
the sense of futility of these circumstances […].77 
 
For these specialists, ‘alcohol thirst’ and ‘sexual desire’ were natural 
consequences of DPs’ wartime traumas. ‘[It] is as foolish to consider alcoholism 
as a specific form of ‘thirst’ as it is to consider promiscuity as a specific form of 
‘sexual’ interest. In both cases the ‘psychological need’ is very much secondary 
to the need to deal with what is felt to be an intolerable mental pain.’78  Over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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time these statements about DPs’ amorality and disruptive behaviour gave way 
to a more durable concept of helplessness and apathy, a ‘psychosis which 
expresses itself in reluctance to face the responsibilities of a normal community 
life.’79 
 In recent years, many scholars have debunked this myth of ‘DP apathy.’ 80 
Countering contemporary claims about DPs’ various illnesses, they have 
highlighted DPs’ ability to reconstruct their lives, to organize themselves and 
rebuild a sense of community. In the French zone, as elsewhere, DPs rapidly 
proved able to run their own camps. 81  In Pirmasens, for instance, British 
UNRRA Officer Nevins, noted ‘[t]he Poles and especially the Yugoslavs are 
exceedingly well organized and the Centre taken as a whole has developed into 
a typical village community in which the various elements, to all outward 
appearances at any rate, live together amicably enough.’ 82 According to him, 
‘[o]nce free from Nazi domination, their immediate and, one might say, innate 
reaction was to rebuild […] their communal life just as their forefathers had done 
before them throughout the troubled centuries of their national history.’ 83 
Kaiserslautern’s UNRRA welfare officer concurred, noting that Russians’ 
attitudes could be summarized by the statement of one of their leaders: ‘Give us 
the necessary materials and we will do the rest.’84 
The fact remained that relief workers had mixed feelings about DPs’ 
organizational capacities. In part, the ability to delegate tasks to DPs’ leaders 
made relief work easier.85 Conversely, well-organized DPs tended to be more 
demanding than UNRRA relief workers had imagined. 86 DPs mainly turned to 
UNRRA for practical assistance and material support. For British UNRRA 
Director Nevins, welfare problems were ‘in almost all cases’ first and foremost 
‘either legal or marital.’ ‘Such problems can only be dealt with by a person 
having a certain amount of legal training and a very complete knowledge of the 
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legislation in force in the Displaced Person’s country of origin.’87 DPs demanded 
information about registering births and deaths, legalizing marriages and 
divorces, recognizing paternity and sorting out questions concerning 
illegitimacy.88 Relief workers often complained that they lacked the information 
or legal competence necessary to respond to the various DP demands.89  
  UNRRA had not anticipated the high numbers of DP marriages that took 
place. In many areas, DPs were in rush and UNRRA relief workers had to get 
civil marriages arranged with the local Burgermeister.90 In some areas, German 
authorities were reluctant to register marriages performed by a DP priest, while 
DPs refused to have marriages performed by a German civil administrator.91 In 
these circumstances, UNRRA officers served as middlemen.  Eliane Brault 
recalled in her memoirs a typical problem facing relief workers. In April 1945, an 
American officer came to see her: 
 
He speaks a little French and I speak a little English. He explains to me 
that the zone under American control is thirty kilometres away and that he 
is returning to our zone two ‘displaced’ whom he refuses to keep. She, 
Lithuanian, round faced and light-coloured eyes, He, Spanish Republican. 
Neither of them wants to return to their homelands. America and England 
do not want to take them. The woman is pregnant. I think the best would 
be to send them to Mexico, and we are searching for the best route. 
Belgium is willing to grant them right of passage if they are married. 
Finally, we find in the camp a pastor who consents to marry this Orthodox 
with this Catholic. The American officer takes one of my Algerian girls as a 
witness along with an English officer and myself, and officiates over the 
wedding on German soil. 92 
 
This episode, and Eliane Brault’s response to it, is illustrative of the fantasies of 
liberation common to DPs and relief workers. Nor was it unusual: weddings 
were celebrated throughout Germany. 93 The re-creation of a family life, of a real 
or imagined normality after the war, was as important in DP camps as it was in 
other European countries.94 
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In Lebach, for instance, on 30 April 1945 alone, seventeen couples were 
married. According to UNRRA welfare officer, ‘there would have been more 
marriages but almost immediately after this date the Russians were instructed 
that there must be no more marriages except in special circumstances.’95 In 
Kaiserslautern, similar problems arose, ‘five Russian girls who wished to marry 
Italian men were refused permission by the Russian Liaison Officers and they 
were taken to Homburg to be returned to Russia against their wishes.’96  In a 
very real sense, this rash of marriages, pregnancies and births symbolized an 
affirmation of life after years of deprivation and fears. As a young Jewish 
survivor wrote, people wanted to live, to taste the pleasures of youth long 
denied: ‘Our young bodies and souls yearned to live.’97  
 
A Frenchified UNRRA? French and Belgian UNRRA recruits arrive 
On 2 July 1945 the American-controlled Northern District was transferred to the 
French authorities.98 By then the majority of French, Russian and Italian DPs 
had been repatriated. But solutions had to be found for Polish and Baltic DPs 
and camps prepared for the coming winter. This transfer of responsibility 
aroused great anxieties among UNRRA relief workers and DPs, who feared that 
standards of living would drop amidst continuing administrative chaos. 99 These 
fears had some foundation. 100  Relief workers eagerly reported the French 
authorities’ shortcomings. On 30 July 1945 UNRRA representatives were told 
that all questions affecting DPs were controlled by the French Service de 
Rapatriement and that ‘a certain General Kappelaen would shortly arrive at 
Baden-Baden.’ Unfortunately, in practice, at least two other organizations held 
some responsibility for DPs, namely the General Staff in the four military 
districts and the military government. 101  This left UNRRA personnel 
exasperated, facing what one described as ‘order and counter-order, especially 
in the matter of supplies,’ something that resulted in ‘constant disappointments, 
friction and waste of time and effort.’102  Based in Wangen, Grace Garvey 
reported ‘[w]e are racing now against the coming of winter in this zone. The 
mornings and evening are cold and our DPs are suffering without coats and 
blankets to say nothing of paneless windows. We are facing a very desperate 
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situation here in regard to those people who are placed in our care.’103 Garvey 
lamented the fact that the French military government had requisitioned all of 
their supplies. She urged the UNRRA administration to act immediately: ‘We 
cannot afford to wait until the long strings of red tape are slowly unfolded to 
possibly obtain some of these things in many weeks. We need them now.’ 104    
 In October 1945, French UNRRA headquarters was at last set up in the 
zone. With this, UNRRA administration was reformed and expanded, British and 
American personnel being progressively replaced by French and Belgian 
staff.105 In the Southern District, the deployment of UNRRA teams had been 
astonishingly late. In November 1945 ten UNRRA teams were deployed in the 
zone’s Northern District, catering to twelve DP centres and approximately 
26,000 DPs. In the South, by 
contrast, there were only five 
UNRRA teams to provide for 
twenty-six DP centres and an 
estimated 52,000 DPs. 106 
Matters did begin to change 
following the signature of the 
18 February 1946 Franco-
UNRRA Agreement. 107  As 
Roberts noted, ‘the work had 
developed late [t]here, and 
was expanding at a time when 
elsewhere there was 
contraction.’108The number of 
UNRRA Assembly centres 
rose from fifteen in November 
1945 to thirty-six by June 1946 
and to seventy-eight by December.109  !
French occupation policy and the formation of DP spaces  
When UNRRA teams arrived in the Württemberg area over winter 1945 and into 
spring 1946 they often had to prospect villages to find DPs. As UNRRA Team 
Director Jean Gerbier observed ‘DPs were unaware of their rights - and their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Fig. 17. UNRRA Teams in January 1946. 
UNA, UNRRA, S-0417-0004-12, Tableau des teams existants, 31 
January 1946. 
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duties – nearly all of them were DPs without even knowing it.’ 110 DPs in Lindau 
were scattered across twenty-nine villages. There was no DP camp as such. 
The UNRRA team was instead installed in several town-centre buildings.  
 
Fig. 18/19. The UNRRA Bureaux in Lindau111 
 
If, as Jean Gerbier observed, ‘for the last seven months UNRRA’s activities 
revolved around the word “camp”’ [elsewhere in Germany], most UNRRA teams 
in his region had no camps.112  Before the arrival of the UNRRA team, the 
majority of DPs were economically integrated into the available German space. 
UNRRA Team Director Pierre Durand arrived in Gutach in December 1945. He 
found around 500 DPs scattered in twenty villages in the surrounding area.113 
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Fig.20/21/22/23.  UNRRA buildings under the direction of UNRRA Team 572, Gutach 
area.114 !
Fed by the local German authorities, they lived either ‘chez l’habitant’ or in 
requisitioned hotels. He organized a mess and a medical service in Gutach 
village. He also established a small school and a transit camp to host DPs 
coming from Haslach.115 The rest of his DPs lived in requisitioned hotels and 
private lodgings: 
 
In spite of great difficulties, it is my opinion that the organisation of centres 
such as ours is very interesting, and that the results approach more 
closely the aims of UNRRA than those achieved in a camp. A camp is 
much easier to run, but the overcrowded condition in which the DPs are 
forced to live is not to be recommended either from the point of view of 
health or morale. 116 
 
UNRRA had no control over the allocation of housing; the military authorities 
were responsible for it. As these examples indicate, the French zone is 
particularly interesting as it presents two very different systems, one based on 
the use of camp, the other on DP dispersal within the community. As Colonel 
Pourchet observed, according to their density of concentration, there were three 
kinds of DPs’ centres in the French zone: 
 
a) Persons living privately, scattered and working particularly in agriculture 
In these cases, their dispersion is often excessive and in practice hinders 
most of the means of contact between UNRRA and DPs. […] Such dispersal 
is incompatible with the means at UNRRA’s disposal for carrying out 
frequent and regular distributions. […] [O]wing to these circumstances, this 
category remains nearly entirely in the German economy, including a ration 
system, which operates by means of German ration cards. 
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b) Persons living privately, but constituting groups of considerable size in 
urban centres or belonging to such large groups of workers that they 
justify the installation of UNRRA detachments […] 
c) Persons living in an Assembly Centre -  managed and cared for entirely 
by UNRRA. 
Such as: Team 573 at Mulheim in the Southern Area, and the majority of 
UNRRA Teams in the Northern Area.117 
 
In the American zone, efforts to manage the post-war disruption hinged on the 
use of DP camps. As a result, DPs had also been regrouped in large DP camps 
in the Northern District. Called ‘assembly centres’, these were run like military 
installations. The buildings chosen were typically large institutional structures. 
The majority of DPs lived in barracks (at Landstuhl, Lebach, Gneisenau, 
Hombourg, Augusta, Niederlahnstein, Feyen, and Pirmarsens).118 Some of the 
barracks were in relatively good condition (Hombourg, and Landstuhl) while 
others, such as Pirmasens, were not.119 The SHAEF Guide to the Care of 
Displaced Persons in Germany had prescribed that national groups should be 
housed together, families maintained intact, and single men and single women 
separated.120 UNRRA relief workers complained that this stipulation was rarely 
fulfilled. DP camps were overcrowded, men and women were mixed together, 
and, as a result of this promiscuity, venereal diseases, it was believed, were 
widespread. 121 As Peter Gatrell puts it, ‘few reception centres and DP camps 
conformed to the bureaucratic ideal of a well-ordered institution.’122 In theory, 
‘[t]he basic standard of accommodation was thirty square feet of sleeping space 
per person, that is, an area six feet by five. In practice, however, […] the space 
available for sleeping quarters was smaller, and inevitably very crowded.’123  
 The camp served several purposes: it facilitated the screening, repatriation 
and provision of basic supplies such as food, housing and medical care and it 
made it easier to maintain law and order by segregating the DP population from 
the German population.124 Liisa Malki suggests that the model elaborated in the 
DP camps informed the subsequent development of contemporary UNHCR 
camps. ‘It was toward the end of World War II that the refugee camp became 
emplaced as a standardized, generalizable technology of power in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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management of mass displacement.’125 
 
The spatial concentration and ordering of people that it enabled, as well as 
the administrative and bureaucratic processes it facilitated within its 
boundaries, had far reaching consequences. The segregation of 
nationalities; the orderly organization of repatriation or third-country 
resettlement; medical and hygienic programs and quarantining; ‘perpetual 
screening’ and the accumulation of documentation on the inhabitants of 
the camps; the control of movement and black-marketing; law 
enforcement and public discipline; and schooling and rehabilitation were 
some of the operations that the spatial concentration and ordering of 
people enabled or facilitated. Through these processes, the modern, post-
war refugee emerged as a knowable, nameable figure and as an object of 
social-scientific knowledge.126 
 
Holian notes that, aside from these practical functions, the camp also served a 
political purpose, separating ‘those who belonged in Germany from those who 
belonged ‘elsewhere.’’127  
 American authorities developed a policy of ‘divided jurisdiction’ that 
established DP camps as spaces of exception. As Proudfoot observes, it was 
believed that ‘after years of forced labour these people had developed a 
profound hatred and contempt for all things German and a desire for 
revenge.’128 Segregation from the wider population was thus regarded as a 
necessity, although the borders between the camp and German civilian space 
were porous. ‘The policy worked as follows: the US Army, assisted by UNRRA, 
was responsible for what went on inside the camp, while the German authorities 
and the US military government were responsible for what went on outside.’129 
Holian argues that this US policy of ‘divided jurisdiction’ found broad support 
among Jewish refugees, who were instrumental in its development.130 In the 
French zone, the evidence suggests that DPs had mixed feelings towards 
camps. Some DPs were reluctant to be moved from the small, more informal 
camps they had occupied prior to the arrival of the Allies.131  
 The camp as ‘space of exception’ was only partially institutionalised in 
post-war Germany. In the Southern part of the French zone, DPs cohabited with 
Germans, or lived in close proximity to them.132 In fact, as mentioned above, 
most DPs resided in individual lodgings or in small groups of fifty to one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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hundred in large houses, hotels or inns.133 What camps there were tended to be 
smaller and more varied. DPs were reassembled in a former Hitler Youth school 
(Calw), a prison camp (Schömberg), in monasteries (Reute, Blönried, 
Weingarten, and Inzigkofen), local chateaus (Isny, Wurzach), requisitioned 
hotels (Konstanz), a former internment camp (Villingen), large stone buildings 
(Ebingen, Tuttlingen), requisitioned private houses (Freiburg, Rottweil, 
Emmendingen), and clusters of wooden huts (Tübingen, Freudenstadt and 
Kisslegg).134  
 Conditions varied accordingly. In Schömberg they were dire. DPs lived in 
a prisoners’ camp in the vicinity of a factory devoted to the extraction of shale 
oil. They suffered from cold, muddy surroundings and air pollution. 135  In 
Inzigkofen, by contrast, 148 DPs lived ‘relatively comfortably’ in a monastery 
dating from the twelfth century.136  In the town of Ravensburg the majority of 
DPs lived in private houses and a further 200 in a former Abbey. The 
Ravensburg DP centre consisted of a building, located in the town centre, in 
which the team had organized an UNRRA store and several workshops.137 The 
small town of Konstanz was particularly over-crowded and UNRRA Director 
Jacques Bauche frequently had to intervene to protect DPs.138 In larger towns 
(such as Freiburg and Tübingen), there was greater competition over 
accommodation between the DP population, local students, the claims of the 
Regional Military Governments and their families, and the German 
administration. 139 
 From the perspective of the administrators the fact that many DPs lived 
in private accommodation complicated the maintenance of law and order, the 
screening and repatriation of DPs and the provision of basic services such as 
food, housing and medical care. Transport was a nightmare. Vehicles in the 
French zone were in short supply, petrol even more so. Roberts observed that, 
‘the roads were atrocious – there were no autobahn, and after the winter frost, 
the country roads, were a succession of deep potholes. It was amazing that 
there were not more accidents, but there were one or two serious ones, though 
no-one [was] killed.140 Dispersal also hampered the development of recreational 
activities and the organization of cultural events. Some welfare officers were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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disappointed to be marooned in rural areas having imagined being in charge of 
social activities within a large camp. In Emmendingen, UNRRA Team 576 
Director Dalichampt reported that most new welfare employees attached to his 
team were unhappy. As he conceded, being a part of his team, ‘entails the 
major inconvenience of being a travail de détail of rural social work, admittedly 
interesting but rather unrewarding and not producing impressive results,’ when 
compared to the cultural events organized in huge camps. 141 He urged UNRRA 
authorities to inform all new recruits that the French zone did not have ‘model 
camps with between 5,000 and 10 000 DPs, like they were told [was the case] 
in the theoretical training classes.’ 142 According to UNRRA Director Jean 
Gerbier, DPs living in private accommodation were uninterested in communal 
recreational activities anyway. ‘The reason behind this is not only transport and 
communication difficulties. It stems from the fact that private life is a much more 
normal way of life than camp life. Hence, DPs behave as free and independent 
men, that is to say, if we dare say it, in a more selfish manner.’143 
Seen from the DP perspective, after wartime years deprived of privacy, 
living in private accommodation offered a return to some sense of psychological 
normality.144 Admittedly, DPs did not benefit from the protection that refugee 
camps afforded. But, they enjoyed easier access to economic opportunities and 
better integration into German civilian life. Germaine Loustalot acknowledged 
these trends after visiting Konstanz: ‘we are progressively moving DPs towards 
a normal life. In fact, they are fed by the German economy and we have to 
ensure that, through a system of vouchers, the DP housewife could get her milk 
from the dairyman, her bread from the baker and the rest of her provisions in an 
UNRRA store.’ 145  UNRRA relief worker Chabanne concurred, arguing that 
conditions in the Southern District were more comfortable for DPs who enjoyed 
greater independence than in the Northern District where camp life was the 
norm.146 
 French authorities’ willingness to maintain DPs in small camps and 
private lodging needs further elucidation, however. As Holian has 
demonstrated, the American policy of divided jurisdiction was intended to create 
a clear distinction between inside and outside, German space and DP space, 
although in reality such distinctions did not exist. Germans penetrated DP 
space and DP entered German space. Why was such separation not envisaged !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in the French zone? Several hypotheses may be advanced. Firstly, French 
authorities expected DPs to work in return for the protection that France was 
offering them. As explained in the next chapter, this was easier if DPs were 
housed close to their place of employment. Secondly, home-grown experiences 
of deportation led French authorities to fear the effects of camp life. In wartime 
France, large-scale deportation had spawned anxieties about the effects of 
camp-life on the morality of individuals. As explained in chapter two, French 
authorities were alarmed by the lax moral standards of French labour conscripts 
and feared that they had been contaminated by the promiscuity in Nazi work 
camps.147 In post-war France, these fears persisted. René Mayer, for one, 
warned that camp-life catalysed the development of an appalling mentality, the 
overwhelming majority of Polish DPs having lost the habit of work.148 Thirdly, 
the relatively small number of DPs (when compared with the British and 
American zones) made recourse to small camps and private housing easier. 
There was no such consensus about the use of DP camps in the 
American zone. Although preferred for the efficiencies and control they offered, 
‘[t]he term ‘concentration camp’ was not a popular epithet and comparison 
between concentration camps and DP camps made the American look bad.’149 
Some relief workers believed that placing DPs in private accommodation 
facilitated the rehabilitative process. As Laura Greaves has recently highlighted, 
many American UNRRA officials believed DPs should be placed in housing that 
allowed a high level of privacy and the maintenance of family units in their own 
quarters. American military officers, on the contrary, focused on housing that 
would provide for the easiest management of the large DP population. DPs had 
to be regrouped in camps located on communications routes near food supply 
sources.150  
So, why were French spatial policies so distinctive? It is easier to 
pinpoint contextual differences than ideological ones. Historians have 
emphasized the central place occupied by home and domesticity in the 
imagination and experiences of post-war Europeans. As Betts and Crowley put 
it, ‘after 1945 the home attracted a remarkable amount of public attention, 
ranging from national governments to municipal policy-makers, welfare workers 
to women’s organizations, architecture and design circles to advertisers and 
consumer activists. It was the centre of social policy in every European country !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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after the war, despite extremely divergent experiences of material decimation, 
housing shortages, social dislocation and refugee crises.’ 151  After the 
experience of the defeat and exodus of 1940, this longing for shelter, security 
and normality was particularly acute in France. In her study about the return of 
Jews to post-war Paris, Leora Auslander has demonstrated that the provisional 
government made an extraordinary, albeit short-lived, effort to reunite returnees 
with their possessions, ‘offering those who would recuperate nothing the 
opportunity to mourn by narrating their losses.’152 
 
 
 ‘For man does not live by bread alone’153 
 
 So far this chapter has underlined the specificities of the French zone: 
the delayed deployment of UNRRA teams, the replacement of British and 
American relief workers by French and Belgian staff, and the distinctiveness of 
French housing policies. These specificities gave rise, in turn, to alternative 
ways of arranging interim provision and ‘rehabilitating’ DPs. The next section 
focuses not only on the similarities and differences between French 
management of DP camps and those of its Western Allies, but also emphasizes 
their interdependence by pointing out the transfers of expertise between the 
three Western zones. 
In the French zone a wide variety of interpretations persisted in regard to 
what rehabilitating a refugee amounted to in practice. At a welfare officers’ 
meeting in August 1946, Zone medical Officer General des Cilleuls described 
the welfare service as a benevolent and feminine addition to the Health Service, 
which was usually entrusted to men. His imagery was telling: ‘[t]he Welfare 
Service was born out of the Health service as Eve was created out of Adam’s 
rib and from this couple emerged a spiritual guardian called Relief.’ 154 
According to him, Welfare Officers had to perform stereotypically feminine tasks 
such as working with children, assisting male doctors and distributing clothing. 
Little reference was made to instilling a sense of self-worth amongst DPs.  For 
American relief worker Elize Zach, this viewpoint reaffirmed a traditional and 
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conservative vision of the relief worker role. According to her, few French 
UNRRA male Directors understood the concept of welfare.155  
 
The majority of the personnel in the teams was composed of persons who 
had never before been connected with any type of social service and 
whose concept of a welfare was vaguely of someone distributing clothing 
– preferably baby’s – as well as chocolates and bonbons, invariably, of 
course in too generous quantity. Unfortunately, some of the welfare did not 
have the training to successfully counteract this notion [word missing]. On 
the other hand, a welfare with a broad concept of her duties was more 
often than not considered a nuisance as she did not remain in her proper 
box, as understood by other members of the team.156 
 
Despite different interpretations of what ‘welfare’ activities entailed, one area of 
relative agreement appeared to endure. As Silvia Salvatici suggests, 
entertainment and recreation were perhaps ‘the lowest common denominator’ 
that everyone could accept when defining ‘rehabilitation’ because it drew on 
Western culture and humanitarianism as traditionally understood.157 
Aside from contributing to DPs’ rehabilitation, this insistence on 
recreation and entertainment served a more instrumental juridical purpose in 
the French zone. In the context of the escalating rivalry between the PDR 
service and UNRRA headquarters, UNRRA’s ideology of welfare and 
rehabilitation enabled its officials to demonstrate that they were doing more 
than the PDR administration. UNRRA officials often congratulated themselves 
on establishing international foyers, organizing painting and art exhibitions, 
developing workshops and providing counselling to DPs in need. 158  This 
social/rehabilitation ethos helped them to defend themselves in a context of 
intense jurisdictional competition with the PDR service. According to UNRRA 
officials, while PDR administrators were content with minimal relief services, 
UNRRA relief workers were more ambitious. In hindsight, the practical 
consequences of this self-declared mandate of ‘rehabilitation’ seem less clear-
cut.  
 
Entertaining and Educating DPs 
  On 20-21 November 1945, during the first welfare officers’ meeting in the 
zone, UNRRA recruits were told: ‘Do not make everything by yourself but 
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stimulate DPs’ personal initiative. ‘By the DPs, for the DPs.’159 In January 1946 
Zone Chief Welfare Officer Despeigne urged District Welfare Officers to 
organize in each camp a theatrical, musical or comedy event that could be 
‘understood by every nationality.’160 A month later the first Welfare Bulletin was 
circulated in the zone. Welfare Officers were asked to oversee DP committees, 
to organize weekly meeting with these committees, to facilitate worship, to 
encourage employment, and to organize recreational activities. In cooperation 
with the Employment Service, UNRRA authorities recommended that each 
assembly centre organize workshops in order to teach or refresh vocational 
skills. Particular attention was to be paid to children and young mothers through 
early detection of pregnant women and the organization of kindergartens.161 
These rehabilitation programs were highly gendered. As Zahra explains, they 
aimed at cultivating domesticity among refugee girls and women, reflecting the 
widespread belief that women’s wartime experiences ‘were not simply 
dehumanizing – they were profoundly defeminizing.’162 Courses in practical 
nursing, homemaking, cooking and sewing were set up in the zone.  
Despite the UNRRA welfare service’s late start in the French zone, its 
impact was soon felt. In each camp efforts were made to provide activities that 
kept the DPs from sitting idle, including cinema screenings, sports groups, 
dances and work projects. In the spring of 1946, nine out of ten DP camps in 
the Northern District had a 
theatre and a dance class, 
seven out of ten a choir and a 
public display area, four a 
band, and three a cinema.163 
In the Southern District, the 
welfare picture was more 
varied, most welfare teams 
having deployed later.164 Still 
UNRRA could boast DP 
training courses for welfare 
assistants and youth camp 
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Fig 24.  DP band in Gutach, April 1946. 
UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0421E0023E09,"‘La"journée"du"jeudi"18"avril"1946"au"team"
572’,"par"P."Durand,"Gutach. 
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As preparation for UNRRA’s anticipated withdrawal at the end of 1946, sixty-
one DPs were trained to become welfare assistants in Gutach. According to 
UNRRA’s training outline, the programme (taught in French, Polish and 
German) was relatively comprehensive. Lectures dealt with a wide range of 
topics, such as laws in the zone, the duty of confidentiality, DP employment, 
screening and food allocation. External partners were brought in for specialist 
classes such as Miss Grunewald from the Service Social d’Aide aux Emigrants 
(SSAE) and Mr. Hebert from the YMCA. Unlike the training provided at Granville 
for class I recruits, the Gutach course was delivered by tutors familiar with DP 
fieldwork. 165  In collaboration with the YMCA, a training centre was also 
established in Hinterzarten to prepare monitors for children’s vacation camps.166 
Recreation was not envisaged solely in terms of entertainment; DPs had 
to be re-educated too. It was UNRRA’s stated policy ‘to provide schools and 
educational opportunity to all displaced persons under UNRRA care, including 
those residing outside of Assembly Centres.’167 Having been deprived of the 
opportunity to attend school in wartime, DPs were hungry for education and 
eager to make up for lost time.  
  
Fig. 25/26. Drawings made by Latvian DP children, UNRRA Team 211, Schwenningen168 !
For all this reservoir of enthusiasm, UNRRA efforts to educate DP children were 
hampered by the absence of books, inadequate facilities, teacher shortages !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and the dispersal of DPs throughout the territory. As a result, schooling facilities 
varied greatly from one area to another. 169 In some camps the Mission scolaire 
Polonaise established Polish national schools, while in other areas DP children 
had to attend German schools. According to UNRRA’s figures, by November 
1946 995 children (aged 6-10) and 1,655 (aged 10-18) were enrolled in schools 
across the French zone.170   
Aside from educating DPs, reconstructing their bodies was seen as 
another crucial aspect of the ‘rehabilitation’ process. In this context, DPs’ 
rehabilitation focused, not just on improving hygiene standards, but also on 
developing physical and outdoor activities. Scouting figured prominently. 
UNRRA Welfare Bulletin No. 6 explained that scouting was aimed at cultivating 
young boys’ sense of duty, self-confidence, courage and self-respect. Scouting, 
it was averred, was ‘about the individual, not the mass.’ 171  It encouraged 
entente between DP children. 172  In the summer of 1946 DP scouts from 
Tübingen even joined a French scout troop camping around Lake Constance.173 
Rest and holiday homes (Maisons d’enfants) were also opened in the Black 
Forest (at Schweigmatt, in Überlingen and Gutach) to improve the health of 
sick, unaccompanied or disabled children. 174  In the summer of 1946, a 
dedicated hostel, Air et soleil (Fresh air and sun), in the Black Forest hills 
welcomed DP children (aged 6-13) living in Northern District DP camps.175 But a 
scandal erupted when some children were found sleeping together in the same 
bed. 176  Although the Director attempted to smooth ruffled feathers with 
reassuring words, this scandal fed fears about the alleged promiscuity of young, 
traumatized DPs, which, as Tara Zahra indicates, were widespread among 
Allied relief workers.177 
UNRRA’s recreational operations were supported by voluntary societies 
and DP committees. In Hinterzarten, the YMCA organized summer colonies for 
young DP boys who were introduced to a rigorously healthy routine. Children 
were expected to walk in the forest daily, to practice gymnastics, to paint, to 
sing and play music and all with only two hours’ nap between the various !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sessions.178 Although UNRRA Zone Medical Officer De Cilleuls complained 
about inadequate discipline and poor diet within this particular colony, UNRRA 
welfare officer Lau believed it was successful.179  The YMCA also helped create 
rest and relaxation huts for DP adults in the zone. In April 1946 Welfare Officers 
were invited for a two-day workshop on ‘leisure activities’ organized by UNRRA 
Welfare Officer Roberts and YMCA representative Herbert. 180  During this 
workshop, YMCA representative William Frey explained to Welfare Officers how 
to build a foyer, based on his experience with French soldiers installed in 
Switzerland after the defeat of 1940. In order to enable DPs’ minds to rest, 
welfare workers were encouraged to ban ‘politics’ or ‘chauvinism.’ They also 
had to ensure that no nationality dominated. Each foyer had to hold a library, a 
canteen, a radio and a room for concerts, conferences and talks. Moreover, ‘to 
be attractive, the foyer [had to] be adequately decorated.’181  
Welfare manuals produced by UNRRA headquarters were meanwhile 
distributed in the field. UNRRA Central Welfare Division distributed pamphlets 
explaining how to use scrap metal in arts and crafts.182 The British Nursery 
School Association and the Friends Relief service distributed a leaflet on 
‘improvised toys for nurseries and refugee camps.’183  
 
Fig. 27. Leaflet 'Improvised Toys'184 
Fig. 28. Lindau’s toy-making workshop185 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Understandably, results tended to reflect the ingenuity of UNRRA welfare 
personnel and the DPs’ particular skills. A DP handicraft exhibition was, for 
instance, organised in the Polish DP camp at Landstuhl, in which, according to 
its UNRRA welfare officer, DPs fashioned ‘marvels’ ranging from wood 
sculpture to fine embroidery. 186  By July 1946 many DP camps, including 
Wangen, Lörrach, Reutlingen, Freiburg and Lindau, incorporated toy-making 
workshops.187  
 Over Christmas 1946, according to Elise Zach, all DP children in the 
zone received toys made by UNRRA or YMCA workshops. ‘Each child received 
at least one article of clothing, as well as chocolate and candies. A number of 
the smaller teams were able to provide a gift for each adult DP as well.’188 In 
Saulgau the Welfare Officer reported that after a Christmas dinner cooked with 
Russian, Polish and Baltic specialties, a polyglot Father Christmas distributed 
presents to all the guests. ‘In our Foyer-Restaurant, lit with candles […] we felt 
that our people were fulfilled and perfectly happy.’189 UNRRA also supported 
numerous other art exhibitions and cultural fairs. In Freiburg, for instance, the 
welfare service organized a ‘charity fair’ on 16 December 1945 in conjunction 
with the Latvian and Lithuanian DP committees, the event making a 4,000 mark 
profit.190 Lithuanian children sang popular French songs such as Sur le Pont 
d’Avignon alongside Baltic folk ballads.191 An exhibition of DP artwork was 
organized in Rottweil camp.192 In Wangen, an Art History conference and an 
exhibition of Hungarian art was scheduled in the spring of 1946.193 UNRRA 
Central Headquarters also envisaged collecting work made by DPs for inclusion 
in a permanent exhibition at the Archives of the United Nations, but this project 
never came to fruition.194 Concerts were organized, however. DPs established 
theatre groups and orchestras in the French zone, reviving traditional plays, folk 
songs and dances. For instance, the Lithuanian Orchestra of Freiburg played a 
programme of folk songs and anthems, together with classical pieces written by 
Claude Debussy, Mozart, Frédéric Chopin or the French composer Jules !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Massenet in August 1946.195  Baltic DPs found an enthusiastic supporter in the 
military government in the person of Raymond Schmittlein, an early Gaullist 
who was put in charge of educational reforms in the French zone.196 Schmittlein 
had lived in Lithuania and Latvia between 1934 and 1940 working as a 
professor and as foreign correspondent for the Havas news-agency. He 
became a staunch defender of Baltic DPs.197 He helped establish the Baltic 
Fine Art school in Freiburg, entrusting it to his friend Jonynas, a Lithuanian artist 
who had exhibited in Paris in the interwar years.198 
 
Fig. 29. Jonynas exhibition programme, November 1946.199 
 
Schmittlein also supported the admission of DPs into German universities.200 So 
much so that the publication World Student Relief noted that ‘a somewhat 
specific feature of the DP student programme in the French zone is that it 
became a more or less established fact long before UNRRA had anything to do 
with it.’201 
 
Even before the basic directive was issued in Berlin in November 1945, 
laying down the general rules for 10% admission of DP students to 
universities in the three Western Zones, a large number of DP students 
were already studying at Tübingen. As a matter of fact, not so few of them 
had been studying there even before the German collapse and thanks to 
the existence of several organised national groups (especially Baltic) they 
quickly managed to reach a kind of accepted modus vivendi with the 
French occupying authorities […]202 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0421E0031E01,"Invitation,"comité"d’entraide"lithuanien"de"Fribourg,"10"August"1946."
196"UNRRA,"SE0438E0009E01,"World"Student"Relief," "Report"on"visit" to"French"zone"from"Yngve"Frykholm,"Franlgen,"8" June"1946;"
Corine"Defrance"Raymond"Schmittlein"(1904E1974):"médiateur"entre"la"France"et"la"Lituanie"Cahiers%Lituaniens,%No."9"(2009)."
197"Robert"Marquant"‘Raymond"Schmittlein"19"juin"1904–29"septembre"1974’"in:"Manfred"Heinemann"(éd.),"Hochschuloffiziere%und%
Wiederaufbau%des%Hochschulwesens% in%Westdeutschland%1945–1952,%die% französische%Zone" (Hildesheim,"1991)"quoted" in"Corine"
Defrance"Raymond"Schmittlein"(1904E1974).’"
198"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE0421E0031E02,"Fribourg,"Exposition,"V.K."Jonynas,"November"1946."
199"Ibid."
200"UNRRA,"SE0438E0009E01,"World"Student"Relief,""Report"on"visit"to"French"zone"from"Yngve"Frykholm,"Franlgen,"8"June"1946."
201"Ibid."
202"Ibid."
! 240 
 
In the Southern District, there were two Universities, in Freiburg and Tübingen, 
with around between 350 and 500 in Tübingen plus 150 students enlisted in 
Freiburg, despite the major bomb damage to its university buildings. 203 The 
majority were Baltic DPs. 204 German academics were often hostile to them. 205 
And, despite UNRRA efforts, DP registration at Mainz University remained 
impossible owing to housing shortages. 206 
Admittedly, not all UNRRA initiatives were successful. In Reutlingen, for 
instance, Mrs Pujos du Coudray noted that it proved difficult to encourage DPs 
to cultivate individual garden plots or take up language courses: 
 
Story of a Failure. We tried to organize language classes: English and 
Spanish, in view of emigration to USA, British colonies or to Spanish-
speaking South America, but without success. It is difficult to get school-
books: we are still waiting for Hugo’s Spanish, ordered a month ago in 
England. Very few adult DPs are interested, and those all want private and 
individual tuition. People do not want to leave their camps and homes in 
the evening, which is the only time when the welfare officer is free.207 
 
But the evidence suggests that in many cases close relations were established 
between UNRRA welfare Officers and DPs, many of whom petitioned over the 
spring of 1947 to protest against the cutting of welfare posts.208    
 
An ambivalent ‘rehabilitation’ programme 
What, then, of the ambivalence intrinsic to these rehabilitation programmes? As 
recent studies have highlighted, while UNRRA tried to foster internationalism, its 
programme actually stimulated nationalist sentiments. In encouraging DPs to 
engage in cultural activities, UNRRA relief workers helped revive national 
religions, languages, crafts and cultural festivals. For DP leaders, DP schools 
also became a medium for the transmission of national values. As Anna 
Jaroszynska-Kirchmann has shown, schooling rebuilt ties to the past, helping, 
for instance, to teach ‘Poland’s history, her national patriotic tradition and 
heritage, religion and language.’209 Scouting instructors also stressed particular 
Christian and national values. Thus, whether purposely or unintentionally, 
UNRRA relief workers fostered national pride and religious revivalism. In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Koblenz, for example, the UNRRA welfare supervisor worried that local youth 
movements were promoting not just discipline but militarism.210 In Landstuhl, 
UNRRA helped the DPs to rebuild a church, the camp’s woodworkers crafting 
its altar. 211 
 
Fig. 30. DP camp newspaper, poem ‘Homeland’, Landstuhl, March 1947212  
Fig. 31. Altar in DP camp, Landstuhl213 !
While in principle ‘international’ and ‘neutral to religion’, UNRRA was in 
practice anything but internationalist, for the simple reason that rekindling 
national traditions became integral to the ‘rehabilitation’ of DPs. Some UNRRA 
personnel clearly thought this circle could be squared. In Ehingen, for instance, 
UNRRA Welfare Officer Veronika Beekman attempted to promote reconciliation 
between DPs and their former German antagonists by organizing common 
religious ceremonies and inviting German priests to attend DP celebrations.214 
As Salvatici puts it, ‘the confidence that officials had in the therapeutic effects of 
nurturing national identities was an expression of their own inability to ‘think 
internationally.’’ 215  While promoting international collaboration, UNRRA 
therefore reinforced national affiliation, its humanitarian workers following a 
vision of reconstruction centered on the reassertion of national sovereignty. 216 
Aside from fostering DPs’ own nationalist sentiments, UNRRA relief workers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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often attempted to promote their own country’s values. Miss Roberts recalled 
that she attempted to counteract DPs’ misleading images of England. ‘I 
regretted their curious ideas about England, which seemed the most foreign of 
all places to them, and did my best to cure them of beliefs that ‘all English 
women are thin’, ‘England is a very diplomatic country’ and ‘England is full of 
mi-ladies.’ 217  As explained in chapter seven, French relief workers also 
attempted to promote France’s image in Germany. DPs were invited to 
participate in French national celebrations such as Bastille Day or the 
commemoration of De Gaulle’s Appeal of 18 June 1940.218 
 
Fig 32. Celebration in Schelklingen, Polish and French National anthem, September 
1946.219 
 
In December 1946, UNRRA Director General Lenclud stipulated that DP 
children were to be integrated in French schools where they would be initiated 
into ‘the spirit of French culture.’220 This formed part of wider French efforts to 
disseminate French culture. In German schools, French culture and history, for 
example, were taught in French, as were teacher-training courses. Not only was 
German culture de-emphasized, but American textbooks were kept out of the 
French zone as well.221 However - and perhaps understandably - the evidence 
suggests that DPs proved reluctant to send their children to French schools.222 
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Towards a ‘democratized’ organization of refugee welfare? 
The rehabilitation programme was never universally followed in the French 
zone. UNRRA Field Supervisor Pourchet remained opposed to what he decried 
as a policy of ‘spectacular events’, considering that it favoured an aristocracy of 
DPs while neglecting the poorest, who only received ‘scraps of it and echos of 
concerts.’223 In Lindau, UNRRA Director Jean Gerbier concurred, considering 
that UNRRA paid too much attention to welfare and not enough to 
practicalities.224 According to Gerbier, the administrative service was by far the 
most important service: it was charged with establishing DPs’ nationality, 
determining their eligibility status, filling out their registration cards and giving 
them information about repatriation and employment. The democratization of 
refugee administration divided UNRRA relief workers even more. UNRRA 
planners promoted ‘active’ welfare over ‘passive’ charity.225 Self-government in 
DP camps was, according to UNRRA’s official historian, the cornerstone of 
rehabilitation, ‘the goal toward which all activities were pointed.’226 While some 
relief workers allowed elected leaders to represent DPs, others saw with 
jaundiced eyes DPs’ empowerment in the French zone. Before UNRRA came 
into existence, military authorities had indicated that DPs should be encouraged 
to organize themselves, mainly because this would facilitate camp control. The 
essential difference between SHAEF recommendations and UNRRA policy lay 
in the fact that SHAEF wanted to select DPs’ representatives while UNRRA 
planners preferred them to be elected.227 For UNRRA planners, DPs’ self-
organisation gave them a renewed sense of purpose after years of extreme 
dehumanization. It reduced the number of military and civilian personnel 
needed to run the camps, and, most importantly, it prepared DPs for life in 
democratic society.228 
 In the French zone, many French occupation officials still held to the 
view that it was preferable to select DPs’ representatives. Reflecting on 
UNRRA’s advocacy of democratic governance in camps, Laffon argued that this 
system of organization would create a ‘state within a state’ and would promote 
activities with a clear ‘orientation revendicative.’ 229  Rejecting the UNRRA 
proposal to place decision-making in the hands of elected committees, he 
suggested that aid workers entrust authority to an elected ‘homme de !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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confiance’, a practice that was used in POW camps.230 French occupation 
officials cautioned that self-organization facilitated the development of political 
activities and the circulation of anti-repatriation propaganda.231 Furthermore, as 
was explained in chapter two, it undermined the transformation of DPs into 
assimilated immigrants, model citizens of the French national community. Even 
so, as in the rest of Germany, many UNRRA team directors relied on DP 
committees in the French zone.232 These committees supervised numerous 
activities, ranging from camp policing to the distribution of food. As we saw in 
chapter three, some of these DP committees were highly efficient. The 
Lithuanian committee of Ravensburg was particularly well structured with an 
overarching policy the implementation of which was supported by a series of 
subcommittees handling particular problems, such as relief distribution, 
education policies, vocational training, employment, and press relations. 
 
 
Fig 33. Chart outlining Lithuanian DP committee organization, Ravensburg.233 
 
Some Directors enjoyed good relations with these committees. 234  In 
August 1945 the Camp Director of the Kemmel-Kaserne in Trier reported that 
‘the leaders have always been found to be most willing and helpful and pass on 
all requests ensuring that they are carried out as far as possible.’235 In other 
places relations were more contentious. In Freiburg, for instance, the DP 
committees wrote a letter to Sir General Morgan, chief of UNRRA operations in 
Germany, to protest against their living conditions. For Lenclud, their letter was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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a ‘tissue of lies.’ 236  Lenclud concluded that the DP committees should be 
progressively reduced to the role of mere ‘auxiliaries’ to the administration.’237  
 
Fig. 34. UNRRA Team 206, Freiburg238 
 
Faced with growing protests emerging from the DP committees at Landstuhl, 
UNRRA Field Supervisor Sebille similarly recommended that DPs should be 
pre-selected before being put forward for election. 239 At camp level, some 
UNRRA Directors, feeling threatened, tried to marginalize their DP leaders, 
something evident from the following comments: ‘In Freiburg, the Director, 
intelligent man, but rather stubborn […] acted as a Dictator that rode roughshod 
over the rules.’240 Similarly, in Gutach, the Director was described as an ‘active 
man, intelligent and brutal’ who rejected DPs that did not please him. 241 
 Recent studies have highlighted the ambiguities within UNRRA’s 
democratic governance. On one hand, UNRRA relief workers fostered a spirit of 
self-reliance and a sense of responsibility. On the other hand, its policies 
reinforced the inequalities between UNRRA relief providers and DP ‘recipients.’ 
Indeed, the methods of refugee management promoted by New Deal-influenced 
relief workers contributed to the process of refugee depersonalization and to 
their presentation as passive and apathetic.242 As will be more fully explained in 
the next chapter, like many other humanitarian institutions, UNRRA’s camp 
system institutionalized an unequal relationship between ‘the compassionate 
and the suffering’ that contradicted the presumed universalism of its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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discourse. 243  As Salvatici has pointed out, Woodbridge’s description of 
UNRRA’s distinct, emancipatory and innovative approach to humanitarian aid 
reflected a widespread and stereotypical image of DPs ‘as children, they were 
deemed to be in the conditions of minors and therefore regarded as eligible for 
assistance, but not entitled to rights.’244  
 Furthermore, although American relief workers were drawn to notions of 
cultural relativism, their practices contributed to the reinforcement of ethnic 
prejudices.245 Some groups were, for instance, singled out as more democratic-
minded than others. Woodbridge noted that ‘in general, it was among the Balts, 
who were usually the most economically advanced group and the most capable 
of democratic action, and the Jews, who by virtue of the existence of strongly 
organized kibbutzim and for other reasons, had the strongest leaders, that 
camp self-government developed most rapidly.’246 In Gailingen, UNRRA director 
Bauche argued, in marked contrast to this view, that administration was 
impeded by the independent spirit of his Jewish charges eager to run their own 
affairs.247 Jewish DPs were particularly reluctant to submit themselves to the 
supervision of any administrative body. According to UNRRA’s Deputy Director 
this attitude was easily understandable in light of their past experiences under 
the Nazi regime.248  
 In sum, while contemporary observers presented UNRRA as an 
experiment in international welfare planning based on secularization and the 
application of scientific methods, the evidence suggests that the effects of 
UNRRA practices were more subtle and ambiguous. The argument developed 
in this chapter (and in the next chapter) sits alongside an emerging strand of 
historiography sensitive to UNRRA’s paradoxes and ‘dilemmas.’ UNRRA was 
both innovative and drew on longer traditions of humanitarianism. It both 
undermined and advanced the ‘international’ idea. Finally, its project sought 
both to satisfy the needs of DPs and to meet relief workers’ own needs.249 
 
UNRRA Reconsidered: ruptures and continuities 
 
As historians have probed more deeply into UNRRA’s post-war efforts, 
the degree of continuity or disjuncture in relief policies and humanitarian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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assistance in the aftermath of the First and Second World War arises.250 While 
UNRRA was widely heralded as a clear break with the past, recent studies have 
highlighted deeper continuities in ideas, personnel and practices with the 
League of Nations. Admittedly, the post-1945 relief operations were, not least in 
medical terms, far more successful than the League’s post-1918 operations. As 
opposed to the devastating influenza plague of 1918-1919, no major epidemic 
occurred in 1945, despite fears of typhus, diphtheria and tuberculosis. 251 
Furthermore, UNRRA promoted an ideology of welfare and ‘psychological 
rehabilitation’, which departed from earlier relief efforts. Yet, as this chapter has 
made clear, UNRRA’s aspiration to transform humanitarianism into a modern 
profession was hampered by its subordination to the military, its lack of 
uniformly-trained personnel and the absence of clear definitions of what 
‘rehabilitation’ and ‘welfare’ meant. 
 Scholars have recently argued that we need a more nuanced 
periodization of the history of contemporary humanitarianism, urging a 
reassessment of whether the war’s aftermath was the founding moment of a 
new era.252 Rather than seeing 1945 as a caesura ‘for the chronology of the 
twentieth century’, historians interested in transnational histories are 
increasingly presenting 1945 as the ‘mid-point of a transitional period in which 
certain ideas and institutions endured, from international institutions that sought 
to deal with hunger and legal rights, to ideas of global social welfarism that were 
not interrupted by war, but rather stimulated and expanded by it.’ 253  In 
highlighting both the profoundly innovative and the old-fashioned aspects of 
UNRRA’s work in the French zone, this chapter contributes to this debate while 
adding to our understanding of the Americanization of relief work in 1945.254 
For Daniel Cohen, ‘DP humanitarianism bore little resemblance to the 
assistance provided after 1918 to the European civilian battered by World War 
One.’ 255  Reflecting on the bureaucratic, regimented and quasi-scientific 
management of DP camps by UNRRA and IRO experts, Cohen argues that DP 
humanitarian assistance signified a midway point between old forms of charity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and the current role played by the United Nations as the ‘West’s mercy 
mission.’256According to him, ‘international assistance provided to DPs after 
1945 marked the transition, under heavy American influence between two 
dramatically different types of humanitarian regimes.’257 Other scholars insist 
instead on the continuities and ambiguities in UNRRA’s rehabilitation 
programmes. In mapping out the varied set of debates and practices aimed at 
rehabilitating war-damaged DPs within UNRRA’s sphere of operations, Tara 
Zahra and Silvia Salvatici highlight, for instance, the tensions between a new 
emphasis on the psychological dimensions of dislocation (blueprints ‘for 
theories and practices of the ‘new humanitarianism’ launched by the United 
Nations’) and traditionalist views of the ‘family’ and ‘nation.’ These contradictory 
tendencies clashed in arguments about what constituted DPs’ best interests in 
the aftermath of war. 258  As Pamela Ballinger observes, ‘[i]n the end, 
humanitarian actors actively participated in a variety of nationalisation and 
renationalisation projects, ironically reinforcing the homogenising logics of the 
state-sponsored ethnic cleansings and genocides that reconfigured Europe 
during and after World War II.’259 
The history of UNRRA’s revolution in the French zone adds another 
dimension to these interpretations. Although General Lenclud maintained that 
UNRRA relief workers had been ‘faithful executors of Roosevelt’s generous 
thought,’ the story told here reveals some of the limits to the Americanization 
and modernization of relief work. French authorities and relief workers rejected, 
at least partially, the standardized bureaucratic model of the DP camp. 
Furthermore, they looked on the emergence of DP municipalities with profound 
scepticism. Even the lowest ‘common denominator’ of rehabilitation, 
entertainment and recreation, aroused some criticism, even though these 
activities were widely adopted throughout the zone. Furthermore, the effects of 
UNRRA’s ideas were not uniformly benign. Equated with the democratization of 
relief work, it contributed to the nationalization of refugees. Avowedly secular, it 
also fed the religious revivalism occurring in post-war Germany. 
Yet, for all its shortcomings, UNRRA mattered. First, it articulated norms 
about the importance of psychological rehabilitation that, although only partially 
observed at the time in the French zone, have gained widespread acceptance 
today. Perhaps, more importantly, it acted as a protector of DPs and a 
guarantor of certain fundamental rights in the zone. UNRRA officials recurrently !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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denounced abuses committed by xenophobic German and French local 
administrators against DPs, defending the ‘values of the United Nations’ in the 
zone. 
What did this mean in practice? For some local French administrators, 
fighting DP criminality and black-market activity was paramount, even if it meant 
having some Germans working for them. Raids were conducted in DP camps 
by military authorities, often with the assistance of local German police, usually 
on the pretext of uncovering black market trading. On 7 March 1946, during one 
such raid, a spahi regiment (North African colonial cavalry), backed up by 
armed French and German policemen, surrounded a DP camp in Pirmasens. 
Tanks and jeeps entered the camp at 6.30 in the morning while most of the 
residents were asleep. DPs were roughly manhandled and searched, their 
personal belongings confiscated. According to the DPs, women were forced to 
line up in front of male soldiers without being allowed to dress properly first. The 
shoe repair and woodworking studios were destroyed. Polish national symbols 
were stamped on by the troops.260 In DPs’ eyes, the presence of German 
soldiers working alongside of French occupation forces was unacceptable. 261 
French authorities could hardly have been surprised after such incidents if 
Polish DPs refused to work for them. The PDR Director vigorously condemned 
such attitudes and the military officers involved were reprimanded.262 French 
authorities nonetheless resorted to troops again after a July 1946 DP 
demonstration in the same camp over delayed food rations.263   
 In many occasions, UNRRA officials and team directors complained about 
abuses committed by French or German police and intervened against anti-
Semitic acts. 264  In Biberach, for example, UNRRA Director De Marnhac 
protested against the policy of systematic arrests of DP suspects pursued by 
the French police.265 In Freudenstadt the UNRRA Welfare Officer reported that 
the antagonism of the local Governor towards DPs made her lose sleep: ‘I am 
so distressed by DPs’ misery that I dream about it at night […] the Governor 
here is not only indifferent but hostile to DPs. He is of Austrian origin and was 
naturalized French in 1936. He lives with the wife of a famous Nazi official in 
prison.’ 266 In the Tübingen area, UNRRA lamented that 126 DPs were convicted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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for various offences in 1946 alone.267 In February 1947, they protested against 
a harsh police search conducted at six am in the Hindenburg Kaserne in 
Tübingen. 268  The cigarettes distributed by UNRRA were confiscated and 
several DPs arrested for illegal possession of clothes, photographic film, bikes 
and tyres.269  According to the UNRRA Director, these search operations were 
conducted with the ‘usual brutality of Germans’ who hated foreigners.270 From 
General Lenclud down, many UNRRA officials expressed concern about such 
incidents, fretting that cases of brutal treatment were jeopardizing France’s 
image in Germany.271 In March 1947, the combined pressure from UNRRA and 
the desire to prevent ugly confrontations between DPs and Germans pushed 
Laffon to issue an order forbidding German police to intervene in DP camps.272 
 It would be wrong, though, to oppose systematically hostile local 
governors and PDR administrators with sympathetic and supportive UNRRA 
relief workers.  Chapters three and six reveal indeed that UNRRA relief workers’ 
attitudes towards DPs were not monolithic. UNRRA was an association of 
people with very different backgrounds and political orientations. The evidence 
suggests, nevertheless, that many UNRRA workers saw the protection of DPs 
as their duty and denounced unfairness and brutality whenever they 
encountered it. 
The significance of UNRRA’s contribution lies in this grey area of subtle 
processes of protection and adaptation of UNRRA’s mandate rather than in any 
fixed rejection or adoption of its directives. UNRRA’s project was partly 
innovative and empowering, partly reactionary and coercive. UNRRA activities 
both facilitated (employment) and hindered (repatriation) the implementation of 
French official directives. Yet, for all that, UNRRA’s presence made a real 
difference. It articulated norms that have today gained in authority. As Didier 
Fassin and Richard Rechtman note ‘contemporary society now accepts without 
question the notion that psychologists and psychiatrists intervene in situations 
of war and disaster, case of exceptional or even everyday violence. No one 
seems astonished when mental health professionals leave their care centres 
and consulting rooms to attend to the ‘psychically wounded’ in debriefing 
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spaces.’273 Fifty years ago this was not self-evident practice and notions of 
‘psychic wounds’, ‘trauma’, and ‘emotional memories’ were poorly understood.  
This ‘psychological turn’ was rooted in the techniques developed after the First 
World War but gained real traction in the aftermath of the Second World War 
before gaining still greater significance in more recent years. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, let’s return to Bryce Ryan’s account quoted in the 
introduction. His narrative contrasts with the more common tale of sacrifice and 
heroic rescues. As Silvia Salvatici has recently suggested, UNRRA relief worker 
diaries, memoirs and narrative reports tend to stress their bravery and prowess 
in Germany.274 After describing their perilous work amidst the German ruins, 
they narrate the self-control and ingenuity they displayed in such abnormal 
conditions. Even Woodbridge glorified their work in his official history of 
UNRRA.275 In 1957, Proudfoot concurred, by concluding his chapter on UNRRA 
and the military:  
 
It is easy, in retrospect, to point out the shortcomings of the organization, 
for they are obvious for all to see. UNRRA’s real achievement lay in the 
rehabilitation work carried out by her anonymous workers in the centres. 
This kind of work is not susceptible of statistical analysis. No reports could 
be drawn up showing so many people in this, that, or the other centre 
restored to normal life, and ready to make a new start as happy, well-
adjusted human beings. Yet, there can be no doubt that this was 
UNRRA’s real contribution.276 
 
Bryce Ryan’s account reveals a different story, one marked by powerlessness, 
waste and boredom. His narrative could be linked to Jacqueline Lesdos’ 
testimony described in the previous chapter. Feeling at odds with her UNRRA 
team, Lesdos resigned in the summer of 1946 believing that she could not 
rehabilitate DPs as she was herself devastated by the death of her brother. 
 Since the publication of Woodbridge and Proudfoot’s books in the 1950s, 
historical research has deepened our understanding of UNRRA’s activities in 
the field of ‘rehabilitation.’ But historians remain divided in their assessment of 
the ‘regenerative’ value of DP camps. For some, DP camps were, first and 
foremost, places of protection and self-realisation. Scholars such as Daniel !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Cohen and Atina Grossmann maintain that DP camps offered a supportive 
environment for the psychological, physical and sentimental reconstruction of 
DPs.277  For others, DP camps signified a withdrawal of rights and loss of 
identity.278  Admittedly, the emergence of politics (described in the previous 
chapter) as well as the flood of marriages and the camp ‘baby boom’ occurring 
in the French zone are clearly signs of life after death. DPs, in the French zone, 
as elsewhere, felt sufficiently protected to set about reconstructing their family 
lives. Yet, the effects of UNRRA relief workers’ rehabilitative activities remain 
difficult to assess, not least because the psychological scars of wartime 
experiences - as well as the psychological impact of post-war pedagogy - often 
only surfaced years after the war.279 As Tara Zahra observes, the efforts to 
rehabilitate DPs ‘simultaneously reflected dystopian fears about the total 
collapse of European civilization and utopian visions of regeneration. As they 
assessed their own impact, […] welfare experts themselves lurched between 
optimism and despair.’280  
 
 
!
Fig. 35/36. DP kitchen and sewing room in Gutach281
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Chapter Six: Between economic exploitation and psychological 
rehabilitation: Employment policies in the French zone 
 
A congratulatory illustrated story with the headline, ‘UNRRA’s activities in 
the French zone’ in the summer 1946 issue of La France en Allemagne, a 
magazine edited by the Military Government’s Information Service, detailed 
UNRRA’s efforts to instil a work ethic amongst DPs. It drew the reader’s 
attention to the central role that employment played not only in the French 
zone’s economy, but also in the reconstruction of each individual DP. The 
author of this article unequivocally maintained that DPs’ conditions were unlike 
those of Germans, UNRRA recognizing the DPs’ victim status by granting them 
an (allegedly) daily food ration of 2,300 calories. The author went on to insist 
that DPs were not really forced to work. ‘Some measures, for that matter benign 
- as compulsion to work […] is against UNRRA’s principles – are taken against 
those able-bodied [DPs] who refuse employment. They are deprived of amenity 
supplies, in other words treats, such as chocolate or supplementary cigarette 
rations.’1 The author assured readers that the overwhelming majority of DPs 
themselves were in fact extremely anxious to find employment, omitting that 
some of them were reluctant to work for their former German oppressors.2 
According to him, DPs organized a multitude of small workshops, including 
shoemaking and repairing, tailoring, dressmaking and carpentry.  
 
Small craft workshops were the most popular amongst DPs; here, one 
knits strips using the paper of cigarette’ packets, with which one makes 
solid and beautiful belts; there, one finds an embroidery workshop, 
somewhere else a workshop full of wooden toys… Often there are 
exhibitions […] these are opportunities for them to compare their artworks; 
they are great stimulants to work. Recently, we saw an exhibition of 
embroidery in Baden-Baden […] it was a roaring success.3 
 
UNRRA archival documents concur: the June 1946 UNRRA’s exhibition Art and 
Work was indeed a success, at least for UNRRA officials. It had been so ‘widely 
acclaimed’ that the UNRRA Paris Mission negotiated with the French Foreign 
Ministry and the Ministry PDR over the possibility of transporting it to Paris. 4  
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Of course, this had clear political and ideological dimensions. Whilst, during the 
inter-war years, Paris provided the venue for 
exhibitions of France’s humanitarian 
achievements in its colonies, at the Liberation 
French governments strove to celebrate their 
country’s good deeds in the German ruins 
with the victims of Nazism. DP Employment 
rates became a measure by which their 
success was measured. Indeed, French 
authorities prided themselves in having 
succeeded in placing DPs in employment 
whereas their Western Allies had largely 
failed.5 In February 1947, for example, the 
parliamentary mission, which toured DP 
camps in Germany reported that French 
employment figures were eloquent proof of 
this achievement, as in the other Western 
zones they did not reach more than thirty per cent of the employable DP 
population.6 In marked contrast, out of the 19,990 employable DPs in the 
French zone, 17,366 DPs were registered as being in work in January 1947, 
representing nearly eighty-seven per cent of the employable population.7 Highly 
satisfied with this result, French UNRRA and PDR relief workers congratulated 
themselves on their advancement of more individualistic and effective solutions 
for the DPs, in marked contrast with American methods, which, they inferred, 
catalysed the development of a ‘begging complex’ amongst DPs.8 Yet, as this 
chapter explains, the reality behind DP employment was far more grim than this 
self-congratulatory account suggested.  
 Firstly, whilst UNRRA Central Administration might have rejected the 
compulsion to work, French authorities did not. On 5 December 1945, Koenig 
issued an order stipulating that DPs who refused work would be deprived of the 
privileges associated with their DP status. 9 In other words, they would lose their 
access to food and accommodation. Work thus became more a duty than a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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right in the French zone. Secondly, although Emile Laffon introduced 
safeguards in February 1946 to protect DPs working under German 
supervision, intense friction between DPs and their former oppressors 
persisted. As UNRRA employment officer Rozale observed, some Germans 
offered DPs ‘the work they did not want to do.’10 In Württemberg, ‘[t]he situation 
of our workers is essentially the same as that during the war, when they were 
forced by Germans to do the hardest work. Coercion has stopped, but the jobs 
offered to them are exactly the same.’11 While many DPs had little choice other 
than to accept these unattractive jobs, many Germans were disinclined to work 
alongside them.12 In October 1946, for example, a DP strike broke out in the 
Zelstoffabrik factory in Ehingen. Amongst DPs’ grievances were the brutal 
management methods of their German Director, an ex-Nazi official. One of the 
DP representatives pinpointed their resentment: ‘People who wore the swastika 
during the war, […] who shouted ‘Heil Hitler’ and who […] mistreated foreign 
workers are now the direct supervisors of DPs.’13   
As this quotation indicates, highly ambiguous French employment 
policies lie at the heart of this chapter. The discrepancy between French official 
self-congratulatory accounts and the methods employed to handpick and 
coerce fit and able-bodied DPs to work raise unaddressed historical questions. 
Did UNRRA relief workers act as ‘protectors’ of DPs against labour abuses? 
Were DP employment policies only driven by the demands of French economic 
reconstruction? Or were they, on the contrary, motivated by a genuine belief in 
the ‘therapeutic’ and emancipatory virtues of work? What were the cultural 
factors shaping DP employment? Was it a form of economic exploitation 
masquerading as humanitarian action, something closer to colonial-style ideas 
of mise en valeur (‘development’)? Did these employment practices bear traces 
of the artisanal craftsmanship idealized by Petain’s National Revolution? Or by 
contrast, were they simply another variant of post-1945 ideology of 
productivism? And, finally, to what extent did such practices contribute to the 
reinforcement of ethnic and gender differences amongst DPs?  
Coercing DPs to work, according to Andreas Rinke, was part of a series 
of measures intended to make DPs’ life conditions harder, the aim being to 
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encourage them to return home.14 In marked contrast with the American zone, 
Rinke argues that there was little acknowledgement of DPs’ war victim status in 
the French zone.15 Instead of being a safe, recuperative haven, the French 
zone was a hostile and unwelcoming place, DPs being the indirect victims of 
harsh French policies towards Germans. In some ways, this interpretation fits 
within a wider historiographical trend, keen to emphasize the exploitative and 
vindictive nature of French economic and social occupation policies. Until the 
mid-1980s, historians, particularly German historians, tended to present the 
French as harsh occupants, ‘industrial cannibals’ who exaggeratedly 
requisitioned German clothes and raw materials, undertook excessive, frenzied 
industrial removals and imposed a draconian food policy on the German 
population under their control.16 In recent decades, the historical reputation of 
the French zone has undergone a significant rehabilitation, with scholars 
highlighting the complexities and ambivalence of French policy.17 The emphasis 
on exploitation has given way to a more nuanced understanding that illustrates 
the considerable regional variation in French policies and their contingency in 
relation to wider political goals. Admittedly, French economic policy in Germany 
had two main purposes: maintaining a positive trade balance in order not to 
require financial support from the French economy and resuming production in 
industries ‘useful for the French economy.’18 But, Dietmar Hüser has developed 
the concept of a ‘double-game French policy’, French authorities officially 
defending a severe policy, while, in practice, implementing a more nuanced 
one.19 More recently, Martial Libera has shown that French policy tended to be 
constructive in the Saarland, relatively constructive in the Rhineland-Palatinate 
and, on the contrary, revengeful and exploitative in the Württemberg. He has 
also argued that policy initiatives were highly contradictory, with French 
occupation officials often at loggerheads on issues of economic policy in 
particular. On the one hand, French policy was marked by a notable push 
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towards democratisation; on the other, it was an exploitative policy resembling 
‘colonial trade.’20 
The history of DP employment offers powerful evidence in this regard, 
employment policies being deeply implicated in the mixed record of the zone: 
the emphasis on DP employment made possible the development of DPs 
initiatives and sense of responsibility, in enabling them to run independent 
workshops and giving them the opportunity to live in private accommodation. In 
this sense, it contributed to normalizing DPs’ life conditions. At the same time, 
actual implementation of employment policies reveals disturbing indications of 
brutality, unjustifiable in their cruelty and arbitrariness, as the example of the 
Zelstoffabrik confirms.   
! !
Fig. 38/39. Photographs of DPs working in a wood and mechanical workshops.21 !
Pursuing these themes, the chapter disentangles the different concerns 
of French official actors involved in DP employment policy, focusing on the 
issue of coercion. It shows that attitudes towards DP employment within the 
military government and UNRRA were not monolithic. As in many other aspects 
of DP policy, various political and humanitarian actors had contradictory 
requirements and divergent policies. Furthermore, employment conditions 
crucially depended on where DPs lived, for whom they worked and their 
nationality and gender. 22 The chapter next explores the question of material 
entitlements and salaries in order to demonstrate the contradictions that shaped 
employment practices. It examines the extent to which DPs’ grievances about 
food, clothing and salaries were perceived by many UNRRA field relief workers 
as both legitimate and the inevitable by-product of deeper resentments that not 
enough had changed since the end of the war, the accusation being that DPs !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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remained vassals to whom fundamental rights – such as access to decent food 
- were denied.  Bringing these issues together, finally, the chapter analyses the 
extent to which employment discourses reaffirmed a hierarchical taxonomy in 
which productivity and desirability were explicitly linked to ethnic and gender 
differences.   
 
Rehabilitation through coercion?23 
 
Amid all the conflict and discord between the PDR Direction and French 
UNRRA Headquarters, one area of outright agreement appeared to endure: 
DPs were expected to work in return for the protection that France was granting 
them.24 On this, UNRRA relief workers and local PDR officials concurred with 
occupation officials. For French administrators, it was unthinkable to support a 
‘group of idle people incapable of participating in the reconstruction of their 
homeland’ in Germany, while French workers at home were asked to participate 
to the ‘battle of production’ and roll up their sleeves for the reconstruction of 
France. 25  Without doubt, DP employment policies were driven by French 
reconstruction imperatives and deeply intertwined with the post-1945 rhetoric of 
the ‘battle of production’ in France.26 As Charles de Gaulle maintained in 1945, 
“[y]esterday there was no national duty that had precedence over the duty to 
fight. But today there is none that can take precedence over that to produce.’27 
Leaders from the Communist Party, the MRP and the SFIO, all presented 
production as the highest duty of the French workers. ‘Soldiers of the 
Reconstruction, let us try to equal our elders, those of the Revolution, who, in 
rags and tatters, led France on the path of greatness’ urged a typical 
propaganda pamphlet of the time.28  
   Beyond the economic demands of reconstruction, the advocacy of 
employment was prompted by several other factors. On the one hand, as 
mentioned earlier, employment was, for some occupation officials and Army 
commanders, part of a series of measures aimed at hardening DPs’ life !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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conditions in order to encourage them to return home. 29  UNRRA Zone 
Employment Officer Gobert complained that, too often, French Army officers 
forgot ‘that DPs [were] our Allies, that most of them were deported or ‘displaced’ 
for several years’ and that not all of them were ‘black sheep.’ 30 Indeed, some 
occupation officials saw DPs as a reservoir of young, able-bodied, cheap and 
docile workers: they could be placed in any job, and could be reasonably 
expected to put up with poor wages, unregulated working hours and 
discrimination. The policy of compulsion to work thus included a marked 
repressive aspect. General Pierre-Marie Koenig’s Military Cabinet, a socially 
and politically conservative group mainly constituted of experienced military 
officers, craved order, stability and the rule of law.31 Reflecting their views, on 4 
December 1945, Koenig announced the creation of three disciplinary camps for 
male DPs, located in Nonnenhof (Württemberg), Kemmel (Rhineland) and 
Lörrach (Baden). 32 In January 1946, as anxieties about DPs’ lack of discipline 
mounted, the Cabinet Director Henri Navarre called for vigilant policing of the 
DP population. He maintained that French authorities might achieve better 
results ‘by shooting several culprits in each camp.’33 For these officers, if DPs 
were not happy, they could return home, as the Military Governor of 
Württemberg’s attested: ‘[T]hose who did not want to go home need[ed] to 
understand that they [could] not be stakeholders, but that they need[ed] to 
contribute to the economy of the Nation that protect[ed] and fe[d] them.’34 In 
Niederlahnstein, Commandant Truchet concurred ‘[o]ne needs to understand 
that young and idle people, fed and housed in the camps, even if modestly, 
must in return serve the  French authorities’ mission through the work they 
perform. It is not a question of compulsory work, it is a matter of moral 
obligation.’35 
Relevant here is the extent to which manual work was widely praised at 
the Liberation for its healing and therapeutic virtues. PDR Director Poignant 
noted, for example, that ‘among the normal activities of an individual, work is 
one of the most noble and commendable.’36 As Daniel Cohen has compellingly 
demonstrated, ‘many virtues aside from economic one were ascribed to 
productive and manual work in post-war France: re-generation, morality, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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patriotism, and humanism.’37 Employment was perceived as the best remedy 
against DP apathy and idleness, traits that were deemed to be typical illnesses 
of uprooted people.’ 38  Daniel Louis Chantal, head of the Centre de 
Reclassement Professionel in France, observed that ‘the acquisition of a 
manual trade, when rationally conducted, allows the most impaired (deportees, 
internees) to escape their moral suffering and restores the psychological 
balance taken from them by adversity.’ 39  It was argued that employment 
promoted a sense of dignity, freeing DPs from their ‘dependency syndrome’ and 
enhancing their sense of morality. In the post-war years, the Service Sociale 
d’Aide aux Emigrants (SSAE) argued that its main mission was to find 
constructive solutions to free the uprooted from the pitiful condition of assisté.40 
Jewish philanthropic organisations concurred. While professional reintegration 
had always been an important component of Jewish philanthropic activities in 
France, its importance rose in Liberation France, marking a pronounced shift in 
French Jewish humanitarian practices. Indeed, Laure Fourtage points out that 
charity work, particularly when it lasted over long periods, was negatively 
perceived in post-war France, allegedly reinforcing its recipients’ feelings of 
humiliation, loss of self-confidence and demoralisation. 41  This prevailing 
discourse explained why nobody in the French zone opposed the idea of 
encouraging DPs to work, even if this entailed forcing them to accept work. 
Indeed, even Laffon’s more progressive Cabinet staff endorsed the need 
to encourage DPs to work. Laffon did, however, set himself against abusive 
labour practices. On 1 February 1946, he transmitted Koenig’s order dating 
from 5 December 1945 to the Delegates of the various military governments. 
But he insisted that on ‘no account, unless they expressly desired it’, should 
DPs be directly employed by Germans. If DPs were to work under German 
supervision, ‘an employment contract or a written statement of the worker 
stating his desire to be employed by a German employer’ was required. 42  
Moreover, Laffon required that DPs’ employment corresponded, as far as it was 
possible, to their particular skills. And, finally, he exhorted local administrators to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37"Daniel"Cohen"‘Regeneration"through"Labor:"Vocational"Training"and"the"Reintegration"of"Deportees"and"Refugees,"1945E1950’,%
Proceedings% of% the% Western% Society% for% French% history,% Vol." 32" (2004)," pp." 368E385," " p." 384." [URL:"
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0642292.0032.021]"
38"UNA," UNRRA," SE1021E0085E02," Team" 585," Historique" du" Service" Welfare," 24" March" 1947";" Silvia" Salvatici" ‘From" Displaced"
Persons" to" Labourers:"Allied" Employment"Policies" in" PostEWar"West"Germany’" in" Jessica"Reinisch" and"Elizabeth"White" (ed)"The%
Disentanglement%of%Populations:%Migration,%Expulsion%and%Displacement%in%Postwar%Europe"(London":"Palgrave"Macmillan,"2011),"
pp."210E228,"p."215.""
39"Cohen"‘Regeneration"through"Labor.’"
40"AN,"AJ/43/1141,"Rapport"sur"l’activité"du"SSAE"en"1950"présenté"à"l’Assemblée"Générale"du"7"mars"1951,"p."3."
41"Laure" Fourtage" ‘Les" organisations" juives" d’aide" sociale" et" l’insertion" professionnelle" dans" l’immédiat" aprèsEguerre’" Archives%
Juives,"Vol."45,"No."1"(2012),"pp."10E26,"p."13."
42"MAE,"HCRFA,"BadeESud,"Délégation"cercles"vrac,"39,"Administrateur"Général"Laffon"à"Général"Délégué"Supérieur"pour"le"GM"de"
Bade,"1"February"1946;"Also"see"PDR6/811,"Laffon’s"letter"to"the"Governor"of"Wurttemberg,"4"April"1946."
! 261 
grant the DPs preferential treatment over Germans. Their food rations were to 
be ‘equal to those of heavy workers’, and in no circumstances ‘inferior to those 
of the German workers in the same category.’43 As far as disciplinary camps 
were concerned, their role was more to ‘re-educate rather than punish’, these 
DPs having been ‘during five years des épaves, separated by force from their 
homeland and thereby, being entitled to indulgence.’44 
 This emphasis on DP employment was not, in itself, specific to French 
humanitarian discourse. As Silvia Salvatici has recently demonstrated, 
American and British humanitarian actors were also convinced about the 
necessity to instil a work ethic amongst DPs.45 In May 1945, the issue of DP 
employment was introduced in the Guide to the Care of the Displaced Persons 
in Germany circulated by SHAEF. This guide provided for four different types of 
DP labour, ‘inside and outside the camps, at the service of the military forces 
but also in the German economy.’46 The report on Psychological Problems of 
Displaced Persons issued in June 1945 by the Welfare Division of the 
European Regional Office also emphasized the necessity of DPs’ employment. 
The authors of this report argued that working gave DPs a sense of purpose, 
restored their self-respect and transformed them from ‘passive recipients’ of 
relief into ‘active participating members of a hopeful and integrated 
community.’47 The fundamental difference between French and Anglo-American 
employment policies lay in the compulsory nature of the work performed. 
Although British and American employment policies were not without 
their share of ambiguities, regulations stipulating requirements for compulsory 
employment were only approved in January 1947 in the British zone and none 
were ever issued in the American zone.48 Compulsion to work was certainly 
contrary to UNRRA’s principles.49 For the UNRRA administration, employment 
should be encouraged and stimulated by every possible means, provided, of 
course, that it did not interfere with repatriation, but it should be voluntary and 
paid.50 The authors of Psychological problems warned that compulsion to work 
in sectors that did not correspond to DPs’ skills and in conditions that resembled 
their wartime situation were unlikely to restore DPs’ sense of self-respect. On !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the contrary, they would exacerbate their ‘feelings of being unloved and isolated 
in strange communities.’51  In the inter-war years, ILO experts had already 
condemned compulsory employment, maintaining that ‘forced labour leads to a 
disgust for work and to hatred of all forms of labour.’52 Compulsory employment 
was clearly opposite to the concept of ‘rehabilitation’ as understood by New 
Deal-influenced relief workers: 
 
The main processes involved in ‘rehabilitation’ are recovery from losses – 
of health, skills, of valued personal relationships and of social connections. 
As a planned process, ‘rehabilitation’ in practice means the provision of an 
atmosphere and opportunities where the careful and graduated use of 
incentives leads to graded satisfactions over efforts. These satisfactions 
arise from the redevelopment of initiative and the realisation that 
satisfaction, contentment or even happiness are in fact inevitably bound 
up with use of initiative and with the acceptance of responsibility.53 
 
Compulsion to work thereby tested the language of human rights repeatedly 
enunciated by UN planners. Admittedly, historians have demonstrated that 
human rights were far from universally agreed concepts in the mid-twentieth 
century.54 But, the Psychological problems’ report, as well as UNRRA high-
officials’ response to French policies of compulsion to work, reveal that the 
language of human rights weighed upon DP policies, even if only marginally. 
‘Rights like freedom of worship, freedom of speech, of assembly, of choice of 
work are now urgent to the restoration of human dignity, and delay may lead to 
anxious protests and turbulent attempts at assertion, in much the same way as 
the pre-war unemployed fought against despairing feelings that society had no 
use for them.’55 
 In sum, in early SHAEF and UNRRA memorandums employment was 
first presented as a right, DPs being assigned priority in employment over 
Germans. Even if it was later constructed as a duty, forcing DPs to work was 
still widely regarded as a morally and legally unacceptable practice. On several 
occasions throughout 1946 and 1947, UNRRA’s Administration called for an 
end to the French policy of employment compulsion and the imprisonment of 
those DPs unwilling to work, claiming that these measures violated international 
norms regarding forced labour.56 For all that, many French occupation and 
UNRRA officials condoned the practice, believing that certain conditions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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legitimated coercion. During UNRRA council sessions in May 1946, the French 
delegation proposed a resolution that would have introduced the compulsion to 
work throughout Germany, claiming that DP idleness was both a ‘breach of 
morale’ and a source of ‘physical and professional inaptitude.’57 Behind this 
insistence on the obligation to work lay, perhaps, some traces of a colonialist 
mind-set. Indeed, in some significant ways, French humanitarian discourse 
contained elements of domination that resemble colonialism.  
Indeed, the advocacy of compulsion to work stemmed, in part, from the 
conviction that the French knew better what served apathetic DPs’ best 
interests than the DPs did themselves. This contemptuous assumption 
resembled the inter-war belief that the French knew what was in the interest of 
indolent indigenous people in the colonies, especially those reluctant to accept 
the regimens of waged labour. As Alice Conklin has demonstrated, colonial 
administrators believed that by forcing the colonized to work they were 
protecting them against their own ‘lazy’ inclinations, and that compulsion was, 
therefore, justifiable as long as it was ‘explained’ and did not exceed colonized 
‘capacity’ for understanding.58 Similarly, some occupation and UNRRA officials 
believed that they, too, were saving DPs from themselves, by compelling them 
to combat their ‘apathetic’ illness. In practice, DPs had very little say over the 
terms under which such ‘humanitarian aid’ was given. To be sure, DPs were not 
forced to work in desperate conditions comparable to those of the colonies. 
Labour abuses and related hardships in post-war Germany were neither in 
scope, nor scale comparable to those in the colonial world during the inter-war 
years. In total, as will be explained later, probably only around forty per cent of 
the DPs worked in jobs widely seen as unappealing or involving heavy manual 
labour. Perhaps, as Michael Barnett suggests, rather than colonialism, one 
should use the concept of ‘paternalism’, defined as ‘the interference with a 
person’s liberty on the grounds that it is in his or her best interests’ to better 
understand the underlying dynamics of French humanitarian discourse and the 
animosities it aroused.59   
 
Gestapo methods? Forceful recruitment, unattractive jobs 
Criticized by UNRRA Central headquarters for complying with this French 
doctrine of coercion, French UNRRA headquarters argued that sanctions ‘were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57"NUOI,"294,"Télégramme"No."1785,"Bousquet,"17"May"1946."
58"Conklin"A%mission%to%civilize,%p."227";"Daughton"‘ILO"expertise"and"Colonial"Violence"in"the"Interwar"Years’,"p."88."
59 "Michael" Barnett" ‘Humanitarianism," Paternalism" and" the" UNHCR’" in" Alexander" Betts" and" Gil" Loescher" (eds)" Refugees% in%
International% Relations% (Oxford:" Oxford" University" Press," 2011)," pp." 105E132,% p." 105";"Michael" Barnett" Empire% of% Humanity%:% A%
history%of%Humanitarianism"(New"York:"Cornell"University"Press,"2011),"pp."11E12."
! 264 
applied with great moderation’, observing that ‘only about a hundred DPs were 
sent to disciplinary camps during the year 1946.’60 Opposed to compulsory 
employment and to the imprisonment of those who refused to work, a British 
Welfare Officer identified only as Miss Roberts visited a disciplinary camp in 
June 1946. She reported that the overwhelming majority of internees were 
either German Wehrwölfes (former members of guerrilla movement formed by 
the Nazi party), or DPs accused of black market activities and thefts.61 On 29 
March 1947, UNRRA Director Lenclud maintained that coercion was never fully 
implemented. The insignificant minority of DPs imprisoned were incarcerated 
without ‘the help of UNRRA.’62 According to Commandant Sebille, UNRRA 
succeeded in protecting DPs against the PDR’s inclination to impose forced 
labour without consideration for DPs’ skills.63  But was this really the case? Or 
did it stem from an attempt by French UNRRA high-officials to justify UNRRA’s 
presence in the context of the escalating PDR/UNRRA conflict? As we shall 
see, the evidence is actually more varied and contradictory than Sebille’s 
statement suggests. 
The number of DPs imprisoned in disciplinary camps may have been 
limited, but the evidence suggests that some local officials used the threat of 
detention (followed by repatriation), as well as deprivation of food, to cajole DPs 
into accepting unattractive job offers. On the ground, sympathetic UNRRA relief 
workers insisted on the painful inadequacies and ironies of the DPs’ situation. 
Germans continued to live a fairly normal life while DPs were subjected to 
compulsory employment and restrictions on their freedom of movement. In 
Rottweil, for instance, PDR Officer Lieutenant de Chanterac sent two Baltic DPs 
to the disciplinary camp of Nonnenhof for a month after they refused to go to 
Saarland to work as drivers. One of them was a medical student, the other one 
an accountant.64 Not surprisingly, these DPs felt aggrieved and unfairly treated. 
Similarly, in Friedrichshafen, DPs’ placement in the Haybach-Dernier’s firm was 
carried out ‘quite brutally under the threat of food deprivation.’65 Central to this 
process was the fact that DPs were often expected to fulfil unskilled, menial 
jobs. The dismantlement of German factories, coupled with the disorganization 
of the French zone’s economy, meant that there were very few possibilities to 
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work in skilled positions, while there was great demand for manual and 
unskilled workers.66  
UNRRA Team Director Sapin observed, for example, that in Sigmaringen 
the situation was particularly difficult due to the ‘excessive requisitions’ operated 
by occupation officials. 67 According to Libera, France requisitioned around 
40,000 machines, representing 50 per cent of the 80,000 machines spoiled by 
the Germans in France between 1940 and 1944. 68  In Emmendingen, an 
UNRRA Employment officer admitted that ‘[i]n her two Kreis, sedentary or soft 
jobs [were] inaccessible to DPs. Very few DPs work[ed] in their specialities; the 
majority employed in agriculture and railways, a few in German industry.’69  
In June 1946, UNRRA relief services complained about Lieutenant Jous 
and Fritch’s brutal and arbitrary recruitment methods for the textile industries.70 
Student DPs had no choice but to accept their work offers. In the eyes of these 
officers, ‘studying was not working and DPs therefore could not be students.’71 
For UNRRA Director (and former resistant) Jacques Bauche these ‘unfair 
practices towards nationals from Allied countries pertained more to Gestapo 
methods than to the practices of representatives of an Allied Nation.’72 Just as 
they perceived compulsory employment as insulting, some UNRRA relief 
workers interpreted their lack of freedom of movement and the obligation to 
work as both a sign of disrespect and a lack of compassion or understanding for 
the trauma they had endured. Particularly resented was the order dating from 
27 September 1945, which restricted DPs from going further than 5 kilometres 
from their residence. In May 1946, the Ravensburg national committees 
observed that it was ‘all the more humiliating to be treated this way, since the 
Germans could circulate freely.’73 In Biberach, Dixi Heim, a relief worker from 
the Jewish Relief Unit concurred: ‘[t]he reasons why people are complaining […] 
are the following: the small food rations, the impossibility of moving about for 
more than 5 kilometres without an official laissez-passer, the hopelessness of 
the emigration situation, still being forced to live in a camp fourteen months 
after the liberation.’74 In Gailingen, UNRRA Director vehemently remonstrated 
against the ban imposed on Jewish DPs for crossing the Swiss border to 
celebrate Purim with the Jewish community of Diessenhofen: ‘Our DPs, are not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Germans, but the victims and survivors of German savagery. Isn’t it, thereby, at 
least shocking, if not scandalous to refuse to them what one permits to the 
others?’75 
The DP committees of Ravensburg also protested against the fact that 
DPs were forced to work in Baienfurt’s textile industries. They did not challenge 
the principle that labour should be performed, even if it meant working with 
Germans. Work was, according to them, a material, moral and psychological 
necessity. What they objected to was the type of employment being offered to 
them. In their words, these were ‘the hardest and dirtiest’ jobs. According to 
them, it was morally ‘unacceptable and economically illogical’ to force 
intellectual DPs to work as heavy labourers.’76 These DPs believed that they 
were entitled to educational and vocational training. Having lost the ‘best years 
of their lives’, they believed that learning a trade should be seen as a sort of 
moral reparation for their losses.77 For them, it seemed only proper that the 
Germans who had destroyed their youth should now at least fund their training 
for a future that most of them intended to pursue outside Germany.78  
On 12 July 1946, in response to the numerous protests against brutal 
recruitment methods the PDR Direction issued a letter inviting local 
administrators to be more selective in their employment of intellectual DPs, 
notably those originating from the Baltic countries. French tradition, it was said, 
‘requires us to act with more discernement in the use of DPs’ capacities.’79 For 
its part, French UNRRA headquarters stipulated that work should be 
encouraged by ‘increases in food ration, the distribution of basic supplies, 
clothing and shoes.’80 Under no circumstances were UNRRA staff to take steps 
to imprison DPs who refused to work.81 Decisions about imprisoning DPs were 
strictly reserved for PDR or military officials. But, as with the instructions on 
repatriation and eligibility, major discrepancies persisted between official policy 
and local practices. Repressive mechanisms endured at lower level, after they 
had been condemned by those higher up in the policy-making chain. For 
instance, the Director of the Economats in Balingen sent a female Estonian DP 
to prison after she complained about the bad working conditions in the 
‘vegetable section’ of his shop. 82  UNRRA’s Area Employment Officer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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condemned this action, highlighting that ‘the method employed towards Miss 
Oja was unbecoming of a French man.’ 83  Rumours about bad working 
conditions under French supervision reached the American zone. In November 
1946, at a meeting of UNRRA employment officers, Mrs Green, the chief 
employment and work training officer from UNRRA central headquarters, 
recalled that employment officers were expected to protect DP against 
employment abuses. She deplored the case of a DP pianist compelled to leave 
his camp after being assigned to forestry work by the French Army, and a DP 
surgeon who was told to join a team charged with digging a ditch.84  
 In early 1947, UNRRA relief workers also raised concern about the 
transfers of DPs from the North to the South of the French zone. By the end of 
1946, almost all employable DPs were employed in the southern region, but 
UNRRA and local authorities experienced greater difficulties putting DPs to 
work in the North as the local job market was saturated.85 In the Württemberg 
area, on the contrary, demand for manpower in agriculture, paper industries 
and forestry was huge.86 DPs were therefore subject to compulsory transfers, 
often causing further trauma to individuals who had already been uprooted from 
their homes. It seemed unfair that Germans could remain in their usual 
surroundings, while DPs were forcibly relocated once again. These transfers 
were perceived as a punishment by DPs who were thus deprived of easy 
contact with networks of friends and family, arguably reinforcing feelings of 
humiliation and uprooted-ness.87 Furthermore, the conditions under which these 
transfers took place were shameful. For instance, woodcutters were sent from 
Lanstuhl to Alpirsbach in terrible transport conditions, travelling fifty-one hours 
with insufficient food or water.88 Once they reached their destination, some 
found out that their potential employers were no longer willing to employ DPs at 
all. 89  PDR Directors attributed the responsibility for this problem to the 
administrative service ‘Eaux et Forets’, the forestry service already being 
notorious for its toleration of bad working conditions.90  
 In principle, French forestry enterprises were not supposed to employ 
German manpower, but, rather, were expected to employ French workers paid 
in francs. As DPs could not be paid in francs, their salaries were inscribed on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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accounts in the General Treasury of the zone.91 Numerous DPs felt that they 
were being cheated and – as the official history of the PDR service observed –
rightly so, for the majority of them were never paid.92 Complaints about working 
conditions in forestry enterprises abound in UNRRA and PDR archives. While 
DPs were allegedly granted the same food rations as their French colleagues, 
they often received considerably less.93 Nor were they provided with adequate 
shoes or clothes. 94 Meagre benefits and lower (if any) wages translated into low 
productivity and mounting hostility between DP workers and their bosses. 
French forestry employers were particularly hostile to DPs. They often 
complained that DPs did not have the required skills that their productivity was 
low and their inclination to laziness was overwhelming.95  
 
German supervision and DPs’ discontents 
As we have seen, contrary to official policy, some DPs were assigned to 
work under German supervision without consenting to do so. For some DPs, 
working under German supervision revived traumatic memories of wartime 
abuses.96  On 2 October 1946, the DP workers of the Zelstoffabrik in Ehingen 
went on strike to protest against an increase in their daily working hours from 
eight to ten and the methods employed by their German supervisor. This 
supervisor used the threat of repatriation to force them to increase production 
over the longer time spent at the factory.97 On 2 October ten men were arrested 
and imprisoned.98 Thanks to the intervention of UNRRA Director Vincent, they 
were released the next day. Vincent admitted that a minority of DPs 
experienced problems bending to work discipline. But he condemned the 
methods used by their German director, which reminded them of the oppressive 
atmosphere of the Nazi period. He further believed that working hours should 
be reduced from sixty to fifty-five per week, due to the hard nature of the work 
itself. 99  Area Employment Officer A.J Pouzenc asked the French Director 
Labbé-Laurent to take measures against Birkelhaudt, a former Nazi official.100 
Yet the evidence suggests that the problem persisted in the Zelstoffabrik. In 
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March 1947 Vincent warned UNRRA officials that the factory’s management 
was gradually wearing down the DP manpower by attrition.101 
 Professional encounters between German employers and DP workers 
were not always so adversarial. Some DPs continued to work in the same farms 
or factories as they had done during the war. 102  As Jill Stephenson has 
demonstrated, some Catholic Polish workers developed ‘reasonably cordial’ 
relationships with their host families during the war. 103  Building on Ulrich 
Herbert’s work, Stephenson argues that foreign workers living and working in 
rural households generally experienced better conditions and less 
regimentation than those in factories and town during the war.104 In many areas, 
UNRRA relief workers reported mutually beneficial and relatively harmonious 
working relations. In the Kreis of Überlingen and Stockach, for instance, 
satisfying relationships between German employers and DP workers were 
established.105 The majority of DPs lived scattered in private German homes in 
125 villages and worked for the same farmers ‘to whom they were assigned as 
deported labourers.’106 A healthy attitude towards work prevailed. In Lindau, 
before the arrival of the UNRRA team, the majority of DPs were economically 
integrated into German life. Gerbier reported that ‘DPs were unaware of their 
rights - and their duties – nearly all of them were DPs without even knowing that 
they were.’107 In some cases, DPs even demanded to work with Germans. In 
Waldsee, for instance, Polish DP Streshenko wanted to be employed as a 
railway worker. He had worked from February 1944 to 15 June 1945 as a 
manoeuvre and then a driver’s assistant on German railways. But the German 
Director of the railway in Karlsruhe only hired German personnel. According to 
UNRRA Employment Officer, Streshenko was very disappointed by this 
refusal.108  
 DPs working in the German economy comprised the majority of DPs in 
full-time employment. In the autumn of 1946, according to La France en 
Allemagne, 22,000 DPs were employed out of a total population numbering 
40,000. Among these employed DPs, 2,000 DPs worked in agriculture, 6,000 
DPs in small industries, 4,000 in the administration of DP centres, 5,000 DPs 
were artisans, 2,500 DPs were members of the GAE and 2,500 DPs occupied !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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various miscellaneous positions.109 A word of caution here. Employment figures 
varied considerably from one source to another.  Tracking DP employment was 
difficult as some of them slipped in and out of work; others did not live in camps 
at all. The DP population was only exhaustively listed in the spring and summer 
of 1947, revealing the presence of an additional 5,000 DPs who had probably 
been in situ for a long time, maybe since the end of the conflict.110 Furthermore, 
as explained in chapter One, French authorities were very often at loggerheads 
with UNRRA team directors over questions of numbers.111  
 
Fig. 40. DP employment in 1946 and 1947 (Freiburg, Müllheim, Lörrach, Gutach, 
Emmendigen). 
UNRRA employment officers complained that they were overwhelmed by 
reports to fill out and did not have time to complete DPs’ labour cards.112 
Evidence also suggests that UNRRA’s registration operation was significantly 
delayed. Despite their inconsistencies, figures nevertheless indicate that the 
largest sources of employment were the German economy followed by UNRRA. 
In mid-January 1947, according to UNRRA, 17,273 DPs were in employment. 
4,999 DPs were employed by UNRRA (29%), 1,948 DPs by the Military 
Government (11,2%), 1,891 DPs by the French Army (10,9%), 6,053 DPs within 
the German economy (35%). Another 1,614 were described as apprentices 
(9,3%) and 768 as artisans (4,4%).113 In fact, among those working in UNRRA 
camps, some worked in small workshops and DP-run businesses. So, in total, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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between 10 and 30% were offered the opportunity to acquire the means to learn 
a trade. 
 This brief overview has revealed the highly ambiguous nature of French 
employment policy. It has shown that there was neither geographic uniformity 
nor official consistency, and that employment conditions greatly varied 
according to where DPs lived and for whom they worked. As we will see in the 
third section, working conditions also varied according to DPs’ gender, national 
affiliation, linguistic abilities and levels of education. For some relief workers this 
highly ambiguous policy did not sufficiently protect the mass of young, unskilled 
and vulnerable (mainly Polish and Ukrainian) DP workers. In their eyes, not 
enough had changed since the end of the war for this majority of DPs. They 
were free but they could not move further than five kilometres from their house. 
Although liberated, many were forced to work for still contemptuous and racist 
German employers. This question of the perceived continuities and ruptures 
between the wartime and liberation period will be examined in the next section 
through the lens of two contested issues: DP food rations and salaries. 
 
(Dis)continuities with the wartime period 
 
In the French zone, much of the DPs’ sense of bitterness coalesced 
around material entitlements and food rations. 114  Complaints about the 
insufficient quantity, inadequate composition or simply bad quality of the rations 
distributed were numerous.  Bare essentials, such as sugar and flour were 
missing; bread was of notoriously bad quality; essential nutrients such as 
vitamins were deficient.115 The calorie counting inscribed into ration levels was 
deceptive. As UNRRA Director Jacques Bauche observed, ‘[o]ne can indeed 
absorb a significant amount of calories in a single teaspoon, the fact remains 
that one is still hungry.’116 In August 1946, UNRRA DP staff went on strike in 
Gutach. They brought their daily food rations to UNRRA’s Warehouse officer: it 
included 22 gr sugar, 23gr butter, 12gr cheese, 25gr Macaroni, 30gr meat and 
¼ litre of wine. The cheese and macaroni were unfit for consumption. UNRRA 
Welfare Officer reported to his superiors ‘[i]f you want to see it, just come to my 
office. I think it is a great shame that people who had a terrible life in Germany !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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during the war and who are now working for UNRRA are fed so badly. I can well 
imagine that they refuse to work having received these rations. I would do the 
same.’117   
 
Fig. 41. UNRRA Store, Gutach DP camp (April 1946)118 
 
Many UNRRA relief workers understood DPs’ grievances about food, clothing 
and salaries as both legitimate and the product of a deeper sense of 
resentment that not enough had changed since the end of the war with DPs 
remaining vassals to whom fundamental rights – such as access to decent food 
- were denied. American training specialist Dorothea Greene strongly 
disapproved of the food given to DPs. She noted: ‘[i]n several camps, I saw 
rotten potatoes […] dirty sugar containing wood residues, dirty and unusable 
lard. In one of the camps, an analysis of the bread was made: the bread 
contained a high proportion of dust, and was of so poor quality that it was unfit 
for human consumption.’119 In Aulendorf, ‘[t]he food situation […] was nothing 
less than tragic. I saw a large quantity of potatoes with at least 80% spoiled, a 
large quantity of salt extremely dirty, and Ersatz coffee with huge solidified 
lumps in it. The DPs around the food store were all sullen and angry-looking.120 
After their experience of forced labour and precarious living, DPs were not 
automatically entitled to better working conditions, housing and food benefits 
than Germans.121  
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 Many DPs were in fact on German card rations. But these cards did not 
guarantee that they would actually receive the ration in question. In Freiburg, for 
instance, DPs living in town depended on French military supply corps 
(Intendance) while their counterparts in the villages nearby received German 
food rations (cartes de ravitaillement allemandes).122 Yet, in shops, German 
suppliers withheld products under quota and kept many products for 
themselves.123 Furthermore, as natives, Germans could more easily resort to 
relatives in the countryside. As Paul Steege has demonstrated, legal rationing 
was only one part of a multifaceted supply system, its allocation bearing little 
connection with the reality of what people actually consumed.124 In May 1946, 
the DP national committees of Ravensburg voiced grave concerns about the 
food situation in their areas, pointing out that children lacked vitamins, milk and 
bread. They argued that their daily allocation was smaller than that of the 
Germans, while Germans had easier access to non-rationed and fresh food. 
‘They have the advantage of being in their homeland; many of them have 
familial connections with people living in the countryside who help them; finally 
some have made savings during the war.’125 DP representatives looked with 
envy to the American zone and wondered why locally DPs were not benefiting 
from the Allied regime in place in the other Western zones.126 
 
The politics of rationing127 
As Atina Grossmann has highlighted, ‘food was much more than a – necessary 
– matter of calories and physical survival.’128 Its calorific content and quality 
were deeply intertwined with highly contested recognition of suffering, 
entitlement to human rights and issues of social justice.129 As the anthropologist 
Margaret Mead has stressed, food ‘crucially defined people’s sense of how fully 
they were recognized and valued as human beings rather than, as DPs were 
frequently labelled, the miserable and unwelcome “human debris” of war and 
genocide.’ 130  For Germans and DPs, food ‘calibrated new (and constantly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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shifting) standards of victimization, entitlement, and – very importantly – 
recognition among the many different groups.’131 Many Germans used their own 
post-war experience of hunger to present themselves as helpless and innocent 
victims of brutal and unfair occupation policies, adopting ‘a language originally 
created for the victims of Nazi oppression to fit their own situation.’132 This 
construction of a ‘victim mentality’ was not just a political tactic; it was also a 
means to ascribe meaning to the dire circumstances of the post-war period and 
a mechanism to cope with the recent past.133  
  British and American authorities were receptive to this hunger 
discourse.134 As the occupation went by, they slowly came to view the Germans 
as hungry people ‘not because of medical evidence, which in fact did not 
support German claims of widespread starvation, but because of concerns over 
the political consequences of German hunger for the future of the post-war 
world.’135 While in 1945 they were determined to impose punitive measures on 
the Germans, their resolve to do so significantly altered as the severity of the 
Communist threat intensified, and food-aid allocations markedly increased.  
This was not the case in the French zone. As Alice Weinreb observed, ‘France 
was little involved in the waves of international aid directed at hungry post-war 
Germans.’136 An article published in the Rhineland in 1948 compared rations in 
Buchenwald to those of the French Zone (purportedly 1675 calories versus 
805), leading a local politician to claim that Germans have "for three years been 
forced to bear a level of hunger such as that known in no concentration camp in 
the world."137 Without question, as Weinreb noted, these comparisons between 
concentration camps and the civilian rationing program had little basis in 
physiological fact, the living conditions of post-war Germans and camp inmates 
being incomparable. It remains true, however, that France imposed a drastic 
food rationing policy on Germans.  
 Although French authorities maintained that they were committed to 
comply with the 1,550 minimum calorific ration determined by the Control 
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received barely 1000 calories.138 Between 1945 and 1946, depending on the 
provinces, the size of the town and the categories of the population, some 
Germans received between 950 and 1300 calories. 139  The inhabitants of 
Saarland were privileged, as were industrial workers.140 Rations progressively 
rose in the spring of 1946, but declined once more in the summer. Flour was in 
short supply everywhere; sugar and meat very severely rationed. Germans 
looked with envy at the food situation in the American zone, convinced that 
French authorities were feeding themselves at their expense.141 
 German resentment was exacerbated by the fact that French 
administrators allowed themselves a generous and varied diet.142  In some 
significant ways, as Dietmar Hüser and Karen Adler argue, ‘this excessively 
ambitious diet, beyond the expectations of any demographic sector in France’ 
was a way to express national strength and symbolic revenge.143 But beyond 
the symbolic demands of revenge and re-affirmation of national strength, this 
drastic food policy was also prompted by other, purely economic concerns. The 
French zone was struggling to provide its own food. Despite its rural profile, the 
zone was unable to supply basic goods such as cereals, meat and milk.144 Its 
economy was constituted of many small size family farms, producing little or no 
marketable surplus.145 Yet the Control Commission had established that each 
occupant was responsible for the budget balance in their zone: in France, the 
idea that the French might be required to pay for Germans’ food was still 
unthinkable.146  
 This sentiment had a direct impact of DPs’ food rations because so many 
DPs were reliant on German food ration cards. In theory, DPs were entitled to 
better food rations than Germans, as the table below suggests. That being said, 
as mentioned earlier, there was no uniformity in the zone. In early 1946, some 
DPs seemed satisfied with their situation. For instance, the Estonian committee 
of Ravensburg reported that food rations were not only in sufficient quantity but 
also of excellent quality.147 UNRRA Director Dalichampt also maintained that in 
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his Kreis DPs living in the countryside enjoyed a relatively abundant and varied 
diet: 
 
I have noticed that the solution adopted to go back to a normal life by 
themselves and get a living from their work was by far the best solution 
both from a nutritional and social standpoints, since the rural German 
population as a diet far superior, despite the card rations, to that of the 
Intendance’s rations.  This is obvious when one looks at the farms where 
chicken, rabbits and pigs… are reared. 148 
 
Dalichampt’s statement reflected a widespread assumption among French relief 
workers and occupation officials: the fact that Germans, especially those living 
in the countryside, still seemed relatively well fed and prosperous. According to 
some officials, DPs were bound to benefit from this situation as well.149 
 
 
Fig. 42. Food provision, German heavy workers and DPs, April 1947150 !
 Yet, even in the countryside, DPs rations in the French zone were far 
below UNRRA’s recommended daily intake of between 2,500 and 2,650 
calories, the amount that the International Labour Organization had set as the 
global standard for the working adult in 1935.151 Admittedly, nowhere was this 
achieved, not even in the American zone. 152 According to UNRRA official 
historian Woodbridge, a daily ration of 1,685 calories was established in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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October 1946 for DPs in the French zone.153 My research in the PDR and UN 
archives reveals nevertheless that this official and theoretical ration was rarely 
applied, and that instead of improving in the course of 1946, food rations tended 
to deteriorate. Before 1 August 1946, the French military supply corps was 
responsible for the provision of UNRRA stores: food ration rates might fluctuate 
but at least the distribution was regular. After August 1946, each military 
government assumed responsibility for providing UNRRA with ‘release 
vouchers’ (bons de déblocages); UNRRA authorities then directly negotiated 
with German producers to obtain essential foodstuffs.154 Intractable transport 
problems, combined with the lack of administrative flexibility, severely 
hampered the smooth functioning of the system.155 As a result, the question of 
food allocation created many disputes between UNRRA relief workers and 
occupation officials. 156 Some authorities accused UNRRA directors of 
augmenting the number of rationnaires.157 In October 1946, Laffon officially 
asked the Sous-secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires Etrangères to re-establish the 
previous system. He argued that if, in theory, the food ration had risen from 
1565 calories to 1686 calories, in practice DPs were receiving far less: 
 
1) In the Württemberg, for instance, spoiled meat was delivered to the DP 
centres 
2) In the Baden Area, in Gutach, it was not possible to give potatoes to the 
DPs – despite the fact that the camp Director had a bon de déblocage for 
12 tons […] 
5) In all the provinces, the order that priority should be given to DPs rather 
than Germans is not respected; it is no less true that one often give to DP 
centres what Germans do not consume or want. 158 
 
Laffon argued that if they wanted DPs to stop stealing from Germans to feed 
themselves then French authorities should give them the minimal vital 
rations.159 Evidence suggests that, in several aspects, the problem persisted, 
and that it was almost impossible to get access to fresh vegetables.160 In 
February 1947 Bauche noted ‘the supply situation is such that the packaging of 
goods is becoming as rare in the zone as the goods themselves.’161  
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Like Germans, DPs resented the food rations that the French granted 
themselves.162 In May 1946, UNRRA team director Daniel de Fos pointed out 
that DPs working in I.G. Farben Industrie in Ludwigshafen were not receiving 
their allocated French Army food rations. He threatened to stop the recruitment 
of DPs unless and until French administrative services got their act together.163 
UNRRA relief workers also complained about conditions of employment in the 
French Army. The same month in Balingen some DPs were sent from Balingen 
to Rastatt. When they arrived, they were not fed and no sleeping arrangements 
had been made for them. According to one of their number, Pietraczyk 
Konstanty, they were better treated in a Nazi concentration camp.164 In May 
1947, General Lenclud lodged an official complaint to the Direction PDR, 
highlighting DP workers’ natural resentment when seeing the French rewarded 
with much more abundant food for performing the same work.165 According to 
the Polish chief, DPs reported that they received forty cigarettes a month while 
French soldiers got 480.166 
 In summary, French food policy was 
profoundly ambiguous and contradictory. On 
the one hand, French occupiers and UNRRA 
relief workers enjoyed a comfortable material 
situation, often combining abundant diet with 
easy access to wine and luxury goods (as this 
menu suggests). DPs and Germans meanwhile 
bemoaned their losses and miserable living 
conditions. The majority of DPs not only lacked 
adequate food but also clothes and shoes. 
Unlike Germans, their access to non-rationed 
food was severely restricted. And despite 
preferential treatment in official policy, Laffon’s 
alarm confirms that, very often, DPs did not 
take precedence over Germans.  On the other 
hand, numerous French UNRRA team 
directors and local administrators took up the defence of their DP populations 
and strove to increase their access to food. As mentioned earlier, some DPs 
living in the countryside established fairly cordial relations with Germans and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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enjoyed relatively decent access to food; finally, the severity of the food 
situation should not be overestimated, as the level of DP health was relatively 
high during the period. (Set against this point, one could argue that only the 
most robust DPs survived the war).  
 
DPs’ salary: fundamental economic right or invitation to the Black-
market? 
As far as DPs’ salaries were concerned, three principles governed French 
official policy: DPs should not receive less than Germans in equivalent 
positions; their salaries should be determined according to local salary scales, 
and they should be funded by the German economy.167 French occupation and 
UNRRA authorities agreed on this; they were only divided over the issue of 
DPs’ taxes and social insurance.168  According to the circular of 1 February 
1946, DPs had to be affiliated to German social insurance (covering sickness, 
industrial injury, and old age pensions) under the same conditions as German 
civilian workers.169 Yet, these contributions largely benefited German social 
insurance recipients, most DPs still being fed and housed by UNRRA. 
Moreover, they were not supposed to remain indefinitely in Germany.170 In 
September 1946, it was decided that DPs would only pay twenty-five per cent of 
the taxes due.171 In February 1947, DPs were wholly exempted from pensions 
insurance, leaving them to pay only social insurance for sickness and accident 
benefits.172 
 As these changes indicate, French policy could be flexible and sensitive to 
changing circumstances.173 But it was also fractured. UNRRA team directors 
raised countless complaints about the delayed or non-payment of DPs’ 
wages.174  Within the same Kreis salaries varied markedly.175 In the area of 
Ebingen, for instance, German pay scales were applied in Tübingen and 
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Reutlingen but not in Rottweil and Balingen.176 In Ravensburg, salaries were 
calculated on the basis of local German pay rates until May 1946. After May 
these tariffs were replaced by a significantly lower Arbeitsamt rate on the 
grounds that DPs should pay for their food rations.177 In some areas DPs were 
simply not paid at all.178 In others, they were asked to pay rent.179 Delays and 
irregular payment caused serious disruption in DP camps’ centres and 
undermined the credibility of UNRRA team directors. 180  In response to 
countless protests, the PDR Direction asked local administrators to set about, 
by will or by force, the full implementation of German authorities’ obligations.181  
German reluctance to honour the payment of DPs’ salaries is hardly 
surprising. Germans had to meet the costs of French occupation at a time when 
their national economy was at rock bottom. 182  The French zone is often 
presented in the historiography as the region, which, out of the four zones, 
suffered the least war damage.183 But its economy was severely deregulated 
and its finances plagued by the shortcomings of French economic policies; in 
order to avoid inflation, French authorities had held German prices and salaries 
down.184  In the context of a severe lack of financial resources, it is little wonder 
that some local administrators were disinclined to pay for those perceived as 
‘privileged’ and unwelcome guests. Historians have also highlighted a 
continuation of the racist mentalities, which had underpinned the Nazi 
regime.185 Many Germans were feeling envious of the DP population lodged 
and fed for ‘free.’ As Grossmann points out, Germans viewed the DP camps ‘as 
a kind of Schlaraffenland (wonderland) of sugar and spam, margarine and jam, 
plus cigarettes and vitamized chocolate bars’ ready for lucrative sale on the 
black-market.’186 
 Perhaps, more surprisingly, UNRRA relief workers and occupation 
officials were divided over the question of DP salaries. On the one hand, some 
maintained that the payment of a wage was an essential economic right and a 
pre-condition for DPs’ individual rehabilitation.187 This view coincided with the 
emerging human rights discourses and the notions that political and civil rights !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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were inextricably linked to material entitlements. During the war, Roosevelt had 
indeed claimed that ‘[a] man in need is not a free man.’188 On the other hand, 
some believed that, in the dire immediate post-war conditions, the fact that DPs 
were fed and lodged for ‘free’ was sufficient. French local administrators and 
UNRRA relief workers often insisted that DPs’ food and housing conditions 
were similar to that of most French workers, if not better.189 UNRRA Assistant 
Director Marchal noted, for instance, that DPs had to understand that ‘France 
[was] shar[ing] generously with them, the little it ha[d] left’ and that they  were 
receiving ‘superior rations (in meat, fat content and bread) [relative] to the 
inhabitants of [French] towns, and even of the [French] countryside.’ 190 
According to him, DPs were more likely to get industrial workers’ food 
allocations than were their French counterparts.191  It is worth noting that this 
argument still informs some contemporary humanitarian discourses. Guglielmo 
Verdirame and Barbara Harell-Bond have indeed demonstrated that refugees 
working for the UNHCR and NGOs in the 1990s in Uganda and Kenya were not 
paid. They received incentives lower than the salaries paid to nationals for the 
same work, the UNHCR arguing that this was legitimate as refugees were 
already getting assistance in kind, namely food and building materials.192 
 In post-war Germany, a supplementary factor justified French reluctance 
to honour the payment of DPs’ salaries. As the Military Governor of Wangen 
observed at an UNRRA meeting of Welfare Officers, an official salary where 
there was little possibility to spend it was simply an invitation to black market 
activities. 193  In Biberach, UNRRA team director Levy-Duplat powerfully 
formulated the challenges that relief workers faced in a note entitled ‘the 
problem of deportees’: 
 
There is only one problem, which consists of helping deportees to restore 
their normal life habits. Yet, the current conditions do not facilitate our 
tasks. We are telling them: 
- Live according to moral standards; and we put fifteen of them in a room. 
- Be clean; and we give them 2gr of soap a day. 
- Work; yet, not only their wage has almost no interest as there is nothing to 
purchase but it constitutes an indirect invitation to black-market, as there 
are no other ways to use the money at the moment.194 
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Fears of black-market involvement were also held to justify scant distribution of 
cigarettes. Many relief workers protested against irregular and at time non-
existent distribution of tobacco.195 As in the other western zones, cigarettes 
often replaced money, performing ‘all the functions of a metallic currency as a 
unit of account, as a measure of value and as a store of value’, in addition to 
being homogeneous, durable and movable.196 Wyman has even argued that 
there was a ‘cigarette economy’ in Germany, cigarettes serving as ‘gold ever 
did as a base for the economy.’197 
 It is beyond this chapter’s scope to analyse in detail the problem of DPs’ 
involvement in the black-market. But two points bear emphasis: firstly, the black 
market was a ‘natural phenomenon.’198 DPs who engaged in illicit trade did not 
necessarily do so to gain money; some simply did it to obtain essential goods.  
As Laura Hilton points out, the term ‘black market’ referred to a ‘wide variety of 
types of economic exchanges outside the legal distribution and rationing 
systems’, encompassing a wide myriad of gradation of trading, some more 
illegal and/or immoral than others.199 In her recent reappraisal of the black 
market, Hilton argues that whereas the Germans engaged in illicit trade most 
commonly for food or cigarettes, and occupation personnel for luxury items, 
DPs needed a much wider range of items, such as clothing and fresh food.200  
Secondly, there was a great discrepancy between perception and reality.  Hilton 
has convincingly demonstrated that, contrary to popular legend, Germans 
participated in illicit trading in larger numbers and higher percentages than 
either DPs or occupation personnel.201 For all that, the black-market provided a 
framework for maintaining the categories of racial enemies that had framed the 
Nazi years. In particular, it buttressed the development of the post-war German 
sense of victimhood.202 In the French zone, the evidence suggests that, like 
elsewhere, rumours about DPs’ involvement in the black-market were 
widespread.203 
 In summary, although regulations explicitly aimed at prioritizing DPs over 
Germans and at treating DPs uniformly without distinction of race, nationality or 
religion, the evidence reveals that, in practice, French policies protected some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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DPs, yet discriminated against others. DPs’ social entitlements depended on 
local budgets, policing methods, the degree of cooperation between various 
occupation services, and DPs’ own ability to establish cordial relationships with 
Germans. As we shall see, DPs’ working conditions were also highly contingent 
on their gender, national affiliations and educational backgrounds. As 
mentioned earlier, it was in response to the forceful employment of intellectual 
and Baltic DPs that the PDR Direction asked local administrators to act with 
more discernment. Indeed, UNRRA relief workers and occupation 
administrators tended to think more highly of Baltic and Banatais DPs than they 
did of Poles. Intellectual Baltic DPs and Banatais farmers were often described 
as more productive and highly skilled, whether because of superior training or 
innate ability, than lazy Polish and Ukrainian DPs. As a result, ‘privileged’ Baltic 
and Banatais tended to secure easier access to work in camps’ administration 
or workshops; this, in turn, gave them easier access to food, money and 
cigarettes. Polish and Ukrainian DPs, on the contrary, faced widespread 
prejudice and were more likely to be forced to work outside camps. The last 
section of this chapter examines this calculus of privilege and prejudice, 
highlighting the profound ambiguities not only evident in French occupation 
official attitudes but also intrinsic to Central UNRRA Headquarters’ guidance. 
 
Privilege and Prejudice: national and gender divides204 
 
 In the conclusion of his book on Hitler’s Foreign Workers, Ulrich Herbert 
points out that those who suffered the most after the Liberation were often, 
quite paradoxically,  ‘the very same persons who had suffered most in Germany 
during the war.’205 Under Nazi rules, Eastern Europeans worked longer hours 
and survived on poorer diets, lower wages, and less adequate housing than 
Westarbeiter.206 At the Liberation these very same unskilled workers were more 
likely to experience labour discrimination and abuses. Where they had formally 
been discriminated against relative to the Westarbeiter, after the war that 
discrimination persisted in new guise - relative to Baltic and Banatais DPs, both 
groups considered as more competent, productive and educated. In Singen, for 
instance, Poles were forced to work in the same factories as they had done 
during the war, while Latvian DP were better placed to refuse such job offers if !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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they did not correspond to their skills. Moreover, Poles were only allocated 
German food rations, while Latvians typically received those of the Intendance. 
The UNRRA Employment Officer Rozale reported that ‘[t]he totality of the Polish 
DPs of the Singen camp are simple-minded people, ill equipped to defend their 
interests; they did not obtain any of the advantages granted to the Latvian DPs. 
They suffer[ed] and protest[ed] against a striking difference in their 
treatment.’207 In Ravensburg the Baltic population was composed of relatively 
‘wealthy’ individuals, according to UNRRA welfare officer Roberts. And, 
paradoxically, the wealthier DPs often received the most aid.208 Without doubt, 
discrimination was not overall as striking as it was in the particular cases of 
Singen or Ravensburg. Yet UNRRA employment statistics show that the 
majority of Polish and Ukrainian DPs worked in factories, farms and forestry 
enterprises, while a significant number of intellectual Baltic DPs (civil servants, 
teachers, doctors, lawyers, entrepreneurs, students…) were either unemployed 
or reliant on their own workshops.209  
 
National and Gender Divides 
In the wake of France’s full-blooded collaboration with the Nazi regime, many if 
not most French occupation officials and relief workers understood that it was 
no longer appropriate to refer to foreigners in the xenophobic terms that were 
ubiquitous in the late thirties and Vichy period. This did not mean, however, that 
well-entrenched stereotypes disappeared. In Feyen, for instance, a Captain 
Pohl labelled DPs as a ‘group of gangsters’, and he singled out the Polish race 
being ‘dirty.’210  More frequently, one finds contemptuous or condescending 
remarks. In Isny in Allgäu a welfare officer suggested that relief workers had to 
understand the intrinsically simple-minded character of Ukrainians. In her camp 
DPs were characterised as being ‘old and primaires [simple-minded].’211  In 
Neudstadt, UNRRA employment officer Bohn reported that everyone around 
him was striving to get rid of uninteresting, unproductive and pitiful Poles. 212 
Stereotypes of Polish DPs as morally lax, bad workers and unproductive were, 
it seems, endemic.213  
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As Elisa Camiscioli argues, ‘[s]kills, productivity and even brute strength 
have always been ideologically inflected categories, subject to the perceived 
influence of gender, race, and nation.’214 In her work on labour power and the 
racial economy in interwar France, she demonstrates how labour experts and 
government officials devalued the productive capacity of colonial workers in 
comparison to the normative model of French workers. ‘By the interwar years 
the language of labour had successfully incorporated both productivism and 
racial hierarchy.’215 Admittedly, Nazism and fascism largely discredited such 
overtly racial idioms after 1945.216 But, the practices of flattening individuals into 
hermetic and hierarchical groups continued. In Sept-ans en faveur des 
personnes déplacées, one can indeed read that the Banatais’ uprightness, 
dedication to hard work, as well as their singular organisational and pioneering 
gifts were only affirmed by their actions in the French zone. 217  French 
authorities had a similarly high opinion of hard-working and well-mannered 
Baltic DPs.218  This hierarchy was not specific to the French zone. In fact, 
Salvatici has demonstrated that Anglo-American policies also ‘introduced and/or 
enforced inequalities in displacement status on the basis of gender and national 
affiliation.’219 According to her, ‘this hierarchy was constructed according to the 
suitability shown by each group in removing the constituent elements of 
displacement (indiscipline, idleness, apathy) and matching the Western model 
of ‘good labourer’.’220 
Labour practices were also highly gendered.  Female employment rates 
and salaries were considerably lower than male ones. 221  When Dorothea 
Greene arrived in Reutlingen, she noted ‘here we found the DP stores (food, 
supplies, clothing and amenity supplies) run by a DP woman. This is the first 
place that we had found a woman in such a position.’ 222  In March 1947 
employed women represented sixty-two per cent of the overall total of 
employable women, while eighty-three per cent of employable men were in 
employment.223 Moreover, as Salvatici has rightly pointed out, men’s work was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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mainly directed outside camps, while women’s work tended primarily to be 
inside camps.224  In the summer of 1947, throughout Germany as a whole, 
women constituted some forty per cent of the DPs working in the camps, but 
they amounted to no more than ten per cent of those working in the German 
economy.225 In the French zone alone, the proportion of women working outside 
camps was higher than in the rest of Germany:  women represented thirty-
seven per cent of the DPs working in camps and twenty-eight per cent of those 
working for the German economy. 226  Some French occupation officials 
defended the male breadwinner model. The Governor of Württemberg argued 
for instance that it was normal that most women did not work, as their role was 
to perform traditional occupations in the household.227 For these administrators, 
women should remain confined to stereotypically feminine occupations such as 
providing care in the kitchen, nursery, or cleaning services within their camp.228  
At a time when citizenship rights and greater access to the paid labour force 
were becoming available to French women in France, DP employment reveals 
continuities of thought with the inter-war years and the persistence of some of 
the tenets of the male breadwinner ideology described by Laura Frader.229 As 
Hanna Diamond has demonstrated, ‘the battle of coal’ marked a crucial moment 
in the celebration of working-class masculinity, the virile male industrial worker 
becoming an iconic manly figure in French men’s attempt to recoup some self-
esteem after the humiliation of the wartime period.230  
 
Janus-faced humanitarianism 
As the preceding comments indicate, UNRRA did not always protect DPs 
against discrimination. On the contrary, the organization’s employment policies 
sometimes reinforced inequalities amongst DPs. In some cases, jobs inside 
camps offered better food allocations and housing conditions than work 
outside.231 In these cases, rather than levelling social differences by preventing 
the ‘lower socio-economic categories from feeling the burden of material or 
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social deprivation’, as Ihor Zielyk suggests, camp employment policies 
contributed to social stratification.232  
 
Fig. 44. The Polish Guard, Gutach DP camp, April 1946 233 
 
Many DP strikes were due to unequal pay and unfair advantages amongst DPs. 
On 12 September 1946, for instance, twenty female DP workers from a textile 
factory near Lorräch went on strike. Having worked in this factory since July, 
they resented the fact that their comrades from the DP camp in nearby Mülheim 
received better food rations (including chocolate), than them. The UNRRA 
Employment Officer pledged to rectify the situation. 234 But, the evidence 
suggests that discontent persisted.235 A few months later, a violent strike broke 
out in the DP camp of Gneisenau (near Koblenz), DPs begrudging that those 
employed by UNRRA (team-workers) received fifteen packets of US cigarettes 
while everyone else were only allocated six. In similar fashion, the food rations, 
clothes and children’s materials were unequally distributed among the camp’s 
inhabitants.236 This strike was particularly violent, the Polish chief of the UNRRA 
shop having been beaten-up and severely wounded.237  
In other cases, as mentioned earlier, UNRRA directors could not pay 
their class II personnel. These administrators appear to have resented the 
marked disparities in treatment between them and class I personnel. ‘Our class 
II personnel proved far more valuable to the Administration than the 
Administration did to them’ commented Jean Gerbier in Lindau. ‘It is unfortunate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that numerous solemn promises made to them were broken. […] Hope being 
the most precious property of our DPs, it was important not to use it wrongly.’238 
The UNRRA Personnel Division in Paris meanwhile made recommendations 
based on their own perceptions of fairness. The Division’s anonymous official 
historian records that ‘[t]he principle of equal pay for equal work is strong 
throughout Europe, and I believe that any future organization should reject with 
the greatest firmness any attempt whatever to make differentiated wage 
scales.’239 It was a different story in the field, however, where attitudes of class I 
personnel towards class II personnel varied greatly within the zone. While some 
directors considered class II staffers as their equals and complained about 
UNRRA’s official policy, others saw absolutely no contradiction between the 
rhetoric of human rights and the persistence of these economic and national 
inequalities.240  
Like many other contemporary humanitarian institutions, UNRRA’s 
employment policies and its camp system institutionalized an unequal 
relationship between ‘the compassionate and the suffering’ that contradicts the 
presumed universalism of its discourse.241 Not only did UNRRA employment 
policies entrench certain forms of social differentiation, notably between those 
working for UNRRA (who generally profited from more food, prestige and 
power) and those having to work outside; but, more importantly, it hardened 
differences in economic status between relief workers and DP ‘recipients.’242 
That being said, some UNRRA directors encouraged DPs’ sense of initiative, 
combatted discrimination and organized vocational training. Generalization is 
commensurately difficult. While as explained in chapter Three, some UNRRA 
relief workers acted as despots, others were inspired by a democratic spirit and 
by notions of ‘cultural relativism.’243 
 Near Koblenz, for instance, UNRRA’s American director Faucette strove 
to help DPs to become ‘self-respecting citizens who work in harmony together’ 
in the Gneisenau Kasern, renamed ‘Gniezno’ in reference to the first capital of 
Poland. 244 His comments are worth quoting at length. ‘Our people are inspired 
with the desire to disprove the ‘Herrenvolk’ ideas of their former masters by 
living a more exemplary life and doing better work than the Germans. We have 
therefore a community which is predominantly church going, very strong in its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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insistence on morality and normal living.’245 ‘We were somewhat amazed and 
very gratified in December when the Oberpostdirektion of Koblenz petitioned 
the French Military Government to allow the Polish group of workers to accept 
the contract for reconstruction of the Koblenz Post Office (a contract involving 
between 1.250.000 and 1.500.000 RM) on the basis of a study they had made 
which indicated that the Poles were producing approximately 20% more per 
man per day than German workers in similar occupations in and around 
Koblenz.’246  
 
Disproving the Herrenvolk idea? Workshops and vocational trainings 
The UNRRA employment Section recommended that each UNRRA team 
organized agricultural projects and workshops in order to teach or re-teach DP 
skills. For UNRRA Employment specialists, vocational training was an important 
factor in ‘helping people to help themselves’, by developing their skills and self-
confidence.247 In February 1946, American UNRRA employment training taught 
employment officers how to create workshops from scratch.248  Despite the 
difficulties in obtaining tools and raw materials in the context of French industrial 
removals and requisition policies, and despite the shortage of DP trained 
instructors, workshops and training courses flourished in many DP centres.249 
As explained in chapter five, these ranged from sewing, knitting and embroidery 
workshops to repair, carpentry, mechanics, electricity and toy-making 
workshops.250 Some UNRRA directors also made sure that DPs were given the 
opportunity to become apprentices in German factories.251   
In Landstuhl, for instance, Daniel de Fos launched a ‘crusade for DPs’ 
reemployment.’252 Convinced that allied nationals should not be forced to work 
in unwanted jobs in enemy country, he made considerable efforts to find tools 
and materials for DPs.253 ‘Without official help’, he organised a forestry worksite, 
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cabinet-work and embroidery workshops.254 In July 1946, UNRRA’s American 
training specialist Dorothea Greene lauded De Fos’ success, noting that 
Landstuhl had very good carpenters and a machine workshop that was 
‘magnificently equipped.’255 Yet, UNRRA Zone headquarters accused De Fos of 
employing too many DPs in the camps, notably in the police services.256 
Greene was undeterred, and also applauded the efforts made in Biberach. 
According to her, Biberach was ‘one of the camps ranking at the top of the list’, 
with its very fine sewing shop, its first rate tie-making workshop (which used 
salvaged materials from American used clothing), excellent carpentry workshop 
and an auto-mechanics theoretical training course.257 In addition to the lack of 
materials, UNRRA employment officers confronted rivalries between groups of 
DPs. In Niederlahnstein, for instance, the welfare officer reported the difficulties 
experienced in running ‘combined Jewish and Polish shops, owing to friction 
between the workers. Therefore the main camp work was done in the Polish 
shops, and the Jewish Committee was given a sewing machine for the express 
use of the Jewish community.’258  
Some French occupation officials were reluctant to encourage activities 
that might slow the pace of repatriation. Others, aware that France needed 
skilled workers, encouraged it. As Daniel Cohen has shown, France launched a 
veritable ‘bataille du reclassement’ [professional reassignement] at the 
Liberation.259  Aimed at war veterans, repatriated prisoners and deportees, this 
post-war reclassement battle drew substantially on Vichy precedent.  As Cohen 
points out, ‘[t]he National Revolution had in a recent past bestowed upon 
manual labor a function of social harmony.’260 DPs themselves were also keen 
to learn new trades. Contrary to the widespread assumption that DPs were 
‘apathetic’, evidence suggests a high degree of personal initiative amongst 
them.261 In June 1946, for instance, the Dr Karvelis, former Finance Ministry of 
Lithuania and President of the Lithuanian Red Cross contacted UNRRA to buy 
a factory, which he hoped to entrust to Lithuanians who would run it ‘for the 
profit of the French Army and France.’ 262  In Lorräch, many self-employed 
craftsmen (tailors, dressmakers, cobblers, electricians…) became wholly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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integrated in the German economy.263 In total, according to UNRRA official 
figures, there were 190 UNRRA workshops in May 1947 employing 1,500 
DPs.264 In the spring of 1947 some of these workshops became self-sufficient 
and progressively freed themselves from UNRRA supervision.265 
 UNRRA doctors and nurses also provided refresher courses for DP 
doctors and assistant nurses. UNRRA medical courses started in the French 
zone in February 1946 and were held in eleven centres (Landstuhl, Lebach, 
Pirmasens, Hombourg, Trier, Nierdelahnstein, Ravensburg, Reutlingen, 
Freiburg, Müllheim and Rottweil).266 304 DP aid nurses passed their exams in 
the French zone. 267  According to many health specialists, UNRRA training 
courses ranked among one of the ‘the most successful undertaking of the 
UNRRA health division.’ 268 
UNRRA official historian 
concurred ‘[t]he remarkably 
high health levels of the 
displaced persons, in spite of 
inadequate food and 
accommodation, represent a 
real achievement of the 
military health authorities, the 
UNRRA doctors and nurses, 
and the displaced persons 
themselves. No epidemic 
caught hold; the infant 
mortality rate was low; the venereal disease rate was lower than that among the 
German population or the armies of occupation.’269 DPs health in the French 
zone was also generally satisfactory (apart from DP mental health which was 
worrying). ‘There was no case of typhus or smallpox; the number of typhoid-
paratyphoid or dysenteric infections was very limited.’270 General De Cilleuls 
argued that the training provided to feminine staff significantly contributed to 
high level of individual and collective hygiene.271 
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Fig. 45.  The training of DP aid nurses, Ravensburg."
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 In the field of vocational training, UNRRA’s efforts were assisted by 
several voluntary agencies, which provided materials, machines and instructors. 
In Freiburg, the American Christian Committee for Refugees (ACCR) helped to 
establish a sewing and knitting school.272  The YMCA meanwhile organized a 
training centre in Hinterzarten, which offered correspondence courses and 
established a workshop in Shramberg.273 In the spring of 1946 thirty-eight DPs 
studied mechanics, twenty DPs trained as electricians, thirty more learned 
aspects of the building trade and a handful more trained in industrial design at 
Shramberg’s professional workshop. 274  UNRRA district employment officer 
Rozale nevertheless lamented that YMCA training courses remained too 
theoretical and insufficiently practical.275 The Inter-governmental Committee for 
Refugees (IGCR) contributed to the creation of an experimental centre in 
Ravensburg.276 In the summer of 1947 nearly 100 DPs were trained in this 
professional centre, taking classes in electrical engineering, radio-telephony, 
the job of assistant topographer, civil engineering and industrial design. Finally, 
the Jewish ORT (Organisation Reconstruction Travail) played a significant role 
in the French zone for Jewish DPs, creating a knitting and sewing workshop in 
Gailingen.277 The ORT was inspired by the philosophy of productivization of 
Jews set forth by socialist Zionist Russian thinkers at the end of the 19th 
Century, aiming at the regeneration through manual labour and their 
deghettoization through their integration in the working-class.278 Although the 
Jewish population was relatively small in the French zone, it is also worth 
recording that there were several Kibboutz in Gailingen and Biberach.279 
From the summer of 1947 French efforts to set up vocational training and 
professional centres intensified. The 6 September 1947 Agreement signed by 
French authorities and the Preparatory Commission of the International 
Refugee Organisation explicitly referred to the question of professional training. 
In fact, the subsection 10, section 3 stipulated that IRO should set a program of 
re-education and professional training for DPs. 280  Recognizing that ‘most 
countries required specific work skills from their prospective resettles’, the IRO !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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tested DPs and encouraged them to learn a profession.281  From the summer of 
1948 DPs were no longer forced to work but they were obliged to learn a 
profession.282  In October 1948, a discrete service of Formation Professionnelle 
Accélérée was entrusted to M. Guyoton.283 In total, eighteen vocational centres 
were created in the French zone training DPs for twenty-six different 
professions, although some of these training centres were notoriously 
inefficient. 284 
Conclusion 
 
French official employment policies were a product of the interplay 
between various economic considerations and cultural influences, from 
nineteenth century socialist utopias to the French civilizing mission; the ideology 
of the National Revolution and the post-1945 rhetoric of production. In purely 
arithmetical terms, there were resounding successes. As many contemporary 
reports highlighted, employment rates were notably higher in the French zone 
than elsewhere. The official PDR leaflet proudly insisted: ‘In July 1947, at the 
time of UNRRA’s disbandment, out of 18,934 employable DPs 18,520 were 
employed. This success speaks for itself; when in 1951, German authorities 
complained that the employment of inémigrables DPs is not possible; one 
should remember these results […].’ 285 Given these successful employment 
rates, French officials often prided themselves in having devised a more 
individualist and suitable solution for the DPs in their care and, thereby, 
hastening their return to some sense of ‘normality.’ Yet beneath this official self-
congratulatory discourse, the reality was more complex. As a matter of fact, 
when French authorities entrusted the DP question to German authorities in 
1950, a significant number of DPs were still not ‘integrated’ into the German 
economy. Amongst the approximate 8,000 DPs who then remained in the 
French zone still unable to emigrate to a third country, the majority of those 
living in the Baden and Rhineland-Palatinate were working; yet, for those living 
in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, the situation was more critical. Many of them 
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continued to live in poor accommodation and camps; they experienced 
discrimination from their German employers.286 
Whilst official instructions stipulated that DPs should enjoy priority over 
local Germans, this chapter has revealed that their situation vis-à-vis their 
German neighbours crucially depended on local conditions and varied markedly 
according to DPs’ nationality and gender. The revival of gender and ethnic 
prejudices within a climate of persistent economic difficulties translated into very 
different treatment for particular categories of DPs. Intellectual Baltic DPs and 
Banatais farmers were often ‘privileged.’ They tended to have easier access to 
work in camps’ administration or workshops, and therefore received better 
rations of food and cigarettes. Polish and Ukrainian DPs, on the contrary, faced 
prejudice and were more likely to be forced to work outside camps. Over time, 
some UNRRA relief workers protested against these blatant inequalities and 
helped to improve DPs’ working situation and material entitlements. But, in 
other cases, these relief workers contributed to the very inequalities that certain 
DPs confronted.  
 In the context of the intensifying PDR/UNRRA conflict, UNRRA officials 
presented themselves as ‘protectors’ of the DPs.  Yet, once again, beneath the 
surface of UNRRA’s humanitarian discourse, the reality was more nuanced. 
French UNRRA relief workers’ attitudes were framed by competing demands, 
between attempts to satisfy the demands of the French economy while 
responding to the needs of DPs. Depending on their assigned tasks, political 
orientation, and perhaps also their wartime experiences, French relief workers 
presented very different interpretations of DPs’ circumstances. Whilst many 
relief workers backed up DPs’ complaints about food rations and salaries, 
arguing that not enough had changed since the Liberation, others showed little 
interest in improving DPs’ situation. On the one hand, this probably suggests 
that French UNRRA relief workers did not uniformly recognize DPs as war 
victims. On the other hand, it reveals the limits of the impact of the rhetoric of 
the Resistance and the emerging Human Right discourses. 
So, taken as a whole, were French employment policies more a form of 
economic exploitation than an attempt to rehabilitate DPs? Without doubt, some 
aspects of French employment practices resembled economic exploitation more 
than humanitarian rehabilitation. DPs’ occasional exposure to arbitrary violence, 
combined with shortage of soap, clothes and fresh food, contributed, in some 
significant ways, to confine DPs to a perceived inferior status relative to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Germans.287 Many relief workers insisted that DPs’ appearance were often 
miserable, their clothes being ‘either completely worn out or too small and their 
shoes without soles.’ 288  Yet, the overall portrait of DP employment is not 
entirely negative. Significant efforts were made to help DPs acquire the means 
to learn a trade. Perhaps more importantly, the majority of DPs felt ‘protected’ 
enough to start re-building families and raising children in the French zone, as 
the extremely high birth rates testified. ‘In 1946 and 1947, a monthly average of 
120 births were registered for a overall population of 40,000 DPs, including 
26,000 adults between the age of 20 and 45 years old […] This rate is higher 
than that of any country in the world.’289 
 
 
Fig.46. Visit for young mothers, medical center, Freiburg.290 !
So, if it remains questionable whether employment policies helped heal the 
deep psychic wounds created by Nazi terror, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that they did not prevent the majority of DPs from feeling secure enough to take 
the first steps in their return to civilian normality. 
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Chapter Seven: Historical Land of liberty or impoverished Communist 
enclave? The IRO and the resettlement of DPs in France (1947-1950) 
 
Over the last two decades, the alleged ‘crisis of asylum’, the rise of Jean-
Marie Le Pen’s extreme right National Front and the creation of the Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration and National Identity in 2007 have generated renewed 
scholarly interest in state nationalism and ‘governmental xenophobia’ in 
France.1 The increased ability of the state to monitor foreigners, by taking 
fingerprints and retinal scans, has corroborated the idea of an irreversible 
‘nationalization’ and ‘bureaucratization’ of migration control, representing the 
culmination of a trend that started in the late nineteenth century.2 In many 
respects, the DP recruitment chapter can be inscribed within this narrative that 
emphasizes the pessimistic and dark sides of the Leviathan state. The 
philosophy behind the recruitment augured the logic behind contemporary 
policy of ‘chosen immigration’3; the anti-Semitic and xenophobic practices of 
ONI bureaucrats foreshadowed the professional culture of arrogance and 
condescension of today’s asylum counters [guichet d’ asile].4  
At the Liberation, French political leaders and journalists attempted, after 
the failure of asylum in the late thirties and the Vichy regime’s suppression of 
elementary democratic rights, to restore their country’s place as the historical 
haven of political refugees. Meanwhile, in contrary fashion, the harsh selection 
methods adopted towards healthy workers in the German ruins recalled aspects 
of Nazi practices. As former Resistant leader Claude Bourdet observed in 
January 1948: ‘[a]re responsible, individually, the various governments and, 
among them, the French government which, waste time and money to hand 
pick, one by one, the best workers amongst the Displaced Persons […] dividing 
needlessly and inhumanly family, victims amongst victims, […] and 
differentiating pernickety the ‘able to work’ and the ‘with no market value’, doing 
exactly what Hitler did.’ 5 
In La Tyrannie du National, Gérard Noiriel presents this episode as a 
blatant example of state hypocrisy. Highlighting the discrepancy between the 
rhetorical airs with which French government figures proclaimed human rights !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and the methods it employed to handpick fit and able-bodied workers in 
Germany, Noiriel argues that the recruitment of DPs embodied the victors’ 
disregard for the humanitarian values that they so recently enunciated in the 
Universal Declaration. 6  Despite the trauma of war and fascism, Noiriel 
maintains, western Governments were inconsistent, ritually mouthing slogans 
they ignored when convenient. To be sure, not only were the majority of DPs 
required to work in menial and strenuous occupations, but unmarried mothers, 
elderly and sick DPs were left in Germany in the hands of their former 
oppressors.7 A simple medical history of TB - a common illness among DPs 
resulting from wartime working and living conditions – was enough to exclude 
them from resettlement.8  
Noiriel’s argument sits alongside the new strand of ‘disenchanted’ 
historiography, keen to challenge the morality-tale version of internationalism 
and emphasize the ‘inauspicious beginnings’ of the establishment of Human 
Rights.9 This growing literature has highlighted the elements of cynicism and 
state interests intrinsic to the establishment of the human-rights regime, 
highlighting that the noble proclamation of human rights was devoid of 
enforcement mechanisms and that the ‘human rights’ revolution did not 
challenge state sovereignty.10 While article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights proclaimed that ‘everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution’ and the constitution of the Fourth 
Republic which announced that all ‘who are persecuted for the cause of liberty 
have a right of asylum in the territories of the Republic’, The ‘France of René 
Cassin’ unscrupulously took part in a ‘slave’s market’ in Germany, leaving 
behind the elderly, the sick and the unproductive.  
This contradiction requires explanation. Why did Western governments’ 
recruitment schemes fail to acknowledge the suffering of Hitler’s war victims? 
Did the presence of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) compel 
changes to otherwise narrow state interest to better serve the DPs’ interests? 
Were French recruitment schemes progressively amended in favour of DPs’ 
‘unproductive’ dependants? And, perhaps most pertinent to us here, did France 
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represent a safe haven for anti-communist DPs? Were DPs that eager anyway 
to come to France after the strikes of the winter of 1947? 
 Drawing mainly on primary sources from the French occupation zone’s 
archives (La Courneuve) and the IRO’s archives (Paris), this chapter examines 
the final act of the DP episode for the French authorities, which took place 
between July 1947 and July 1950. To that end it focuses on the installation of 
the IRO in the French zone and the resettlement of DPs around the world. 
Particular attention is paid to French authorities’ race for DPs. According to 
French official figures, between 1 July 1947 and 31 December 1951, 4,441 DPs 
residing in the French zone were repatriated and 39,497 emigrated under the 
aegis of the IRO. 11  Amongst these DPs, between 6,000 and 8,000 DPs 
immigrated to France and 200 to French Guiana, 125 to Morocco, 102 to 
Tunisia and 12 to Algeria.12 The majority of the remaining DPs were resettled in 
the USA, Australia, Canada, Brazil and the United Kingdom. Taking into 
account the additional immigrants recruited in the British and American zones of 
Germany and Austria, France attracted a total of 38,000 DP workers.13 In 
numerical terms, the recruitment was disappointing. Its figures fell short of the 
French government’s minimal expectations. Moreover, significant numbers of 
them re-emigrated shortly after their arrival.  
 This chapter juxtaposes the initial working assumptions of French 
authorities and IRO officials with the way in which realities on the ground forced 
them to modify their practices. It begins with the installation of the IRO in the 
French zone in the summer of 1947, and the transfer of responsibilities of DP 
administration from UNRRA to the French PDR administration. It ends at the 
end of June 1950, when, barely a year after the establishment of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, French authorities handed responsibility for DP 
administration to the German authorities.14  Germans became responsible for 
the ‘hard Core’ of DPs, consisting mainly of the elderly and infirm, widows and 
unmarried mothers, groups that stood little chance of finding a country willing to 
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accept them.15 As IRO official historian Louise Holborn observes, the chief 
deterrents to immigration had been ‘adverse health conditions, advance age 
(i.e. unattached men over 45 or unattached women over 40), family composition 
(i.e widows and unmarried mothers with young children, or other family groups 
with little prospect of supporting themselves), difficulty […] of procuring 
adequate documents regarding nationality, birth, marriage, divorce, unsolved 
personal problems (e.g. criminal record […]) and finally membership of people 
over 35 in a professional or intellectual class.’16 The number of ‘hard core’ DPs 
handed over to Germans was, however, relatively limited in the French zone 
when compared to the two other Western zones. In total, the French left 1,738 
‘hard-core’ DPs in German hands. 17  Between 100,000 and 200,000 DPs 
remained in the rest of western Germany (the former British and American 
zones) by early 1950 of which approximately thirteen per cent constituted the 
so-called ‘institutional hard core.’ 18  The IRO officially terminated on 31 January 
1952 in the French zone, although several IRO-financed resettlements 
continued until June of that year.19  
 
The Historiographical context 
 
 The failure of the French recruitment operations is, in some significant 
ways, paradoxical. Compared to countries belonging to the New World, 
France’s geographic position was advantageous. It confronted DPs with a much 
shorter journey than either the USA or Australia. 20 Furthermore, owing to the 
number of Polish and White Russian migrants that had settled in France in the 
inter-war years, France hosted significant numbers of Polish associations, 
churches and welfare groups able to facilitate DPs’ resettlement. 21  Some 
associations such as the Comité d’action pour la liquidation des camps de 
personnes déplacées, linked to Jewish associations and the CGT, actively 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15"AN," AJ/43/797," Convention" relative" à" la" prise" en" charge" par" les" autorités" allemandes" des" Personnes" Déplacées" et" Réfugiés"
inémigrables";"MAE,"HCRFA,"PDR6/869,"OIR,"Minute"de"la"conference"trizonale"pour"le"réetablissement"des"cas"DP"du"‘hard"core’"
dans"l’économie"locale,"tenue"les"17"et"18"juin"1949"à"BadenEBaden."
16"Holborn"The%International%Refugee%Organisation,%p."481."
17"Sept% ans% en% faveur% des% personnes% déplacées," p." 77." The" figure" given" by" the" Haute" Commission" Alliée" is" slightly" higher." AN,"
AJ/43/797," Confidentiel," Haute" Commission" Alliée," Comité" des" Affaires" politiques," sousEcomité" des" réfugiés" et" personnes"
déplacées," rapport" sur" la" remise" aux" autorités" allemandes" des" camps" de" personnes" déplacées" en" zone" française"
d’occupation,Pol/RDP/P(50)BJ,"4"August"1950."
18"Jacobmeyer"‘The"‘Displaced"Persons’"in"West"Germany’,"p."280."
19"Sept%ans%en%faveur%des%personnes%déplacées,"p."57."
20"AN,"AJ/43/628,"compteErendu"de" la" reunion" tenue" le"18"décembre"1948"à"Auxerre,"à" l’occasion"de" la"venue"en"France"d’une"
délégation"de"Personnes"Déplacées,"venue"étudier"les"possibilités"d’immigration."
21"AN,"AJ/43/628,"Procès"Verbal"de"la"conférence"sur"le"plan"français"‘culture"famille’,"entre"les"délégué"IRO,"ONI"et"les"délégués"
ethniques"à"Neuenburg,"26"October"1948."
! 300 
defended DPs’ interests in France.22 It is also true that a considerable amount 
of financial resources and international expertise were invested in DPs’ 
preparation for emigration to France. As explained in the previous chapter, 
schools and DP training centres were established in the French zone to train 
DPs in various trades thereby facilitating their smooth assimilation in France. 
Finally, every effort was made by French PDR authorities to stimulate interest 
among potential recruits. 23 On 13 January 1948, the French government signed 
an agreement with the PCIRO [Preparatory Commisssion of the International 
Refugee Organization], which provided for the payment of a bonus of sixteen 
dollars to those DPs willing to emigrate to France.24 Later that autumn, France 
launched the ‘Plan Culture Famille’, which made provision for the entry of DPs 
and their families. 25 As an American IRO expert noted, ‘[t]he nature of the 
scheme meant that many semi-skilled agricultural workers for whom other 
resettlement opportunities had not been found could emigrate to France 
together with their families.26  Finally, in December 1948, a DP delegation was 
invited to visit France and see conditions there at first hand. 27  By then, 
according to Holborn, ‘considerable improvement in reception arrangements 
was noticeable, and the delegation on its return agreed to publicize the scheme 
in conjunction with the French publicity team.’28 
 Explanations of this paradoxical failure tend to fall into three broad 
strands. Andreas Rinke insists on its political character, highlighting the roles 
played by communist recruiters and the strikes of 1947 in France both in 
slowing down the process and in sullying France’s reputation among anti-
communist DPs.29 In addition to the communist threat, French employment 
offers were generally unattractive.30 Daniel Cohen argues that DPs’ reluctance 
to immigrate to France mainly accounts for the failure of the scheme. France’s 
particularly high medical and professional selection criteria, its limited 
employment opportunities, and the presence of ‘card-carrying Communists in 
the selection teams’ further depressed DPs’ scant interest in choosing a country 
severely damaged by war.31 Examining the situation from a French perspective, 
Alexis Spire stresses the economic factors that hindered recruitment and, more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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particularly, emphasises French farmers’ reluctance to employ DPs in a context 
of worsening French unemployment.32  
This chapter draws on the work of these historians, but takes a new 
approach by focusing on untapped archival documents originating from the 
archives of the French occupation zone and the IRO. By adopting a more 
resolutely local approach, it allows for more nuanced understanding of French 
attitudes towards the recruitment of DPs. While recognizing the importance of 
macro-economic factors and national politics in shaping French recruitment 
operations, this chapter demonstrates that they also crucially depended on how 
ONI agents, IRO officials and PDR administrators re-interpreted and 
implemented official instructions in the German field.33 In contrast with the 
UNRRA period, more effective collaboration was established between French 
IRO officials and PDR administrators despite recurrent financial disagreements 
between the two administrations.34 French operations suffered, however, from 
the outset because Belgium had already intensively recruited miners, leaving 
few suitable recruits who either wanted to go into mining or had the necessary 
experience in it.35  Furthermore, while the IRO and PDR authorities made every 
effort to encourage DP recruitment, the National Immigration Office (ONI) was 
much more circumspect (if not hostile) in its approach to DPs. Indeed, the first 
French ONI Selection Missions were unnecessarily harsh with DPs, rapidly 
gaining a reputation as arbitrary and communist-tinged. Combined with the 
negative effects of the strikes of the winter of 1947, in the eyes of many DPs, 
American authorities and foreign IRO officials alike, France was not a land of 
liberty with a long tradition of asylum and hospitality to refugees but an 
impoverished and communist-dominated country.  
In probing beneath the formal structure of official instructions and macro-
economic imperatives to reconstruct the ways in which recruitment was put into 
practice, it becomes apparent that attitudes towards the recruitment within the 
military government, the service PDR, the ONI and employee organizations in 
France were never so monolithic. As in many other aspects of DP policy, 
French actors had contradictory requirements and divergent policies. Their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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approach was also as cultural in focus as economically determined. French 
occupation officials, many of whom were Gaullists, were particularly concerned 
about the image of France that circulated in DP camps and IRO official circles. 
They often associated the encouragement of immigration with French 
patriotism. Thus, the issues posed by the recruitment of DPs were far greater 
than a problem of satisfying manpower needs. As explained below, anxieties 
about DPs’ reluctance to come to France were tied to the reformulation of 
French identity and the restoration of French prestige in post-war Germany.   
As Enarque Robert Poignant observed in 1948, although state intervention 
was significantly extended at the Liberation, administrative practices were not 
unified and the various services in charge of immigration control remained ill-
equipped to manage incoming foreign workers.36 Furthermore, in contrast with 
the interwar years, during which national immigration laws predominantly 
regulated the movement of migrants, the IRO employed selective procedures 
on a multilateral basis. 37  Admittedly, the IRO never superseded national 
immigration policies but it pressed governments to accept DPs and played a 
decisive role in shaping emigration policies. Furthermore, it provided DPs with a 
platform to raise concern about national selection missions and, in so doing, 
transformed them, albeit in a limited way, from ‘passive recipients’ to ‘actors’ in 
their resettlement. Before examining this further, we need to return to the 
installation of the IRO in the French zone. 
 
The IRO, the ‘largest travel agency in the world’38 
 
In early July 1947 the IRO’s installation in post-war Germany marked a 
turning point in the governance of Europe’s displaced persons. 39 Allied policy 
shifted from an emphasis on repatriation to a focus on resettlement. The Soviet 
Union and its satellites withdrew from the organization; indeed, only eighteen of 
the UN’s fifty-four member states participated.40 The IRO was rapidly dubbed 
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‘the largest travel agency in the world.’ 41 The re-establishment of DPs 
supervised by the IRO represented ‘an unprecedented instance of planned 
population redistribution’, marking the peak of centralized international 
migration.42  In total, the IRO repatriated around 70,000 DPs and resettled over 
a million in foreign countries.43 Huge sums were involved. Between July 1947 
and December 1951, the IRO spent some $430 million on resettlement alone.44 
The IRO provided support for three types of emigration: first, emigration 
conducted under government selection schemes (mass settlement); second, 
emigration through personal nomination by known sponsors in resettlement 
countries (individual emigration); and, thirdly, the placement of individuals with 
prospective employers on the basis of specific qualifications and needs 
(Placement Service).45 
 In the spring of 1947, the French government began selecting refugees 
without making any formal agreement with the IRO. It later signed two 
agreements with the IGCR on 10 June. The French scheme was then covered 
retroactively by a further agreement concluded on 15 January 1948, which 
provided for recruitment in mining, farming, factory and domestic work.46 The 
French scheme posed several challenges throughout the three western zones. 
These problems stemmed from the fact that the French government was, at 
first, principally interested in miners. In addition, ONI agents were notoriously 
severe. Finally were the logistical difficulties presented by dispersed DPs 
lacking adequate transport. 47 In the French zone, where fewer DPs were living 
than in the British and American zones and where a higher proportion of the 
refugee population was working and living outside assembly centres, the IRO 
therefore had to adapt its organisation to the requirements of individual 
casework.48 
 
The IRO in the French zone 
In the French zone, as elsewhere, UNRRA’s relief operations terminated at the 
end of June 1947. UNRRA was replaced by the PCIRO, which officially became 
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the IRO on 20 August 1948. 49  While the PCIRO employed considerably less 
international staff than UNRRA, the administration of DP camps did not fall 
within its remit. 50  Camp management instead fell to the French military 
authorities.51 Overnight, a single PDR agent was typically expected to replace a 
large UNRRA team in each DP centre. As explained in chapter one, former 
PDR Director Alfred Poignant became the French zone’s PCIRO Director. His 
appointment heralded closer cooperation between international IRO staff and 
PDR officials. 
On 6 September 1947, an official agreement was signed between the 
PCIRO and the French government. 52  It stipulated that the PCIRO would 
support the cost of DP administration and resettlement. PCIRO personnel were 
charged with ensuring that their agency’s policies were enforced, meaning, in 
practice, the requirement to determine DP eligibility, to collect statistical data, to 
promote repatriation and, finally, to support DP resettlement.53 In contrast with 
UNRRA, the PCIRO introduced a distinction between those DPs eligible for 
‘care and maintenance’ (receiving food provision, health care, clothes and 
accommodations) or those to whom only ‘legal and political protection’ applied. 
Between 1 July and 31 December 1947, the IRO provided for 33,756 
rationnaires complets and 11,310 rationnaires incomplets. 54  Initially, the 
financial terms of the 6 September 1947 Agreement seemed favourable to the 
French authorities.55 However, the IRO and French authorities disagreed about 
the numbers of eligible DPs. After a fortnight-long conference in Paris during 
January 1948, it was decided that the French authorities would receive 25-
centime US dollar for those DPs residing in camps, and 15-centime US dollars 
for those living privately.56  Within months, the monetary reform of 21 June 1948 
aggravated the financial situation in the zone.57 From October 1948, employed 
DPs were required to make reimbursement for the cost of their care. The 
payments required ranged from twenty-five to seventy DM per month for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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displaced persons with free lodging, and between fifteen and fifty DM for those 
who paid for their lodgings.58 
It is worth recalling that the IRO had been established ‘to bring about a 
rapid and positive solution of the problem of bona fide refugees and displaced 
persons.’59 In addition to encouraging DPs’ repatriation or emigration, the IRO 
carried out screening operations to expunge unworthy DPs from the wider 
refugee community. Just as German citizens filled out much despised 
questionnaires designed by Allied occupiers to uncover active Nazi supporters, 
as Daniel Cohen observes, their DP neighbours were handed ‘eligibility 
questionnaires’ to verify their nationalities, dates of displacement and wartime 
personal histories. 60 Admittedly, UNRRA workers had already carried out 
screening operations, but it was slapdash and chaotic. Under the IRO, 
screening turned into a professional and ‘complex bureaucratic venture’, 
conducted by personnel who claimed ‘high moral standards’ as well as 
‘extensive knowledge of European history, politics and law.’61 The IRO eligibility 
process had clear procedural guidelines that (allegedly) made it easier for IRO 
screeners to recognise lies. 62  Although IRO’s eligibility procedures were 
understandably loathed at the time by some of the excluded persons and 
groups, Cohen argues that, overall, the practices remained relatively liberal.63 
The Prague Coup of February 25, 1948 marked a turning point in IRO eligibility 
policy, the organization progressively liberalizing its conception of refugee.64 
From then onwards, one could be found to have collaborated with the Germans, 
and yet still be recognized as a refugee needing resettlement in a third country. 
 As the issue of DP eligibility testified, the IRO marked a further step 
towards the bureaucratization and standardization of refugee administration. In 
theory, IRO ‘care and maintenance’ policies transformed DPs into objects of 
precise social-scientific knowledge: specific policies regulated DPs’ living space, 
their cleanliness and their nutritional standards. IRO nutritionists, child 
specialists and health experts toured the zone to verify that PCIRO standards of 
welfare, health and care were adequately upheld. In addition to calorific 
measurements, IRO experts compiled a multitude of statistical data on various 
aspects of DP life. After visiting several DP camps, Janet Flanner reported ‘[t]he 
displaced persons are willing to go anywhere on earth except home. In the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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course of this suspended period of time, these people have turned into statistics 
and initials.’ 65  Detailed information on sex, family status, age, nationality, 
previous occupation were systematically passed on to IRO headquarters, 
contributing to the construction of what Daniel Cohen has famously termed a 
‘refugee nation’, an abstract group of dispossessed people united by a need for 
special care.66 
 This quasi-scientific management of displaced persons sought to 
transform DPs into ‘emigrated-minded’ people and suitable candidates for 
resettlement countries. The IRO became a formidable marketing enterprise 
working on behalf of DPs, drawing recruitment missions’ attention to their wide 
range of skills and professional experiences. It compiled information on the 
occupational skills of DPs between sixteen and sixty-five years of age and then 
circulated this information to the various Selection Missions. In the French zone, 
the IRO established that 26.6% of the employable DPs were skilled workers, 
39.1% agricultural workers, and a further 10.1% suitable for liberal 
professions.67 French authorities nevertheless criticized the categories used by 
IRO experts, noting that the proportion of skilled or semi-skilled workers did not 
correspond to reality. 68 The evaluation of female DPs’ credentials was equally 
misleading: in some areas, women with children were classified as non-
employable. 69 Furthermore, by the end of 1948, only 1,700 DPs had been 
tested by practical aptitude tests in the zone.70 
In its efforts to increase acceptance rates by governmental missions, the 
IRO developed training courses for DPs that were notionally adapted to the 
resettlement countries’ needs. For instance, during the preliminary selection for 
emigration to Brazil, Dr. Utaba of the Brazilian Mission expressed an interest in 
DPs’ trained as bee-keepers. As a result, IRO authorities placed greater 
emphasis on training in bee-keeping at the Nonnenhof Centre. 71  In close 
collaboration with the Service the Formation Professionnelle accélérée (FPA), 
IRO experts compiled lists of professions and skills required by resettlement 
countries, progressively diversifying their courses and exams to respond to 
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them.72 In total, fourteen DP training centres were organised and twenty-five 
trades were taught by the FPA with the support of the IRO.73 These courses did 
not all achieve the desired results. Hastily established, they lacked trained 
instructors, adequate resources and material.74  
Aware that high levels of illiteracy increased the risk of rejection, the FPA 
also organised adult education and language training in Münsingen and Bad 
Kreuznach.75 In addition to routine trade testing skills, IRO medical officers 
searched for cases of tuberculosis, as many recruitment missions rejected DPs’ 
families even if a sole member was ill.76 As IRO official Holborn observed, ‘the 
strict medical criteria employed by missions engaged in the selection of 
emigrants rendered maintenance of a high standard of health essential in 
refugee communities. As well as detection and treatment of incipient disease, 
the importance of the symptomless hernia, varicosities, orthopaedic troubles 
and dental defects as handicaps to resettlement had to be stressed.’77 In the 
French zone, IRO authorities lamented that rejection on medical grounds were 
more numerous in the North, where DPs lived in camps and standards of 
hygiene were poorer than in the South.78  According to IRO Director Poignant, 
camp life was detrimental to emigration. Not only were DPs in poorer health, but 
DPs were more likely to be influenced by DP leaders and changed their minds 
quickly about resettlement. 79  
 Just as the IRO authorities lobbied recruitment missions in favour of DPs, 
so they tried to transform DPs into ‘emigrated-minded’ individuals. Often, IRO 
experts complained that DPs showed insufficient enthusiasm for emigration.80 
According to IRO Counselling officer Steel, this was the natural result of their 
living conditions, the lack of information they received, and the relative comfort 
of DP life, which encouraged them to postpone critical decisions. 81 To remedy 
the situation, the IRO started publishing a monthly bulletin containing practical 
information about the various emigration schemes.82 In April 1949 Bulletin No.9 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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published an official complaint about DPs refusing resettlement after having 
signed up for a recruitment scheme. ‘Do they realise that […] their enrolment to 
a recruitment scheme generated many costs (involving several travels, costly 
medical examinations and a waste of time for the IRO personnel) and, far worst, 
that it prevented the IRO to examine more serious candidates, due to quota 
reached?83 Exasperated, Counselling officer Steel noted that it was about time 
that DPs learned to become individuals ‘able to think and reason with 
themselves.’ 84  IRO officials were not alone in despairing at DPs’ lack of 
enthusiasm for resettlement. PDR officials also wished that DPs showed greater 
eagerness to re-emigrate, particularly to France. 
 
The PDR service: Selling France to the DPs  
Despite these complaints, the French recruitment scheme seemed, at least 
initially, relatively popular. In October 1947 the PDR authorities reported that 
nearly twenty per cent of the DP population, accounting for nearly half of the 
able-bodied male population, had presented themselves to French recruiters.85  
Yet, as rumours about ONI communist recruiters and strikes in France 
circulated, DPs’ enthusiasm fell away. The French PDR executive was 
bedevilled by this rapid deterioration in France’s reputation. It informed local 
PDR agents that creating a ‘pro-French movement’ in Germany was more than 
an economic necessity; it was a ‘national duty.’86 PDR Administrators were 
asked to work in close collaboration with DP priests to propagate Francophile 
sentiments in the zone. French language courses were to be provided 
whenever possible.87 And, finally, in order to increase DPs’ pro-French affinities, 
PDR administrators were required to live inside DP camps. ‘Live [with DPs], 
think with them, get to know each of them personally, pay them loving 
attention.’ 88 ‘[The French PDR Director] must be assisted, if not by a French 
doctor or social worker, at least by a DP with Francophile sentiments. The 
priests […] will also be devoted to the cause of France. The teachers 
(instituteurs), the physical trainer, the French teacher will be the emanation of 
France and its spirit.’ 89 
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The analysis of the PDR archives unveils the cultural – as well as the 
economic – aspect of DP emigration to France. The symbolic linkage between 
encouragement to emigrate and the post-war recasting of French patriotism 
reveals how anxieties about DP reluctance to emigrate in France were tied to 
the reformulation of French identity and the restoration of French prestige in 
post-war Germany. PDR efforts to sell France to the DPs must be placed in the 
broader context of French occupation authorities’ attempts to promote French 
culture in post-war Germany. As Corinne Defrance argues, these efforts were 
not only driven by deep-rooted cultural reflex; there were also motivated by a 
more circumstantial and urgent need for the political re-affirmation of basic 
French’ values in the aftermath of a divisive and traumatic war experience. 90  
The exhibition of French cultural richness was not only aimed at impressing 
DPs and Germans; it also served to reinforce France’s prestige in its allies’ 
eyes. In practice, however, PDR efforts to sell France were undermined by the 
deterioration of DP living conditions in the zone.91 As the overall number of DP 
camps decreased and overcrowding rose, so food rations diminished.92 
While military authorities continuously pressed PDR officials to focus on 
clearing the German barracks occupied by DPs, German religious 
congregations urged them to concentrate on convents arguing that their 
occupants had also been persecuted under the Nazis. 93 In the winter of 1948 
the well-organized and maintained DP camp of Landstuhl was closed, its 
remaining DPs relocated to the Niederlahnstein DP camp. 94 There, up to five 
families were accommodated in the same room. In February 1948 the IRO 
Director lamented the state of other remaining DP camps, noting that the 
barracks of the Münsingen camp was suffering from bug infestation and that 
hygiene at the Tuttlingen transit centre was in a ‘repulsive state.’95 As a result of 
the reduction in available camp accommodation, ethnic groups were 
increasingly mixed together. DPs were accused of living increasingly 
promiscuously, transgressing what General Koenig termed, ‘the most 
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elementary rules of decency and morale.’ 96 Other factors contributed to making 
the DPs’ situation appear unacceptable. 97  The transformation of the Saar 
province into an autonomous territory economically linked to France resulted in 
its 1,280 DP residents facing the choice between ‘definitive establishment’ in 
Germany or transfer to the French zone.98 Tellingly, nearly eighty per cent 
chose the German option, even though they lost IRO protection as a 
consequence.99 Another indicators of France’s unpopularity were the hostile 
reaction to the communist recruiters amongst the first ONI selection missions 
deployed in Germany. In October 1947 a local administrator from Freiburg 
lamented the atmosphere in which the recruitment was carried out. ‘It is 
disheartening to see people full of eagerness to start a new life and willing to 
accept hard and unpopular labour, who sacrificing their current situation and 
considering France as their last hope to live freely, are brutally condemned to 
remain in a country where they have suffered so much, either as prisoners of 
war or as deportees.’100 
 
The ONI selection: a communist sabotage? 
 
In June 1947, an ONI delegation, headed by Labour Inspector Hornez, 
arrived in Baden-Baden to take charge of the recruitment process. It was made 
up of two ONI representatives and a delegate of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) who, in turn, oversaw nearly 200 agents. 101  Three 
recruitment centres were created, one in each zone (in Freiburg for the French 
zone, Paderborn for the British zone, and Karlsruhe for the American zone).102 
DPs were supposed to be registered and carefully selected in each of these 
three centres. Only those aged between eighteen and forty-five who passed 
medical, safety and professional tests were sent to France.103 For all that, ONI 
selection remained slapdash and arbitrary: as explained below, the simple fact !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of having well-manicured hands or not knowing how many teeth a cow had 
could result in rejection. The fear that poor vetting had excluded many suitable 
candidates prompted PDR and IRO officials to urge the French government to 
bring ONI personnel to heel. These recruiters were accused of ideologically-
motivated ‘political sabotage.’ On 15 February 1948 Henri Fesquet used the 
pages of Le Monde to exhort the French government to rid the ONI of its 
political and syndicalist influences.104 Was this a fair criticism? 
 
Communist recruiters 
General Koenig informed the Foreign Ministry in November 1947 that the 
direction des Personnes Déplacées was being ‘bombarded’ with complaints 
originating from local authorities (délégués de cercle) about arbitrary selection 
processes at the Freiburg centre. ‘Almost all these complaints,’ he noted, ‘are 
about professional examinations; most of the time, these examinations take a 
political turn.’ 105 Koenig claimed that ONI agents considered any ‘Polish or 
Yugoslav citizen who expresses a wish to work in France’ to be politically 
suspicious and rejected them due to ‘unfitness.’ 106  Failed candidates far 
outnumbered successful applicants, a fact confirmed by the most recent 
statistics. Over 700 candidates had been turned down in under three weeks.107 
By the end of December 1947 only 5,309 DPs had been recruited from the 
French zone, alongside 525 dependents, figures that fell well short of the 
government’s minimum expectations.108 
 Admittedly, the French recruitment mission was not the only one to be 
disproportionately harsh with DPs. The PDR official history recalled that the IRO 
recorded a thirty per cent rejection rate for Canada, thirty-three per cent for the 
United States and up to forty per cent for Australia.109 Even so, some ONI 
agents distinguished themselves by their discourteous, condescending attitudes 
towards DPs. To take a few examples, in Karlsruhe, Josef Sarachman was 
dismissed on these grounds.110 In Freiburg, a Polish worker was rejected on the 
grounds that he could not harness a horse à la mode française. 111 Elsewhere, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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DPs were faulted for not knowing how many teeth a cow had or that tractors 
usually ran on diesel.112 The Münsigen area delegate raised the case of Stefan 
Mazur, ‘best of all the Poles of Münsingen.’ ‘Strong, calm, intelligent and 
meticulous at work’, he failed his professional test, despite his determination to 
work in France. 113 The reason? Mazur was told that he was a ‘fumiste [shirker] 
who only wanted to go to France in order to be with his family.’114 In Reutlingen, 
a Hungarian DP was failed because his hands were too well-kept, an 
observation taken to prove that he was lazy and a bad worker. 115  PDR 
administrator Estrade went further, lamenting that ‘certain nationalities’ – by 
which he meant Hungarians and Yugoslavs - were systematically turned 
away.116 Latvians, with SS tattoos were not just rejected, they were also ill-
treated. 117  Arbitrary rejections were sometimes tied with outright racial 
discrimination and anti-Semitism. On 19 November 1947, for instance, General 
Koenig passed on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a letter from the Director of 
the American Joint Distribution Committee, Lauter. This letter described the 
case of three Jewish families that had been sent from Berlin to the Freiburg’s 
recruitment centre. ‘After having abandoned everything, these families were 
denied entry in France having learned that the fact of being Jews [allegedly] 
prevented them from performing manual work.’ 118   
US authorities in the American zone also became increasingly frustrated 
at the costs of the French scheme, the disproportionate number of ONI agents 
involved, and their archaic administrative methods. 119 In Karlsruhe, Polish DPs 
formally complained about the ONI recruiters’ bad behaviour. According to 
them, they were treated as cattle and not as ‘allied and voluntary workers.’120  
They quoted the case of a Polish DP, called Midler, originating from a village 
near the German border. Arriving equipped with his DP Identity papers and 
evidence of prior IRO screening, he was nonethess rejected because he had a 
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German-sounding name.121 In the same camp, another DP was turned away on 
the grounds that he was ‘a bigmouth.’122 
DPs’ newspapers meanwhile continued to circulate stories about French 
communist recruiters. On 25 January 1948, the Ukrainian gazette, related the 
story of a former soldier who was asked to answer political questions by a 
French bureaucrat after undergoing a demanding medical test: ‘The employee, 
who was busy reading L’Humanité (the French communist party newspaper), 
refused my return to France, where I had been a soldier for several years. And 
yet I presented him my certificates.’123 Not without reason, French occupation 
officials fretted about the presence of these ONI communist in the three 
Western zones, worrying that they adversely affected recruitment rates while 
tarnishing the reputation of France.  
Rumours that ONI agents were Soviet fifth-columnists also spread. On 2 
October 1947, Officer Ponty bemoaned that the Commission de classement 
professionnel comprised ‘50% naturalized agents.’ He pleaded for the hiring of 
‘agents pensant Français and putting the interest of France above party 
politics.’124 On 15 November 1947, Officer Berge concurred: 
 
The secretary of the Baden Central Service, previously expelled from 
Canada for espionage for the Russians, had also to be thrown out from 
the French zone. Nemeth and Korzec are in contacts with Russian agents, 
Lecourtois is a press correspondent for L’Humanité, Hervieu is an active 
communist, he has apparently been sentenced to several months’ 
imprisonment for subversive activities. A man called Bajinsky, currently in 
the ONI of Karlsruhe, is allegedly the chief of this crew. By all accounts, 
their tactic originates from a certain Mr. Du Villaret in the ONI of Paris. 125 
 
Finally, in January 1948, the State Secretariat for German and Austrian affairs 
ordered an inquiry. Carried out by the prefect Roger Gromand, it drew the 
attention of senior French governmental figures to the irregular activities of the 
ONI agents: 
 
For the months of January 1948, the figures are the following: 480 
Displaced Persons and 741 Germans. These poor results makes one think 
that the recruitment faced serious difficulties.  If, on one hand, one 
considers the vast number of available Displaced Persons living in 
Germany as well as the current German demographic situation and, on 
the other hand, the important means implemented to carry out the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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recruitment (the ONI delegation alone employed no less than 191 agents), 
it is not unreasonable to think that serious imperfections hampered the 
running of the operation. Numerous reports have signaled that the 
recruitment was the target of a veritable sabotage, motivated by political 
reasons.126 
 
Without doubt, Gromand concluded, ‘DPs were asked to answer questions by 
[politically motivated] recruiters who had no other aim than to oust candidates 
that were hostile to the Soviet regime.’127 Recruiters justified their decision by 
arguing that official instructions required appraising whether ‘the ideas of the 
candidate were not in complete opposition with the social beliefs prevailing in 
the milieux where they were bound to live in France.’ 128  Extracts from 
Gromand’s report offer a sense of its flavour: 
 
We deplore the case of Senesse, agent from Karlsruhe, former ONI driver, 
employed by the OIR, accused of carrying a prohibited weapon and 
falsifying money; the case of Jonis, CGA delegate at Paderborn, former 
Latvian member of Parliament, not naturalized, having only lived a year in 
France, completely oblivious about agricultural matters; the case of 
Hourdeaux, former chef of the Donaueschingen center who has just been 
sent back to France due to accusations of false declarations, falsification 
of food rations cards, unlawful wearing of decoration, abusive use of police 
cards, illegal possession of weapons.129 
 
In Berlin, French Political Advisor Jacques Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin urged the 
Quai d’Orsay to act, noting that American authorities had a ‘very bad opinion of 
the French recruitment mission.’ According to him, this constituted ‘bad 
propaganda in our zone whose political colours you know as well as in the 
American zone.’ 130 As this quotation subtly indicates, the opposition to ONI 
agents emerging from within the military government was intrinsically linked to 
the broader conflict between communist leaders and Gaullist followers. As 
Fourth Republic President Vincent Auriol observed, ‘80% of the Quai d’Orsay is 
Gaullist. Same in Germany.’ 131 The Gaullist party-cum-movement, the 
Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF), formally launched in 1947, certainly 
benefited from the unofficial support of numerous occupation officials in the 
zone. 132  In the context of the Cold War and the opposition to the newly-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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established Fourth Republic, RPF activism in the zone combined ardent anti-
communism with a defiant, unapologetic imperialism.133 It was, according to 
Emmanuel Droit, ‘perceived by many RPF servicemen as the expression of a 
specific political culture based on a continuity of practices and values that arose 
during the Resistance period.’ 134  To illustrate the point, a confidential 
information note from the Brigade de Bad-Kreuznach reported on  16 October 
1947 : 
 
Over the last two weeks, several gendarmes of the Brigade have been 
‘contacted’ in order to join a Gaullist group. […] Gendarmes who gave 
evasive answers to these requests were told ‘if you are not Gaullists, you 
are Communists. After the taking of power, if you did not go along us, you 
will be dismissed. If you disclose that we spoke to you, il vous en cuira 
[you’ll pay for it].’ According to these gendarmes, the garrison’s officers 
are eager to act and firmly believe that the occupation troops should 
march into France.’ 135 
 
 In January 1948, the majority of these communist recruiters were 
dismissed.136 A month later, CGT representatives were also forced off the ONI 
Board of Directors.137 This heralded a drift to the political right for the ONI 
administration which matched the recent end of centre-left coalition government 
in France. 138  These punitive measures were followed by a reform of the 
recruitment procedures, with the creation of IRO-directed prospecting 
missions.139 For all that, the impression left by communist ONI agents lasted. 
Coupled with the effects of the strikes of the winter of 1947, they helped cement 
a negative view of France as a poor country rapidly falling under Communist 
influence. In April 1948 Général Koenig highlighted France’s dismal recruitment 
figures when compared with Great Britain, Belgium, the United States and, to a 
lesser extent, Canada: 
Host countries […] are in order of diminishing importance: Great Britain 
(47.635 without counting the soldiers of the Anders Army), Belgium 
(26.000), the United States (24.000), France (21.500 but one needs to 
deduct 14.500 Israélites which are only transiting via France); so France 
ranks in fact behind Canada (10.500) and just in front of Palestine (5000), 
Holland (3.500), Brazil (2.700), Paraguay (2.300), Australia (2.200), 
Venezuela (1.223), Switzerland (1.142), Bolivia (750) and Morocco (500). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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France has barely benefited from its geographical proximity to supplant 
overseas countries. 140 
 
The image of Communist France had enormous potency. Despite the countless 
efforts of the PDR administrators and other French officials to counteract it, the 
evidence suggests that the damage was done. This may be gauged from the 
testimony of Anne-Marie de la Morlais, a social worker from the Union Nationale 
des Associations Familiales (UNAF) charged with female recruitment in the 
American zone. 
Anne-Marie de la Morlais and the feminine recruitment  
Anne-Marie worked for the ONI on behalf of the Union Nationale des 
Associations Familiales (UNAF), the national union of family associations. 141 A 
well-known figure in the IRO circles as well as within the French military 
government, she was highly critical of ONI management.142 Convinced that 
female recruitment was not the business of men, she arrived in Karlsruhe on 28 
August 1947 and set up a ‘specific plan’ for women’s recruitment, with a Mrs. 
Trimble of Heidelberg. 143  De la Morlais repeatedly complained about the 
‘organized apathy of the ONI.’ 144 According to her, France’s survival depended 
on the entry of healthy, assimilable DP women: 
 
Our housewives collapse under the burden, suffer miscarriages and 
undergo abortions. Many weak babies (their mothers being exhausted) 
have died in the first two years of their lives. At 10%, we have the highest 
rate of infant mortality, whereas the rates for neighboring countries’ 
range from 2.5% to 3.9%.145 
 
Despite France’s obvious demographic needs, the ONI direction was, in her 
words, ‘botching up recruitment’. 146  Not only did it take more than two months 
for work contracts to arrive, but the propaganda leaflets that de la Morlais 
meticulously designed were not printed. In a note entitled sabotage des 
contrats, she drew French authorities’ attention to the unprofessionalism of ONI 
Direction management: ‘Work contracts are used to send anyone, anywhere. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The ONI’s main concern […] is to get rid of the maximum number of contracts.’ 
147  While some medical officers were told to recruit women aged between 
eighteen and thirty-five, others were informed that women up to forty-five could 
be selected. 148  This administrative pagaille was all the more deplorable 
because the number of foreign recruitment missions was steadily increasing 
and thereby, the competition between them was worsening. When she first 
arrived, only six nations were recruiting. But, by February 1948, seventeen 
nations were competing with France.149  
 De la Morlais spent a considerable amount of her time touring DP 
camps, reassuring their residents about the supposed ‘communist threat’ in 
France: 
 
Many questions about communism – political life in France – DPs’ rights in 
France – their situation regarding the Soviet embassy etc. 
Two miners from neighbouring camps returned from France – at the time 
of the general strikes – because they could not work and therefore stayed 
without money. They asked to return to Germany because life was 
impossible in France. I try to minimize the incident in presenting it as 
‘perhaps plausible’ but certainly exceptional! The DPs understand and 
become less dubious about France – very good atmosphere at the end. 150 
 
De la Morlais also stressed the breadth of French welfare provision when 
compared with other, more popular destination countries: 
 
I am being asked to present life in France, its social legislation etc… Then 
a noisy heckler says that ‘it is better to go to Australia or Canada, as they 
are superior countries.’ My answer disconcerted the noisy hecklers ‘no 
social legislation in America comparable to France – nor family support.’151 
 
Other grievances related to delays in family reunion, something usually resulted 
from French administrative chaos rather than DPs’ shortcomings. By contrast, 
the problem of young men emigrating alone while leaving behind unmarried 
mothers with their abandoned children was real.152 This issue caused mounting 
anxiety among IRO and PDR officials, who worried about the increasing 
number of ‘forgotten’ children in camps as well as the proliferation of illicit 
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abortions.153 While it was men who more commonly abandoned their offspring, 
some women did too.154 The November 1948 IRO monthly report highlighted 
the scale of the problem: 
 
Unmarried Mothers. Most of these are 20-25 years of age, with children 1-
4. All of them refuse to return home […] and say they want to emigrate. It 
is extremely difficult to make them understand that they have little chance 
of obtaining their wish. We have the very definite impression, however, 
that several of them have made their minds to stay in Germany, but are 
afraid to say so for fear of losing IRO assistance. Few of these unmarried 
mothers are trained for any kind of work. A distinction should be made, 
however, between those in the camps and those living in private lodgings. 
The former do not work, are dirty and in general let themselves be; 
whereas those living in private lodgings are trying very hard to earn a 
living […].155 
 
These concerns were echoed among certain ethnically-based support 
agencies. The Association of Ukrainian Women complained that DP men and 
women bore children with different partners, asking emigration committees to 
insist that male DPs bear responsibility for their illegitimate children.156  
 Just as unmarried mothers were offered little, if any, opportunity to 
emigrate, people aged over forty-five had little prospect of passing through the 
screening of labour migrants. In Ravensburg, a group of older DPs were denied 
official authorisation to create an association to aid DPs aged over forty-five to 
emigrate. 157  Young people with elderly dependents were also advised to 
separate from them, a suggestion that, quite understandably, revived traumatic 
memories of wartime separations. According to IRO counselling officer E.W.D 
Steel, DPs’ unhealthy attachment to their families was one of the symptoms of 
their ‘refugee complex.’ According to her, DPs were ‘removed from reality’ and 
in a state of permanent anxiety.158  This viewpoint was consistent with dominant 
perceptions widespread amongst humanitarian actors of the time that DPs’ 
were ‘apathetic’, inert, or had regressed to an infantile state.159 
If the majority of countries refused to allow DPs to emigrate with their 
families, France did introduce the ‘Plan Culture-Famille’ in November 1948, a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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scheme designed to recruit 1,000 agricultural workers with their families. The 
plan generated considerable expectation among DPs and IRO officials. Philip 
Ryan, chief of operations in the US Zone, recalled that ‘[t]he nature of the 
scheme meant that many semi-skilled agricultural workers for whom other 
resettlement opportunities had not been found could emigrate to France 
together with their families. 160  In the event, these hopes were soon 
disappointed. Despite IRO intense propaganda activities in favour of the 
recruitment, DPs still remained reluctant to emigrate to France. Moreover, 
international competition was, if anything, intensifying. In June 1948 the US 
congress passed the DP Act, authorizing the admission of 205,000 displaced 
persons over a period of two years.161 For Jewish DPs the formation of the 
State of Israel in May 1948 was also of central importance, transforming the 
outlook for emigration to the newly established country. But do these pressures 
entirely explain the DPs’ continuing lack of enthusiasm for emigration to 
France? 
 
From single workers to families 
 
Despite French governmental efforts to simplify recruitment procedures 
and improve administrative coordination, in the summer of 1948 the road to 
emigration either to France or French colonies was still strewn with bureaucratic 
hurdles. For instance, the departure of the forty-six candidates selected by the 
Moroccan mission during its visit to the zone in July and August was delayed by 
nearly a month because the visas for DPs’ families were not sent to the French 
Consul at the same time as those of the workers.162 The IRO authorities were 
unimpressed with the Moroccan mission, which they decried as being made up 
of a handful of incompetent businessmen whose visit was costly and 
unproductive. 163  Within the French zone recruitment for France was also 
delayed by the June 1948 monetary reform and the resulting non-payment of 
DP salaries.164  The majority of unpaid DPs preferred to wait in the zone before 
being resettled in France or elsewhere. More importantly, French selection 
missions were still severe, interpreting selection criteria conservatively and to 
the letter. A French selection mission, for instance, visited Niederlahnstein from 
21 to 23 September 1948. Of fifty-four families examined, only twenty-eight !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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were accepted, with twenty-six families (seventy-eight people in total) 
rejected.165 
As explained earlier, the launch of the Plan Culture-Famille in the autumn 
of 1948 followed on previous attempts to improve France’s attractiveness.166 In 
January 1948, France had signed an agreement with the PCIRO, which 
provided for the payment of a bonus of 16 dollars to DPs willing to emigrate in 
France.167 Although the evidence suggest that it proved difficult to actually 
implement this measure, the French authorities replicated it in the autumn of 
1949, offering 60 dollars to DPs willing to emigrate in France.168 This policy of 
enhancement of familial immigration was also in affinity with the Christian 
values of the Ministry of Population, Germaine Poinso-Chapuis.169 Practising 
Catholic, she was a strong advocate of familial immigration.  
Given the reluctance of many countries to accept entire DP families, the 
Plan Culture Famille offered a comparative advantage to France. In many 
respects, the plan was original with several elements designed to help those 
families who accepted it to establishment themselves in France. IRO officials 
welcomed the project, particularly its recognition that heads of families could be 
up to fifty years of age and the further concession that, in special cases, where 
the individual’s physical condition was exceptionally good or where their 
children were already of working age, the age limit might be increased to fifty-
five.170 Yet again, however, other factors hampered the scheme’s operation in 
practice. Abiding mistrust of Communist influence in France remained 
problematic. 171 Experts, journalists and welfare professionals also pointed out 
that DPs preferred emigrating overseas in the belief that the New World 
provided better security in the event of renewed international conflict.172  These 
problems were compounded by the steady trickle of dissatisfied DPs returning 
from France. In August 1948, A.C. Dunn, IRO acting chief of Operations noted, 
 
[D]espite repeated promises, French authorities are still sending returnees 
back to the US Zone without following the legal procedure outlined by 
EUCOM Headquarters. It appears from reports reaching this Headquarters 
that many workers recruited for France arrive in that country only to find 
that the jobs for which they signed a contract are not available, or that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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living accommodation promised for families is not obtainable. […] There is 
now a new French Scheme through which 1000 farm workers and their 
families are to be recruited for France. We are extremely hesitant to 
sponsor this new plan, especially due to the fact that numerous returnees 
have come back because the farmers on whose land they were contracted 
to work could not provide living accommodation for their wives and 
children. 173 
 
As Dunn’s report suggests, the problem of the returnees was not new. Many 
DPs who went to France in 1947 and 1948 found reception arrangements 
defective. Housing was substandard, food rations unsatisfactory, and many 
DPs were rejected by their employers, leaving them in desperate 
circumstances. In addition, there were often considerable lapse of time before 
family dependants were admitted into France. In 1950, reflecting on immigration 
and French public opinion, Professor Joanny Ray admitted that ‘living 
conditions, which used to attract immigrants in the past, have changed 
considerably: real wages have not yet returned to the pre-war level […] housing 
conditions were still very precarious.’174  
 
‘We are behind barbed wire’175 
In January 1948, French administrator Paul Gobe toured the DP camps of 
Northern Bavaria in the hope of stimulating DPs’ interest in France. 
Dissatisfaction with the French scheme reigned ‘As in all the other DP camps, 
those of the Bayreuth area are unfavourably impressed by France’s high cost of 
living, governmental instability, political troubles and the bad reception that DPs 
often receive at their arrival in Karlsruhe. Everyone knows that these rumours, 
either true or false, circulate very rapidly in all the DP camps and often appear 
in DP national gazettes. 176  Paul Gobe reported the tragic odyssey of Rudolf 
Uzanicki, a former legionnaire who was awarded the French Legion of 
Honour.177  Lodged in a rabbit hutch in Montpellier, he was forced to strike with 
other agricultural workers. ‘In this place were only Communists, and they strike 
weekly. During this strike, I didn’t dare to work, for they threatened to kill me or 
to return me back to Yugoslavia. Not only the workers were communised, the 
same authorities and police was communised to. I have been permanent 
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hungry and very afraid from communists.’178 Constantly suffering from hunger 
and cold, he returned to Germany, where he was placed in the Brombach 
centre, a ‘veritable concentration camp.’ Before emigrating in France, Uzanicki 
was amongst the loudest advocates of the French cause. After his unfortunate 
experience, he became one of its severest critics. Administrator Gobe urged the 
French government to stop sending DPs to French departments whose local 
administration was either overwhelmingly communist or otherwise hostile to 
DPs.179 Meurthe et Moselle was one such. There, French farmers refused DP 
workers with dependents: 
 
You can imagine the strong emotion caused by this decision, a decision 
backed up by les services départementaux de la main d’oeuvre. 
Obviously, many DPs cannot accept the idea of a long separation from 
their family, who remains in the precarious DP situation in Germany. And, 
here, things get worst. Returned to the French zone, the ‘réfractaires’ (If 
one dares using this word) are sent in special camps. They often call 
these camps ‘concentration camps’ in their correspondence.180 
 
 DPs’ grievances were magnified by their camp representatives, who 
circulated letters and stories from DPs in France. In December 1947, for 
instance, American Zone Camp Director Roberts, passed on a series of DP 
letters sent by DPs to their wives.181  ‘We are here behind [barbed] wire […] we 
do not know how long we shall stay here.’ 182 ‘The contract which we signed in 
Karlsruhe is a valueless scrap of paper […] French authorities failed to check 
employers’ offers before recruiting people for France.’183Another letter read: 
 
We left for France, but we were not permitted to work because we have 
families. The Arbeitsamt (Labour Office) sent us back to Nancy in order 
that we might return to Germany; we went to Camp Offenburg and then to 
a concentration camp in Brombach. We do not know why we are behind 
wires – we fear we are in some danger, the nature of which is well known 
to you. We are asking you most sincerely to get us out of this miserable 
position; we have not offended against the law – everything happened in 
the way I have told you. This is pure truth, and we can swear to it. God 
help us!184 
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Another DP related his arrival in a camp near Paris: ‘[t]he walls were full of 
holes and it was as cold as a dog’s kennel. We were given something to eat but 
it was awful – dried snails and peas.’ 185 The experience of hunger is central in 
this testimony, which ended in almost apocalyptic terms: ‘Dear Father,… I 
would not even advise my worst enemy to come to this country. Please write 
and tell me what I have to do – am I to be lost without a trace, as in Siberia?186 
These multiple allegations of ‘concentration camp’-type conditions and of 
comparisons with Stalin’s gulag recurred time and again in such letters 
exchanged with loved ones. 
 In spite of protracted negotiations, it proved impossible to establish 
procedures for the return of DPs to the satisfaction of the British and American 
occupation authorities in Germany.187 A large number of those who returned 
made their own way back to Germany. Alerted by IRO officials and the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour nevertheless ordered an 
investigation into the inadequacies of DPs’ reception arrangements in 
France.188 French observers conceded in response that returning DPs were 
sent to a disciplinary camp: 
  
True, the Brombach camp is a disciplinary camp in which all the 
unsuccessful workers who had been placed in France and are driven back 
to Germany are held for security reasons. This policy is dictated by the 
necessity to isolate these workers from those to be recruited, in order to 
avoid counter-propaganda. By all accounts, the conditions in this camp 
have significantly improved, and barbed wires have been cut off. 189 
 
Yet for French officials these disciplinary measures were justifiable, 
necessitated by the need to prevent contact between returnees and other DPs 
still considering emigration to France. They believed that DPs’ complaints were 
exaggerated, arguing that Italians migrants were satisfied with the situation they 
encountered in France: 
 
The conclusion of the investigator on this affair is that Kosarynskys’ 
grievances are not justified. This is corroborated by the fact that no 
reclamation has been made concerning the organization of the camp, 
neither by the Italian Consul, nor by the local representative of the CGIL. 
As the majority of immigrants in this centre are Italians, the Italian Consul 
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or the representative of the CGIL would have brought the camp’ 
defectiveness to our attention, if they had found some.190  
 
Commissioned by the Ministry of Labour, Samson concurred. ‘These persons 
who have experienced multiple forms of deceit during their internment in 
Germany are now suffering from a veritable psychosis of propaganda and 
broken promises.’191 According to him, conditions in France were as good as 
the economic situation allowed them to be. What bears emphasis, though, is 
that DPs were not ordinary migrant workers; they were, first and foremost, 
traumatized war victims for whom stable living conditions were even more 
critical. Many employees remained reluctant to do so, arguing that to provide 
DPs with the same wage as French workers when they were less productive 
was itself a form of ‘sacrifice.’192 Although French authorities made substantial 
efforts to sell the DP population to French employees – through radio 
broadcasts and articles in newspapers – they never really succeeded.193 In the 
summer of 1949 the refoulement centre of Toul-Bautzen was still full of DPs 
rejected by French employees.194 
  Despite DPs’ widespread scepticism about France, the French farm 
family scheme might still be counted a partial success. The scheme ultimately 
attracted 1,139 families, amounting to 3,666 people admitted. 195  Soon 
afterwards, in early 1949, the first signs of job market saturation appeared and 
by May the Ministry of Labour recorded a significant decrease in demand for 
foreign workers. 196 In the face of worsening unemployment, some French local 
authorities fiercely opposed the circulation of materials advertising DP labour.197 
As a result, the inter-ministerial commission and the ONI decided in August 
1949 to temporarily suspend direct immigration, reducing the quota for farm 
families. 198  Three months later, in October, all French selection of DP 
immigrants was suspended owing to seasonal unemployment in agriculture and 
the consequent overcrowding of DPs’ reception centres.199  Not only could 
France barely absorb those DPs already accepted, but the various DP !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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recruitment schemes were proving increasingly expensive. 200  Cost varied 
depending on whether DPs were recruited on contracts or through the family 
scheme.201 But French officials complained that IRO participation only reduced 
overall costs by a tenth. 202  In consequence, during 1948 the ONI, which 
depended on French employees’ financial contributions, confronted the most 
severe financial crisis of its history.203 Meanwhile, continuous French efforts to 
obtain additional funds from the IRO infuriated their British counterparts: 
 
The French Delegation are very busy canvassing a proposal whereby IRO 
would pay the French government a capitation grant of 133 dollars per DP 
resettled in France. They claim that it would still be cheaper to send DPs 
to France than to Australia or South America and that the absence of 
shipping problems would also lead to more rapid resettlement and hence 
greater ‘invisible savings’ on care and maintenance. We have already told 
them that they are asking too much since, resettlement in Canada and the 
USA costs little, if anything, more than what the French are asking. […]  
Although we think that there are no longer the same objections to 
resettlement grants on the grounds of principle as there were when 
“Westward Ho” and other non-subsidized West European resettlement 
schemes were extant, the French would stand a better chance of getting 
their plans accepted if they were to reduce their demands to say, 50 
dollars […] If 50 dollars is taken as the basic figure, IRO may be able to 
provide a stick and a carrot to induce the French to take larger numbers 
and hence more ‘marginal hard core’ DPs by increasing the grant for each 
additional 5,000 DPs, e.g. 50 dollars a head for the first 5000, 70 dollars 
for the next, 90 dollars for the next, and so on. Thus the last to be taken on 
(who would, of course, be those who had been rejected by everyone else) 
would repay the French so much more that the first, or better class 
recruits, that they would be under a mounting temptation to accept sub-
standard DPs for the sake of their immediate dollar-earning capacity, 
rather than their ultimate social value.204 
 
In the event, these arguments proved transient. By early 1949 French interest in 
taking in large numbers of DPs had dissipated. An unanticipated phenomenon 
had overturned demographic projections: in only four years a post-war baby-
boom had produced an additional three million live births.205 As Paul André 
Rosental points out, demographers first believed that the birth rate increase !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was a short-term, circumstantial phenomenon.206 After the First World War, the 
French birth rate had risen sharply but then immediately dropped, a reflection, it 
was thought, of child-bearing deferred during the conflict.207 Yet, throughout 
1948 and 1949, the rising French birth rate continued to prove demographers 
wrong. 
 
The limits of asylum 
Turning briefly to consider the case of another discrete category of 
displaced persons - the thousands of Spanish refugees who crossed the 
Pyrenees after the closure of the Franco-Spanish border in March 1946 - the 
same mounting barriers to asylum in France become evident. Until 1948 post-
war French governments pursued a resolutely anti-Francoist and 
commensurately liberal policy toward Spanish refugees. 208  Yet, from 1948 
onwards, Spanish refugees were increasingly perceived as an economic 
burden and a threat to public order. Local authorities maintained that many 
among them were simply manual workers in search of employment rather than 
bona fide political refugees. Although the IRO relieved France from the financial 
burden generated by the influx of Spanish refugees by paying maintenance 
costs and providing material assistance, the French authorities refused to 
resurrect their previously liberal policies. A minority of political refugees were 
accepted, but the majority of asylum-seekers were deported back to Spain 
having been declared ineligible and economically unsuitable.209  
As the Spanish experience suggests, following the Liberation migration 
and asylum policies diverged into two opposing streams. The first was inclusive, 
migrant workers securing equivalent welfare rights as those of French workers. 
The second, though, was exclusionary and marked by heightened barriers to 
entry, allegedly justified by France’s limited economic and social capacity for 
absorption. As explained earlier, French ONI agents and IRO officials often 
stressed that France offered generous welfare provision, including family and 
social security benefits higher than in most other industrial nations. But they 
also maintained that the country simply could not grant these privileges to every 
candidate for entry. 210  
Admittedly, the new decade would see the re-emergence of new patterns 
of humanitarian compassion typified by Church groups, which increasingly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
206"Rosental"L’intelligence%démographique,%p."202."
207"Ibid."
208"Cohen"‘The"West"and"the"displaced’,"p."114."
209"The"rate"of"deportations"of"illegal"clandestines"rose"from"5%"to"60%"in"1950."Cohen"‘The"West"and"the"displaced’,"p."118.""
210"AN," AJ/32/1269," M.R." Pointe" ‘Le" Pays" d’accueil’," Published" report," ‘Journée" d’études" de" SainteEOdile," 11" au" 15" juin" 1951’,"
Secours"catholique,"pp."31E40,"p."40."
! 327 
lobbied on behalf of refugees in Western Europe. Typical in this regard was the 
French Secours catholique, which, in June 1951, organized a workshop on 
‘Réfugiés Européens et migrations internationales’, in the Mont Saint Odile 
monastery in the Vosges mountains of Alsace. It gathered together refugee 
experts from eight different countries. The French representatives were also a 
diverse group. Alongside members of the Secours catholique, ILO experts were 
IRO officials, Mrs Chevalley (President of the Service Social d’Aide aux 
Emigrants), the Abbé Glasberg (Centre d’orientation sociale des Etrangers) and 
Professor Massignon (Professeur au Collège de France). All professed their 
support for the application of French republican values (Liberté, Egalité, 
Fraternité) to the refugee situation.211 Still feeling the effects of the huge pre-
war influx of Spanish refugees, the French government however was wary of 
binding commitments in regard to refugees and migrant rights. This was 
particularly visible during the negotiations preceding the signature of the 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees In July 1951. 
 Knowing that only a few countries expressed genuine interest in 
elaborating a system of refugee protection, France advocated a narrow and 
continental definition of refugee. 212  Aware of its bargaining power as a 
representative of a major country of asylum, France opposed the ‘universalist 
camp’ led by Britain.  French spokesmen argued that British universalism was a 
‘non-committal and hypocritical position for an island well protected from 
refugee influx.’213 To be sure, memories of the late 1930s, when France was left 
to its own devises in handling the flood of German and Spanish refugees, were 
central to this argument.214 The final Geneva resolution, a compromise between 
these divergent views, left open the implementation of specific time and space 
restrictions. In 1952, the creation of the Office Français pour la Protection des 
Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA) confirmed the importance of national 
regulations. While some refugee supporters in France had campaigned for an 
international organization to protect refugees, the French government opted for 
a national one: ‘while the Geneva Convention provided the international 
framework for refugee eligibility, the French state had the last word in refugee 
selection.’215 
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Conclusion 
 
 After the First World War, France attracted over a million foreign migrants 
who proved willing to fill vacant positions in often unattractive and low-paid 
occupations. After the American quota system was implemented in 1921 and 
revised in 1924, France became the most important destination for immigrants 
in the entire industrialized world. Migration was, at least initially, regarded as a 
temporary palliative, not as a long-term solution to the country’s anaemic 
population growth.216 After the Second World War, France once again called 
upon migrant workers to aid national reconstruction. In contrast with the 1920s 
though, France not only strove to attract workers on short-term contracts; this 
time, it also hoped to facilitate the entry of assimilable foreigners on a long-term 
basis in order to transfuse fresh blood into its flagging population. Yet, as the 
recruitment of DPs clearly illustrated, France quickly lost appeal as a 
prosperous nation with a proud tradition of asylum and hospitality to refugees 
and migrant workers. 
The issue of France’s unpopularity was particularly salient in Germany, 
where occupation officials strove to restore France’s grandeur and prestige. In 
the battleground for DP labourers, France suffered severely in comparison with 
other competitor countries. Despite French IRO officials and PDR 
administrators’ efforts to publicize the attractions of France, DPs proved 
understandably cautious about emigrating to what they regarded as an 
impoverished and, for some, a quasi-Communist country. New World Countries 
and Britain remained far more popular. In total, France drew in 38,000 DPs, 
while Britain attracted more than the double this number: 86,346.217 For their 
part, the United States absorbed nearly 300,000 DPs, Israel accepted 132,109 
DPs and Australia admitted 182,159.218  
 DP emigration was not simply the final act of a long humanitarian drama 
involving IRO experts and Western officials. As Daniel Cohen has recently 
demonstrated, anxieties regarding ‘surplus population’ and the dissemination of 
‘freedom loving’ Europeans were intrinsically related to the necessity to 
countenance the global spread of Communism.219 ‘Orchestrated by the Cold 
War West under American leadership’, the redistribution of ‘surplus manpower’ 
and ‘surplus population’ marked ‘the peak of centralized international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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migration.’220  In the interwar years, international organizations, such as the 
ILO, had already advocated supranational regulation of migratory movements 
and the orderly redistribution of excess population.221 Yet, as IRO Assistant 
Director Pierre Jacobsen observed, ‘no organization prior to 1939 has 
attempted to put [planned international migration] into practice’, international 
body only providing regulations, conventions and recommendations.222 ‘In no 
earlier world migration’, commented official IRO historian Louise Holborn, ‘have 
so many uprooted people in an organized effort been resettled in foreign 
countries as was accomplished by the IRO. The migration of refugees for 
settlement [was] nothing new; what was new about this migration was the fact 
that it was organized.’223 In fact, over a period of four a half years, the IRO 
supervised the migration for settlement of 1,038,750 persons in some forty-
eight countries, ranging from the US which accepted 328,851 to Panama which 
accepted 63.224 
Despite the IRO efforts to overcome DPs’ obstacles to resettlement and 
encourage national representatives to take in DPs on humanitarian grounds, 
the old, infirm and breadwinners of families with too many dependents stood 
little chance of finding a country willing to accept them. Intellectual DPs 
(advertised by the IRO as the ‘Forgotten Elite’) also faced similar discrimination. 
The majority of them either stayed in Germany or were resettled as manual 
workers.225 As explained in the introduction, this generated sharp criticism. 
Aware of their agency’s limits, IRO officials insisted on their efforts to enhance 
what would today be called DPs’ employability: 
 
We have been criticized for the côté négrier [slave-labour aspects] of the 
work of the IRO. I do not think that a solution could have been found if we 
did not accept these solutions of négriers [slave-traders]. In reconciling 
contradictory interests, the IRO found a solution. If its solution is not 
perfect, it is at least in part acceptable and in some cases surprisingly 
satisfactory. 226 
 
Through the development of vocational training, language and literacy classes 
and the establishment of medical and occupational rehabilitation services for 
the numerous physically handicapped refugees, the IRO enhanced DPs’ 
chances to leave Germany. Admittedly, in the French zone, the development of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the FPA was delayed by difficulties in obtaining the necessary German currency 
funds. Even so, as explained earlier, fourteen training centres were created. 
Moreover, in October 1949, the Resettlement Placement Service (RPS) was 
established to facilitate the selection of those refugees classified as having 
limited opportunities for resettlement. The RPS compiled a dossier on each 
refugee and provided potential employers with a complete professional history 
of the head of the family, including photostatic copies of diplomas, testimonials 
of former employers, the IRO’s trade-test certificate, a curriculum vitae, as well 
as all relevant information about each member of its family, notably their 
complete medical reports.227 
After the termination of IRO operations at the end of 1951, the ILO stood 
apart as the sole international organisation devoted to the cause of planned 
migration. But the United States, loath to delegate large powers to an 
international body with Communist governments among its members, refused 
to sponsor the ILO project.228 In Germany, approximately 140,000 IRO refugees 
became the responsibility of the new West German State. In 1951 the West 
German government assigned them the new legal status of ‘stateless 
foreigners.’ In most respects, these stateless foreigners enjoyed the same rights 
as German citizens. One notable exception was in the political field, the right to 
set up political associations being denied.229  The newly-established United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees remained nominally responsible for 
Germany’s stateless people. 230 In France, meanwhile, numerous officials still 
insisted that German overpopulation posed an inherent security threat to 
Europe. For them, the twin problems of refugees and surplus population the 
other side of the Franco-German border impeded the building of a European 
community. After French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced his 
famous plan for a European Coal and Steel Community on 9 May 1950, he 
echoed these concerns stressing that a solution to the problem of refugees and 
population surplus was ‘a precondition to the success of European 
integration.’231 Evidently, the DP issue retained its capacity to divide nations as 
well as communities and families. 
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Conclusion 
 
In his remarkably perceptive documentary film on the return of French 
Absents, Henri Cartier-Bresson captured the raw horror that allied liberators 
encountered at the Liberation. ‘Each building site was a penal colony, each 
worker a slave, each soldier a prison guard or a torturer. This was Germany, 
yesterday.’ The collapse of Germany was accompanied by a humanitarian 
disaster of staggering proportions. Nazi work and racial policies had brought 
unprecedented numbers of Europeans to Germany, most by force. These 
victims surfaced from factories, concentration camps, streets or hiding places. 
Having longed for home and fantasized about those they had left behind for 
years, most sought to return swiftly. Some began their journey immediately after 
the Liberation, on foot or by any borrowed means of transport. Others expected 
justice and the punishment of traitors and collaborators prior to their 
repatriation. Former collaborators rubbed shoulders with anti-Nazi activists. 
Cartier-Bresson, who had himself been held captive during the war, captured 
the public denunciation of a Gestapo informer in an American-controlled transit 
camp for DPs.   
 
Fig. 47. Dessau, April 1945 © Henri Cartier-Bresson / Magnum Photos.  !
 A woman with her head bowed in shame is publicly exposed as a Nazi 
collaborator to the camp commandant. The woman accusing her, enraged and 
vengeful, bares her teeth and raises her arm before publicly slapping her in the 
face. Just as 20,000 French female collaborators had their heads shaved in 
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France, their neighbours, wartime traitors and collaborators, were unmasked in 
improvised DP camps in Germany.1 Revenge, it was hoped, would compensate 
for the torture inflicted by collaborators, for the terrifying years DPs had spent 
cut off from their families and for the multiple humiliations they had endured.2 
Cartier-Bresson’s film powerfully illustrates the experiences of ‘life after 
death’ for former captives in the first days following their Liberation. 3  He 
captured the return by plane of French deportees and their arrival in Le 
Bourget, evoking their joy at drinking their first glass of French wine in years. 
After the ‘mal du pays’ [homesickness], French returnees suffered on arrival, 
the ‘mal du retour’, a sadness created by recollections of those who did not 
survive. Cartier-Bresson’s film encapsulates the transition from ‘extreme 
violence’ to the long slow adjustment to peacetime. It shows columns of 
refugees moving Westwards and Eastwards. UNRRA is not mentioned once in 
his film; nor is the problem of those DPs who refused to return ‘home.’ For 
Cartier-Bresson, as for the majority of French people, the headline story was of 
French Absents’ homecomings and families reunited. As Megan Koreman 
observes, although it is not remembered as such, the return of French Absents 
was the great event of 1945.4 It was no coincidence that Cartier-Bresson’s film 
ended with scenes of joyous, tearful reunions in a Paris railway station. 
Unlike Cartier-Besson’s film, this thesis has not focused on the ‘return’ of 
displaced persons but, rather, on those left behind.  Not everyone boarded the 
‘train of joy’; nor were those who did so necessarily welcomed ‘home’ with open 
arms. Some displaced persons could not return to their home societies and the 
families they left behind. Their homes had been looted or bombed, their 
neighbours or relatives had been murdered. Some feared for their own lives or 
for their freedom. As mentioned in the introduction, according to Soviet 
government statistics nearly a fifth of the civilians and PoWs who returned to 
the Soviet Union were conscripted into forced labour battalions immediately 
upon arrival.5 Paradoxically, Germany thus became the refuge for thousands of 
its former victims who refused to return to their Communist-dominated 
countries. Although most viewed their time in post-war Germany as transitional, 
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pending emigration to countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia or 
(later) Israel, this waiting period was often protracted. 
Henri Cartier-Besson’s account is nevertheless pivotal to the story told 
here.  This thesis has tried to explain why, despite the presence of the UNRRA 
and later the IRO in the French zone of occupation, the solution to the ‘non-
repatriable’ DP problem was initially answered so differently by French 
occupation officials when compared with their British and American 
counterparts. Part of the answer lies in the fact that France had been affected 
so differently by the Second World War. As Lagrou observes, the ‘fundamental 
differences in the Western European experience of the war were not national 
frontiers but particular experiences at the heart of this particular war: resistance, 
labour conscription, and persecution.’ 6  For British and American planners, 
isolated as they were from direct experience of civilian population transfers, the 
tracing and categorization of DPs was, in many respects, an arid bureaucratic 
exercise. For French planners, by contrast, repatriating and tracing civilians was 
less dispassionate. This fundamental disjuncture in the perception of the DP 
problem: immediate and personal for the French; a matter of logistics and social 
theories for the British and Americans, was a source of significant conflict 
between them.  As explained in chapter one, Anglo-American unfamiliarity with 
deportation bred enormous differences in perspective, as much concerning 
relief needs and requirements as future international collaboration more 
generally. Irritated by UNRRA’s slow and inefficient response, French 
authorities chose to maintain their own PDR service in France’s occupation 
zone independent of UNRRA structures. The decision to do so caused friction 
between different authorities in the zone and complicated the work of UNRRA 
teams in the field. The problematic question of the return of French Malgré-nous 
created additional diplomatic constraints - notably in regard to the Soviet Union 
- that British and American authorities never faced.   
There was, though, much more behind French specificities than divisive 
wartime experiences. Approaches to the DP question were closely related to 
the ways in which French policy-makers mobilized both to reconstruct the 
French nation and to prevent any resurgence in German expansionism. The 
work of French authorities and relief workers was not only shaped by diplomatic 
considerations, but also by concerns about economic recovery, domestic 
political tensions and diverging cultural trends. The emergence of alternative 
ways of providing interim provision for DPs therefore reflected France’s wider !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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political aspirations for the future. French responses to the DP problem also 
mirrored the ways in which French occupiers approached the occupation of 
Germany more broadly. National security concerns dominated French policy.7 
Ever conscious of Germany’s physical proximity, French attempts to secure the 
political or economic detachment of the Ruhr and Rhineland region as well as 
measures taken to ensure German industrial disarmament were devised to 
prevent Germany from regaining its economic power and thereby its military 
potential.8  
Security concerns also motivated French attempts to recruit DPs and 
German refugees to curb the growth of the German population. DP and 
German children were particularly coveted, their youth promising better 
prospects for seamless integration into French society. French occupation 
officials not only tried to bring unaccompanied Allied children to France; they 
also encouraged German mothers of French occupation children to surrender 
their offspring into the care of the French state. This phenomenon constituted 
the ‘first great movement of adoption in France’, French authorities having 
compiled more than 15,680 dossiers relating to children sired by French 
occupation soldiers and German mothers.9 In 1958, François Mauriac’s boutade 
‘I love Germany so much that I am thrilled that there are two of them’ testified to 
the persistent trauma wrought on France by three wars with Germany in the 
space of three generations.10  
If security needs dictated the pursuit of policies designed to contain 
German strength; French economic realities dictated dependence on the United 
States. 11  An important factor behind the signature of the Franco-UNRRA 
agreement of 18 February 1946 was French policy-makers’ eagerness to 
secure surplus supplies and foreign currency. UNRRA did not, however, provide 
the dollars that the French signatories expected. It did, though, bring to the field 
an army of professional and international relief workers determined to the 
spread New Deal values. In particular, social workers schooled in America’s 
expanding federal welfare agencies transported a firm belief in the principles of 
casework to liberated Europe.12 In a shift from earlier relief efforts, UNRRA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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planners aimed to provide more than mere ‘soup kitchen’ charity by meeting 
DPs’ emotional needs as well. 13  This meant focusing on DPs’ emotional 
problems, on their individual backgrounds and circumstances. Admittedly, the 
majority of UNRRA relief workers in the French zone were French and Belgian, 
largely unaware of psychoanalytic and psychological theories. Few were 
familiar with Freud or with the application of ‘casework.’ But, they did read 
UNRRA’s instructions, they mixed with American relief workers, and they 
developed their own understandings of what ‘rehabilitation’ meant.  
The history of UNRRA and the IRO in the French zone should not, 
therefore, be solely understood as a story of confrontation and culture clashes. 
Numerous transfers of expertise and the circulation of ideas and people 
between the zones occurred. As was evident in chapters four and five, UNRRA 
and IRO were forums where new forms of expert knowledge about 
displacement, reconstruction and ‘rehabilitation’ emerged. By examining the 
extent to which humanitarian aid went ‘from soup-kitchen charity’ to 
‘humanitarian expertise’ in the zone, we have seen that the French zone was 
never hermetically sealed to changing humanitarian practices. Certainly, the 
shift from providing ‘bread and butter’ relief to long-term psychological 
rehabilitation was only partially fulfilled in the French zone. French UNRRA 
recruits lacked either substantial professional expertise in case-work or the 
common cultural and professional values necessary to frame a sophisticated 
rehabilitation programme for DPs. Furthermore, as demonstrated in chapter 
five, the use of camps as humanitarian enclaves was limited. Yet, UNRRA relief 
workers progressively embraced the organization’s declared mission of ‘self-
help’, albeit on terms that reflected their interpretation of what DPs’ best 
interests were. Faced with growing criticism from within official occupation 
circles, many UNRRA recruits became increasingly eager to demonstrate their 
capabilities as social workers and ‘international’ civil servants. The French zone 
therefore witnessed the emergence of an inchoate ‘professional discourse’, 
which grew out of the necessity to differentiate UNRRA activities from those of 
the PDR service in the zone. As elsewhere, DP camps became ‘laboratories’ in 
which expert knowledge was acquired, debated and contested. Old and new 
practices of relief work inter-mingled. Differing allied visions of relief work ran in 
parallel. Some drew on current psychological and psychoanalytic theories while 
others remained more traditionally oriented to short-term welfare. While, for 
instance, UNRRA’s American director Faucette strove to help DPs to become !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘self-respecting citizens who work in harmony together’ thereby disproving the 
‘Herrenvolk’ ideas of their former masters in the Gneisenau Kasern, in Tübingen 
DPs complained about UNRRA Team Director De Hericourt, an allegedly 
tyrannical director and ‘protector’ of the Germans.14 
In this context, DPs became central figures in wide-ranging debates 
about the ideology and methods of modern humanitarianism, the categorization 
of wartime collaborators, helpers and allies, and the reconstruction of European 
families and countries. Throughout this PhD, I have argued that the DP problem 
was embedded in much broader post-war occupation policies and was thus 
more than a technical issue of short-term relief. Answers to the DP question 
were closely related to the ways European policy-makers mobilized to 
reconstruct families, replenish populations, create homogeneous nation-states 
and prevent any future resumption of German aggression.15 French responses 
to the DP problem were also bound up with diplomatic relations with the United 
States, Britain, Poland and the Soviet Union. They were integral to the 
reconstruction of France’s economy and they were shaped by legacies of 
French resistance. By bringing together a series of issues, which are not 
generally seen in the same context – this study has tried to bridge a number of 
gaps in French post-war history and historiography. So how, in the final 
analysis, has this study modified our understanding of the post-war period? 
First, this study offers an opportunity to reassess the new ‘orthodoxy’ 
regarding French post-war foreign policy. Over the last two decades the 
emphasis on French diplomatic failures in the post-war period has given way to 
a more sympathetic reading of the extent to which French leaders shaped the 
reconfiguration of post-war Europe.16 So much so that positive assessments of 
French political influence on the European continent, notably its ability to 
influence post-war international developments, have become widely accepted.17 
Yet, as Talbot Imlay suggests, French diplomacy after 1945 was perhaps less 
effective or coherent than these recent studies imply. The complex and uneven 
picture of Franco-UNRRA/IRO relations that emerges in this thesis suggests 
that French policies were more ambiguous than ‘orthodox’ accounts indicate. 
Admittedly, French planners managed to negotiate a decent deal for 
themselves within UNRRA’s executive structures. Yet, as France’s position !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14"UNA,"UNRRA,"SE1021E0085E05,"Mr."W.J."Faucette,"History"of"UNRRA,"report"No.E.26,"31"March"1947,"5";"SE0421E0069E05,"Lettre"
des" DPs" de" toutes" les" nationalités" vivant" à" Tubingen" à" Monsieur" le" directeur" général" de" l’UNRRA" pour" la" zone" française" en"
Allemagne,"10"January"1947."
15"Zahra"Lost%Children,%p."243."
16"See"chapter"One."
17"Talbot"Imlay"‘A"success"story?"The"Foreign"Policies"of"France’s"Fourth"Republic’"Contemporary%European%History,"Vol."18,"No."4"
(2009),"499–519,"p."500."
! 337 
within UNRRA’s administration improved, divisions between French policy-
makers resurfaced. As UNRRA became entrenched in the French zone, 
administrative arguments took a more Franco-French turn. Disputes about 
whether the presence of UNRRA was needed revealed intractable conflicts 
between Paris and Baden-Baden, Baden-Baden and Rastatt, and Rastatt and 
Haslach. 
The policies of French occupation officials re-emerge here in all their 
complexity, marked by extraordinary ambiguities. Internal rivalries, coupled with 
a complex decision making-process and the lack of coherent direction from 
Paris, fed political and jurisdictional conflicts between political planners, experts 
and relief workers in the field. As a result, decision-making was fractured and 
susceptible to changing circumstances. Following the lead of historians Dietmar 
Hüser and Talbot Imlay, this thesis has also placed emphasis on an often-
overlooked element in post-war French diplomacy: domestic politics. 
Metropolitan debates about the recruitment of DPs revealed how deep and 
multifaceted the divisions created by the war were. The DP problem not only 
pitted East against West; it also divided French against French. The bitterness 
of the debates over DP recruitment mirrored the nascent Fourth Republic’s 
internal divisions. On the one hand, some French planners saw DPs as a rich 
source of human capital for economic and social reconstruction at home. The 
philosophy behind their approach was strongly nationalist and republican. On 
the other hand, Communist decision-makers and their ideological fellow-
travellers on the French left remained strongly opposed to the recruitment of 
what they regarded as fascist DPs. These debates resulted in contradictory 
instructions from the Foreign Ministry and Parisian ministries, affecting the 
implementation of DP policy inside occupied Germany.  
While recognizing the importance of diplomats and national politicians in 
formulating DP policies, this thesis has also shown that these policies crucially 
depended on how French administrators re-interpreted their instructions once 
inside the zone. Probing beneath the formal structure of official instructions to 
reconstruct the ways in which DP policies were put into practice is revealing. It 
is worth recalling that, within the zone, eight decision-making entities existed: 
General Koenig and his Cabinet, Emile Laffon and the GMZFO (Gouvernement 
Militaire de la Zone Française d’Occupation), the GFCC  (Groupe français du 
Conseil de Contrôle) in Berlin, and the five Superior Delegates.18 The majority 
of these Superior Delegates were former Gaullist military commanders inclined !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to assert their jurisdictional rights to the full.19 Nothing illustrated more clearly 
the discrepancies between official policies and local practices in French-
occupied Germany than the problem of repatriation. By exposing the 
vicissitudes of repatriation, this study has exposed a realm of historical 
contingency left largely obscure by previous scholarship.20 Building on the work 
of Andreas Rinke, Adolphe Lesur and Julia Maspero, it adds nuance to the idea 
that the French adopted a pro-Soviet policy in their zone. It demonstrates that 
contradictory instructions and jurisdictional disputes opened spaces for DPs’ to 
make claims of their own, enabling a discrete DP politics to emerge. As the 
Baltic protests of March 1947 testify, DPs were not only ‘passive’ recipients’, but 
also political actors.21 
While French political and security strategies favoured decentralisation, if 
not dismemberment, French economic priorities privileged a unified 
administration of Germany. 22 Economically damaged by four years of 
occupation, France attempted to use its zone to facilitate reconstruction in 
France. DPs were required (like Germans) to work for the French authorities ‘in 
return’ for the protection they received. As Charles de Gaulle explained in 1945, 
“Yesterday there was no national duty that had precedence over the duty to 
fight. But today there is none that can take precedence over that to produce.’23  
‘Though the subsequent economic recovery in France was similar to that in 
other Western European nations, what made France unique’, as historian 
Richard Kuisel points out, was the ‘collective sense of national decline and 
disenchantment’ that inspired the creation of an interventionist state committed 
to national planning.’24  
French occupation officials justified the employment of DPs by arguing 
that it eased their return to ‘normality.’ Manual work was widely praised at the 
Liberation for its healing and therapeutic virtues. As Daniel Cohen has 
demonstrated, ‘many virtues aside from economic one were ascribed to 
productive and manual work in post-war France: re-generation, morality, 
patriotism, and humanism.’25 Brandishing their high employment figures, French !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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UNRRA and PDR relief workers congratulated themselves on their 
advancement of more individualistic and effective solutions for DPs, in marked 
contrast with American methods, which, they inferred, catalysed the 
development of a ‘begging complex’ among the displaced.26 In its history of the 
IRO, French diplomat René Riestuehlber concurred, arguing that DP conditions 
were more ‘normal’ in the zone than elsewhere.‘Thus, in the French zone, the 
small number of refugees, the methods adopted and the local conditions have 
prevented a regime of population concentration in the vicinity of ruined cities. 
The impression that dominates is that of people dispersed within pleasant 
countryside [campagne riante] and picturesque villages.’27  
 This thesis demonstrates that this self-congratulatory discourse should 
not be taken at face value. It needs to be placed in the context of French efforts 
to restore national prestige.28 The reinvention of the Republic was accompanied 
by significant attempts to re-affirm French traditions of asylum and 
humanitarianism, presenting France as the homeland of ‘democracy’ and the 
‘rights of man.’ This was particularly evident during the crisis of the Exodus over 
the summer of 1947. To counteract the greater international standing and 
military capacity of the Big Three, France presented itself as the bastion of 
humanism. According to Léon Blum, for instance, ‘the highest form of patriotism’ 
was ‘not to stretch our country to the highest point of military power but to make 
it the interpreter, the agent, the procurer of ideas which respond to her 
particular vocation in the world.’29 The study of UNRRA and the IRO therefore 
provides fascinating insight into what might be described as French missionary 
efforts in post-war Germany. 
  As much as French cultural policies worked to restore the image of 
France as the cradle of high culture and the heartland of Enlightenment 
philosophy, French efforts to rehabilitate DPs reveal how France attempted to 
remake Germany in its own image.30 French occupation officials attempted to 
impart their political culture and their way of thinking, not only to Germans but 
also to DPs. As Adam Davis and Betrand Taithe have recently argued, French 
humanitarian aid ‘constituted an explicit and material development of the 
meaning of being French in the world.’ Beyond philosophical engagements with 
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abstract concepts such as universalism, humanitarian aid expressed French 
political aspirations to play a leading role in the [post-war] world.’31  
Contrary to this idealised image of humanitarian assistance in the French 
zone, this thesis argues that the reality behind French employment policies and 
humanitarian practices was grimmer than this self-congratulatory account 
suggests. The emphasis on DP employment made possible the development of 
DPs’ initiatives and a sense of responsibility by enabling them to run 
independent workshops and giving them the opportunity to live in private 
accommodation. In this sense, it contributed to ‘normalizing’ DPs’ living 
conditions. At the same time, actual implementation of employment policies 
reveals disturbing indications of brutality, unjustifiable in their cruelty and 
arbitrariness, as the example of the Zelstoffabrik confirms. Again, there was 
neither geographic uniformity nor official consistency evident here. Employment 
conditions varied according to where DPs lived and for whom they worked. 
French economic policies were sensitive to regional and local variations: they 
tended to be constructive in the Saarland, relatively constructive in the 
Rhineland-Palatinate and, on the contrary, vengeful and exploitative in 
Württemberg.   
Furthermore, employment policies varied according to DPs’ gender, 
national affiliation, linguistic abilities and levels of education. UNRRA relief 
workers and occupation administrators tended to think more highly of Baltic and 
Banatais DPs than they did of Poles. Intellectual Baltic DPs and Banatais 
farmers were often described as more productive and highly skilled, whether 
because of superior training or innate ability than ‘lazy’ Polish and Ukrainian 
DPs. As a result, ‘privileged’ Baltic and Banatais tended to secure easier access 
to work in camps’ administration or workshops; this, in turn, gave them better 
access to food, money and cigarettes. Polish and Ukrainian DPs, on the 
contrary, faced widespread prejudice and were more likely to be forced to work 
outside camps. By highlighting this calculus of privilege and prejudice, this 
thesis contributes to the recent literature keen to emphasize that the Liberation 
did not represent a bright new dawn. Admittedly, in the wake of France’s full-
blooded collaboration with the Nazi regime, many, if not most French 
occupation officials and relief workers understood how inappropriate it was to 
refer to foreigners in the xenophobic terms that were ubiquitous in the late 
thirties and Vichy period. This did not mean that entrenched stereotypes and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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inter-war practices disappeared. Employment discourses reaffirmed a 
hierarchical taxonomy in which productivity and desirability were explicitly linked 
to ethnic and gender differences. Ugly reflexes of anti-Semitism, ethnic 
prejudice and misogyny resurfaced.  
How does this sit with Michael Kelly’s argument that the liberation of 
France represented a ‘humanist moment’? The plethora of books published with 
some variant of l’homme or l’humanisme in their title confirmed, according to 
him, that humanism ‘emerged suddenly and unexpectedly as the uncontested 
framework of values within which the debates and struggles of the period were 
expressed.’32 For Kelly, this phenomenon has passed virtually unnoticed by 
subsequent commentators, yet it provided ‘the ideological adhesive for French 
national unity, a precious and fragile field in 1944, and defined the parameters 
of what was thinkable, or at least speakable.’33 Admittedly, there were promises 
of a more just society born of the Resistance. In the realm of migrations, new 
regulations were passed aimed at encouraging permanent immigration and a 
new National Immigration Office was founded to coordinate policy among 
ministries and protect ‘foreign workers.’ Without question, this overtly 
populationist approach to migration ‘exhibited more openness to permanent 
settlement than had the guest-worker policies of the 1920s.’ 34  But French 
policy-makers’ egalitarian rhetoric cannot be taken as read. As Mary Lewis 
powerfully argues, beneath the surface of this republican universalism, the 
reality was that the Republic’s doors were open to some migrants, yet closed to 
others.35 
 The formidable economic recovery that followed the Second World War 
and the beginning of what Jean Fourastié famously termed the ‘Thirty glorious 
[years]’ risks obscuring the profound division of the early post-war period.36 
Admittedly, the contrast between ‘the enormous outbursts of violence during the 
1940s’ and the rigid conservative normality that characterized so many aspects 
of life in French (and European) societies during the decade that followed is, in 
many respects, astounding.37 But French debates about the recruitment of DPs 
reveal the deep anxieties that France was experiencing. Beneath the surface of 
ostensibly political opposition to DP recruitment lay a labyrinth of economic 
fears, a traditional protectionist reflex, and cultural concerns about the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘desirability’ of DPs. Debates over the recruitment of DPs triggered controversy 
about how far DPs could or should be assimilated into the nation state, about 
the presumed superiority or inferiority of races, and about the nature of French 
national identity itself. 
Arguments over the recruitment of DPs therefore raise fundamental 
questions about how the French constructed identities in the post-war years. 
DPs were perceived through the prism of 
domestic wartime experiences. French 
Absents posed challenges to the black and 
white demarcations of collaboration and 
resistance. Taking this as its starting point, 
the PDR ministry policy consequently unified 
the different categories of repatriates. A 
famous poster representing a prisoner of war 
and forced labourer carrying a häftling 
proclaimed: ‘They are united. Don’t divide 
them.’ While the ministry PDR’s policy aimed 
to iron out differences between the different 
categories of repatriates, other French 
authorities, by contrast, tended to rank 
repatriates according to their ‘merits’, with 
PoWs being as François Cochet observed 
‘Les Exclus de la Victoire.’38 Disputes over the status of French absents were 
closely related to the development of two opposing political cultures of memory. 
Historians have long shown the emergence of two contrasting French national 
myths at the Liberation, each designed to reframe the nation in a particular 
ideological light and thus help cope with the past. The Gaullist myth, best 
described by Henry Rousso, essentially claimed that the French had stood 
united in resisting Nazi Germany. 39  The second, the ‘communist myth’, 
supported the ‘paradigm of an antifascist community of combat and suffering’.40 
The Communist Party claimed to be the party of the ’75,000 fusillés’ (shot). This 
anti-fascism was a highly inclusive form of patriotic community. As the Cold War 
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unfolded, so these disputes over the status of French absents were increasingly 
translated into Cold War terms.  
If the domestic debates about the ‘desirability’ of DPs were closely 
related to the problematic memories of collaboration and resistance, they also 
reveal that the memories of Nazi persecution was more fragmented than the 
dominant Gaullist and Communist myths suggested. 41  The Communists 
deliberately exaggerated the extent of DP collaboration, perhaps in an attempt 
to conceal memories of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and their de facto alliance with 
Germany in the eighteen months that followed. In Alsace-Lorraine, on the 
contrary, the Banatais’ wartime experience was clearly mobilized as a means to 
rehabilitate the memory of their Alsatian brothers who were also ‘forcibly 
enrolled’ by the Germans. Despite the fact that France's ‘Dark Years’ of 
German occupation count as the most intensely worked-over period of French 
history, relatively little attention has been paid to the question of the return of 
French PoWs, labour conscripts, deportees and Malgré-nous.42 Following in the 
footsteps of Pieter Lagrou and Karen Adler’s work on the legacy of France’s 
wartime experiences, the thesis has shown that the Banatais hold a mirror to 
the way that the people of Alsace-Lorraine framed their own wartime suffering, 
revealing, in the process that French memories of the war were not only more 
fragmented, but more politically divided than historians have previously 
assumed.43  
In many respects, the situation of DPs was comparable to those of the 
French STO.44 In France, as Adler notes, the ‘STO remained a historically and 
politically sensitive topic, one that no French historian tackled in depth and on a 
national scale before 2010.’45 In her study of reparations for Nazi victims in 
post-war Europe, Regula Ludi concurs: economic difficulties after liberation, 
aggravated by high levels of inflation and widespread unemployment, and the 
deprivations they involved ‘soon drew attention to other problems than the 
humanitarian crisis caused by mass victimization. In spite of their high public 
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profile in 1945, Nazi victims faced mounting difficulties in having their claims 
heard in the years that followed.’46   
Just as this thesis reveals divided and fragmented memories of the war, 
it has also pointed to continuities of thought regarding gender and the 
persistence after 1944 of some of the tenets of the male breadwinner ideology 
described by Laura Frader.47 Admittedly, women won full political citizenship 
with the April 1944 decree enfranchising women. And the first Plan issued in 
1945 called upon women (alongside immigrants) to contribute in the economic 
reconstruction of France by returning to work.48 The preamble to the 1946 
Fourth Republic constitution further guaranteed notional equality between the 
sexes in all domains. 49 Yet, as Laura Frader observes, ‘in spite of the equality 
guarantees of the Constitutions of 1946 […], women lab[ou]red under a host of 
civil constraints built into the French Civil Code, particularly within marriage, and 
lacked full legal personhood.’50 Furthermore, in spite of public pronouncements 
lauding women’s contribution to reconstructing post-war society, family policy 
remained pro-natalist: women were encouraged not to work but to remain in the 
home, caring for children.51 For Hanna Diamond, ‘the Liberation was in no 
sense a ‘liberation’ for women.’52  
Despite what would today be called UNRRA’s claims of gender 
blindness, the positions allocated in the field were, in large measure, ranked 
along gender lines: most camp directors were men, while the majority of the 
welfare officers were women. For UNRRA Zone Medical Officer De Cilleuls and 
many male officers, women’s allegedly natural maternal and nurturing qualities 
made them ideal recruits to provide assistance to male doctors.53 Equally, 
UNRRA’s rehabilitation programme served to re-masculinise and re-feminise 
DPs according to traditional gender roles. Labour practices were also highly 
gendered. Female DP employment rates and salaries were considerably lower 
than male ones. When Dorothea Greene arrived in Reutlingen, she noted, for 
instance, that ‘here we found the DP stores (food, supplies, clothing and 
amenity supplies) run by a DP woman. This is the first place that we had found !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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a woman in such a position.’54 Men’s work was mainly conducted outside 
camps (in forestry, mines, and paper factories for instance), while women’s 
work tended primarily to be inside camps. Meanwhile, within France,  ‘the battle 
of coal’ marked a crucial moment in the celebration of working-class 
masculinity, the virile male industrial worker becoming an iconic manly figure in 
French men’s attempt to recoup their self-esteem after wartime humiliations.55 
 The incorporation of gender into the study of UNRRA/IRO in the French 
zone, indicates that some French male UNRRA personnel also suffered from 
what we might term a ‘complex of the civilian.’ French UNRRA’s male staff 
struggled to adjust to their non-combatant status, to their uniform without 
galons, and to their lowly status within both UNRRA’s wage hierarchy and the 
administrative structures of the military government in the French zone. To be 
sure, this problem was neither specific to the French zone nor to French 
recruits. Indeed, it remains a feature of modern humanitarian intervention, UN 
field workers sometimes showing signs of an inferiority complex towards military 
actors. But the institutional rivalry between the PDR administration and UNRRA, 
when combined with gender anxieties deriving from the war, significantly 
aggravated these problems of status among relief workers in the French zone.  
It seems that for some UNRRA male recruits, joining the organization was less 
about aiding DPs and applying ‘scientific methods’ to alleviate their suffering 
than about their own personal sense of having ‘missed out’ during the war 
years, something that fired their efforts to regain authority and prestige. Gender 
tensions were, in this sense, bound up with broader questions of national 
identity and efforts to come to terms with the recent past.56 They were also 
related to what Mary Louise Roberts calls ‘fears of Americanization through 
sex.’ French authorities fretted that the lure of American commodities might lead 
a new class of women into prostitution, ‘sexual encounters between American 
soldiers and French girls coming to symbolize a loss of French respectability 
and honour, as well as the suppression of French culture by American wealth 
and power.’57   
So, while there are solid reasons to define the history of DP 
administration in the French zone as peripheral to more encompassing stories – 
notably those of the return of French PoWs and civilians, the efforts to come to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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terms with the recent Vichy past, and the reconstruction of domesticity and 
family in the wake of war - the transnational perspective of this thesis reveals 
that the history of UNRRA, the IRO, French administration and the DP problem 
deepens our understanding of the dynamics of reconstruction that transformed 
French society after 1945. The study of the UNRRA, ITS and IRO archives, 
combined with the examination of the French occupation administration, also 
offers new perspectives on demographic issues, the tensions at heart in the 
French occupation project and the difficult recognition of Nazi victims in 
Liberation France. Equally, examining allied occupation and refugee policies 
through the lens of French DP administration provides some new insights for 
the study of the post-war international refugee regime. 
General accounts of the liberation of Europe often depict the Nazi defeat 
as a dramatic historical rupture in Western Europe, heralding a period in which 
liberal democracy, internationalism, free markets and human rights all came to 
the fore. According to Glenda Sluga, ‘if the end of World War I was the apogee 
of nationalism, then World War II was the apogee of twentieth-century 
internationalism, when ‘international government’ renamed as ‘world 
government’ was a rhetorical commonplace. 58 What set this new 
internationalism apart was, according to Sluga, the extent to which ‘for a 
relatively brief moment and among a considerable swathe of mainstream and 
marginalized public opinion, the discarded utopian precepts of the earlier period 
suddenly took on the semblance of political realism.’59 Admittedly, the post-war 
period saw the casting of human rights (and refugee rights) in individual rather 
than collective terms and the creation of a myriad of UN agencies aimed at 
protecting rights and improving world-citizens’ well being. But historians are 
becoming increasingly attentive to the paradoxical and ambiguous elements of 
these post-war international projects.  
In practice, as Tara Zahra points out, international organizations and 
policymakers simultaneously endorsed two collectives – the family and the 
nation – as the basis for European reconstruction and as the recipe for 
individual psychological rehabilitation. ‘In the process, they defined ‘human 
rights’ and children’s ‘best interests’ in sharply gender-specific, nationalist and 
familialist terms.’60 Likewise, as Pamela Ballinger observes, careful examination 
of the emergence of the post-1945 international refugee regime and its 
recognition of certain identifiable groupings (such as gender and family) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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tempers the assessment – argued most forcefully by Mark Mazower – that the 
‘strange triumph’ of human rights after 1945 meant abandoning the inter-war 
focus of the League of Nations on collective (minority) rights in favour of rights 
framed in individual terms. 61 Despite the fact that they spoke a ‘universal 
language of human rights’, Allied occupation officials and relief workers divided 
Germans from Poles, Poles from Russians, and Jews from Christians. 
Furthermore, as Ballinger notes, the recent literature on Jewish international 
activism in post-war Germany also revealed that Jewish survivors were 
recognized explicitly as victims of genocide. ‘These authors thus question a 
recent stress on the supposed immediate post-war silence surrounding this 
genocide. The ‘silence’ thesis was itself, of course, a necessary (if overstated) 
response to the anachronistic reading of the Holocaust paradigm back onto the 
1940s and 1950s.’62 
Differences in interpretation frequently derived from differences in 
methodology. Historians who focus on the motivations of activists and drafters 
of the UN Declaration of Human Rights often come to radically different 
conclusions from those focusing on field-workers. Historians, most famously 
Samuel Moyn, have argued that human rights were far from universally agreed 
concepts in the mid-twentieth century. 63  Yet, as Daniel Cohen powerfully 
illustrates, European refugees still facilitated ‘their frustrating, often hypocritical, 
but in many respects revolutionary beginnings.’64 The Psychological problems’ 
report, as well as UNRRA high-officials’ response to French policies of 
compulsion to work, reveal that the language of human rights weighed upon DP 
policies, even if only marginally. Some UNRRA planners sought to protect DP 
‘rights’ - including the right to live normal community lives without the threat of 
movement orders or repatriation; the right to have the chance to begin a new 
life overseas with dignified emigration opportunities; the right to a salary in 
exchange for work - even if their discourses did not explicitly mention ‘human 
rights’. As this thesis makes clear, generalization is commensurately difficult: 
first, because UNRRA and the IRO were composed of personnel with very 
different backgrounds, motivations and political orientation; secondly, because, 
as David Pendas observes, the literature on the history of human rights (and 
also to a certain extent western humanitarianism) remains fragmentary.65 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Building on this recent scholarly literature, this thesis has demonstrated 
that UNRRA/IRO projects were partly innovative and empowering, partly 
reactionary and coercive. UNRRA rehabilitation efforts simultaneously reflected 
a new emphasis on the psychological dimensions of dislocation and a long-
standing view of the family as the foundation of both society and the nation. 
UNRRA activities both facilitated (employment) and hindered (repatriation) the 
implementation of French official directives. Furthermore, the effects of 
UNRRA’s ideas were not uniformly benign. Often they were contradictory. 
Equated with the democratization of relief work, UNRRA contributed to the 
nationalization of refugees. Avowedly secular, it also fed the religious revivalism 
occurring in post-war Germany. Openly ‘neutral’ and ‘impartial’, it failed to 
implement a coherent and unbiased policy on repatriation. As David Forsythe 
has demonstrated in his analysis of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), neutrality is a matter of constructed image.66 In frontally and 
doggedly opposing the PDR direction over the issue of repatriation, General 
Lenclud not only misunderstood the subtlety of French policy but also 
compromised UNRRA’s posture of neutrality. Instead of promoting mutual 
understanding by facilitating pragmatic cooperation between the PDR and 
Eastern European governments, Lenclud exacerbated divisions. This also lent 
weight to criticism that UNRRA itself failed to send clear instructions to its 
personnel. As a result, Laffon reproached UNRRA officers for failing to 
understand the ‘delicacy’ of French policy. 
Finally, this thesis has drawn attention to the convergences between 
colonialism and humanitarianism in the post-war era of European 
decolonization. In June 1945, former British Colonial administrator Nevins was 
entrusted with the task of organizing a Yugoslav and Polish Displaced Persons 
(DPs) camp in Pirmasens. He reported ‘[t]he Poles and especially the 
Yugoslavs are exceedingly well organized and the Centre taken as a whole has 
developed into a typical village community in which the various elements, to all 
outward appearances at any rate, live together amicably enough.’67 Reflecting 
on the organization of his camp, Nevins warned against the detrimental effects 
of humanitarian aid ‘[i]t has frequently occurred that well meaning persons and 
societies, by striving at all costs to implant their own method and ideas 
regardless of climate, race and custom, have not only destroyed the social 
system they set out to improve, but have contributed no living structure in its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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place.’68 He touched here on a critical tension at the core of UNRRA’s project 
and modern refugee humanitarianism more generally. While humanitarian 
actors tend to understand humanitarianism as a doctrine of universal validity, 
inherent to its project is an impulse to overturn practices of religion, ethnicity 
and gender in a manner and to an extent that might not be universally shared 
by the ‘recipients’ of help. 69  As a result, humanitarianism more closely 
resembles empire, despite its emancipatory claims, something that discomfited 
its many defenders.70  
French insistence on the obligation to work exposed traces of a 
colonialist mind-set. French humanitarian discourse also contained elements of 
domination that both resembled and, to some degree, derived from colonialism. 
Colonial administrators believed that by forcing the colonized to work they were 
protecting them against their own ‘lazy’ inclinations, and that compulsion was, 
therefore, justifiable as long as it was ‘explained’ and did not exceed the 
‘capacity’ of the colonized to understand what was being demanded of them. 
Similarly, some occupation and UNRRA officials believed that they, too, were 
saving DPs from themselves, by compelling them to combat their ‘apathy.’ In 
practice, DPs had very little say over the terms under which such ‘humanitarian 
aid’ was given. To be sure, DPs were not forced to work in desperate conditions 
comparable to those of the colonies. Labour abuses and related hardships in 
post-war Germany were neither in scope, nor scale comparable to those in the 
colonial world during the inter-war years. Yet, employment policies reflected a 
critical tension at the core of UNRRA’s project. The figure of Nevins, an 
administrator with extensive experience in British colonial administration, 
personified this continuity between late colonialism and humanitarianism. As 
Taithe suggests international organisations’ discourses of relief and 
humanitarian expertise often present ‘the paradox of originating from the twin 
sources of missionary and colonial administration while reneging both 
genealogies.’71  
 In sum, this thesis has tried to show that UNRRA and the IRO’s 
‘revolution’ was perhaps not as innovative, coherent and modern as observers 
contended in the 1950s. But it also shows that UNRRA/IRO should not be 
completely erased from the history of French administration in post-war !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Germany. Today, the two organizations appear virtually forgotten in France. 
Outside a handful of specialist historians, most French people are unaware that 
it ever existed, including direct successor institutions. Their contribution to the 
shaping of contemporary humanitarian practices should thus be better 
acknowledged, particularly in the literature on the history of French 
humanitarianism.72 Admittedly, the majority of UNRRA field workers in the zone 
had never heard of Freud. But, some UNRRA relief workers became 
progressively aware that relief work should not simply be equated with ‘feeding’ 
refugees. However limited and incomplete the shift from ‘bread and butter’ to 
‘psychological rehabilitation’ was in the zone, UNRRA and IRO mattered, 
transforming, albeit to a limited extent, French humanitarian practices. UNRRA 
and the IRO articulated norms that have today gained in authority. As Didier 
Fassin and Richard Rechtman note, ‘contemporary society now accepts without 
question the notion that psychologists and psychiatrists intervene in situations 
of war and disaster, case of exceptional or even everyday violence.’73 
Sixty-five years ago this was not self-evident practice and notions of 
‘psychic wounds’, ‘trauma’, and ‘emotional memories’ were poorly understood. 
According to Rechtman and Fassin, this shift in paradigm occurred in the mid-
1960s when ‘victims’ entered in the realm of psychology and in the public 
sphere. Before, the ‘victim – who in fact was rarely thought of as ‘victim’ – was 
tarred as illegitimate; ‘trauma’ was a suspect condition.’74 Without refuting this 
interpretation, this thesis has nuanced the notion that an ‘anthropological 
rupture’ occurred in the mid-1960s: in the ‘era of suspicion’ of 1945-1950, there 
were some signs, albeit limited, that a condition of victimhood was recognized 
alongside an awareness that refugees might have suffered from psychological 
‘trauma.’75 In the French zone UNRRA and the IRO transformed the landscape 
of humanitarian aid, contributing to the practices of humanitarian action, as we 
know them today. 
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